THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOLUME IV

British India

1497–1858

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA

VOLUME IV

British India

1497–1858

EDITED BY

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PREFACE

I GREATLY regret having to record the deaths of two contributors, Mr S. M. Edwardes, and Lt.-Col. C. E. Luard, while this volume was in preparation. Dr Surendranath Sen, however, was kind enough to revise Chapters XIV and XXII, with their bibliographies.

The spelling of proper names is generally that of the *Imperial Gazetteer*; all diacritical marks have been omitted.

The reader will find that in this and the following volume the scale of treatment has had to be materially reduced. The period covered by them is much shorter, but it is also incomparably fuller, and the allocation of space has offered many difficult problems. In the circumstances it seemed to me desirable to economise as much as possible in the space given to political history in order to provide room for an outline of the development of the administrative system, a subject on which easily accessible information is scanty and inadequate. I have thus been able to make room not only for the chapters dealing with this topic in the present volume but for a longer series of chapters in the next.

H. H. D.

SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
LONDON

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THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498–1598

THE last decade of the fifteenth century witnessed the discovery of a new world by Columbus and of a new route to an old world by Vasco da Gama. Both discoveries were epoch-making, though in totally different ways. The latter, however, had the more immediate effect on the history of Europe; and perhaps no event during the middle ages had such far-reaching repercussion on the civilised world as the opening of the sea-route to India. Vast countries, hitherto visited only by rare travellers or not at all, and known by name only to the learned few, were suddenly brought into touch with the West; and the luxuries of the East, which had hitherto passed through so many hands before they reached the European market, could now be brought direct to Lisbon. As a result, the sea-borne trade of the Muslims in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea was paralysed, and the prosperous houses of Genoa and Venice were faced with the ruin of half their trade in the Levant, while Portugal rose suddenly to such prosperity and fame that she was soon without a rival in Europe. Persia, too, was threatened with the loss of the heavy customs she had for centuries been levying on the wares which were carried westward through her territory. Nothing can better illustrate the revolutionary effect of the opening of the sea-route to India on the markets of Europe than the detailed statement of the payments made by merchants trading from India to Alexandria which is given by contemporary Portuguese writers. I repeat here the excellent summary given by Mr Whiteway:[1]

> The profits on wares sent from the East to Europe were enormous to bear the cost of passage through so many jurisdictions and the expense of so many transhipments. There has come to us a detailed statement of the payments made by merchants trading from India to Alexandria, which is full of interest; it refers to a time when an independent Sultan ruled in Cairo, but under the Ottoman Turks the payments would certainly not have been smaller. The Red Sea merchants lived in Jedda and had their factors in Calicut. The regulations of the Sultan of Cairo required that one-third of the imports should be pepper, and this amount must be sold to him in Jedda at Calicut prices. Say a merchant brought goods from Calicut to the value there of £300, and among them no pepper. He would have to buy in Jedda, at Jedda prices, pepper worth in Calicut £100, and re-sell it to the Sultan at the Calicut price. On the balance of the goods he would pay 10 per cent. *ad valorem*, and again on the balance, after deducting this 10 per cent., 4 per cent. more. Instead, however, of getting the Calicut price of the pepper in money, he was compelled to take copper in Jedda from the Sultan at Calicut prices—that is, copper in Jedda was worth 7 cruzados the quintal, but this he was compelled to buy at 12 cruzados, the Calicut price. Practically, therefore, the Sultan of Cairo was, at no expense to himself, a partner to the extent of one-third in every voyage.

[1] *Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, pp. 7, 8.

In spite of these exactions the profits on the double journey would be very large indeed.

To continue, however, with the goods to Europe. Brought to Suez in smaller boats from Jedda, the importer had to pay 5 per cent. *ad valorem* in ready money; and to supply this money there were banks at Suez prepared to cash drafts. The journey to Cairo took three days; and a camel to carry about 450 lbs. cost about 37*s.* 6*d.* A mile out of Cairo the goods were registered. The value of pepper in the Cairo market was about 20*d.* the pound, and a merchant buying pepper had to buy an amount equal to one-third of his purchases. From Cairo the goods were taken down the Nile in boats, and were carried from the river to Alexandria on camels. At Alexandria they were registered again, and buyer and seller had each to pay 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. The shipper had also to pay 5 per cent. to frank him across the sea.

The Pope, Alexander VI, in view of the wonderful discoveries by the Spaniards and the Portuguese, had taken upon himself between 1493 and 1494 to issue no less than four bulls with the object of parcelling out the world between these two nations.[1] The Pope's delimitations, which with each bull showed greater advantages to Spain, were somewhat modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas (June, 1494), which gave Portugal all the lands which might be discovered east of a straight line drawn from the Arctic to the Antarctic Pole at a distance of 370 leagues west of Cape Verde, and to Spain all lands west of that line. And in 1502 the same Pope gave the king of Portugal permission to style himself "Lord of the Navigation, Conquest and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India".

It must not be forgotten that by the end of the fifteenth century the Portuguese had explored not only the whole length of the western coast of Africa but also a portion of the mainland beyond the Cape of Good Hope; and that Vasco da Gama was not sent to discover India, but merely to find the direct sea-route to that country. The original idea underlying this mission was to find spices and Christians. Factories were established without great difficulty, but the chief care of the Portuguese commanders was the attempt to drive all Muhammadan shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in order to ensure the carrying of all Indian products in Portuguese vessels. The next hundred years are therefore occupied not only in establishing factories on the coast of India, but also in placing garrisons at a number of strategic points, i.e. at the entrance of the Red Sea and elsewhere outside India.

So long as their energies were mainly devoted to the control of the high seas and to the capture or defence of these strategic points, the Portuguese were pre-eminently successful, though thwarted of two of the prizes they most coveted, namely Aden and Jedda. But they showed themselves incapable of founding on Indian soil anything resembling an overseas empire; and although they have continued to hold a certain number of their Indian possessions down to the present

[1] See especially Van der Linden, "Alexander VI and his Bulls, 1493–1494", *American Historical Review*, XXI, No. 1, 1916.

day, they were not strong enough, when the time came, to defeat their European rivals in the East, and lost one by one those outlying bases which had once given them the command of the eastern seas.

Though, as has been so often observed, the predominance of the religious orders in civil affairs contributed greatly to the decline of the Portuguese power in India, the devoted labours in other spheres of the Jesuits at Goa must never be lost sight of. The contributions of their missionaries to the historical and geographical literature of the world constitute an inestimable treasure-house of knowledge, and have placed under a lasting obligation all students of the East. It is also a fortunate circumstance that, apart from the literary activity of the Jesuits, the Portuguese produced during this heroic age, in addition to a great epic poet, a number of fine chroniclers, who wrote minute and thrilling narratives of their progress in the East; notably Barros, Couto, Castanheda, Goes, Alvarez, Almeida, Duarte Barbosa, and last but not least the great Affonso d'Albuquerque himself, whose *Letters* and *Commentaries* will bear comparison with those of any other soldier-statesman.

Finally a word may be said regarding the Muhammadan sources for the history of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, existing in Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Although these writers, like the Portuguese, are not free from prejudice nor above the suppression of incidents wounding national and religious pride, their narratives are usually in complete accord with those of their enemies, and bear striking testimony to the intelligent grasp which the Portuguese gained of the public affairs and private intrigues of the Musulmans.[1]

The principal states in Hindustan and Western India at the end of the fifteenth century were the Muhammadan kingdoms of Delhi, Gujarat, Berar, Bidar, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur: and the Hindu kingdoms of Vijayanagar, Kannanur, Calicut and Cochin.

It was actually the power of Vijayanagar which prevented the Muhammadan states of Northern India from making a coalition against the Portuguese when they first settled on the coast; and when in 1565 the power of Vijayanagar was broken and a coalition formed, the Portuguese were too strongly established to be ousted. As, during the first half of the sixteenth century, Vijayanagar was really the dominating power in Southern India, it is strange that the Portuguese never tried to conciliate that state, but on the contrary were at times openly hostile.

On 8 July, 1497, three vessels, varying from 60 to 150 tons burden, left Lisbon under Vasco da Gama, and on 17 May, 1498, they anchored off a small village eight miles north of Calicut. It is not without

[1] See *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, October, 1921, and January, 1922, "The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507–1517; and between 1517–1538", by the present writer.

significance that the first landing of these men, whose main object was to usurp the spice trade, hitherto a monopoly of the Muhammadans, should have been on Hindu territory. One wonders what might have been the fate of da Gama and his companions if the landing had been attempted, say, in some part of the powerful Muslim kingdom of Gujarat. As it turned out, the Hindu ruler of Calicut, whose hereditary title was *Zamorin*, gave a friendly reception to these strangers, had them conducted by a pilot to a safer anchorage, and invited da Gama to pay him a visit in Calicut. In response to this invitation a party of fourteen set out for the Zamorin's capital; and so great was their ignorance of things Indian that they mistook a Hindu temple for a Christian chapel, imagining that what was not Muhammadan must be Christian. Though they cannot have found the Hindu idols very orthodox in type, they nevertheless entered the temple and prayed there.[1]

For the attainment of their immediate object these early Portuguese adventurers were poorly equipped. In the first place they had brought no presents for the local rulers with whom they would have to treat—a strange omission in view of their past experiences in Africa; and secondly their wares proved unattractive to the Indians, which in the circumstances was quite natural. In spite of the difficulties which the Muhammadan traders, in self-defence, put in their way, the adventurers achieved, thanks to the Zamorin, a certain measure of success and seem to have established quite friendly relations with the people of the country. When, however, on 29 August, 1498, da Gama set out on his return voyage, he carried with him five out of twelve inhabitants whom he had made prisoners as a reprisal for the detention of some of his goods, ultimately restored to him. This was the one injudicious act associated with the first expedition, and no doubt helped to confirm the stories, eagerly spread by the Muslim traders, of the high-handed methods of the Portuguese in Africa. As a reconnaissance, da Gama's voyage was of the utmost importance; for on his return to Lisbon after an absence of two years with two out of his three ships, and fifty-five survivors out of the original company of 170, he was able to show specimens of the articles obtainable in the Calicut market, and to tell the merchants of Portugal what wares met with the favour of the Malabaris. Of the religion and customs of that part of India he seems to have learnt surprisingly little. To judge by the instructions issued to the second expedition,[2] it would appear that da Gama's party had actually passed three months in a Hindu country without discovering the existence of the Hindu religion. All the inhabitants of India who were not Muslims were assumed to be Christians, but of course bad Christians as they were not Catholics; and we know how much time and how many lives the Portuguese

[1] See Whiteway, *op. cit.* p. 80.
[2] *Idem*, p. 89, n. 1.

afterwards devoted to the conversion to the Roman faith of the Ethiopians who were already Christians. Still it remains a mystery why they failed to discover that the Zamorin was neither Christian nor Muslim, seeing that they were for so long in daily intercourse with him.

After the return of da Gama, preparations were immediately made in Portugal to equip a new fleet on a far larger scale than the first, and, on 9 March, 1500, Pedro Alvarez Cabral set out from Lisbon in command of a fleet of thirteen vessels and 1200 men. Among his captains was Bartholomeu Dias, who had been the first sailor to round the Cape. After a series of amazing adventures, including the accidental discovery of Brazil and Madagascar, Cabral with six vessels reached Calicut on 13 September, 1500, and on the 18th he had an interview on shore with the Zamorin. Cabral was eminently unsuited for the diplomatic side of his mission, and showed no disposition to consider the sentiments and prejudices of those with whom he was sent to trade. Misunderstandings due to ignorance and mistrust arose after the first interview, and reached a climax with the seizure on 16 December of a ship belonging to the Arabs, which led to a riot in which forty Portuguese perished and their factory was levelled with the ground. In consequence of this it became impossible for Cabral to remain at Calicut, but, before leaving with only two ships laden, he put to death 600 innocent boatmen who had had nothing to do with the riot, and for two days bombarded the town. On 24 December they reached Cochin, where, though they did not actually meet the raja—who afterwards proved such a valuable ally to them—they succeeded in loading the remainder of their ships. Scarcely had they done so, however, when news came that a large fleet was sailing down the coast from Calicut to attack them. Cabral stole away on the night of 9 January, 1501, leaving in Cochin about thirty Portuguese, among whom was the famous Duarte Barbosa.[1] On the following day Cabral only escaped an encounter with the Zamorin's fleet by reason of a calm. It may be mentioned that when off Kannanur he was assisted by the local raja with supplies. Eventually Cabral reached Portugal with five vessels so richly laden that the expenses of the whole expedition were more than covered. But the most important result of this in many ways disastrous journey was the discovery of the Cochin harbour, which was greatly superior to Calicut as an anchorage, and the further knowledge of Indian politics, which taught them that in the raja of Cochin, the enemy of the Zamorin, they might find a constant ally.

In 1501 a fleet of four trading vessels went to Cochin and returned in safety, having been warned at Mozambique to avoid Calicut.

It is convenient here to review the new situation in which Portugal found herself as a result of these adventures. The Portuguese had now

[1] *Duarte Barbosa*, ed. by M. Longworth Dames (Hakluyt Society).

learnt that the Indians were not Christians, were capable of showing themselves formidable foes, and must consequently be treated with some consideration. They realised that the possibilities of trade were enormous, and that the rival they had to fear was the Arab trader. It could make no difference to the Hindus whether they traded with the Arabs or the Portuguese, though, as far as imports were concerned, the latter were able to introduce many commodities which were not brought by the Arabs from the Red Sea. The main business then of the Portuguese was to conciliate the local Indian rulers and drive away the Arab merchantmen. Although the Zamorin was an avowed friend to the latter, to whom Calicut owed its prosperity, the Portuguese had the great advantage of beginning their Indian enterprise at Hindu ports; and not until they moved further north along the west coast of India did they find themselves in conflict with a Muslim state whose sympathy with the Arabs was founded on something more binding than trade relations.

The object of the Portuguese was now not only to hinder as far as possible trade between India and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, but also to divert to Portugal all the trade of the East with Europe. To this end a fleet of twenty ships was dispatched in February, 1502, under Vasco da Gama, followed in April by five more vessels under Estavão da Gama. In September this combined fleet assembled off Anjadiva (south of Goa), where they perpetrated one of the most dreadful deeds in the annals of a not over-nice period. A rich Muslim pilgrim vessel on its way to India from the Red Sea was intercepted by da Gama's fleet, plundered and sunk; there were many women and children on board; but to these no mercy was shown; and we actually read that da Gama watched the horrors of the scene through a porthole, merciless and unmoved.

He reached Calicut on 29 October, 1502. His aim was to compel the Zamorin to turn the Muhammadans out of the country. This was an instruction previously issued to Cabral, but at a time when the powers in Lisbon imagined the Zamorin to be some sort of Christian. When da Gama arrived the second time, he found the Portuguese ostensibly at war with the Zamorin, and made the expulsion of the Muhammadans a preliminary condition to any peace. The Zamorin, of course, refused; and his refusal was followed by acts of wanton and revolting cruelty on the part of the Portuguese leader. It is needless here to enter into the details which are all too vividly described by the Portuguese historians; it is, however, quite evident that da Gama had no bowels of compassion, and that his only policy when opposed was one of frightfulness. On 3 November he sailed for Cochin, where he established a factory. From there he proceeded to Kannanur, where, after erecting a defensive palisade, he sailed for, and eventually reached, Lisbon on 1 September, 1503.

According to the original plan, Vincente Sodre had been left behind

to patrol the coast with six vessels and a caravel. It cannot be supposed that the raja of Cochin bore any love to da Gama and his Portuguese, by whom he had been treated in a most high-handed manner, especially in regard to prices; but he was anxious to obtain the support of Sodre in the event of an attack by the Zamorin. Sodre, however, thought it would be more profitable to intercept vessels at the mouth of the Red Sea, and so sailed away from the Indian coast to the despair of the factors left in Cochin and Kannanur. He took several rich prizes, but perished with three of his ships at the end of April, 1503, in a bay in one of the Curia Muria islands. Meanwhile, as da Gama had foreseen, the Zamorin proceeded to revenge himself on Cochin, eventually succeeding in overrunning the raja's territory; and the raja himself was forced to retreat to an island sanctuary, taking the Portuguese with him. During 1503 the authorities in Lisbon, probably under the impression that the safety of the factories at Cochin and Kannanur was assured by the presence of Sodre with his patrol, did not send out a fleet. But in April of that year three small squadrons were dispatched under the respective commands of Affonso d'Albuquerque, his cousin Francisco d'Albuquerque, and Soldanha. Francisco was the first to arrive, and found the Zamorin and the Portuguese still at war. He drove the Zamorin's troops from the immediate vicinity of Cochin, and set about constructing the first fortress built by the Portuguese in India. On the arrival of Affonso, the rest of the Cochin territory was cleared of the Zamorin's men, and a treaty of peace was concluded between the two Hindu princes, by which the Zamorin agreed to pay upwards of 4000 cwt. of pepper. It was in connection with the late delivery of the second consignment that hostilities again broke out between Calicut and Cochin, provoked no doubt by the Portuguese. Nevertheless, on the last day of January, 1504, the two d'Albuquerques started for home; Francisco disappeared mysteriously on the voyage, and the great Affonso reached Portugal with only two vessels.

The famous Duarte Pacheco had been left with less than a hundred men to defend Cochin against the entire forces of the Zamorin, numbering some 60,000. Only about 8000 of the Cochin troops could be relied on to fight beside the Portuguese. Pacheco was not only a great soldier, but also a man of resource and intelligence. He quickly took stock of all the local resources, and in order to secure the regular provision of supplies during the siege of Cochin, which was self-supporting, he managed to conciliate the leading Muhammadan merchants on whom such supplies had always depended. The first assault was made on Palm Sunday, 31 March, and the siege dragged on for nearly four months, during which Pacheco showed himself the master of every situation, while the Zamorin's forces were daily reduced by gun-fire and sickness. Lisbon had, of course, no news of what was passing, and towards the end of 1504 Lopo Soares arrived

in Indian waters with a fleet of fourteen vessels with orders to prevent any but Portuguese ships lading at Cochin. At the request of the Zamorin he visited Calicut, arranged a peace, and then, having taken in a cargo, he sailed for home carrying with him Duarte Pacheco, and leaving in his place a man who did everything to make the raja regret the departure of that brave soldier.

With the year 1505 begins a new era in the history of Portuguese India. The sending of an annual fleet, and the abandonment of a handful of men to their fate between the departure of one fleet and the arrival of the next, had proved a failure. One can picture the feelings of anxiety and desolation which must have possessed these little colonies of strangers without means of escape either by sea or land. Their only consolation can have been the thought that they were as safe in their isolated factories as they would have been on the high seas. It was now decided to appoint a viceroy who should remain at his post in India for three years. At the beginning of 1505 Francisco d'Almeida set out in command of a large fleet and 1500 soldiers, with orders to build fortresses at Kilwa, Anjadiva, Kannanur and Cochin.

It was a fortunate chance that led to the appointment of this man as viceroy, for in the first instance Tristão da Cunha had been selected, although owing to "temporary blindness" he had been unable to accept (just as the illness of Bobadilla who had been first proposed for the Eastern Mission by Ignatius Loyola, led to the dispatch of the great Francisco Xavier).

Almeida reached India in September, 1505, and at once began to build a fort at Anjadiva, which proved useless and was dismantled two years later. He next proceeded southwards to Kannanur and later to Cochin, where he arrived in time to settle in Portuguese interests a question of succession to the throne.

Now that the Portuguese fleet was continuously patrolling the Malabar coast, it became expedient for the Red Sea merchantmen to adopt a new route by way of the Maldives. Almeida sent his son Lourenço to patrol this route and to explore Ceylon; but nothing was achieved beyond a hasty visit to that island.

In March, 1506, an engagement took place between a large fleet of Muhammadan traders, armed and equipped by the Zamorin, and a Portuguese fleet of four vessels, resulting in the capture of the largest Muslim ships and a veritable massacre of their crews, with no casualties among the Portuguese. Later, owing to the unwarranted sinking of a Muhammadan vessel belonging to a well-known merchant of Kannanur, the ruler of that place, aided by the Zamorin, besieged the Portuguese garrison, who, after great suffering from shortage of food, were, at the end of four months, saved by the arrival of Tristão da Cunha (August, 1507).

Tristão da Cunha, having recovered his sight, left Portugal in April,

1506, with ten cargo vessels and a squadron of four ships under the famous Affonso d'Albuquerque, who was designated to succeed Almeida, though with only the lower title of Governor of India. Their instructions were that da Cunha, having captured and fortified Socotra, in order to block the entrance to the Red Sea as an answer to the Egypto-Venetian confederacy, should proceed to India, leaving Albuquerque with six ships and 400 men to attack Jedda and Aden. They finally reached Socotra, where they took the Arab fort by storm, and built a new fortress. On 10 August, 1507, Tristão left for India, and, as we have seen, was able by the end of the month to relieve the beleaguered garrison of Kannanur. At the end of November his own fleet and that of the viceroy completely destroyed the Zamorin's fleet; on 10 December Tristão set out for Portugal with a full cargo.

Albuquerque remained in Socotra until August, 1507, arranging for the defences and internal administration of the island. Perceiving, however, that Socotra was ill-placed for blockading the Red Sea, and further that with his slender forces he had no chance of successfully attacking Aden, he ignored his instructions and determined to attack Ormuz.

The second phase in the history of Portuguese India began in the middle of Almeida's viceroyalty. Till then the most northerly point touched by the Portuguese vessels had been Anjadiva, and not till 1508 did they venture nearer to what ultimately became the centre of their activities. But then begins their struggle with the Muhammadan powers, for on the Malabar Coast, though they had encountered Muhammadan merchants and their fleets, their political dealings had been only with Hindu rulers.

There were two motives which now induced the Muhammadans to take concerted action. On the one hand, the rulers of Arabia and Egypt were being deprived of the duties levied on Indian goods passing up the Red Sea and across Egypt on their way to Alexandria; and on the other hand the great Musulman kingdoms of Gujarat, Bijapur and the rest had begun to realise that the Portuguese must ultimately attempt at the northern sea-ports what they had so successfully achieved at the southern. The news that the Portuguese had decided to appoint a resident viceroy and to keep a standing fleet in Indian waters impelled these Muslim rulers to negotiate with the sultan of Egypt for joint action against them. Even the Zamorin is said to have thought of inviting the help of the sultan of Egypt. So prompt was his response, that his fleet, specially equipped at Suez, was ready in May and reached Aden in August, 1507, under the command of Amir Husayn, whom Portuguese writers called Mir Hashim; and it was this fleet that the Portuguese encountered before they had tried issues with the Indian Muslims. Lourenço d'Almeida, the gallant son of the viceroy, set out for the north in January, 1508, and was anchored off Chaul when the Egyptian fleet arrived off that

harbour; and in this, their first naval battle with the Muhammadans, they met with a severe reverse, and their young commander was killed (January, 1508).[1]

Meanwhile, Albuquerque had left Socotra with his own fleet in August, 1507, and, having systematically destroyed the chief ports belonging to the king of Ormuz, he then entered into negotiations. These led to nothing but a nominal treaty, and finally, in February, 1508, Albuquerque was compelled to leave for India, reaching Kannanur in December, 1508.

He arrived in India just as Almeida was setting sail to avenge the death of his son Lourenço. Almeida met the Muslim fleets off Diu and gained a signal victory, February, 1509. On his return to Cochin in March, a great quarrel arose about delivering the government to Albuquerque, and it was not until 5 November, 1509, that this was finally arranged.

The first expedition which the new governor undertook was against Calicut, but it achieved nothing beyond the destruction of a few buildings, and Albuquerque himself received two wounds in the shoulder. But as soon as he had recovered, he set to work to refit the whole fleet, and determined to set out for the Red Sea in search of the sultan of Egypt's fleet. On 10 February, 1510, he sailed from Cochin with twenty-three ships for Guardafui, but was diverted from his course by learning of the defenceless state of Goa, off which he anchored on 28 February. Only a slight resistance was offered, and on 4 March he received the keys of the fortress. His first care was to strengthen the fortifications in case Yusuf Adil Khan,[2] the ruler of Bijapur, should attempt to recover the place. Albuquerque had already contemplated making Goa the headquarters of the Portuguese in India; but, in spite of all his preparations and individual attention to every detail of defence, he was unable to resist Yusuf Adil Khan's attack, and after many misadventures he had at last to retire to Anjadiva on 16 August, much to the relief of his captains who had all along been opposed to the adventure. During the next two months he received important reinforcements in ships and men, and at the end of November he sailed back to Goa and recovered the place by storm. In reporting this victory to King Manoel, Albuquerque wrote: "My determination now is to prevent any Moor entering Goa, to leave a sufficient force of men and ships in the place, then with another fleet to visit the Red Sea and Ormuz".

Amir Husayn, who since his defeat in February, 1509, had been at Cambay awaiting reinforcements from Suez, then sailed back, to find the new fleet still in process of building.

Albuquerque now devoted all his energies to the strengthening of

[1] The story of his heroic death is told by Camoens in his *Lusiads*, Canto x, 29–32.

[2] Called by the Portuguese *Idalcão* or *Hidalcão*. He is also called by Albuquerque *Sabaio*. See Whiteway, *op. cit.* p. 133, note. See also Fonseca, *Hist. of Goa*, p. 131, note.

Goa, and to increasing its commercial importance. He dispatched several captains along the coast with orders to compel all the ships they met to put into that port. In the city itself every encouragement was given to trade, and vessels soon began to arrive there from Ormuz and elsewhere. Even Moors trading in spices were encouraged to settle there, and in order to secure a permanent population, Albuquerque did everything in his power to encourage his Portuguese to take Indian wives.

In April, 1511, Albuquerque set out for Malacca, at which point all traffic between India and China was concentrated. The first attack on Malacca (25 July, 1511) led to no definite result, and Albuquerque's captains were against making a further attempt. He, however, finally convinced them of the wisdom of his policy by pointing out that "if they were only to take Malacca out of the hands of the Moors, Cairo and Mecca would be entirely ruined, and Venice would then be able to obtain no spiceries except what her merchants might buy in Portugal". In August, 1511, a second and successful attack was made, and the Portuguese became absolute masters of the place. Great importance was attached to this triumph of Portuguese arms. King Manoel wrote to inform Leo X of the event, and the Pope made the news the occasion of a series of ceremonies of public thanksgiving of unusual pomp and splendour. Tristão da Cunha was head of the special mission sent to Rome, bearing magnificent presents to the pontiff, including an elephant of extraordinary size, which, as it passed the papal palace stopped, and kneeling down, bowed thrice to the Pope who was watching the procession from a window.

Albuquerque reached Cochin again in January, 1512, after an absence of less than twelve months, to find that affairs had everywhere fallen into disorder, while Goa was constantly alarmed by persistent rumours of the advent of the Turkish fleet. "The Rumes are coming" was the constant cry. In April, 1512, he wrote to King Manoel as follows: "I would respectfully submit to your Majesty that until we go to the Red Sea and assure these people that such beings as the Rumes are not in existence, there can be no confidence or peace for your Majesty's subjects in these parts". The security of Goa was not, however, yet assured: and at the end of 1512 Albuquerque was obliged to take a large force to attack the fort of Benasterim, six miles from Goa, which had been strongly fortified and garrisoned by the king of Bijapur. The reduction of this fort was one of Albuquerque's most gallant exploits.

Not till February, 1513, was Albuquerque able to set out for the Red Sea. He first attacked Aden. His force was composed of 1000 Portuguese and 400 Malabaris, who landed in small boats carrying with them scaling ladders. The Aden garrison, in order to avoid the fire of the Portuguese guns, enticed Albuquerque's men within the city walls, and, after four hours of fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the

besieging force was obliged to withdraw to its ships. After this Albuquerque attempted to proceed to Jedda, but the winds were unfavourable, and he decided in May to anchor at Kamaran. Having destroyed all the fortifications on this island, he returned to Aden, but, finding it even stronger than when he left it, he set sail for India in August, 1513. The Portuguese historians tell us that Albuquerque lay ten days off Aden on his return from Kamaran,[1] but do not refer to any further attack on that city; but some Muslim historians speak of a second unsuccessful attack and assert that the guns of the fort did great damage to the Portuguese ships lying at anchor.[2]

In 1513 Albuquerque came into diplomatic contact with Persia. Ismail Safavi had sent ambassadors to the kings of Gujarat, Ormuz and Bijapur; and the ambassador sent to Bijapur visited Albuquerque at Kannanur, and invited him to send Miguel Ferreira to Ismail. Ferreira returned with the Persian *via* Ormuz, and at Tabriz had many interviews with the shah, who expressed a great desire for the destruction of the sultan and the house of Mecca. When he dismissed Ferreira, he sent with him an ambassador to Albuquerque with rich presents. While they were at Ormuz on the return journey, Albuquerque himself arrived there, but, instead of coming to terms, he established Portuguese suzerainty over Ormuz, thus denying Shah Ismail's claims in that quarter.

In November, 1515, Albuquerque, feeling his end was near, set sail for India, having just learnt that Lopo Soares had been appointed captain-major in India and that he himself had been recalled. The last letter he addressed to King Manoel, dated at sea, 6 December, 1515, must be quoted here:

> This letter to your Majesty is not written by my hand, as when I write I am troubled with hiccoughs, which is a sign of approaching death. I have here a son to whom I bequeath the little I possess. Events in India will speak for themselves as well as for me. I leave the chief place in India in your Majesty's power, the only thing left to be done being the closing of the gates of the Straits. I beg your Majesty to remember all I have done for India, and to make my son great for my sake.[3]

He died on 16 December, 1515, having done more than any other Portuguese leader to establish the prestige of his king, and to make the name of his fellow-countrymen respected and feared. He realised that the three keys to the eastern trade were Malacca, Ormuz and Aden. He obtained complete control of the first two, and almost secured the third. He combined the most resolute determination with the greatest personal bravery. He was scrupulously loyal to his master; and the only blot on his character was his ruthless cruelty towards his enemies, the Muhammadans.

[1] Barros, II, viii, § 4.
[2] See *J.R.A.S.* Oct. 1921, p. 559.
[3] *Cartas*, I, 380, The Letters of Albuquerque, published by Royal Academy of Lisbon, 1884.

Had Albuquerque lived long enough to return to Aden from Ormuz, he would have found the governor of that town ready to submit, whereas owing to the stupidity of his successor, Lopo Soares, the chance of adding Aden to the Portuguese possessions was thrown away. In February, 1516, Lopo set out with a fleet of twenty-seven sail for the Red Sea in order to engage the fleet which the sultan of Egypt had been so long preparing at Suez. When he arrived unexpectedly before Aden, the governor, Amir Mirjan, who had been recently attacked by Rais Salman,[1] the commander of the Egyptian fleet, offered the keys of the citadel to the Portuguese general, but Lopo, instead of taking advantage of this surprising offer, continued his course in search of the Egyptian fleet, thinking to return and take possession of Aden when he had disposed of Rais Salman. Hearing that Salman and his fleet had been driven by stress of weather into Jedda, he followed him thither; but instead of bombarding the city, he sailed away two days later on the plea that he had instructions to fight the fleet but not to attack Jedda. On his return he destroyed the town of Zeyla, and, on reaching Aden, found Amir Mirjan in a very different mood, and the fortifications repaired. He returned to Goa in September, 1516, having achieved nothing. The remaining two years of his governorship were uneventful, saving that he succeeded in entering into relations with China.

In December, 1518, he was succeeded by Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, who in February, 1520, made a fruitless expedition into the Red Sea with a fleet of twenty-four vessels. On his way back he was entertained by Malik Ayaz at Diu, which the Portuguese had coveted ever since the time of Albuquerque, and which had once been offered them. Diogo Lopes in his conversations with Malik Ayaz must have shown his hand too clearly, for when he revisited the place in February, 1521, with a large fleet, its defences were so strong that the Portuguese refrained from attack.

Duarte de Menezes succeeded Diogo Lopes as governor on his arrival at Goa, September, 1521. His government was marked only by unpleasant happenings at Ormuz which reflected small credit on the Portuguese. King John III, who succeeded King Manoel in 1521, selected as viceroy Vasco da Gama, now a man sixty-four years of age. Vasco reached India in September, 1524, to die on Christmas Day of the same year. He was buried in Cochin, whence in 1538 his remains were carried to Portugal. He was succeeded by Henrique de Menezes, who held the office of governor from 1524 to 1526, mostly engaged in fighting on the Malabar Coast. The next governor was Lopo Vaz de Sampaya, who was in turn succeeded by Nino da Cunha.

[1] Not "Sulaiman"; Castanheda calls him correctly Salmão Rex. The Arabic historian Ibn ad-Dayba' says that Salman had been sent by Sultan Salim of Turkey to help the Egyptians against the Portuguese. See *J.R.A.S.* Oct. 1921, p. 549.

Nino da Cunha arrived in India in November, 1529. Early in 1530 the headquarters of the government were moved from Cochin to Goa, which from this date became, as it has ever since remained, the capital of Portuguese India. The next eight years were mainly occupied with the dealings of the Portuguese with Sultan Bahadur of Gujarat, and their acquisition of Diu. The history of this period is copiously illustrated by both the Portuguese and the Muslims; and on the whole the various narratives are convincingly consistent. In order the better to understand the local conditions with which the Portuguese had to cope, it is necessary to sketch briefly the state of affairs in Gujarat itself. In the year 1526 the emperor Babur had made himself master of Hindustan from the Indus to the borders of Bengal. He, however, died in 1530 before he could subdue the kingdoms of Bengal, Gujarat or the Deccan. His son and successor Humayun endeavoured to complete his father's work, and one of his first undertakings was an invasion of Gujarat and Malwa. The campaign opened with the battle of Mandasor at the beginning of 1535. The troops of Bahadur were in every engagement unsuccessful and in the early stages of the campaign he was deserted by his most valuable soldier, the famous master-gunner Mustafa Rumi Khan, who, aggrieved at the treatment he received at Bahadur's hands, offered his services to Humayun. In October, while Humayun was still pressing his conquest, Bahadur had made an appeal to the Portuguese for help, and had agreed to give them a footing at Diu in return for a contingent of 500 Portuguese. He had already, in 1534, made considerable concessions, ceding the island of Bassein with all its dependencies and revenues to the Portuguese. When at last, in 1537, Humayun suddenly withdrew, Bahadur, feeling that his troubles were over, regretted his promises, and set about negotiating with Nino da Cunha for his withdrawal from Diu. It may be mentioned incidentally that the 500 men had not been forthcoming. Long discussions took place with a view to a conference between Bahadur and Nino da Cunha, who had come up to settle the matter, Bahadur begging the Portuguese governor to visit him ashore, and the Portuguese insisting that the sultan should visit the fleet and conduct negotiations on board. Each thoroughly mistrusted the other; but eventually Bahadur consented to visit Nino on board, where a scuffle arose, and Bahadur was drowned endeavouring to escape. All Portuguese historians say that Bahadur had intended to murder the Portuguese governor on the occasion of his return visit. The exact circumstances which led to the drowning of Bahadur will probably never be known. The various narratives for the first time here come in conflict, each side blaming the other for the disaster, which occurred on 13 February, 1537.

Early in Bahadur's disastrous campaign with Humayun, the king of Gujarat had made plans for escaping from India with his belongings in the event of defeat. He had dispatched a certain Asaf Khan to

Mecca with his harem and treasure, and with rich presents for the sultan Sulaiman—the Ottoman sultans since 1517 had been in possession of Egypt—entreating him to come to his assistance.[1] The envoy had an audience with the sultan Sulaiman at Adrianople after the death of Bahadur; and by way of avenging the death of the Muslim king the sultan at once gave orders for the equipment of a powerful fleet in Suez to be sent to attack the Portuguese at Diu.

Among the small party that had accompanied Bahadur in his fatal visit to the Portuguese governor was a certain Khwaja Safar Salmani,[2] who played an important part in subsequent events. He at first was on friendly terms with the Portuguese, who put him in charge of Diu, but when he heard of the arrival of the Egyptian fleet under Sulaiman Pasha, he at once changed his tactics and attacked them. He reported to the pasha that there were 500 fighting men in Diu, and that all he required was guns and munitions. The siege began in October and came suddenly to an end on 5 November, 1538, when the pasha, hearing of the arrival of twenty Portuguese ships, sailed away without striking another blow. The defence of Diu by a tiny garrison commanded by Antonio da Silveira is one of the most heroic episodes in Portuguese history. The brunt of the first attacks fell on Gogala, a suburb of the island known to the Portuguese as *Villa dos Rumes* and to the Muslims as *Bandar-i-Turk*, which with its garrison of about eighty men had at last to capitulate. The main fort of Diu, however, continued to hold out, women and children working with the same devotion as the men. The besieged were also much favoured by the great differences which arose between the Turks and the Gujaratis.

In the meanwhile (September, 1538) Garcia de Noronha, nephew of the great Albuquerque, had reached Goa as viceroy, superseding Nino da Cunha, who had only held the rank of governor, and who died broken-hearted on the voyage home. In the fleet of eleven ships the new viceroy brought with him from Lisbon there also came the first bishop of Goa, which had been made a bishopric by a bull of Pope Paul III in 1534. Garcia de Noronha on his arrival in Goa had collected a powerful fleet and army for the relief of Diu, but seemed in no haste to lead them into action; so that, when news came of the departure of Sulaiman Pasha, his people were furious with the delay which had deprived them of an opportunity of engaging the Turkish fleet. The viceroy eventually reached Diu in January, 1539, and his first task was to rebuild the fort. He entered into negotiation with the new sultan of Gujarat, with whom a peace was signed in March of that year. Under its terms a high wall was to be raised between

[1] See *An Arabic History of Gujarat*, Indian Record Series, vol. II, Introduction.

[2] His name Safar has given rise to much confusion, as it has been variously corrupted by Portuguese and English writers into Ja'far, Ghazanfar, Suffy, Cofar and Sifr! See *J.R.A.S.* January, 1922, p. 17.

the fortress and the town, and one-third of the custom-house receipts were to be paid to the Portuguese.

In 1540 de Noronha, after a term of office characterised by gross corruption and cruelty, died, and was succeeded by Estavão da Gama (second son of Vasco), who had for five years been captain of Malacca. He immediately prepared for another expedition into the Red Sea. In February, 1541, with a large fleet of seventy-two sail he reached Massowah, where he left the greater part of his fleet and sailed with some lighter vessels to Suez, which he found so well guarded that he speedily withdrew, without having destroyed a single Turkish galley. One incident in connection with this fruitless expedition, however, deserves mention here. On his return to Massowah in June, 1541, urgent appeals for help were received from the Abyssinians who had been long engaged in hostilities with their Muhammadan invaders. In response to the call of these Christians, the governor landed his young brother Christavão da Gama with 400 men. The adventures of this handful of men form one of the most romantic tales in history.[1] Christavão was finally defeated and put to death in August, 1542; but at the beginning of the following year the king of Abyssinia, with 150 of da Gama's followers who had survived, attacked and defeated the Muhammadans, and recovered his country.

The next governor, Martim Affonso de Sousa, arrived in India in 1542, carrying with him the great Jesuit saint, Francisco Xavier, who had been selected by Ignatius Loyola and appointed papal nuncio by Pope Paul III. Affonso de Sousa was a bad and greedy governor. His successor, Dom João de Castro, who reached India in August, 1545, was the last of the great Portuguese governors in India. With his death, in June 1548, began the decline of Portuguese power and prestige in the eastern seas.

As soon as he had assumed the reins of government, an improvement became visible both in political and military affairs. There had been continued disputes with the king of Gujarat ever since the conclusion of peace in March, 1539, and finally the Portuguese pulled down the wall between their fortress and the town, built in accordance with the terms of peace. In April, 1546, Sultan Mahmud III, nephew of the sultan Bahadur, began to besiege the fortress of Diu, which was commanded by João Mascarenhas. Although he must have regarded this attack as inevitable, no preparations for a siege had been made, and the garrison numbered only about 200 men. In command of the besieging force was Khwaja Safar Salmani, who as governor of Surat had received the title of Khudawand Khan, and who had about 10,000 fighting men under him. On 18 May reinforcements reached the Portuguese from Goa, raising the garrison to about 400 men, but they remained inferior in artillery and

[1] The full narrative is given by Miguel Castanhoso. See also Whiteway, *The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia.*

musketry. In June Khwaja Safar had his head carried off by a cannon-ball and was succeeded by his son Ramazan Rumi Khan.[1]

At last in October João de Castro was able to send sufficient troops to relieve the garrison which by that time was reduced to a mere handful of wounded, sick and hungry men. In November the viceroy himself arrived in Diu and led an attack in which 3000 of the enemy, including Ramazan Rumi Khan, were killed and 600 taken prisoners. After this success de Castro was able to make a triumphant entry into Goa in April, 1547, but in May, 1548, he died and was succeeded by Garcia de Sa.

In the middle of the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese Empire in the East had attained the climax of its grandeur, it was divided into three sections: (1) from Guardafui to Ceylon, (2) from Pegu to China, and (3) all territories on the east coast of Africa.

Under the viceroy or governor of India, with his headquarters at Goa, were placed five governors or captains who ruled respectively over Mozambique, Ormuz, Maskat, Ceylon and Malacca. The viceroy or governor had entire control over the military, naval and civil administration. In civil suits his decision was final, and in criminal matters his power extended to sentence of death, except in the case of Portuguese nobles. He was assisted by two councils, the Council of State, and the Council of the Three Estates.

It will be evident from the brief narrative we have attempted that this history of one hundred years of Portuguese adventure in the eastern seas contains little or no indication of any effort to found an empire; never at any stage did the Portuguese captains assume the offensive on shore, nor did they actually come into contact with any of the great fighting races of India. They depended solely on their control of the high seas; their main objective was always the capture and occupation of the most important ports and their defence when occupied. For this purpose were needed, not administrators, but brave soldiers and sailors; and success was due, first, to the high military qualities and personal courage and endurance of most of the captains, and secondly, to the rich rewards which attracted so many to undertake perilous journeys (on an average not 60 per cent. of the men who left Portugal reached India, so great was the mortality on the crowded vessels) and face the countless risks which awaited them at the other end.

The ultimate decline of Portuguese power in India was due primarily to two causes: first, the encouragement of mixed marriages at home and abroad, and secondly, religious intolerance. The former policy had been adopted, as we have seen, by the great Albuquerque, who probably foresaw that the constant drain on the male population of a relatively small country like his own must ultimately lead to a shortage of man-power; the latter was pushed to its utmost

[1] See *Arabic History of Gujarat*, Indian Record Series, vol. II, Introduction.

extreme by the zealous fervour of the Jesuits who selected Goa as their second headquarters outside Rome, soon after the foundation of their order. The arrival of St Francisco Xavier in India in 1542 was an event of the most far-reaching importance and laid the foundations of that ecclesiastical supremacy in Portuguese India which sapped the financial resources and undermined the civil administration of its governor. Albuquerque and his immediate successors left almost untouched the customs of the people of Goa, only abolishing, as did the English later, the rite of sati. It may be recalled, however, that after the arrival of the Franciscan missionaries in 1517 Goa had become the centre of an immense propaganda, and already in 1540 by the orders of the king of Portugal all the Hindu temples in the island of Goa had been destroyed. The inquisition was introduced into Goa in 1560.

Garcia de Sa only held his high office for thirteen months, during which period little of importance is recorded. His general policy was one of conciliation with the Indian princes. In August, 1548, he concluded a formal treaty with the king of Bijapur, under which it was stipulated that Salsette and Bardas were to be the property of the king of Portugal in perpetuity, and that in the event of the Turks sending a fleet to attack the Portuguese, the Adil Khan should send men and supplies to help them, but at the expense of the Portuguese. Peace was also concluded with Sultan Mahmud of Gujarat.

Garcia de Sa was succeeded, on his death in August, 1549, by Jorge Cabral, who was immediately confronted with trouble in Cochin, where the safety of the king was threatened by a league formed against him by the Zamorin and the king of Pimienta. In spite of a rumour that the Turks were fitting out a new fleet at Suez, Cabral sent an armada of ninety sail to help the king of Cochin, and himself followed later with a large force of soldiers. The fighting was protracted and severe, and when Cabral was at last on the point of negotiating a peace with the enemy he had surrounded, a vessel arrived (November, 1550) with orders from the new viceroy, Dom Affonso de Noronha, to stay all proceedings, and the enemy were thus allowed to escape.

Affonso de Noronha's four years of viceroyalty were not marked by any very notable event, although Portuguese arms were often busily engaged in Malacca, Cochin and Ormuz, which nearly fell to the Turks. Two events of considerable interest, however, occurred during this period, namely the death of St Francisco Xavier (1552) and the arrival in India of Luiz de Camoens, the author of the *Lusiads* (1553), who, finding a new expedition was ready to sail to help the king of Cochin against the king of Pimienta, at once attached himself to it and, we are told, bore no inconsiderable share in the conquest of the Alagada Islands.

The next viceroy, Pero de Mascarenhas, who had been archbishop

of Goa, only lived to hold office for ten months, and was succeeded in June, 1555, by Francisco Barreto with the title of governor. His three years of office showed him to be a man of courage and determination, but of exceptional cruelty even for those times. Being invited to come to the aid of the king of Sind, he went with a fleet and 700 men to Tatta. Finding on arrival that his help was no longer required, he demanded the payment of expenses incurred in fitting out the fleet, as had been previously agreed upon. "On this being refused, Barreto landed his men, entered the city and in his rage killed over 8000 people...and loaded his vessels with one of the richest booties ever taken in India."[1] It was during the governorship of Francisco Barreto that King John III of Portugal died, and with his death the fortunes of that country both in Europe and in the East began to decline. During the minority of Dom Sebastian, however, the regency selected for the viceroyalty Dom Constantino of Braganza, brother of the duke of the same name, who was one of the wisest and worthiest men ever entrusted with that great office. He arrived in India in September, 1558, and his first act was to recall a fleet which Barreto had dispatched to Malacca, which was threatened by the king of Achin. We have seen above how Affonso de Noronha on arrival in India put a stop to Cabral's proceedings in Cochin, and as Danvers says "it appears to have been a prevailing custom in India, that new governors never put into execution the plans of their predecessors".[2] During the governorship of Barreto the territory of Bassein had been granted to the Portuguese by the king of Gujarat, and one of the first aims of the new viceroy was to gain possession of the neighbouring port of Daman, which was only occupied after several fierce engagements with a rebellious Gujarat noble who had established himself there (1559). Now the king of Gujarat at that time, Ahmad II, was a mere puppet in the hands of two rival nobles, 'Imad ul-Mulk and I'timad Khan. The former of these nobles included among his officers the fief-holder at the port of Daman, a certain Sayf ul-Muluk Miftah (called by the Portuguese historians Cide Bofata). In order that he might devote his whole attention to combating I'timad Khan, he made an agreement with the Portuguese that in return for the services of 500 "Frankish" troops, he would hand over to them the port of Daman. Miftah, however, refused to surrender the port, even when the original mandate of 'Imad ul-Mulk had been sent to him. When, finally, the Portuguese got possession of Daman, they ignored their side of the bargain and sent no men to help 'Imad ul-Mulk, who then repented his action and resolved on the recapture of Daman. The Portuguese historians, who call 'Imad ul-Mulk "Madre Maluco, king of Cambay", relate that he was preparing for an attack in force on Daman, and the Portuguese governor of that port, feeling that he could not resist such a force, had recourse

[1] Danvers, *Portuguese in India*, I, 508. [2] *Idem*, I, 510.

to stratagem. He persuaded Khudawand Khan Rajab, the son of Khwaja Safar (Portuguese *Cedeme*), lord of Surat, that his brother-in-law 'Imad ul-Mulk was in reality intending not to attack Daman but to drive him out of Surat. Khudawand Khan, believing this statement, invited his brother-in-law to a party, where on arrival he was foully murdered with all his attendants. The Muslim historians, on the other hand, tell us that 'Imad ul-Mulk marched on Surat in response to an appeal from the inhabitants of that town, who were grievously oppressed by Khudawand Khan, and make no reference to an attack on Daman. Chingiz Khan, the son of 'Imad ul-Mulk, at once resolved to avenge his father's murder and marched on Surat which he invested, but being able to produce no effect by this means, he called in the Portuguese to his assistance, who with ten ships blockaded the waterway by which provisions entered the port. It appears from the Portuguese accounts that both the besiegers and the besieged were given to suppose that the ships had been sent to help them, but the Muslim historians say that Chingiz Khan made definite promises of territory to the Portuguese in return for their help. However this may be, it appears that Chingiz Khan withdrew temporarily, and on his return to the attack was met by the Portuguese who put him to rout; for in the interval Khudawand Khan had promised to give Surat to the Portuguese if they would help him against Chingiz Khan. But no sooner had the Portuguese accomplished their task than Khudawand Khan was obliged to flee from his own people, who were incensed by his intention of surrendering the port. In making his escape he fell into the hands of one of Chingiz Khan's nobles who cut off his head and sent it to his master.

The next notable viceroy to be sent to India was Dom Luiz de Atayde, during whose viceroyalty (1568–71) the Portuguese were confronted by a danger which threatened their very existence in India. In 1569 three of the most powerful Indian princes concluded an offensive league against the Portuguese which, we are told, had been discussed among them with the utmost secrecy for the past five years. These princes were 'Ali II, the Adil Khan of Bijapur, Murtaza Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar, and the Zamorin of Calicut. So great was the confidence of these princes in their ability to drive these unwelcome strangers out of India, that they had arranged beforehand exactly how the Portuguese possessions should be divided among them; the Adil Khan had gone so far as to nominate certain of his officers to posts in Goa, at the same time promising them certain Portuguese ladies, famous for their beauty, in marriage. Ignoring all treaties, the Adil Khan marched against Goa at the head of 100,000 men; and Murtaza Nizam Shah against Chaul. To protect Goa the viceroy had at his disposal 650 active troops and about 250 aged and infirm; having dispatched 600 to reinforce the commander of Chaul. He sent these troops to defend the most vulnerable points of attack,

while the defence of the town of Goa was entrusted to Dominicans, Franciscans and other priests numbering some 300 in all. In addition to this he organised 1000 Christian slaves of various nationalities into four bands, and placed 1500 native Christians under selected Portuguese officers, with a sprinkling of reliable Portuguese soldiers. His council strongly urged the abandonment of Chaul and the concentration of all efforts on the defence of Goa, but the viceroy was resolved that the enemy should pay dearly for all they might take. The attack on Goa at the end of December, 1569, opened with the bombardment of the Pass of Benasterim, where the viceroy himself took command. The defence of Goa forms one of the most brilliant feats in Portuguese annals, and the courage and resource shown by Dom Luiz de Atayde in the face of such overwhelming odds entitle him to rank among the great soldiers of the world. Although during the siege, which lasted ten months, he received reinforcements in ships and men, it must be remembered that he was able not only to send troops to other threatened ports along the coast, but even to dispatch the trading ships with their annual consignments to Lisbon, as if nothing unusual were toward. Hardly less remarkable was the defence of Chaul by the small garrison of Portuguese against the superior forces of the king of Ahmadnagar which lasted all through the summer, and terminated in the signing of an offensive and defensive alliance between Murtaza Nizam Shah and Dom Sebastian of Portugal. The part played by the Zamorin was of little or no account, and it was not until the beginning of June, 1570, that he made an attack in force on the fort of Chale, near Calicut, where a small garrison was only saved from surrender by the arrival of reinforcements in September. Not until December, 1571, was a final treaty concluded between the new viceroy and the Adil Khan, whereby the local princes were compelled to recognise the rights of the Portuguese to their Indian possessions. Thus did Dom Luiz de Atayde, by his unflinching valour, his single-minded devotion and his military genius, succeed in re-establishing for a time the prestige of Portugal in the East, by withstanding the most serious confederacy that had ever taken arms against her. Dom Luiz returned in the same year to Portugal, where he was received with great honour.

The newly appointed viceroy, Antonio de Noronha, arrived at Goa in September, 1571, before the siege of that town had been raised. Chale, in the meantime, was holding out against desperate odds, and the reliefs sent by the new viceroy immediately after the conclusion of peace with the Adil Khan, arrived only to find that the garrison had surrendered conditionally to the Zamorin. With the appointment of Antonio de Noronha the administration of the Portuguese possessions in the East were divided, as we have seen above, into three governments, Noronha becoming viceroy of India, while governors were appointed to the other two provinces. This experiment led at once to disputes between the viceroy and Antonio Moniz Barreto,

the governor of Malacca, and ultimately involved the viceroy's recall in 1573.

It is necessary at this stage to revert to the events which were passing in Gujarat. Ever since the invasion of that country by the emperor Humayun, and the tragic death of Sultan Bahadur in 1537, the kingdom of Cambay, as Gujarat was called by the Portuguese, had been in a state of almost continuous civil war, the nominal kings being merely figureheads at the mercy and disposal of whichever of the rival nobles was able to capture and hold them. Such a state of affairs was, no doubt, very greatly to the advantage of the Portuguese, who were able to play one chief off against another, as we have seen in the case of Surat. Although Humayun had virtually conquered Gujarat, he had withdrawn without making any arrangements for the incorporation of that country into the Moghul Empire; and not till 1572 did his son, the great Akbar, who had then been seventeen years on the Moghul throne, think fit to undertake the reduction of this rich province. The political situation in Gujarat at this moment has already been described.[1] It may here suffice to say that it was with two distinct classes of opponent that Akbar had now to contend. First, the Gujarat nobles, who were divided always into two or more factions, the one or the other having the person of the puppet king, and secondly, the so-called *Mirzas*, members of the royal house of Tamerlane, residing for their personal safety outside the Moghul Empire, who with the prestige of their descent were able to command a certain following wherever they went. The *Mirzas* were a constant source of trouble to their imperial cousin, especially in Gujarat, and it was due to them rather than to the Gujarat nobles that the final absorption of that country into the Moghul Empire was delayed.

The nominal king of Gujarat at this time was Sultan Muzaffar, and the leading noble was the I'timad Khan who has been mentioned above. It was at the invitation of the latter that Akbar, towards the end of 1572, entered Ahmadabad and received the submission of I'timad Khan and his partisans and later of Sultan Muzaffar, who was found lurking near Akbar's camp. It was after his entry into the capital that Akbar visited Cambay, where for the first time he saw the sea and made acquaintance with the Portuguese, receiving there certain of their merchants who came to pay their respects. Meantime, the *Mirzas*, headed by Ibrahim Husayn, had collected their forces in Broach and were plotting against Akbar; and when it reached the emperor's ears that they had murdered Rustam Khan, the lord of Broach, who had expressed his intention of obeying Akbar's summons, Akbar resolved on immediate vengeance and set out at the head of 200 men for Surat, which was occupied by Muhammad Husayn. On his way he encountered and defeated Ibrahim Mirza in superior force at Sarnal (December, 1572), but the *Mirza* escaped

[1] *Camb. Hist. of India*, III, chap. xiii.

to Delhi where he tried to stir up the common people in order to necessitate Akbar's withdrawal from Gujarat, only to perish shortly afterwards in Multan. In January, 1573, Akbar began siege operations against Surat. It was during this siege that Akbar first entered into negotiations with the Portuguese. The accounts are confusing, but it would appear from a collation of the narratives of Abul Fazl and Couto, that the besieged in Surat had offered to hand over that port to the Portuguese if they would help them against Akbar, but that, when the Portuguese contingent realised the strength of the Moghuls, they changed their rôle from that of enemies to ambassadors, and were well received by the emperor who "made enquiries about the wonders of Portugal and the manners and customs of Europe".

It was, no doubt, a source of great vexation to the emperor to find that important ports like Diu, Daman and Bassein, were in the hands of these alien merchants, but the failure of the triple alliance of 1569 had clearly shown that without the co-operation of a powerful fleet it would be impossible to dislodge the Portuguese from these coastal strongholds; and it was not within the competency of the Gujaratis, still less of the Moghuls, to build ships of the requisite strength. Akbar, therefore, confined his military activities to the reduction of the ports which still remained in the hands of the Gujaratis, notably Cambay, Surat and Broach.

To return to the Portuguese, in 1573 Antonio Moniz Barreto became governor in Goa, and it was during his term of office that a curious incident occurred which may be fitly recorded here. The annual pilgrimages of Muslim Indians to Mecca, whose route lay through Gujarat (which was called the Gate of Mecca) had been for some years interrupted by the domination of the Arabian Ocean by the Portuguese and also by the disorder prevailing in Gujarat. Now that order had been restored in this province and Akbar's relations with Goa were of a friendly nature, it was considered safe for the ladies of the imperial household to fulfil a long-cherished desire of performing this chief act of Muslim piety (for although Akbar himself in his religious experiments had almost abjured Islam, his family had remained devout Muslims). The party reached Surat in safety at the end of 1575, but it was not till the following season that satisfactory passes were furnished. The ladies, who included the famous Gulbadan Begum, performed the pilgrimage and returned safely in 1582.

In 1578, under the viceroyalty of Dom Diego de Menezes, Antonio Cabral (who had met Akbar at Surat in 1573) was accredited to the emperor's court as ambassador, and it was the conversations of Akbar and Cabral on religious matters which resulted in the dispatch of the first Jesuit mission to the Moghul court in 1580.[1] Like Kubilai Khan in the thirteenth century, Akbar was disposed to give Christianity a fair hearing, but he had to reckon with the spiritual forces of Islam

[1] See Payne, *Akbar and the Jesuits.*

which he was obliged to conciliate outwardly at least throughout his progress towards the new religion which was forming in his mind.

In the meanwhile, events of far-reaching importance for the history of India were passing in Europe.

In August, 1578, Dom Sebastian, then only twenty-five years of age, was killed in battle near Fez, fighting like a hero in a hopeless enterprise against the Moors. Philip II of Spain had long coveted the kingdom of Portugal, and on the death of the cardinal Dom Henrique, who had assumed the title of king, he invaded that country and totally defeated the Portuguese at the battle of Alcantara (1580), and in April, 1581, was crowned king at Tomar. Portugal thus became a part of the kingdom of Spain, but it was stipulated that the commerce of Africa, Persia and India should be reserved to the Portuguese, and carried only on their vessels.

The first viceroy sent to India under the new *régime* was Dom Francisco Mascarenhas, who had already considerable experience of India. Among the many happenings of his period of office may be mentioned the rebellion of the ex-sultan of Gujarat, Muzaffar, who, escaping from captivity, managed to raise an army of some 30,000 men and recovered a large part of his former kingdom (1583). In the confusion which ensued, the viceroy thought an opportunity possibly offered of "laying hands on Surat at small cost"[1], but his plans were frustrated by the sudden arrival of a Moghul army.

By reason of the assistance given by Queen Elizabeth to the Netherlands in their revolt against Spain, a declaration of war became merely a matter of time, and in 1584 diplomatic relations were broken off between England and Spain, and consequently Portugal. In 1586 six ships sailed from Lisbon for India. Off the Azores they fell in with Sir Francis Drake, who brought into Plymouth a cargo valued at over a hundred thousand pounds. This success taught the English and the Dutch that what the Portuguese had achieved in Indian waters was, no doubt, equally possible for themselves. Though the merging of Portugal into the kingdom of Spain may be said to have hastened the end of Portugal's monopoly of Indian trade, rival European adventurers were bound to appear in Indian waters sooner or later in an age which produced and encouraged such men as Francis Drake. The only wonder is that other seafaring nations allowed her to enjoy for so long the advantages she had gained. By the time she had recovered her independence after "sixty years' captivity", the Dutch had already deprived her of the greater part of her possessions and her trade.

The neighbouring island of Ceylon had been discovered by the Portuguese more or less by accident. It was during the viceroyalty of Dom Francisco d'Almeida that the Muhammadan merchants, in

[1] Couto, x, 6.

order to avoid their new rivals, began to make a detour by way of the Maldives when proceeding with their spice ships to the Red Sea. In November, 1505, the viceroy sent his youthful son Lourenço with a fleet of nine vessels to try and intercept these merchantmen, and while searching for them Lourenço was driven on to the coast of Ceylon in the neighbourhood of Galle, where he replenished his stores, and then proceeded to Colombo. According to some accounts a treaty was then concluded with the king of Ceylon, whereby the king agreed to pay tribute in cinnamon and elephants to the Portuguese, who, in return, undertook to protect Ceylon against all enemies. Seeing that the next official visit to Ceylon did not take place until 1518, when Lopo Soares actually secured similar terms from the local king, it would appear that the first treaty was not regarded very seriously, although we hear in the interval of Portuguese merchants trading in cinnamon at Colombo. The only evidence which remains of Dom Lourenço's visit is a stone, still standing, bearing the royal arms of Portugal surmounted by a cross, but marked with the unaccountable date of 1501.

The report sent to King Manoel from Cochin, dated 22 December, 1518, contains the following entry: "Lopo Soares has returned from Ceylon, where he has erected a fortress of mud, stone and clay, and obtained tribute of ten elephants and 400 *baharis* of cinnamon".

In 1520 Lopo de Brito, bringing with him 400 men, arrived in Colombo, and at once set about the rebuilding of the little fort, which had suffered badly from the torrential rains. He had scarcely had time to complete his defences when the inhabitants showed open hostility, which led to a siege of the little garrison, who were only saved at the end of six months by the timely arrival of a Portuguese galley. Hostilities ceased shortly after this and friendly relations were re-established. The Portuguese had, however, made themselves thoroughly disliked by the Sinhalese, and the constant exposure of the garrison to attack led them finally, in 1524, to dismantle the fort at Colombo, and to confine themselves to a factory under the protection of the Sinhalese king. In 1538 the Zamorin of Calicut dispatched a fleet of fifty-one vessels carrying 8000 men to attack Ceylon. A Portuguese fleet set out in pursuit, and inflicted a severe defeat on the Zamorin's forces after a very fierce engagement; the grateful king rewarded his allies with a handsome contribution towards the expenses of the expedition, but further assistance to meet a renewed attack by the Zamorin in alliance with the king's brother was not forthcoming as the Portuguese were at that time too busily engaged in and around Diu to spare any ships or men. In the following year, however, the required help was sent, and peace was restored in Ceylon. Shortly after this (1541) a Sinhalese embassy was sent to Lisbon carrying, among other gifts to the Portuguese king, an image of the child who had just been declared heir apparent to the throne.

The coronation of the image was celebrated with stately ceremony and the day was observed as a holiday throughout the land. The name of this child was Dharmapala, and on the death of his grandfather in 1550 he ascended the throne. In 1556, thanks mainly to the wave of religious enthusiasm kindled by the missionary activities of Francisco Xavier, Dharmapala and his queen were baptised and received into the Catholic Church. Had the priests by whom he was surrounded acted with moderation, or even with understanding, this conversion might have had momentous results; but, no doubt with the best of intentions, they did everything that was possible to offend the Buddhist inhabitants of the island; without making any effort to enquire into the nature of the Buddhist religion they determined to destroy it by every means in their power, and by their ruthless action only succeeded in undoing the labours of twenty years. It was at this time that we find introduced among the Sinhalese that curious medley of Portuguese names and the high-sounding title of *Dom*. From 1559 to 1565 the Portuguese were engaged in constant war with the Sinhalese by whom they were so much hated, and on more than one occasion were very near to being altogether ejected from the island. In 1560 matters became so serious that the viceroy, Dom Constantino of Braganza, himself led a great expedition against the Sinhalese. The headquarters of the Portuguese had hitherto been Kotte, but in 1565 it was decided to remove the garrison and factory and the native inhabitants to Colombo, and the ancient capital, thus abandoned, soon became the haunt of wild beasts. The rest of Ceylon remained in the undisputed possession of the Sinhalese monarch, the grand-uncle of Dharmapala, who was now a refugee under the protection of the Portuguese. In 1578 the old king, feeling he had no longer the strength to cope with the increasing aggressions of the Portuguese, abdicated in favour of his son, Raja Sinha, who, in the following year, laid siege to Colombo, but was driven off. In the meantime Dharmapala executed a deed of gift, by which, after setting forth his own title to the throne, and explaining that nothing had been left him by his rivals but Colombo, he made over all his claims to the king of Portugal, Dom Henrique, and in 1583 executed another instrument by which Philip II, who was now lord of Portugal, was made heir to Dharmapala. Raja Sinha meanwhile devoted all his energies to raising an efficient army and to erecting strong forts, which became a source of much anxiety to the Portuguese, who on their side were engaged in strengthening the fortifications of Colombo. Constant appeals for assistance were sent to Goa, but seldom met with a satisfactory response. In 1587 Raja Sinha, with an army of 50,000 men, made his first great assault on Colombo. The carnage was terrible, but the half-clothed Sinhalese could not cope with the fully armed soldiery of Europe, and the assault was turned to a siege, during which large reinforcements in men and munitions arrived from Cochin, and

later on from Malacca; and finally, in February, 1588, the Portuguese had acquired such superiority over the enemy that they were able to make a sortie in force, and Colombo was saved. In 1597 Dharmapala died and a convention of delegates was held, which, after two days spent in negotiations, agreed to recognise Philip II as the king of Ceylon, provided the Portuguese "would guarantee on his behalf that the laws and customs of the Sinhalese should be maintained inviolate for ever".

In considering the achievement of the Portuguese in thc Indian Ocean, it is our duty to recognise the important part they played, having regard for the future history of India, in successfully frustrating all the attacks made on them by the Turks. Although we have no documentary evidence for believing that the Turks ever entertained the idea of establishing a naval, and still less a military base in India, it is quite conceivable that if one of their fleets had succeeded in driving the Portuguese out of their fortresses on the Indian coast, the establishment of the Christian powers in India might have been indefinitely postponed.

CHAPTER II

THE DUTCH IN INDIA

THE first Dutch vessels to sail round the Cape of Good Hope and to cross the Indian Ocean in search of trade left the Texel on 2 April, 1595. The owners were a group of Amsterdam merchants who had formed a company for Indian trade in 1592. The Netherlands had long been a most important centre for the European trade in the produce of the colonial world. The wares which the Spaniards and Portuguese transported from America and the Indies to Seville and Lisbon were carried further north very largely in Holland and Zeeland ships. Antwerp had been the great distributing centre for Northern and Middle Europe, but after its fall in 1585 and the consequent closure of the Scheldt by the more successful rebels of the northern provinces, the trading towns of Holland and Zeeland, and particularly Amsterdam, had inherited its position. The circumstances of the time made the use of the Iberian ports, all obeying Philip II after the conquest of Portugal in 1580, as centres of Mediterranean and colonial trade a perilous practice. Even though the economic dependence of Spain and Portugal on the Netherlands rebels was too great to permit the king to adopt a consistent policy of prohibition with respect to Netherlands trading, the embargoes of 1585 and 1595 served to create a sense of insecurity in Netherlands trading circles.

To venture out into the vast, unknown regions of the Indian world, however, was an enterprise not lightly to be undertaken. Knowledge of the route to India was of the vaguest, and ignorance exaggerated the power of the Spanish-Portuguese Empire to defend its claims. At first, therefore, attempts were made to reach the Indies by the north of Asia, although a plan for an expedition round the Cape of Good Hope had been conceived as early as any of the northern expeditions. But years of preparation preceded the execution. The first act of the Company formed in 1592 was to send Cornelis de Houtman to Lisbon to collect information about the conditions and methods of Indian trade, and in 1595 it was he who led the expedition. The famous geographer Petrus Plancius, a Reformed minister who had fled from Flanders, and who in 1592 had published a map of the world based, in so far as the Indies are concerned, on Portuguese data, was commissioned to instruct the skippers and mates who were to take part in the expedition in the newest discoveries of the science of navigation. And invaluable was the advice of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, whose *Reysgeschrift van de navigatien der Portugaloysers*, a seaman's guidebook to Indian and Far Eastern navigation, appeared in 1595, while the *Itinerario, voyage ofte schipvaert van Jan Huyghen van*

Linschoten naer Oost ofte Portugails Indien, although published only in the next year, must have been printed earlier, since we know that de Houtman took a copy with him on his voyage.

The number of Netherlanders who made the voyage to India in the Portuguese period and served the Portuguese in some capacity or other must have been considerable. Some were engaged in trade out there, and many served on the Portuguese ships, particularly as gunners. Jan Huyghen van Linschoten in 1583, after some years spent in Spain and Portugal, accompanied the newly appointed archbishop of Goa to his post in the capacity of secretary. He was still a very young man, having been born in 1563. He stayed at Goa from September, 1583, to January, 1589. He came back to Holland in September, 1592, and settled at Enkhuizen. He became an active promoter of the plans for direct trading with the Indies which were already in the air. In 1594 and 1595 he took part in fruitless attempts to find the North-east Passage, yet in spite of that found time to work out the notes collected during his travels into the two works above cited.

Of the two, the *Reysgeschrift* was probably of the greater immediate use, but it is on the *Itinerario* that Linschoten's fame is chiefly founded. It is much more than the ordinary traveller's story. In fact, Linschoten's personal observation of India was practically confined to Goa, but in the *Itinerario* he gives an encyclopaedic account of the whole of the extensive area which the Portuguese looked upon as their special preserve. He describes towns and harbours, the political organisation, the social conditions and the religions of the various peoples, and the produce and industries of particular regions; through it all he traces the ramifications of the Portuguese Empire and of Portuguese trade, explaining how it works, where it is weak and where it is strong. One fact he stresses over and over again which must have stimulated the spirit of enterprise of his countrymen—and no doubt that was his intention—namely that the Portuguese system was vulnerable in the extreme, undermined by abuses and corruption, while Portuguese methods of navigation in particular were far inferior to those of Dutch seamen. At the same time Linschoten did not under-estimate the strength of the Portuguese fortified establishments, and he pointed to the Malay Archipelago as the most suitable area for Dutch enterprise on account of Sunda Straits being undefended: there was not a Portuguese fortress on either Java or Sumatra, which nevertheless offered great opportunities to the European merchant; Bantam in particular was the centre of a trading movement to Malacca on the one side and the Spice Islands, or Moluccas, on the other.

It was excellent advice and it was taken. Houtman set his course straight for Java, where he found the inhabitants quite willing to enter into commercial relations with rivals of the Portuguese, and although he spoiled his chances by injudicious behaviour and this

first expedition yielded no profits, in August, 1597, Houtman, with three out of his four ships, reappeared before the Texel, and the mere fact of his having accomplished the voyage was encouragement enough. (The pent-up enterprise of the Dutch commercial class burst forth as if a dyke had been cut.) New companies for the Indian trade sprang up in several towns of Holland and Zeeland. Twenty-two ships left for the Archipelago in 1598, and about forty more in the next three years. Some of the so-called Pre-companies made enormous profits, but it soon became apparent that their keen competition would in the long run spoil the market both in the East and in Europe, while their jealousy made it impossible for them to co-operate in order to secure the new trade against the attempts of the Portuguese to enforce their monopoly. The foundation of the English East India Company (1600), which at once sent an expedition in the track of the Dutch, to Java, drove home the conclusion that unity was necessary. The Government, anxious lest a promising new source of wealth should dry up, and realising that the energies of commercial enterprise might be so directed as to help the country in its war with the Spanish Empire, took action. It was the Advocate of Holland, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who initiated negotiations for an amalgamation, on the basis of a national monopoly. For although public opinion in the Netherlands was strongly averse to monopolies, in this particular case it was realised that the amalgamated companies must be protected from further competition. In December, 1601, delegates of the various companies, at the invitation of the states-general, met at the Hague. It was far from easy to reach agreement, Zeeland interests in particular proving refractory. The Advocate, however, exerted all his influence and at last a scheme was evolved by which the Pre-companies consented to be merged into a monopolist chartered company and this was at once embodied in a resolution of the states-general (20 March, 1602).

(The United Company was a very powerful organism.) The directors of the Pre-companies, who now became directors of the United Company, had every time put up their capital for one expedition only. New capital was now invited from the general public—a total of 6,500,000 guilders (about £540,000) was subscribed—and that for ten years; the directors were to be liable only for the amount they subscribed as shareholders. In fact the return of the capital on the expiration of the period named in the charter never took place, nor had the shareholders ever any effective control over the direction of affairs. In its administrative organisation its origin as the result of an amalgamation appeared very clearly. It was composed of six "chambers" which traded each with its own capital, but profit and loss were pooled. The directors of the several chambers, who held office for life, were appointed by the government of the town in which the chamber was situated (by the Provincial States in the case of the

Zeeland Chamber) out of three persons nominated, on the death of a director, by his surviving colleagues. (The Amsterdam Chamber was by far the most important and appointed eight of the seventeen general directors.) "The Seventeen", who met three times a year, could only lay down general lines of policy, the execution of which rested with the several chambers. This complicated organisation, intended to reconcile the warring interests of various groups and political entities, particularly of Amsterdam and Zeeland, lasted as long as the company.

To this body the states-general by the charter of 20 March, 1602, delegated important sovereign powers. Not only was the Company given the exclusive right to trade in all countries between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan, but within that area it was empowered to carry on war, to conclude treaties, to take possession of territory, and to erect fortresses. (The Pre-companies had had little thought of colonisation or of attacking the Portuguese, whom on the contrary they sought to avoid.) Only on the outskirts of the Portuguese sphere of influence, in the Moluccas, had the desire to control the spice trade inspired attacks on Portuguese posts. The states-general, by their interference, set a new direction and made the United Company a great instrument of war and conquest.

The powerful fleets, of about a dozen large ships each, which the Company sent out annually during the first years of its existence, boldly attacked the Portuguese Empire at its vital points. Mozambique, Goa, Malacca, were all attacked, but in vain. The Dutch had the command of the seas, they hindered and interrupted communications between the Portuguese ports, they even prevented the sending of reinforcements from the mother country. But they failed to break Portuguese power ashore. (Only in the Moluccas did they succeed in ousting the Portuguese and securing a foothold for themselves.) Even there, however, the Portuguese, supported by the Spaniards from the Philippines, offered a strong resistance, and the determined attempt of the Company to become masters of the Moluccas —in an instruction of 1608, the directors described this as their principal aim—for a number of years claimed much of its energies. For a considerable period these were in any case concentrated on the Malay Archipelago. (The spice trade of the Moluccas was looked upon as the great prize of the Indian world.) Java, moreover, was proving as important as Linschoten had foretold. Factories were established at Bantam and Jacatra, and these insensibly became the centre of the trading movement which the Dutch were developing and which already embraced the Moluccas in the east, China and Japan in the north, and Coromandel and Surat in the west. In 1609 unity of command over the scattered ships and posts in the East was secured by the institution of a central authority, the governor-general and the council of the Indies. The first governor-general was Pieter Both.

and his instructions, endorsed by the states-general, ordered him to establish some fixed seat for the central government in the Indies, and suggested Johore, Bantam or Jacatra for that purpose. It was years before these instructions were acted upon, and it was done, not by Both, but by his second successor, Jan Pietersoon Coen, the real founder of the Dutch Eastern Empire. In 1619 Coen conquered Jacatra and founded Batavia on its ruins. At the same time his ruthless energy saved the Dutch from being superseded by the English, whose chances in the Archipelago were in the course of a few years effectually ruined, and who thenceforward concentrated their attention on India. Great exertions were still required of the Dutch, however, to defend their new capital against the Javanese themselves, and altogether it was not until the governor-generalship of Antonie van Diemen (1636–46) that the ruling powers at Batavia felt themselves sufficiently secure in the Archipelago to resume the earlier policy of aggression against the strongholds of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean.

In 1633 the Dutch had already begun to blockade Malacca, which finally they took in 1641. Meanwhile from 1636 onwards a fleet had been sent every year to blockade Goa during the winter months, the only time when the port was accessible. In the spring of 1638 the fleet returning from that blockade attacked Batticaloa and a twenty years' struggle began in which the Dutch wrested from the Portuguese all they possessed on Ceylon and in the southern part of the mainland of India itself.

A long time before they made those conquests, the Dutch already had acquired factories on the Coromandel Coast, in Gujarat, and in Bengal. Except for the fortress Geldria at Pulicat, these settlements were merely unfortified trading posts, and the position of the Dutch in India for a long time remained essentially different from that in the Archipelago. And the Archipelago was not only the strategic and administrative centre of their system, it was also the economic centre. It was pepper and spices, the produce of Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas, then so much in demand for the European market, that had originally drawn the Dutch to the islands, and from the early years of the United Company they set themselves to obtain a monopoly in these articles. What took them to India in the first instance was rather the requirements of the Archipelago than of the European market; in other words, it was a distinctly subsidiary interest. The Dutch traders were not slow to discover that the system of paying in money for the pepper and spices had grave disadvantages. At the same time they saw that there was an active commercial movement in existence, with Bantam, and especially Achin, as its intermediary centres, by which the populations of the Archipelago exchanged their own products for cotton goods from Gujarat and from the Coromandel

Coast. The idea naturally arose of controlling that movement, eliminating the Arab and Indian middlemen, and paying for the spices by imported cotton goods.

As early as October, 1603, the Seventeen directed the attention of the admiral (Van der Haghen) of a fleet they were just then fitting out to the Coromandel Coast and particularly to Masulipatam as a place well fitted for the buying of cotton goods. Even before this, an attempt had been already made to start trade on the other side of the peninsula, at Surat and on the Malabar Coast, but it had ended in disaster. The two Zeeland merchants who had ventured out into those parts had fallen into the hands of the Portuguese and been hanged at Goa. So the United Company looked to the east coast, and a circumstance which especially recommended Masulipatam, was the weakness of the Portuguese in that northern region. Admiral Van der Haghen, from Calicut where he then was, while going on himself to Bantam with the main fleet, dispatched the yacht *Delft* to open up trade with the Coromandel Coast. Masulipatam belonged to the king of Golconda, and although there were Portuguese merchants in the town, their rivals were welcomed by the Indian authorities and the senior merchant Pieter Ysaac Eyloff remained behind with a small number of assistants to set up a permanent factory when the *Delft* left early in May, 1605, with the first cargo of cotton goods for Achin and Bantam.

The beginning was thus very easy, and another factory was founded at Petapoli (Nizampatam), also in the kingdom of Golconda, but many difficulties were still to be overcome before the new settlement could work smoothly and profitably. The governors of the two ports imposed crushing import and export duties in the most arbitrary fashion, and interfered in the intercourse between the factors and the native weavers and dyers. The export trade in textiles was highly technical, and the servants of the Dutch Company wanted to be free to instruct the native craftsmen as to the requirements of the Archipelago markets and actively to supervise their work. A mission to the Golconda court in 1606 secured farmans fixing import and export duties at 4 per cent., but the governors did not heed them much. In 1608, hoping that the fear of their going away altogether would check their tormentors, the Dutch factors sent out some of their subordinates to found a new settlement at Devenampatnam to the southward. A treaty guaranteeing the same tolls as in Golconda was obtained from the nayak of Jinji, in whose province the port was situated. After some trouble due to the influence which the Portuguese, themselves established at St Thomé and Negapatam, preserved at Vellore, the Dutch obtained permission to rebuild an old fort at Devenampatnam and to build a factory at Tirupapuliyur to be armed with four pieces of cannon, while the Portuguese were expressly forbidden access to either place. In 1610, by direct

negotiations with the king, permission was obtained to found another factory at Pulicat, and again, in spite of their attempts to dissuade the king, the Portuguese were expressly excluded from the port. The Dutch were thus extending their position on the Coromandel Coast, although at the same time the main forces of their Company were so fully engaged in the Archipelago that no Dutch vessels appeared on the coast between October, 1608, and March, 1610. The king of the Carnatic began to doubt whether the Portuguese, whose trade the newcomers threatened with ruin, might not after all be the more valuable friends. But by means of a present of elephants from Kandi and other bribes the Dutch retained his favour, while the Portuguese, who made one or two fruitless attacks on the Dutch at Pulicat by sea from St Thomé, only displayed that inferiority in naval power which was the real cause of the ruin of their Indian Empire.

Meanwhile the Seventeen, before the news of the settlement at Pulicat had reached them, had realised the need for unity of administration on the Coromandel Coast. In December, 1610, the council at Bantam, acting upon their instructions, organised the administration of the Coromandel factories. The senior merchant of Masulipatam and Petapoli, Van Wesick (Pieter Ysaac had died), was appointed to be General Director. The Portuguese, however, had not yet learnt to acquiesce in the presence of their rivals. On 9 June, 1612, they carried out a successful raid on Pulicat from their neighbouring settlement of St Thomé. The Dutch factory was destroyed. Wemmer van Berchem, Van Wesick's successor as Director, was absent in Golconda; but some of the factors were killed and the senior merchant, Adolf Thomassen, carried off to St Thomé, whence he only escaped over a year later. Wemmer van Berchem realised that, if the factory at Pulicat was to survive, it would have to be fortified. The local authorities, as well as the raja at Vellore, professed great indignation at the action of the Portuguese; liberal presents secured freedom to proceed with the work; and with the aid of the crews of two ships, which happened to call in March, 1613, the fortress, called Geldria after Van Berchem's native province, was completed. In the very next month it had to withstand an attack by a native chief, Etheraja, behind whom Van Berchem naturally suspected the Portuguese. A direct attack by the Portuguese, both by sea and by land, soon followed, but was beaten off. For some time the Dutch still feared that, although the neighbouring Portuguese settlements had proved too weak to dislodge them, the viceroy at Goa might send an armada to restore Portuguese monopoly on the east coast. An attempt was actually made in 1615, when a Portuguese fleet sailed to Arakan to expel the Dutch; but the king of Arakan's ships, assisted by a single Dutch yacht, the *Duif*, compelled the assailants to return. Both in Golconda and in the Carnatic the native authorities and the Dutch

factories prepared jointly to resist the Portuguese fleet, which sailed south along the coast; but at no point did it venture to attack. Portuguese prestige never recovered from this failure, and Geldria never again had to fear attack from them.

Fort Geldria, meanwhile, played a part of growing importance. For several years after 1614, the kingdom of the Carnatic was shaken by a disputed succession and civil war. The Dutch castle was a fixed point in the midst of turmoil, and many natives, and even many refugees from St Thomé, sought its protection, so that almost at once it became the nucleus from which a new territorial power might have sprung. When the anarchy in the Carnatic led to its falling under the sway of the kings of Golconda, conditions in that region were not greatly changed. The Dutch Company continued to coin its own gold pagodas at Pulicat, out of imported gold, as did the English later on at Madras. At Masulipatam, however, so much nearer the capital, no such developments took place. That town was ruled despotically by its havildar, while the Dutch factory, like the English one, remained a trading settlement pure and simple. The Company had soon obtained another farman by which the king of Golconda remitted the 4 per cent. duties for an annual payment of 3000 "old pagodas" (25,000 guilders). Even this did not save the Company from the exactions of the local authorities,[1] and embassies to Golconda were frequently needed to solicit the king's interference.

On the whole, however, the advantages of the new settlements far outweighed the drawbacks. The Coromandel Coast soon played a very important part in the life of the Company. As early as 1612, it was described as "the left arm of the Moluccas and neighbouring islands, since without the cottons from thence trade is dead in the Moluccas".[2] The export of textiles for the Archipelago market always remained the chief business of the Coromandel factories, although soon considerable quantities were exported to Europe as well, and the export of rice and vegetables and of slaves (for Batavia) became important;[3] diamonds also were exported; while the hinterland of Masulipatam supplied indigo. Both the indigo and the textile trades required considerable skill on the part of the Company's servants. As regards the latter, the requirements of the Archipelago market were exactly studied. Patterns were sent from Bantam or Batavia, and minute instructions were given to the weavers and dyers who worked for the Company in towns and villages within a wide radius of the factory.

The Dutch were able to carry on their trade to a large extent by importing other articles in exchange for those of the country. This

[1] *Daghregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia*, I, 229.
[2] E. Heeres, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum*, p. 154.
[3] *Daghregister*, I, 189, 221; II, 445 *sqq.*

was one of the great problems for the European Companies.[1] The Indian market could not absorb any considerable amount of European articles. Neither the English nor the Dutch Company could export an unlimited supply of money from their own countries. In India money could be borrowed only at an extortionate rate of interest. Two ways lay open to the European Companies who did not want to fall into the hands of the native moneylenders. They could raise money by trading in countries where imports were paid for with cash; the trade with China and Japan was the most fruitful in this respect, and here the Dutch had a practical monopoly. Secondly, they could escape the necessity of importing money by importing non-European articles for which there was a demand in India, and here again the Dutch were fortunate in their control of the supply of spices. Apart from spices, the chief articles which they imported on the Coromandel Coast were sandal wood and pepper from the Malay Archipelago, Japanese copper and certain Chinese textiles from the Far East.

In 1617 the directorate of the Coromandel Coast was raised into a *gouvernement*, its chief at Pulicat being given the title of governor as well as becoming an Extraordinary Councillor of the Indies. In 1689 the governor's seat was removed from Pulicat in the centre to Negapatam in the south, which as will be described in a subsequent paragraph, had been taken from the Portuguese in 1659. No doubt the decision to make it into the capital of the coast, which was adversely criticised by many who praised the situation of Pulicat as ideally central, was inspired by the consideration that in the troublous times ahead, now that Aurangzib was master of Golconda, Negapatam, close to the Company's new stronghold of Ceylon, was the natural strategic basis of the whole *gouvernement*. A new castle was at once constructed, at a cost, it was said, of 1,600,000 guilders, which far surpassed Fort Geldria in size and strength.

We possess a very vivid account of the conditions in the Dutch factories on the Coromandel Coast just about the time when this transfer was taking place in the travels of Daniel Havart.

The society into which Havart introduces his reader is purely official. The "Free merchants" whom early governors-general had wanted to encourage had been driven away by the severely monopolist policy on which the Seventeen insisted. There were only the servants of the Company left, who enriched themselves (although Havart does not say so) by infringing that very monopoly which was so dear to the directors' hearts. During the last years of Havart's stay on the coast this little society was shaken to its foundations by the appearance of a commissioner, Van Reede tot Drakensteyn, entrusted by the Seventeen themselves with extraordinary powers to put down corruption and reform abuses. Several officials, chiefs of factories among them, were broken by this ruthless reformer, whose social

[1] Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, pp. 58 *sqq*.

position (he was a member of the Utrecht nobility, a very unusual rank among the servants of the Company) added to the awe which he inspired.

By Havart's time some of the early factories, Petapoli and Tirupapuliyur, had been abandoned. On the other hand several new ones had been founded. Proceeding northward from Negapatam, Havart enumerates: Porto Novo, Devenampatnam, Sadraspatam, Pulicat, Masulipatam, Nagelwanze, Golconda, Palakollu, Daatzerom and Bimlipatam. Of these, Porto Novo, founded as late as 1680, was a prosperous centre for the collection of cottons. Sadraspatam and Palakollu were important on account of the especial excellence of the textiles to be had there. Devenampatnam and Masulipatam were the busiest factories, both for export and import, although Masulipatam had lost some of its importance since the establishment, in 1660, of a factory at Golconda, the chief of which, apart from his commercial duties, acted as the Company's resident with the king of Golconda, although special embassies continued still to be sent after as before 1660. Nagelwanze was the centre for the indigo trade. At Palakollu the Company had had a factory since 1613, and carried on a profitable dyeing industry. From 1653 the village was administered by the Company which held it from the king at an annual rent of 1000 pagodas.

In all these places the Dutch Company had buildings, more or less fortified, and large enough to accommodate the factors, their slaves, and sometimes a small body of soldiers. The number of factors varied a good deal. At Sadraspatam, although a very successful trading centre, there were only four; at Nagelwanze, at the time of its highest prosperity about 1680, eighteen. Many of the factors were married, and if the factory could not house their families, they lived outside. At Masulipatam eight or ten were married, when the Commissioner Van Reede strictly prohibited (except for the chiefs of factories) what was regarded as an abuse, and sent many families to Europe or Batavia. The factors in the Company's service were called merchants, and their ranks were assistant, junior merchant, merchant, and senior merchant. This nomenclature was preserved even in possessions where the duties of the Company's servants were not primarily commercial, but administrative, as in Ceylon. At the head of a factory there were as a rule two chiefs, the first and the second chief, who might be junior merchant, merchant, or senior merchant in rank. The Coromandel instructions of the Pulicat governors of 1649 and 1663[1] laid it down that the first chief presides over the council, on which the other factors also sat; he had the general supervision over the factory's affairs, kept the money, negotiated with native traders, contracting for textiles, etc., and corresponding with the central administration, with the director or governor, as the case might be, but consulting his *secundo*.

[1] Havart, *Op- en Ondergang van Cormandel*, III, 57.

The second himself kept the trading accounts and looked after the warehouses.

At Pulicat—Havart knew the place before Van Reede ordered the transfer of headquarters to Negapatam—the governor's house and those of some other high officials were within the castle. But in the town, there were "many streets where none but Dutchmen live, and among them one whole row of houses all built in the Dutch way, with three rows of trees in front of them". The governor, who had to consult his council about most matters of importance, corresponded, not with the directors in Europe, but with the government at Batavia. The Geldria fort, as Havart observes, was by no means so fine a castle as the English castle at Madras, and on the whole, the English factories surpassed those of the Dutch in size and beauty, if not in trade, all along the Coromandel Coast. Particularly after the reductions of 1678, when the Company ceased supplying chiefs of factories with horses and palanquins, and the number of servants in each factory was greatly cut down, Havart feared that Dutch prestige in the eyes of the natives would suffer irreparable damage.

In fact, bad times, but not only for the Dutch, were fast approaching. Relations with the court of Golconda had on the whole been very friendly. In 1676, on the occasion of a visit to Masulipatam, when the king insisted that the Dutch ladies should visit his wives, and when he himself attended service in the Dutch church, he remitted all the annual payments which the Company owed him in respect of freedom of tolls or possession of lands. In 1686, a quarrel broke out about a debt which the Company had outstanding at Golconda. It had just been settled after a display of vigour on the Company's part —the inland factories had been evacuated and Masulipatam occupied by a force shipped from Ceylon—when the army of Aurangzib appeared before Golconda; the king was deposed and the country overrun. The Dutch factory at Nagelwanze was destroyed, and altogether a time of dearth and insecurity began in which trade declined. The profits of the Coromandel *gouvernement*, which in the years 1684 and 1685 appeared in the Company's books as exceeding 1,200,000 guilders, fell to 445,000 guilders in 1686 and 82,000 in 1687.[1] Nor was the high water mark of the years before Aurangzib's conquest of Golconda ever reached again. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century there was an improvement, but it was not maintained, and the figures generally moved between 200,000 and 400,000 guilders profit, which indeed still made a good showing in the Company's books when, as will be shown in a subsequent paragraph, so many of its establishments were worked at a loss.

In the days before the amalgamation of the companies, two Zeeland

[1] Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Niederl. Ostindischen Compagnie*, 1894, Beilage IX.

merchants, as has been briefly mentioned above, had tried to open up relations with the ports on the west coast of India, but had been hanged by the Portuguese at Goa. Their reports on Gujarat, however, had been most sanguine, and the United Company was anxious to follow up their pioneer work and secure Gujarat cottons for the markets of the Moluccas and the west coast of Sumatra and Jambi as well as for Europe. In 1604, and again in 1605, the admiral commanding the annual fleet was instructed to detach two ships to Surat; whether the order was carried out in 1604 does not appear; in the following year, at any rate, it was set aside because reports of an impending attack by the Portuguese made a concentration of all forces in the Archipelago seem imperatively necessary. A Dutch merchant was at Surat in 1606 and 1607, but, wrought upon by nervous fears that the Portuguese were succeeding in setting against him the mind of the Khankhanan, Jahangir's representative at Burhanpur, he committed suicide. The English soon were more successful, and, stimulated by their example, and urged moreover by the shahbandar of Surat, the Dutch governor of Coromandel in May, 1615, sent one of his officials, Gilles van Ravesteyn, to Surat, where he arrived after a six weeks' journey on horseback. Van Ravesteyn, who went to Burhanpur in the company of Sir Thomas Roe, on his return advised against the establishment of a factory. Political conditions in the Moghul Empire did not seem to him to promise security to foreign traders; in any case a farman signed by the Great Moghul himself would be required and would be very difficult to obtain.

Coen, however, who in the capacity of director-general of trade at Bantam was already the leading spirit among the authorities in the East, considered the cottons of Gujarat indispensable for the Molucca trade, the more so as the factory at Achin, where they could be obtained, if at much higher prices, was exposed to intolerable vexations and had soon to be withdrawn. Even before Van Ravesteyn's report had been received, therefore, Coen had dispatched a yacht under Pieter van den Broecke to Gujarat. After touching at Mokha, which became the usual practice, as cash useful for the purchases to be made at Surat could be obtained there, Van den Broecke arrived at Surat in August, 1616, and asked permission to establish a factory. Sir Thomas Roe did what he could to excite the Great Moghul's suspicions against the newcomers,[1] but the Surat merchants feared that in case of a refusal the Dutch might attack their shipping, and the governor of the town gave a provisional permission. The next year two senior merchants, Van Ravesteyn and Adriaan Goeree, were left in charge of the Surat factory, and they had to struggle through some very difficult years. Van Ravesteyn succeeded, to the mortification of Sir Thomas Roe, in negotiating, not it is true with Jahangir himself, but with his son Prince Khurram, a satisfactory treaty of

[1] *Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe* (ed. 1926), pp. 202 *sqq.*

commerce (1618), but all his and his colleague's efforts were in vain since no ships appeared to carry away their indigo and cottons. Van den Broecke, sent from Bantam for the third time in December, 1618, was immediately recalled on account of the outbreak of the war with the English, which necessitated the concentration of all available forces in the Archipelago. The two factors at Surat were driven almost to distraction by their false position until at last, in October, 1620, Van den Broecke, after having called at Aden, arrived at Surat. Coen had appointed him director of both Mokha and Surat, and he took up his residence at the latter place. A number of the Company's other servants arrived overland from Masulipatam later in the year, and factories could then be organised in the inland towns, explored during the preceding years, Broach, Cambay, Ahmadabad, Agra, and Burhanpur, where indigo and textiles of various kinds were to be had.

A more prosperous time now began for the settlement. There was a dangerous conflict in 1622 with the Gujarat authorities, especially with Asaf Khan, Prince Khurram's powerful father-in-law, over the activities of a Dutch ship which had sailed along the Arabian and Persian coast, seizing native craft belonging to Portuguese ports, and had confiscated property belonging—or so it was alleged—to that dignitary. The factor at Cambay, who was within the reach of Asaf Khan's resentment, nevertheless took a high tone and threatened Coen's vengeance in a way eloquent of the self-confidence engendered by the events of 1619. He was, however, arrested and sent to Agra, and Van den Broecke had to pay an indemnity before the Cambay factory could be recovered. Incidents like these were typical of trade in a strong but despotic empire like the Moghul's, and did not prevent the Gujarat factories from producing larger and larger profits. Coen was impatient with Van den Broecke for sending him indigo, when he wanted textiles.[1] In course of time, however, the indigo trade came to be as important as the trade in cottons. In 1624 the first ship sailed from Surat direct for Holland; its cargo consisted mainly of indigo. In those years three or four ships were sent annually from Batavia to trade with Gujarat and Arabia. The English Company, which, after its defeat in Java, was beginning to develop Gujarat as the centre of its eastern system, was still somewhat ahead of its rival here. But the advantages of the Dutch which have been mentioned in connection with their Coromandel trade told in Gujarat as well, and the directorate of Surat—the factories farther to the west were soon formed into a separate directorate—came to be one of the most profitable of all the establishments the Dutch Company possessed.

In 1627 the governor of Coromandel sent some of his subordinates to found a trading establishment in Bengal. At first the new post was kept within the jurisdiction of the Coromandel *gouvernement*, but

[1] Colenbrander, *Jan Pieterszoon Coen*, III, 184.

distance and its growing importance caused the government at Batavia in 1655 to give it a separate organisation as the Directorate of Bengal. Pippli, the first place where the Dutch had established themselves, was soon abandoned for Balasore. When in 1653 a firm footing was obtained at Chinsura up the Hugli river, Balasore was retained only for the convenience of the ships. Chinsura, Kasimbazar and Patna, however, became the centres of an exceedingly prosperous and profitable trade. Although the Dutch in Bengal never attained to the position of independence which they enjoyed in the Carnatic, they were given considerable liberties by the nawab of Bengal, from whom they held the villages of Chinsura and Bernagore in "perpetual fief", with wide jurisdiction even over natives. They were allowed to construct a fortress at Chinsura, called Fort Gustavus, which at any rate safeguarded them against any sudden attack by native forces. They were always exposed, nevertheless, to the exactions of native authorities, but the profits of the Bengal trade enabled them to suffer many losses and to pay many bribes with equanimity.

The articles of export were textiles and silk, saltpetre, rice, and particularly, opium. The opium, which was sent to Java and China, yielded enormous profits. Even when in the eighteenth century the Company's position in Bengal had become precarious, the establishments there continued to be among the most profitable in all the Company's domain.

Ceylon had attracted the Dutch from the early days of their colonial enterprise.

In 1602 Joris van Spilbergh, in command of three ships owned by Balthazar de Moucheron, called at Batticaloa, which was not occupied by the Portuguese, and travelled up to Kandi. Before the year was out, another three ships (detached from the first of the United Company's fleets) appeared at Batticaloa, and their commander, Sebald de Weert, followed Spilbergh's example and visited the "emperor". "Dom João" was eager to enlist the help of the Dutch against the Portuguese, and De Weert arranged with him to go to Achin for reinforcements with which to blockade Galle by sea while the Sinhalese attacked it by land. On 25 April, 1603, De Weert was back at Batticaloa with a fleet of seven ships, but before the expedition against Galle could be undertaken, a quarrel arose, and the Dutch commander was slain with a number of his companions.

This misfortune naturally had a discouraging effect on the Dutch Company, and for many years to come it devoted its energies to the strengthening of its position in the Malay Archipelago. Posts on the Coromandel Coast and Gujarat were a necessary corollary to the enjoyment of the monopoly of the Molucca trade, but the building up of a new monopoly in Ceylon could wait. Relations were not broken off altogether. When the Dutch had founded a factory at

Devenampatnam in 1608, the new king (Dom João had died in 1604) sued for their help again, and in 1610, and again in 1612, treaties were concluded. The man who had negotiated the latter treaty, de Boschhouwer, rose into high favour with the king and left Ceylon in 1615 full of zeal for the plan of an immediate attack on the Portuguese in the island. Both in Java and in Holland, however, he found the authorities immersed in their cares for the Moluccas. At last he persuaded the Danish Government to fit out an expedition to Ceylon, but he himself died on the way out, and without him the Danes achieved nothing at Batticaloa.

The Portuguese now woke up to the danger threatening their position, and closed the ring round the king of Kandi by occupying and fortifying both Trinkomali and Batticaloa. An attempt to take Kandi, however, failed disastrously.

Soon afterwards (1632), the throne of Kandi was occupied by an energetic young ruler, Raja Sinha, who resumed the policy of setting the Dutch against his arch-enemies the Portuguese. On 9 September, 1636, he wrote a letter to the Dutch Governor of the Coromandel Coast at Pulicat—it took his envoy six months to elude the watchfulness of the Portuguese and deliver the letter—in which he asked for a fleet of five vessels to blockade the Portuguese fortresses while he attacked them from the land side; he promised the Dutch leave to build a fortress of their own and the repayment of all the expenses of the expedition.

These proposals now found ready acceptance. The Company, securely established in the Archipelago, was thinking of expansion, and under the energetic leadership of the governor-general Van Diemen a determined attempt was being made to break down the Portuguese Empire. The main effort was directed against Malacca, but at the same time Goa, the nerve-centre of the Portuguese system, was paralysed by an annual blockade (this policy had been started in 1636), and the Dutch felt strong enough to try and wrest from the Portuguese the places which provided the valuable pepper and cinnamon, on the west coast of India and in Ceylon.

In January, 1638, the admiral of the fleet before Goa, Westerwolt, detached two yachts under the command of Coster to begin the siege of Batticaloa. When the south-west monsoon necessitated the break-up of the blockade, he himself appeared on 10 May with four ships and landed 300 men; Batticaloa surrendered after a bombardment without awaiting a storm.

The only importance of Batticaloa lay in that it established communications with the independent ruler of the interior. Westerwolt at once obtained Raja Sinha's consent to a new treaty prepared beforehand and which assured enormous advantages to the Company. By it the Company promised to supply the troops and ships required for the expulsion of the Portuguese from the island; the king was to

make good all expenses thus incurred by deliveries of cinnamon, pepper, etc.; the Dutch were moreover to have complete freedom of commerce in the island to the exclusion of all other European nations. Clearly the king thought hardly any price too high that would help him to re-establish his authority over the coastal towns. By the third clause of the treaty, as Westerwolt sent it to Batavia, however, the king, on top of all this, consented that the Dutch should garrison the fortresses captured from the Portuguese. One wonders why he should have thought it worth his while to pay the Dutch so heavily merely to step into his enemies' place. But the mystery is solved when the Dutch copy of the treaty is compared with the Portuguese translation handed to Raja Sinha: in the only version known to the ruler of Kandi the clause in question contains an addition making the garrisoning of the fortresses by the Dutch dependent on his approval. The deception remained undetected for some time, as the king, pleased with his allies and conscious of his impotence against the Portuguese, made no objection to the Dutch retaining Batticaloa. When Westerwolt on 4 June, 1638, departed for Batavia, he left Coster behind him as governor of the town.

At about the same time another disaster befell the Portuguese, a fleet with reinforcements from Goa for Colombo being shipwrecked. Coster urged the authorities at Batavia to strike while the iron was hot, and the governor-general and council themselves wrote to the directors at home (22 December, 1638) that if they would only send some extra ships and troops, the time had come "to help the Portuguese out of India": the Malabar Coast with its rich trade, Ceylon and Malacca, all seemed within the grasp of the Company.

But quarrels with Raja Sinha supervened, and nothing was achieved in 1639 except the capture of Trinkomali, useless for the cinnamon trade, and the special effort which the Company made towards the end of that year, sending out a fleet of twenty-eight ships in order to blockade Goa and attack Ceylon simultaneously, still did not enable them to capture Colombo. But the command of the sea enabled the Dutch to attack the enemy where he was weakest. In order to provide for the defence of their capital, the Portuguese had reduced the garrison of Negombo, and on 9 February, 1640, that town was taken by the combined Dutch and Sinhalese forces. The first breach had been made in the strong places protecting the cinnamon country, but the immediate result was a quarrel between the allies over the right to occupy the captured town, and the discrepancy between the two versions of the treaty of 1638 now came to light. Raja Sinha's indignation can easily be understood, but the Portuguese were still the more formidable intruders, and Coster succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation on the basis of a compromise which assured to his masters the reality of power. Trinkomali and Batticaloa were to be surrendered to Raja Sinha in return for ten elephants and 1000 bahars

of cinnamon; after the Portuguese had been driven out of Ceylon altogether, the Dutch were to be allowed to retain one fortress; they might, however, hold all they took as a pledge till their expenses had been paid; Colombo was in any case to be dismantled. This treaty was to take the place of the third clause of the treaty of 1638, which was reconfirmed as far as its other provisions went. Immediately after the conclusion of this arrangement, Coster sailed southward and laid siege to Galle, which after hard fighting was taken on 13 March, 1640. No Sinhalese troops took part in the siege.

The Dutch now held two ports in the cinnamon area and expected to have a good share in the trade. But Raja Sinha, although Trinkomali was given up to him in April when he paid the stipulated price of ten elephants, still suspected the intentions of his allies with regard to the captured fortresses. Thanks to their exertions, he now controlled part of the cinnamon fields, but he never delivered the quantities which the Dutch claimed under the treaty, preferring to deal with Arab merchants in spite of its provisions. Coster, who went from Galle to Kandi to remonstrate with the king, was murdered by his Sinhalese escort on his way back (August, 1640). Shortly afterwards the Portuguese were enabled by reinforcements from Goa, where an energetic new viceroy, d'Aveiras, had taken up the government, to make a determined attempt to retake Negombo, and although Galle, where Thijssen had assumed the command after Coster's death, held out, its position was difficult. The Portuguese now dominated all the surrounding area with their troops, and not only was no cinnamon to be obtained, but the town had to be provisioned from Pulicat.

The news of these events aroused the more disappointment at Batavia as developments had taken place in Europe which threatened to interfere with the Company's schemes of conquest. A rebellion against Spanish rule had for some time been brewing in Portugal; in November, 1640, the Duke of Braganza was proclaimed king. Portugal's colonial possessions had for forty years been fair game for the Dutch East India Company, because Portugal was part of the Spanish Empire, with which the states-general still continued at war. Now that Portugal had freed herself and had become Spain's enemy, peace between Holland and Portugal seemed inevitable. In fact negotiations with that object were begun at the Hague in April 1641,[1] and the Batavia government felt that no time was to be lost. The siege of Malacca, which had been taken in January, 1641, had exacted a high toll of life, and the forces at their disposal were small. Yet in September, 1641, they again, as in 1639, sent out a fleet capable of blockading Goa and attacking Ceylon simultaneously, but nothing was achieved, although the negotiators in Europe had taken care to allow as much latitude of time to the Company's arms as decency

[1] Prestage, *The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland from 1640 to 1668*, p. 175.

would permit. On 14 February, 1642, news was received at Batavia of a ten-year truce signed at the Hague on 12 June, 1641; but it was only to come into force in the East a full year after the king of Portugal's ratification arrived at the Hague. War could go on, therefore, in spite of the attempts of the Goa government to arrange an immediate armistice. The ratification was not passed by the king of Portugal until 18 November, and news of this was only received at Batavia on 2 October, 1642. The delay had not been of any use to the Company. The Portuguese still kept Galle practically invested on the land side, and the Dutch had no access at all to the cinnamon fields. But the resources of the Company's diplomacy were not yet exhausted. A difference of interpretation as between Goa and Batavia of one important article of the truce arranged in Europe was used as a pretext to continue the war. It must be said that the Dutch interpretation seems the correct one, and that the Portuguese viceroy's attitude was most unyielding. The successes of the last two years in Ceylon had inspired the Portuguese with a new confidence.

The article in question, the twelfth of the treaty of truce,[1] arranged the affairs between the two nations on the basis of *uti possidetis*, with this proviso, however, that the *lati campi*, the countryside, between fortresses belonging to the contracting parties, were to be divided by the authorities on the spot in accordance with their dependence on these fortresses. Basing themselves on this article, the Dutch demanded that the Portuguese should evacuate the districts of Matturai and Saffragam, parts of the cinnamon country which had always been considered as falling within the jurisdiction of Galle. The Dutch Commissioner, appearing at Goa, which in spite of Portuguese protests was still being blockaded, on 1 April, 1643, proposed a provisional division of the cinnamon lands until the governments in Europe had settled the matter. When this was rejected, war was resumed.

It was not waged by the Dutch only to compel the Portuguese to accept their interpretation of the twelfth article of the truce. There still was a state of war between the Portuguese and Raja Sinha; the viceroy did not recognise the king's authority, in spite of the third article of the truce, which included all Indian rulers allied to either of the contracting parties. In Ceylon, therefore, the Dutch pretended to act on the king's behalf, which meant that they claimed to be free to extend their conquests. Reinforcements from home made it possible for the Batavia government to act with vigour. While in the autumn of 1643 the usual fleet sailed to blockade Goa, a second fleet of nine ships, manned by 1550 men and under the command of Caron, made straight for Ceylon. After a battle under the walls of Negombo, in which the Portuguese were entirely routed, the Dutch penetrated into the town in the wake of the flying army, and became masters of

[1] Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique*, VI, 214.

Negombo once more (January, 1644). Without heeding Raja Sinha's requests that the town should be given up to him, the Dutch strongly fortified it.

The viceroy at Goa, regretting his uncompromising rejection of the offers made him the year before, now wrote to Batavia that he was willing to accept them. But the Dutch were no longer content with the cinnamon country near Galle, they also claimed Negombo with the surrounding area. They claimed it on behalf of Raja Sinha, to whom, however, they did not dream of surrendering it. Yet when in the autumn of 1644 the Batavia government once more sent a large fleet to blockade Goa, its commander, Joan Maetsuycker, was empowered to negotiate. The Seventeen, primed by the states-general, had been remonstrating with their servants in the Indies about the high-handed way in which they had made war on the Portuguese all over the Indian Ocean on account of some cinnamon fields in Ceylon, and it really was a relief to the Batavia authorities when Maetsuycker succeeded in obtaining from the viceroy a treaty (10 November, 1644), by which both Galle and Negombo were ceded with the cinnamon lands divided at equal distances between those places and Colombo. The viceroy, however, only gave up Negombo under protest, and a treaty made between the home governments on 27 March, 1645, in ignorance of what had been done in the East, could still be interpreted by each party to suit its own interests.

At the same time, Negombo was the cause of serious trouble with Raja Sinha, whose men were ravaging the cinnamon lands in which the Dutch hoped to recoup themselves for their expenditure. The governor of Galle, Thijssen, rashly declared war on the king in May, 1645, and was at once recalled, but before Maetsuycker, who became his successor, could restore peace, a military disaster occurred; a Dutch encampment was surrounded, the troops sent to relieve it cut to pieces, and the king returned to Kandi with 400 prisoners (May, 1646). In the negotiations which now dragged on for years, Raja Sinha held a trump card, his prisoners. At last, in 1649, the Dutch consented to a treaty which restored the alliance of 1638, but on somewhat less favourable conditions; not even the monopoly of the cinnamon trade was to remain to them once Raja Sinha had paid off his debts, no doubt a somewhat unlikely contingency. In any case, the old scheme for the expulsion of the Portuguese was again being discussed between the king and the Dutch.

While the Portuguese claims to Negombo were still a matter of negotiation with Maetsuycker, news had arrived, in the summer of 1646, of the rebellion against Dutch rule that had broken out in Brazil. This settled the matter of Negombo; it served as a sufficient pretext for its indefinite retention by the Dutch. Relations between the Dutch Republic and Portugal were greatly strained and the East India Company's pretensions now had the support of the states-

general. Quite apart from the narrow issue of Negombo, it was clear that the peace between the two countries was precarious. When the ten years' truce ran out in 1652, the Company's servants in the East were apprised that they were again to make war on the Portuguese. During the next period, the affairs of the Dutch West India Company kept the war between the Dutch Republic and Portugal alive, and while the Portuguese were successful in Brazil, and could not make peace on account of that very success, they lost nearly all they had left in India, and the schemes of conquest of the Dutch East India Company, which had been interrupted in 1642, were now to a large extent realised.

It was not until 1655 that a serious effort was made. At the urgent requests of the Batavia government, larger quantities of ships and men had been sent from home: 13,500 men during the three years from 1653 to 1655. On 14 August, 1655, twelve ships, with 1200 soldiers on board, left Batavia with orders to attack Colombo; Gerard Hulft, director-general of India, was the commander. Towards the end of September Colombo was invested. It was kept closely blockaded both by land and by sea, and non-combatants trying to escape were driven back. Famine and disease raged as the months wore on, and still the Portuguese held out, hoping for relief from Goa. Early in April a fleet of twenty-two small vessels trying to carry troops and provisions to Colombo was scattered off Quilon by a single Dutch ship. At last, on 7 May, after reinforcements had arrived from Batavia, the town was stormed, and the north-east bastion captured. On 12 May Colombo capitulated, which did not save it from being sacked by the Dutch soldiers.

Colombo was at once garrisoned and the ruined fortifications rebuilt by the Dutch. Raja Sinha had not taken a very active part in the siege. His army had most of the time been encamped near Raygamwatte. Yet his help had been useful in the provisioning of the Dutch troops, and his relations with Hulft had been most cordial. The maharaja bravely kept up the fiction of the Dutch being merely the humble auxiliaries of his august and all-powerful person. Of Hulft he spoke as "my Director-General", and of the Dutch army as "my army".[1] Hulft was killed during the siege, on 10 April, 1656, and with Adriaan van der Meyden, who took his place, Raja Sinha's relations soon grew less agreeable. When the capitulation of Colombo was concluded, in his name and the Company's, but without his even being consulted, and when it became clear that the Dutch had no intention of giving up their conquest to him, the king's attitude became frankly hostile. He closed the mountain passes and forbade the delivery of cattle and other provisions to the Dutch. He tartly reproached the Company with faithlessness. In November Van der Meyden made an end of pretences. A little army was sent against the

[1] Aalbers, *Rijklof van Goens*, p. 53, note 4.

camp at Raygamwatte. Raja Sinha did not wait for it, but broke camp hastily and retired to his mountains. It was to be feared that he might be reconciled with the Portuguese, who were still in possession of two strong places on the north of Ceylon, Manar and Jaffnapatam, and held Tuticorin and Negapatam on the mainland. The Dutch could not feel safe in the possession of the cinnamon lands, therefore, until they had expelled the Portuguese from those last strongholds and "cleaned up that whole corner".[1]

In September, 1657, Rijcklof van Goens, an Extraordinary Member of the Council of India, who had already served the Company in many capacities and in many lands with striking success, was instructed to effect this. Having expelled the Portuguese from the open town of Tuticorin, Van Goens dispatched a mission to the *thever*, the nayak's vassal, and to the nayak of Madura himself, and continued on his way. On 19 February, the fleet crossed from the island of Rammanakoil along Adam's Bridge to Manar, where a number of Portuguese vessels with great obstinacy tried to prevent a landing. When it was nevertheless effected, on the 22nd, the fortress surrendered at once, most of the garrison having hurriedly evacuated it and made for Jaffnapatam. Thither, Van Goens, with 850 men, followed overland; 200 more soldiers, brought from Colombo, joined him before the town. On 9 March the Dutch troops fought their way into the town, the Portuguese retiring into the citadel, which as Van Goens put it, "deserved that name more than any one I ever saw in India". The Portuguese garrison numbered about 1000, and in addition there were 700 or 800 native soldiers. But some thousands of refugees from the town created confusion and accelerated the consumption of provisions. After having captured (26 April) the fortress on the islet of Kays in the mouth of the channel between Ouratura (afterwards Leyden) and Caradiva (afterwards Amsterdam), Van Goens could use the cannon of the fleet which was now assembling before Jaffnapatam, and ten batteries were constructed round the fort. Famine and disease, however, were the most potent weapons of the besieger, and at last, when all hope of relief from Goa had vanished, the Portuguese commander capitulated (23 June, 1658).

As soon as the difficult problem of the great number of prisoners and of the occupation of the fort was settled, Van Goens sailed for Negapatam. The garrison of 367 men was too small to hold that large fortified town, and capitulated at once. Negapatam at first remained under the governor of Ceylon, but, as has already been stated, in 1689 the Dutch made it the seat of their administration on the Coromandel Coast. Portuguese power was definitely broken in the whole of Southern India. The only remaining task was to expel them from the Malabar Coast, and this, too, was a few years later undertaken by Van Goens.

[1] Instruction for Van Goens, 5 September, 1657, *ap.* Aalbers, *Rijklof van Goens*, p. 66.

The Malabar Coast was the region on the mainland of India where the Portuguese had struck root most deeply. The small rulers between whom the country was divided had been unable to prevent the intruders from acquiring large political powers, which they used in the first place to secure for themselves the exclusive trade in the only important export of the region, pepper. In a number of towns there were considerable settlements of Portuguese, and Roman Catholicism had made many converts.

The Dutch, although they had never found time to obtain a firm footing on the Malabar Coast, had been repeatedly in communication with rulers unfriendly to the Portuguese in that region, particularly with the most powerful of the Malabar princes, the Zamorin of Calicut. In September, 1604, Admiral Steven Van der Haghen had concluded a treaty with the Zamorin[1] but, as we know, all available forces were needed for the establishment of Dutch power in the Archipelago in those early days. The piece-goods trade of the Coromandel Coast was moreover thought to be of greater importance than the pepper trade of Malabar, pepper being obtained in sufficient quantities at Bantam and at Achin. And so, although other fleets stopped at Calicut, and Van der Haghen's treaty was renewed, and once (1610) merchants were sent from Tirupapuliyur to conclude a fresh treaty of friendship and commerce, all these arrangements remained a dead letter, and in the days of Van Goens the only Dutch port on the west coast of India was Vengurla to the north of Goa. Here in 1637, when the policy of annually blockading the Portuguese capital had just been adopted, the Dutch had built a fort which served as a *point d'appui* for the blockading fleets and as a post of observation during the months when they were not there. The Malabar Coast proper was still controlled effectively by the Portuguese fortresses.

For some time after the conquest of Negapatam, the war with the Portuguese was carried on less energetically. The Company, exhausted by its effort, tried to obtain assistance from the states-general. But in 1661, although little assistance was forthcoming, it was decided to make a fresh effort to drive the Portuguese from the coast. The states were at last making up their minds to waive their claims to Brazil, and the Company was anxious to complete this new conquest before peace came to upset its schemes.

In October, 1661, a Dutch fleet of twenty-three sail, large and small, appeared under the command of Van Goens off Quilon. The town was taken after a fight with the Nairs, who here as elsewhere took the side of the Portuguese. A garrison was left behind, and the fleet sailed northward to Kranganur, which Van Goens desired to occupy before attacking the principal stronghold of the Portuguese at Cochin. Kranganur, which offered an unexpectedly vigorous resistance, was taken

[1] De Jonge, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië*, III (1865), 204.

by assault on 15 January, 1662, and now the Dutch making themselves masters of the island of Vypin, on which they built the fortress Nieuw Oranje, opened the attack on Cochin. The kings of Cochin had for a long time leant on the support of the Portuguese against their enemy the Zamorin of Calicut, and so again the Nairs had to be driven off, and the queen of Cochin to be made prisoner, before the Portuguese town of Cochin could be besieged. The difficulties of the marshy ground, however, were considerable. The army, weakened already by the garrisons left at Quilon, Kranganur and Nieuw Oranje, was further weakened by illness. The commander decided to raise the siege, and in the dead of night the 1400 men were successfully embarked before the Portuguese knew what was happening. The delay almost proved fatal. On 6 August, 1661, the treaty of peace between Holland and Portugal had actually been signed. It laid down that hostilities were to cease in Europe two months after signature and elsewhere on publication; each side to retain what it then possessed. Had this treaty been ratified at once, the Dutch East India Company would have been baulked of Cochin. But Portugal's new ally, Charles II, was unwilling to share with the Dutch in the remaining Portuguese possessions trading facilities which had hitherto been reserved to the English, and the Portuguese government was too dependent on English help not to seek an alteration of the terms. The Dutch East India Company possessed influence enough in the states-general to take advantage of these new negotiations, and so it was not until 14 December, 1662, that instruments of ratification were exchanged at the Hague, and only several months later was the treaty proclaimed—in Holland in April, in Portugal not before May.

Meanwhile in September, 1662 a large fleet had sailed from Batavia to attack Cochin. In November the siege was renewed. The town was subjected to a furious bombardment, but, fearing that peace might save it, the governor-general and his council had empowered the commander to offer unusually favourable conditions, particularly freedom of exercise for the Catholic religion. Only after repeated assaults had carried the Dutch into part of the town, were these conditions accepted (January, 1663), and Van Goens made his triumphant entry. The subjection of the king of Porakad and the capture of Kannanur completed the conquest of the Malabar Coast. In vain the Portuguese protested in Europe that Cochin and Kannanur, having been taken after the peace, ought to be restored. After protracted negotiations a settlement was arrived at in July, 1669. The Dutch promised to restore the two places on payment by Portugal of certain debts and of the costs incurred by the conquest and fortification of the two towns. As the sums in question far exceeded Portugal's financial capacity, the Company remained in possession.

The Malabar Coast, Kanara and Vengurla were organised as a separate administrative unit under a *commandeur* residing at Cochin. The title of *commandeur*, which was also borne by the chief officials at Galle and Jaffnapatam, who were subordinate to the governor of Ceylon, was not a very high one. The *commandeur* ranked after the director. In fact, the Malabar Coast never gave the Company all that had been expected.[1] The position here was quite different from that in the other establishments on the mainland of India, where the Company traded in open competition with European and native merchants. What had tempted it to conquer the Malabar Coast was the prospect of a monopoly in the pepper trade; and in the eyes of those who guided the Company's destinies, only a monopoly based on contracts at low prices with the native rulers could compensate the high cost of a political establishment. The first task of the *commandeurs*, therefore, was to make the pepper monopoly a reality, but this task proved more arduous than had been anticipated. English, Portuguese, and Gujarat competition enabled the native rulers to avoid dealing only on Dutch terms. It was impossible to prevent smuggling by way of Calicut and of the mountains. Towards the end of the Company's rule, however, the financial position was more satisfactory in this region.[2]

The Zamorin had preserved his independence, and relations with him were frequently strained. In 1717 there was a war, after which the Company attained greater influence over that potentate.[3] But Hyder Ali, who conquered the Zamorin's lands half a century later, was a far more dangerous neighbour, and under Tipu, his son, the Company was, very much against its inclination, drawn into the quarrels between that ruler and the English.

In Ceylon, as on the Malabar Coast, the Dutch had merely stepped into the position of the Portuguese. They held the coastal towns and controlled most of the cinnamon fields and of the regions where elephants were found. But the "emperor of Ceylon" still resided at Kandi, in undisputed possession of the mountainous interior, and the nobles and headmen of the plains, particularly of the south, never quite renounced their allegiance to him. The ancient organisation of society, under *disawas* and *mudaliyars*, was retained, and Dutch rule rested on a native officialdom, open to many influences of race and religion over which they had no control. It was the policy of the Dutch to maintain friendly relations with the court of Kandi, because whenever there was tension the king could stir up trouble for them among the Chalias, the cinnamon-peelers, or among the Sinhalese nobles and officials. Not only Raja Sinha, who lived until 1687, but

[1] *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government; Dutch Records*, No. 11 (1910), *Memoir of Commandeur Caspar de Jong*, 1761.

[2] *Dutch Records*, No. 2 (1908), *Memoir written in the year 1781 by Adriaan Moens*, p. 130.

[3] *Dutch Records*, No. 8 (1910), *Diary kept during the expedition against the Zamorin, 4th Dec. 1716–25th April, 1717.*

his successors as well, still claimed Colombo, and the Dutch, anxious above all to be left in peace so that the cinnamon might be safely collected, humoured their pretensions by paying them excessive honours and posing as their humble allies bound to aid them against the attacks of foreign powers. During Raja Sinha's lifetime this did not prevent frequent trouble, the king sometimes attacking Dutch posts and extending the cinnamon area directly under his control. Cinnamon-peeling was repeatedly prevented and the export of areca-nuts, the most important product of the king's own dominions, prohibited. Better relations prevailed under his immediate successors, although the Dutch maintained their pretension to keep the trade with the outside world completely in their own hands, and in 1707, in order the better to prevent smuggling, closed all ports except Colombo, Galle and Jaffnapatam. By placing ships at the disposal of the court for intercourse with Pegu, whence came Buddhist priests, and with Madura, whence the kings generally obtained their wives, the Company strove to make its control of overseas relations less galling. The kings of the Dravidian dynasty, however, who came to the throne in 1739 with Hanguraketa, and under whom all power at court was in the hands of nayaks from the mainland, were not so easily pacified. At the same time the Company's governors became more and more impatient of the humiliating conditions of their position in Ceylon. Particularly they disliked the annual embassy to the king's court, in order to secure with abject genuflections the right to collect the cinnamon-bark in the area under the king's sovereignty.

But the relations with Kandi did not constitute the only difficulty with which Dutch rule had to contend. Wide regions with populations of varying national and religious traditions and complicated social structures were brought under direct Dutch control. At the time of the conquest, material misery, after Portuguese misrule and protracted war, was the most pressing problem. The Dutch imported slaves from Southern India to restore irrigation works and cultivate the rice fields. They encouraged new crops, like cotton and indigo. They did their best to reduce the chaos which reigned in land tenure. In the Sinhalese country Maetsuycker's *Batavia Statutes*, a codification of the Company's laws, were introduced, but experienced Sinhalese were always members of the *Landraads* in order to see that the ancient customs of the country were observed. In the north, Tamil law, codified under Dutch auspices in 1707, was taken as the basis for legal decisions so long as it appeared consonant with reason, all deficiencies being supplied from Dutch law. The administration of justice left, however, a great deal to be desired. The governors never ceased complaining about the scarcity of officials with sufficient legal training and at the same time conversant with the conditions of the country.

On the whole, circumstances were not such as to favour the growth of a vigorous public spirit among the officials. The society in which they lived at Colombo and in the other coastal towns remained permeated with Portuguese influences. The same was true, to a greater or lesser extent, for all the places on the mainland of India and in the Malay Archipelago from which the Dutch had ousted the Portuguese, and it is to be explained by two characteristics of Portuguese colonisation, their marriages with the natives and their successful propagation of Catholicism. Under Dutch rule ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church at once took charge of the communities of Christians formed by the Portuguese ecclesiastics, but far into the eighteenth century complaints were frequent that the attachment of native Christians, then numbered in hundreds of thousands, to Protestantism, and even to Christianity, was purely nominal. The later historian owes a very real debt to some of the Dutch Reformed ministers. We mention only Philippus Baldaeus, whose description of Ceylon and the Malabar Coast was published in 1672, François Valentyn, whose encyclopaedic work on the possessions of the Company appeared from 1724 to 1726, Abraham Rogerius, probably the best scholar of them all, who was at Pulicat from 1631 to 1641, and whose *Gentilismus Reseratus* was described by A. C. Burnell in 1898 as "still, perhaps, the most complete account of South Indian Hinduism, though by far the earliest". The principal author, too, of the famous botanical work *Hortus Malabaricus*, which under the patronage of Van Reede tot Drakensteyn appeared in 1678 and following years, was a minister of the church—Johannes Casearius. But the Dutch *predikants* had little of the missionary zeal which distinguished the Roman Catholic priests, and they made far less impression on the native populations in whose midst they lived. In Ceylon, seminaries for the training of native missionaries were founded in 1690, but until the governorship of Baron van Imhoff, 1737–40, when only one at Colombo survived, they led a precarious existence.[1] Afterwards half-caste Malabar and Sinhalese pupils regularly passed from the Colombo seminary to Holland, and, after a course of theology at the universities of Utrecht or Leyden, returned to their native land fully qualified ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church. Their influence was never very deep however, and in spite of all repressive measures—no doubt greatly relaxed during the second half of the eighteenth century—Catholicism continued to show much vitality. Portuguese remained the language of the slave population and this, added to the deplorable failure to provide good education for them, had unfortunate effects on the children of the officials, who frequently entered the Company's service when they grew up. The number of Dutch free burghers who settled in Ceylon was never very great. There was, in short, no healthy

[1] Van Troostenburg de Bruyn, *De Hervormde Kerk in Nederl. Oost-Indië onder de O. I. Compagnie*, pp. 574 *sqq*.

public opinion to restrain corruption and loose living among the official class, and the efforts of several able and energetic governors to improve this state of affairs had little effect.

Nor could the Company's general policy be called inspiring. While conflicts with the native powers were anxiously avoided and the armed forces in the island lost all martial spirit, and fortresses were allowed to fall into ruin, the underpaid officials were everywhere urged to increase the financial profits. It was particularly private trading in areca-nuts with which they enriched themselves at the Company's expense, but the abuses which a reforming governor at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Hendrik Becker) discovered and tried to stamp out were of many other kinds besides.

It so happened that not long after Becker's governorship there were two governors in succession against whom the central authorities were constrained to take extreme measures.[1] The first was Pieter Vuyst, a man born in the East, and who behaved like the worst type of eastern tyrant. In 1732 he was arrested by a commissioner, specially sent over from Holland by the Seventeen, and, having been found guilty of the most revolting abuse of power, he was executed at Batavia. The commissioner, who became governor in his stead, Pieter Versluys, reduced the people to despair by speculating in rice. Again the home authorities interfered. A new governor was sent out, who had Versluys arrested and sent to Batavia, where after long delays he escaped with a fine. The misconduct of these men shook Dutch authority in the island. At the same time the cinnamon-peelers complained of undue exactions imposed on them, while agrarian unrest was rife in the Sinhalese districts. So in 1736 a very serious rebellion broke out in the cinnamon region, soon spreading over the whole south and south-west of the island, and secretly encouraged by the king of Kandi. The Dutch suffered some serious reverses and the situation might have taken a disastrous turn, had not in 1737 a vigorous governor appeared on the scene, Baron van Imhoff, who soon restored order.

The events of 1736 were a foretaste of the much more serious war that broke out in 1760, under the governorship of Jan Schreuder. It began with a rebellion in the district of Colombo, in which the Chalias, supported by the maharaja, soon joined. In 1761, the maharaja, who was especially aggrieved by the refusal of the Dutch to allow him freedom of trade from his last remaining ports of Chilaw and Puttalam, openly took the part of the rebels, and the deterioration of the Company's military forces soon became evident. The forts of Matara, Kalutara and Hanwella were captured by the Sinhalese, and although they could not long maintain their position in the plains, the Dutch were very greatly alarmed. The governor-general at Batavia tried to pacify the king by sending him a letter couched in

[1] Van Kampen, *Geschiedenis der Nederlanders buiten Europa* (1832), III, 19.

flattering terms and transmitted with the greatest ceremony. Fear of the English, from whom the Dutch had just suffered a severe humiliation on the Hugli and who were known to be in communication with the king, no doubt contributed to inspire this policy. When it failed, nothing remained but to make a military effort, and the suspicion of English intentions now served to drive home the necessity of carrying it through to a definite conclusion. A new governor, Van Eck, repeatedly attempted to invade the mountain kingdom. Troops were collected in Malabar, Coromandel and Java. In 1765, Van Eck succeeded in penetrating to the capital, which was plundered disgracefully. Van Eck died soon afterwards. The garrison of 1800 men left behind at Kandi could not maintain itself owing to lack of provisions. Its withdrawal became a disaster. In spite of this, such was the distress of the Sinhalese that, while the new governor, Iman Willem Falck, a young man of great ability, was making vigorous preparations for a new invasion, the king opened negotiations. On 14 February, 1766, a treaty was signed which restored peace and placed the relations between the Dutch and the king on a more satisfactory basis than that afforded by the treaties of 1638 and 1640. The Dutch Company's absolute sovereignty over the regions which they had held before the war was recognised. In addition, the sovereignty over a strip of land four miles in width from the sea coast round the whole of the island was expressly ceded to the Dutch, who had occupied Chilaw and Puttalam early in the war. For the rest the king's sovereignty was recognised, but he lost the power to permit or forbid the Company's trading in such produce of his dominions as experience had shown to be indispensable or profitable. The degrading ceremonies attending the annual embassy to the court were abolished. Finally, while the Company pledged itself to protect his dominions from all external aggression, he promised not to enter into any treaty with any European or Indian power, and to deliver up all Europeans coming within his territory.

The Dutch could congratulate themselves that the treaty of 1766 had consolidated their position in Ceylon. Falck, moreover, proved one of the best governors the island had ever known. Much was done during his term of office to improve the administration and to increase the economic prosperity of the people. But meanwhile the rise of English power constituted a menace against which nothing availed. In 1781, the king of Kandi appeared to be unwilling to support the English in their enterprise against Dutch rule on the island. In 1796, his aloofness no longer mattered: Dutch power, as we shall see, collapsed at the first touch.

In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Company's position in India rested on sea-power. While the English made of Surat, where they were dependent on friendly relations with the Moghul, the centre of their Indian system and obtained a footing at Goa itself by an amicable

arrangement with the Portuguese, the Dutch broke down the Portuguese monopoly by the open and persistent use of force, capturing their ships and supplanting them as the actual rulers of one stronghold after another. Even in their relations with the Moghul they occasionally brought their naval superiority into play. So conscious were they of their naval supremacy that in 1652 the outbreak of war with both England and Portugal was welcomed at Batavia as likely to turn to the Company's advantage.[1] The advantage, as against England at any rate, was confined to the occasional capture of prizes. The factories of the English Company were protected by the Moghul's peace. In the third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–4) communications between Surat and the new English settlement of Bombay were constantly threatened, and three home-bound English ships were captured in the Bay of Bengal. France was England's ally in that war, and in 1671 Louis XIV had already dispatched to India a fleet of twelve sail under the command of Admiral de la Haye. Even before war had been declared in Europe, the French occupied some abandoned forts in the bay of Trinkomali. Van Goens, who was then governor of Ceylon, without losing time, collected such ships as were available and attacked the intruders. Soon reinforcements arrived from Batavia, and de la Haye was forced to leave Ceylon with the loss of several of his ships.[2] With the remainder he sailed for St Thomé and captured that town. Van Goens was soon on the spot and blockaded the town from the sea side, while the king of Golconda, its rightful sovereign, invested it by land. The English and the French were too jealous of each other to co-operate, and an English fleet of ten sail allowed itself to be beaten separately off Petapoli.[3] About a year afterwards, 6 September, 1674, de la Haye capitulated. He had lost all his ships, and the 900 men left to him out of the 2000 with whom he had started, were transported to Europe in Dutch vessels.

While the naval power of the Dutch was the despair of their rivals, they themselves often were inclined to envy the English, who were able to carry on their trade without incurring the vast expenses for the upkeep of a navy and of fortresses and garrisons which burdened the budget of the Dutch Company. The recollection that it was the Dutch attacks on the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly which had opened the Indian trade to their rivals as well as to themselves added bitterness to these feelings. In fact, the settlements where they had not taken up the responsibilities of sovereignty were by far the most profitable in the eyes of the Company, which never learnt to separate its purely trading accounts from its political budgets. In the years 1683–1757, therefore, the only period for which these figures are

[1] Aalbers, *Rijklof van Goens*, p. 81.
[2] De Jonge, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsch zeewezen*, II, 768.
[3] Shafaat Ahmed Khan, *Sources for the History of British India in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 245–6.

available,[1] Surat, Bengal and Coromandel figure in the Company's books with annual profits of hundreds of thousands of guilders each, although Bengal, after 1720, very frequently shows a loss. Ceylon and Malabar on the other hand constantly showed heavy losses, although we know from other sources that Malabar ceased to be "a bad post" towards the end of the eighteenth century.[2] In these figures profit and loss made by commercial transactions are lumped together with the yield of taxation and tributes and the expenses of administration, and no account is taken of profits made in Holland by the sale of merchandise.

All through the eighteenth century the Company's commitments as a sovereign power increased: garrisons became more numerous, the expenses of administration grew. As a result, although its trade continued to prosper, the Company's finances became more and more involved. Something like 50 per cent. profit was regularly made on the Company's turnover even as late as the seventies of the eighteenth century, very largely owing to the enormously profitable trade of Surat, Bengal and Ceylon.[3] At the same time the general balance-sheet showed a steady decline. In 1700 there were still 21,000,000 guilders on the credit side; in 1724 the zero point was passed, and the deficit grew uninterruptedly until in the eighties of the eighteenth century it surpassed 100,000,000 guilders.[4]

Obviously the Company's system suffered from grave defects. Great as it had been as an empire-builder, able as it still was as a merchant, it failed as a colonial ruler. Its strict adherence, against the advice of all its ablest governors-general, to the policy of commercial monopoly was perhaps its gravest mistake. The settlement of "free burghers," which might have brought in its train a much more intensive economic development of countries like the Malay Archipelago and Ceylon, was consistently discouraged by the directors at home. Another defect, and one which more nearly concerns the Company's possessions in India, was the severe subordination of the whole of its system to the administrative and commercial centre at Batavia. Ceylon was the only place whence direct communications with Holland were more or less regularly conducted, and its governors were allowed to correspond with the Seventeen, while the chiefs of all other settlements could only correspond with the governor-general and his council. One unfortunate result of the distance of the central authority was the prevalence of corruption. No posts in the Company's employ were considered so lucrative as those in what were called "the Western Quarters".[5]

[1] G. C. Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick*, Beilage IX.
[2] See above, p. 36, note 2.
[3] Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick*, p. 193.
[4] Klerk de Reus, *op. cit.* Beilage VIII.
[5] This term in the early days was applied more particularly to Surat and the Persian and Arabian factories.

The commonest form of peculation was private trading. While the Company jealously suppressed the rise of a class of independent traders within its sphere of influence, it was powerless to prevent its own servants from infringing its monopoly to their own private advantage. As early as 1609 the directors bitterly complained of the prevalence of the abuse, but while they continued grievously to underpay their employees, the constantly reiterated edicts prohibiting the practice, threatening penalties, prescribing oaths, remained entirely without effect. In 1626, the directors resolved[1] that all the establishments in the East were to be visited every year by two inspectors, to one of whom "the Western Quarters" were allotted; they were to report both to Batavia and to the Seventeen themselves. In spite of another resolution to the same effect in 1632, nothing came of this annual inspection, and even requests, made by the directors in 1650[2] and repeated afterwards, that an inspection should be held every two years had no result. The Batavia government excused themselves by the difficulty of finding suitable men for so arduous a task, but no doubt they were themselves lukewarm in the cause of integrity. Inspections were actually ordered only when there were special reasons to suspect mismanagement, but even then an energetic and honest man like Van Goens, who inspected Surat in 1654, had to confess[3] that it was difficult to bring the wrong-doers to book, as they knew well how to escape detection. In 1684 the Seventeen, despairing of ever getting the Batavia government to act with requisite firmness, themselves appointed a commissioner-general to inspect the Western Quarters, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakensteyn, formerly *commandeur* of Malabar, whom we have met on the Coromandel Coast. For seven years Van Reede laboured at his herculean task; when he died in 1691, it was still far from being completed, and the results of the inspections actually carried out soon vanished. From then onwards no serious attempts were made to put down the evil, and it grew steadily. So much had it become an accepted thing that directors themselves began to traffic in appointments, and about 1720 an Amsterdam burgomaster accepted 3500 guilders for conferring on a candidate the post of under-merchant, the official salary for which was only 480 guilders a year.[4]

As in course of time the Company, from being a purely trading body, became the sovereign of many Eastern lands, its servants could enrich themselves in other ways than by infringing its monopoly or embezzling its money. Oppressions and exactions at the expense of the subject populations were no less lucrative and no less common. We have seen in the cases of Vuyst and Versluys that the supreme authorities were not prepared to countenance the worst excesses.

[1] J. A. van der Chijs, *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek*, I, 188.
[2] Aalbers, *Rijklof van Goens*, p. 30.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 107.
[4] Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis*, II, 219.

Vuyst's judicial murders even caused them to introduce a general reform. Governors and directors had until then always presided over the Council of Justice in their governments. In 1738 this function was transferred to the second. Nor are these cases the only ones to show that the growth of humanitarian ideas during the eighteenth century occasionally inspired the authorities at Batavia or at home to energetic interference on behalf of the Company's wronged native subjects. In 1765, for instance, the Seventeen ordered action to be taken against the governor of Coromandel, Christiaan van Teylingen, on the strength of serious charges which a minister of the king of Tanjore, Paw Idde Naiker, had succeeded in bringing directly to their knowledge.[1]

If the directors occasionally exerted themselves to put down some crying abuse; if now and again an able and energetic man rose to some high executive post in the Indies; no radical reform of the Company's defective system was ever attempted. Van Imhoff, whom we have met as governor of Ceylon, became governor-general in 1743, and high expectations were founded on him, which were hardly realised. He attempted, among other things, to put down the illicit trade in Bengal opium by allowing officials to form an "Opium Society" among themselves, thus legalising private trade in this one instance. When, however, another generation of officials had arisen who did not own any shares in the "Society", matters were as bad as ever. In 1747, again, the Orangist restoration at home seemed to offer better prospects, but the new stadtholder, William IV, for whom in 1748, under the direct pressure of public opinion, the office of director-general of the Company was created, did not effect any essential or permanent changes.

At the same time circumstances had arisen which made the need for reform more urgent. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, the English Company, realising the insecurity of its position in the troubled Moghul Empire, had copied from "the wise Dutch" their policy of the strong arm. The first attempts ended in failure, but, as the eighteenth century proceeded, just when the Dutch had allowed their navy hopelessly to decay, and in their relations with native rulers trusted to flattery and presents, it became clearer that the position of the European nations in India had no solid basis except in naval and military power. The rise of French influence in the southern part of the peninsula caused the Dutch many alarms. Particularly obnoxious was Dupleix's capture of Masulipatam in 1750. In the War of the Austrian Succession, the Dutch Republic, although technically neutral, had in fact sided with England. In the Seven Years' War, on the other hand, its neutrality was real, with, if any-

[1] A. K. A. Gysberti Hodenpyl, De Gouverneurs van Koromandel: Christiaan van Teylingen (1761–65) en Pieter Haksteen (1765–71), *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis*, v, x (1923), 136 *sqq.*

thing, a bias against England. Clive's successes in Bengal were viewed by the authorities at Batavia with deep suspicion. It was felt that the power to which the English, through their ally and tool Mir Ja'far, had now attained, threatened the prosperity, if not the existence, of establishments which were looked upon as constituting one of the Dutch Company's main supports. Immediately after Plassey, Dutch trade on the Hugli was reported to be suffering, and exactions on the part of the Indian authorities became more unbearable. So the governor-general and his council resolved to make an attempt to retrieve the position.[1] It only served to make it apparent to all the world how far the Dutch Company had left the days of Coen and of Van Goens behind it. The ships sent up the Hugli were captured, the troops cut to pieces. Nothing remained but to make a speedy submission, and the Dutch retained their factories, but had to promise not to garrison them with more than a small number of troops. They were now worse off than before, but the next crisis, in 1781, was to leave them even more helpless.

In the American War the Dutch Republic, tossed by violent party struggles, recklessly provoked England, and when England, at the end of 1780 declared war, the republic proved entirely incapable of defending its own interests. Its trade came to a dead stop. In the colonial world, the English took Negapatam, which in spite of its large garrison offered little resistance. Trinkomali was lost, and regained only by the efforts of the French. But at the peace congress Holland could not be saved from all loss by its ally. Negapatam had to be given up, and free access to the waters of the Archipelago had to be granted to English commerce.

The war, moreover, had revealed the Company's financial distress. The state had had to assist it when it proved unable to raise the money needed for its own armaments and for the reimbursement of the French. In 1783 only a public guarantee of the Company's shares enabled it to carry on. Everybody realised that the state must take in hand the reform of a body which had the care of such important national interests. Unfortunately, the state was too much shaken by internal dissensions to be capable of energetic action. When in 1787 the Orangist *régime* was restored by England and Prussia, still very little was done. In 1793 the republic was involved in the Revolutionary War, and only in 1795, when the Batavian Republic was established under French influence, did the state formally take over the administration of the Company's possessions. But at the same time these were exposed to the attacks of England, with whom the Batavian Republic found itself automatically at war.

[1] G. C. Klerk de Reus, "De expeditie naar Bengale in 1759", *De Indische Gids*, 1889 and 1890.

CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA

THE French appeared in India long before the time of Louis XIV. In the second quarter of the sixteenth century, about thirty years after the Portuguese had reached the Malabar Coast by way of the Cape, in July, 1527, a Norman ship belonging to the Rouen merchants appeared, according to the Portuguese João de Barros, at Diu. In the next year the *Marie de Bon Secours*, also called the *Grand Anglais*, was seized by the Portuguese, at the very time when one of Jean Ange's most famous captains was proposing to that famous merchant to sail to Sumatra and even to the Moluccas. In 1530 the *Sacre* and the *Pensée* actually reached the west coast of Sumatra; but they did so without touching at any intermediate point on the shores of Asia; and contemporary documents do not indicate the arrival of any other French ships in Indian harbours in the later years of the sixteenth century or the earlier ones of the seventeenth.

However, many facts show at the beginning of the latter a desire to open maritime and commercial relations with India. In 1601 we have the equipment by a company of St Malo merchants, de Laval and de Vitré, of the two ships, the *Croissant* and the *Corbin*, the voyages of which have been related by François Pyrard de Laval as far as the Maldives, and by François Martin de Vitré to Sumatra by way of Ceylon and the Nicobars; in 1604–9 came the attempts of Henry IV to set up a French East India Company, like those just established in the Netherlands and England; then in 1616 a fleet sailed from St Malo for the Moluccas, while in that year and 1619 the two so-called "fleets of Montmorency" sailed from Honfleur for Malaya and Japan. But the scanty success of these enterprises, and the violence of the Dutch, eager to keep for themselves the monopoly of that profitable trade with the Far East, soon checked these bold attempts of the French sailors. In 1625 Isaac de Razilly declared that "as regards Asia and the East Indies there is no hope of planting colonies, for the way is too long, and the Spaniards and Dutch are too strong to suffer it".[1] A little later Richelieu observes in his *Testament Politique* that "the temper of the French being so hasty as to wish the accomplishment of their desires in the moment of their conception, long voyages are not proper for them"; but nevertheless he admits that "the trade that could be done with the East Indies and Persia...ought not to be neglected".[2]

[1] Léon Deschamps, "Un Colonisateur au temps de Richelieu", *Rev. de Géographie*, XIX, 460, December, 1886.

[2] Ed. Amsterdam, 1708, pp. 154–5.

However, some captains, especially the Normans, attempted, though their accomplishment is on many points obscure, if not to reach India itself, at least to make it easier of attainment by securing near the Cape of Good Hope a place of refreshment, whence they could make their way to Arabia, Persia, the Deccan ports, Bengal, or the Malayan Islands. Such were Gilles de Rezimont and Rigault, the latter of whom obtained in 1642 from Richelieu for himself and his associates the privilege of sailing to Madagascar and the neighbouring islands, to establish colonies and trade there.[1] Indeed the French almost at once established themselves on the south-east coast of Madagascar, setting up their first post at Fort Dauphin, easily reached by ships coming from or going to India. Moreover, some of their ships or smaller vessels between 1650 and 1660 proceeded to the Arabian or Indian coasts. Thus was confirmed the opinion expressed some years earlier by the navigator, Augustin de Beaulieu, who had commanded one of the Montmorency fleets, in a memoir of 1631–2, still unpublished:

I find the said island [Madagascar] proper, once we are established there, for adventures to any place whatever in the East Indies...for from the said place at the due season Persia can be reached...where a very useful and important trade can be established.... And when the said trade with Persia is inconvenient, that with the countries of the Great Moghul, Ceylon, Masulipatam, Bengal, Pegu, Kedda, Achin, Tiku and Bantam, can easily be followed.

By way of Persia, which Beaulieu recognises as a valuable market, it was easy to reach India. While French sailors were exploring the sea-route by the Cape, various travellers and merchants were exploring the much shorter land-route, which leads from the shores of the Levant through Asia Minor right on to the valleys of the Indus and the Ganges. After the Italian, Pietro della Valle and the Englishman, Thomas Herbert (only to mention the most recent) several Frenchmen tried this way, such as Capuchin missionaries, including Father Raphael du Mans in 1643, inspired by the ideas of Father Joseph du Tremblay (the famous *Éminence Grise*), and before him the well-known traveller Tavernier who thus began in 1632–3 his numerous journeys in the East, and who on his return became controller of the household to the Duke of Orleans, brother of Louis XIII. Soon afterwards (1642–8) he returned eastwards, and reached India by way of Ispahan, followed speedily by the Angevin noble La Boullaye le Gouz, whose travels were so popular when they were published in 1653. Thus was heightened the eager desire felt in France on the eve and at the beginning of the personal reign of Louis XIV to share with Dutch and English in bringing to Europe the precious goods of India. Neither Fouquet, superintendent of finances, whose father had been

[1] Flacourt, *Relation de la Grande Île Madagascar*, ed. 1658, p. 193. Cf. "Les Documents inédits relatifs à la Constitution de la Compagnie des Indes de 1648", *Bull. du comité de Madagascar*, October, 1898, pp. 481–503.

concerned in all the maritime enterprises of Richelieu, nor Colbert, who had been employed in the private business of Mazarin before coming to play his great part under Louis XIV, were unaware of these travels, and sometimes even received direct reports. Thus the latter became the interpreter of the unanimous desire of the merchants and mariners of the kingdom, as well as of all those who desired its economic development, when he proposed to his master the creation of "a French company for the trade of the East Indies".[1]

His personal convictions even more than public opinion had led Colbert to regard the establishment of a company of this kind as likely to render the greatest services to and powerfully to aid the development of French maritime trade, on condition that it should be strong in a very different way from the numerous associations of a like nature that had formerly sprung up throughout the kingdom. Those had hardly been more than municipal, such as the Company of St Malo, the de Laval and de Vitré Company, or the coral companies of Marseilles; or provincial, such as the Company de Morbihan, and had never included more than a small number of shareholders. Their financial resources had always been limited, and their influence and prestige alike slight. No attempt had been yet made to create a national association, uniting the whole forces of the country. But that was just what Colbert desired the new *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* to do. He laboured therefore in every way before constituting it to educate public opinion, and, when it had been formed, to secure it full success. Hence the publication in April, 1664, of a *Discourse of a faithful subject of the King touching the establishment of a French company for the East India trade addressed to all Frenchmen*, prepared by François Charpentier, the Academician, and printed at the king's expense; hence a little later the formation of a company to which Louis XIV not only gave his full approval, but also advanced 3,000,000 *livres* free of interest, from which were to be deducted all losses that the company might incur for the first ten years; moreover he made the members of the royal family subscribe, and displayed his interest strongly enough to make the courtiers follow his example. Hence also Colbert's own subscription to the new *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, and the campaign which he conducted throughout the country to induce the officials and merchants of the chief towns to prove their real interest in a project thus royally patronised.

By letters-patent in the form of an edict the *Compagnie* was placed under the management of a general chamber of twenty-one directors (twelve for the capital and nine for the provinces) and received for a term of fifty years an exclusive privilege of trade from the Cape of Good Hope to India and the South Seas. It also received a perpetual grant of Madagascar and the neighbouring islands, on condition of promoting Christianity there, a perpetual grant with all rights of

[1] Souches de Rennefort, *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, p. 2.

seigneurie of all lands and places conquered from its enemies, and ownership of all mines and slaves which it might take. The king was to supply the Company at cost price with all the salt required for its fleets, to pay it a bounty of fifty *livres* on every ton of goods exported from France and seventy-five on every ton imported into the country, to allow the Company to establish a free port on the French coast, with a reduction of duties on the articles of trade with France, and a special exemption of duties on all stores needed for the building of ships. The General Chamber, which was to be renewed one-third every year and to prepare accounts every six months, was entrusted with the duty of appointing governors of its possessions, and the king limited himself to giving them their formal investiture. The chamber was also to give account of its management every year to an assembly of shareholders each possessing at least six shares. The capital of the Company was divided into 15,000 shares of 1000 *livres* each.

The privileges thus granted were very considerable. But in order to form a complete idea of them it is necessary also to take account of certain other privileges, also of value, enumerated in the forty-eight articles of the charter establishing the Company as an official body and confirming at once its rights and duties. On his part the king promised to protect the new Company and to escort its ships with his own men-of-war; he allowed the Company to send ambassadors to make treaties with, and declare war on, the sovereigns of India; and, at the same time as he allowed it to fly the royal flag, he granted it arms and a motto—*Florebo quocumque ferar*—signifying the great hopes placed by both him and Colbert in the new association.

If the country had responded with enthusiasm to the appeals made to it, the Company would doubtless have realised those hopes and become that "mighty company to carry on the trade of the East Indies" anticipated in the preamble of the letters-patent. But nothing of the sort happened. For various reasons—lack of enterprise among the trading classes and the lesser *noblesse de robe* outside the ports and a few great cities; dislike of most wealthy men for distant expeditions; losses of the war with Spain still not made good; revival of the *frondeur* spirit in the face of an admittedly official propaganda; fear lest the subscription should be merely a device to tax the nobles and other exempt persons[1]—the king's appeal addressed to the mayors and bailiffs of the principal towns in the form of a *lettre de cachet*, was unheeded and the royal example followed by few. So that of the 15,000,000 *livres* of which the capital was to have consisted, only about 8,200,000 *livres* were actually subscribed, and of that only a third was called up when the letters-patent of August, 1664, had given legal existence to the new Company. Thus the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*

[1] Unsigned letter to Colbert (Depping, *Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV*, III, 476).

began its existence with a capital of about 5,500,000 *livres*, including the 3,000,000 advanced by the king.

Colbert in fact was in haste to secure for France a share in the considerable profits which foreigners were then drawing from the East India trade, and which were rendering the Dutch, as Charpentier said, the wealthiest people in Europe.[1] So from October, 1664, he sought to prepare the way for the traders whom the new Company was meaning to send as soon as possible to the most distant shores of the Indian seas. To the shah of Persia and to the Great Moghul he sent by way of Aleppo representatives of the king and agents of the Company with orders to secure the favour of those princes and to hold preliminary discussions for the conclusion of real treaties of commerce. At the same time he was busy with the preparation of the first fleet. After passing the Cape the Company's ships were to put into Madagascar to strengthen the position of the French colonists already settled on the east and south-east coasts of the Île Dauphine, as the island was now officially called, and to set up a post for victualling and refreshment for French vessels on their way to India; they would then push up the East African coast to Arabia, leaving it to a later fleet to reach the Deccan ports and establish factories there.

At first sight the plan seems wise and well concerted. Was it not wise in fact to secure to French vessels a good port of call on the long voyage to India, and to place it at a point from which the Company's ships could easily push on in all directions? By establishing themselves at Table Bay in 1652, by seeking to establish themselves at Mauritius from 1638, by trying to form a colony on the west coast of Madagascar at St Augustine's Bay, both the Dutch and English had in a way imposed this policy on Colbert, rendering it the more necessary by the jealousy which they displayed of the young French Company. His real error, explained, however, by his love for his country and his master, by the ambition of Louis XIV, and the devotion of France to the king at the outset of his personal rule, lay in not discerning sharply enough how the position of the French Company differed from that of the Dutch in the East; the result was that he imposed on the former from the first the task of conducting at the same time two distinct enterprises—a considerable colonising effort as well as the establishment of a commerce full of risks; perhaps also he reckoned too lightly the mishaps and successive disappointments of every new enterprise, especially in a field so remote from the seat of control. In point of fact the Company escaped no kind of misfortune, so that Colbert's elaborate plans were hardly realisable. Even if any of the five nobles and merchants who set out for the Middle East at the end of 1664 had been able to fulfil their instructions, none of the four ships that made up the first fleet sailing in March, 1665,

[1] *Discours d'un fidèle sujet du roi.*

got further than Madagascar. The second fleet of ten vessels that sailed a year later, made, like the first, a very long voyage to Fort Dauphin; so that, only at the beginning of 1668, nearly four years after the formation of the Company, did any of its qualified representatives arrive by the sea-route in the Swally Roads on the coast of Gujarat.

There one of the agents sent in 1664 had long been awaiting his chiefs. Béber (for so he was named), after accompanying La Boullaye le Gouz to Agra in August-September, 1666, had returned to Surat, where he proceeded to act on a farman of Aurangzib granting the French a site and factory at Swally and permission to trade in the neighbouring town on the same terms as the Dutch and the English. A man of zeal and ability, as one of his chiefs testifies, Béber had so well prepared for the new arrivals that they were able to establish themselves at once, purchase a certain quantity of goods, and send them back by one of the ships that had accompanied them from Madagascar.

Unluckily there, as at Madagascar, jealousies and misunderstandings between the directors themselves, and between them and their subordinates, led to disastrous results. A good beginning had been made; from Surat several of the Company's ships had sailed up the Persian Gulf, visiting Bandar Abbas (where Mariage, who had set out from France with Béber, had a short time before established a factory), and even reaching Basra; a footing had been also secured on the Malabar Coast as a stage on the way to Ceylon and Malaya. But François Caron, an old servant of the Dutch Company and a man of experience and intelligence whom Colbert had engaged in the French service, relying on his knowledge, tried to keep all business in his own hands, while he was also influenced by his personal sympathies and dislikes. Hence resulted many differences, of which the Dutch, irreconcilable enemies of the French establishment in India, took advantage the more easily because Caron had quarrelled with the Moghul governor of Surat.

Meanwhile many events had induced Colbert to modify his original project. In France what enthusiasm had at first been aroused by the formation of the Company had quite disappeared; many shareholders, who had only subscribed in order to pay their court to the king and minister, preferred to lose what they had already paid than to meet the demand for the second instalment, called up in December, 1665, and it was still worse with the demand for the remaining third a year later; so that the king had had to promise (September, 1668) two more millions to the company to enable it to carry on. Moreover, the reports from the Île Dauphine had shown Colbert that matters there were going ill, that, as he said, considerable sums had been absolutely squandered. Without yet deciding to give up the Madagascar project, the minister agreed for the present to relieve the

Company of the task of planting that great unsettled island, in order to employ all its resources in the eastern trade, and, as the directors demanded, go straight to India.[1] But on the advice of La Boullaye le Gouz and Caron, who from their knowledge of the country had urged him "to show a little sample of his master's power" to the princes of Asia, Colbert resolved early in 1669 to send a considerable fleet into the Indian seas. It was to display the *fleurs de lys*, to give the native sovereigns "a high opinion of the justice and goodness of His Majesty, at the same time that they learnt his power", and to disprove the assertions of the Dutch who had never ceased attempting to ruin the French reputation among the people of India. Accordingly a squadron of ten vessels, under the command of Jacob Blanquet de la Haye, "governor and Lieutenant-general for the King in the Île Dauphine and in all India", sailed from La Rochelle 30 March, 1670.

The "squadron of Persia", as it was called to show the public, and especially the shareholders of the Company, the new direction of policy, took no less than eighteen months to reach Surat, instead of the six or seven months Colbert had expected. When it arrived at last, in the middle of October, 1671, Caron was no longer there. In spite of the divisions among the tiny group of Frenchmen, he had succeeded in the preceding months in founding certain factories on the Malabar Coast and another at Masulipatam, and had then set out to establish yet another at Bantam, in the extreme west of Java. Thus the directors charged by Colbert with the restoration of amity in the French factory, and de la Haye's great squadron, arrived during his absence. De la Haye, who had taken the title of viceroy on his arrival in India, had been instructed above all "to establish the company so strongly and powerfully that it shall be able to maintain itself and to increase and augment itself in the course of time by its own power". Such was the "sole and single purpose" of this important squadron in Indian waters. De la Haye was to effect it by establishing fortified posts at points reckoned most favourable for trade, in Ceylon especially, and by force if necessary. Doubtless such an enterprise would injure the European peoples already established in India, especially the Dutch; but such a consideration would weigh little with Louis XIV or Colbert, who could not forgive the United Provinces for their manifestations of political and economic hostility. Colbert wrote to de la Haye, "The Dutch, though powerful, will not dare to prevent the execution of His Majesty's designs; but it will be necessary to be on your guard against any surprise on their part". And in this connection, as in all others, de la Haye was "to act in concert with, and even follow the views and orders of, the directors of the company who are in India;...and even though the Sieur de

[1] Dernis, *Recueil et collection des titres concernant la Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, I, 187.

la Haye knows that they are doing ill, [he should] after representing his opinions to them, exactly follow their judgment".[1]

In the face of instructions so formal and even imperative, what could de la Haye do but await the return of Caron, whom Colbert had mentioned by name as "having a profound knowledge, by reason of his twenty-two years' service with the Dutch, of all that can and ought to be done in India for the profit of the company"? He therefore awaited his return from Bantam. Hence followed a delay by which the Dutch profited, strengthening their defences, especially as at the end of 1671, in India as in Europe, war had been expected between France and the republic. To crown this, even when Caron and the newly arrived directors had met, they could not agree, which added to the delay in the sailing of the squadron. Not until the beginning of January, 1672, could de la Haye and his ships leave Swally Roads "to carry into the Indies the first knowledge of the arms and might of His Majesty".

The viceroy's instructions ordered him to neglect no means of attaining this end. He spent, therefore, six weeks sailing down the Malabar Coast, trying "to show it off, and to display to advantage its beauty, power, guns, and crews", firing numberless salutes in every port he visited—Daman, Bombay, Goa, Calicut, Kranganur, Cochin, etc. Just as he was about to quit the coast and make for Ceylon, he learnt of the approach of a Dutch fleet; on 21 February he sighted twelve ships out to sea off Cape Comorin. He desired to approach them, and even to attack; but "M. Caron was as displeased [de la Haye wrote to Louis XIV some months later] as if I had proposed to him a crime. How often [he adds with some bitterness and not a little reason] have I regretted my express orders to follow the opinions of the directors". He was indeed right; and Caron, overwhelmed as he had been with benefits by Colbert, was already beginning to exhibit a strange, dubious conduct, which later developments were to prove still more dubious.

Leaving then with great regret his enemies to sail away, de la Haye coasted round the south and west of Ceylon, where the Dutch were already established, and then ran up the east coast as his instructions directed. Soon he was off Trinkomali Bay, the one natural harbour of the island, which he entered at once, but only to find that the Dutch had been beforehand with him, and had improvised, if not solidly built, various defences. Thus the position reckoned on by Colbert in December, 1669, had totally changed by March, 1672.

Was he then to give up that considerable settlement on Ceylon, which the minister's instructions said was to open the cinnamon trade to the Company? Was he to disregard the king's view, that nothing could be more for the benefit of the Company? De la Haye thought not. Since then he was sent to choose a site, build a post

[1] Clément, *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, III (2), 461–70.

there, put it in a state of defence, and provide it with every necessity, he paid no heed to "the insolent orders" of the Dutch to leave the harbour. But he went no further. Once more at the repeated instances of Caron he abandoned his project, which was to fight the fleet of the Admiral Rijckloff van Goens, and contented himself with procuring from the king of Kandi a grant of the bay of Trinkomali, with the country of Kutiari and its dependencies, taking possession in the king's name, and building a little fort there. He did not know that the Dutch had told the natives that he had not dared to fight them, that they were isolating him, and that they were about to deprive his crews and sick of victuals. A victory would have established the prestige of the "squadron of Persia", and made the French undisputed masters of Trinkomali, if not of India; but on 9 July de la Haye quitted the bay without having given battle, merely leaving on one of the little islands within it a handful of men whom the Dutch seized a few days later, thus justifying in the eyes of all the assertions of his enemies.

A little later, on his arrival before St Thomé (or Mailapur, as the Indians called it) on the Coromandel Coast, de la Haye reaped the fruits of his error; the officers sent to ask for victuals met with an unreasonable refusal from the Muhammadan officials and insults from the populace.[1] On the advice of Caron, who was certainly the evil genius of this campaign, and who may with cause be suspected of treason, the viceroy resolved to strike a blow; on 25 July, 1672, five days after dropping anchor before the place, he carried it by escalade, to the great alarm of the Muhammadans and even of the Europeans scattered along the coast in the various factories.

Ten years earlier the king of Golconda had conquered St Thomé from the Portuguese, and had also occupied the neighbouring part of the Carnatic. The loss of the place irritated this sovereign; he at once set to work to recover it, and quickly surrounded it with horse and foot, elephants, and work-people with everything needed for a blockade.[2] In spite of the diligence with which he had sought to consolidate his position, de la Haye had had no time in which to lay in provisions; and from the beginning of October he had to revictual himself by sea. As yet the Dutch had not joined the Muhammadans, although they had learnt a month earlier of the outbreak of war between France and England on the one side and the Netherlands on the other. By dint of his own energy, the bravery and spirit of his troops, the zeal and intelligence of his subordinates, volunteers or agents of the company, the French leader held St Thomé for two years against the king of Golconda and the Dutch, with no help from the English. But courage and good will themselves are not always enough; and even after Caron's departure for France (October,

[1] *Mémoires de Bellanger de Lespinay*, p. 143.
[2] Carré, *Voyage des Indes Orientales*, f. 289.

1672), de la Haye failed to make the most of his opportunities. Even when he had obliged the Muhammadans once to raise the siege (March, 1673), he failed either to make peace with the king or to prevent him from allying with his European enemies; so that his position became entirely unfavourable when the Muhammadans and the Dutch joined against him. Little by little his army had melted away, and his ships had either been captured by the enemy or become unserviceable for want of repairs. De la Haye sadly admits this when, after a few weeks' absence, the Muhammadans began to press him again, and especially when the Dutch admiral, Rijckloff, lent them help ashore and blockaded the place by sea (September, 1673). His stubborn spirit still prolonged resistance for another year. In fact he did not sign the capitulation till 6 September, 1674, and then the honour of the defenders was fully safeguarded, for the town was only to be occupied by the Dutch in case the French received no succour within the next fifteen days.

Among the causes permitting this prolonged resistance to be made must be set in the front rank the activity displayed by several of the French Company's agents—François Baron, one of the directors in India and formerly French Consul at Aleppo; and François Martin, director of the Masulipatam factory. Bellanger de Lespinay, one of the volunteers who accompanied de la Haye, should also be mentioned. Sent in November, 1672, to Porto Novo to seek from the governors of the rival kingdom of Bijapur the provisions needed by the defenders of St Thomé, the young *Vendômois* had performed his mission with much skill. It is true that the governor of Valikondapuram had already sent to François Martin favourable proposals, to which Caron, the misguided or, more probably, treacherous adviser of de la Haye, had prevented him from replying. But the latter's departure now left Bellanger de Lespinay free to act. He obtained from the governor, Sher Khan Lodi, not only munitions and victuals, but also a site for a factory. Just as Lespinay was about to take leave, 2 January, 1673, an agent of the Dutch Company arrived in order to prejudice Sher Khan Lodi against the French. But he received a sharp answer. The other said "loudly that merchants were not soldiers, and that he knew the difference between the Dutch and the French". He concluded, to the great surprise and joy of his guest, by declaring that "as the Dutch and French were neighbours in Europe, so they should be in India, and therefore he gave us Pondichery as a place where our nation might settle".[1]

Sher Khan Lodi's gift was a little village near the borders of the hostile kingdom of Golconda, on the coast, and well placed for the assistance of the besieged in St Thomé. "Indeed it was a most convenient place for me", wrote Lespinay in his *Mémoires*. By order of his leader, he established himself there on 4 February, 1673, and, as

[1] *Mémoires de Lespinay*, pp. 203–4.

long as his countrymen held out, he did not cease to send them, with the constant help of Sher Khan, supplies of victuals, munitions, and even men. Thus began in modest fashion the historic rôle of Pondichery.

When on the morrow of the capitulation Bellanger de Lespinay quitted the few fishers' and traders' huts that surrounded the French factory, he did not suspect what a future awaited the tiny place. But he left there François Martin, the man whose great courage, intelligence, and persevèrance were to develop it, transform it, and render it the capital of the French settlements in India.

At the beginning of 1674 Martin had been sent by the viceroy to second Lespinay, and this he had done effectively, thanks to his intelligence, knowledge of affairs, and patriotism. From 21 September, 1674, he was left at Pondichery with six Frenchmen "to act as affairs may require". At first, together with Baron, he sought to obtain from Golconda the grant of St Thomé. But though under pressure from Dutch and English alike the place was demolished, neither lost heart. Perceiving clearly that the Company could drive a profitable trade with two well-established factories, one on the Malabar and one on the Coromandel Coast, and deeming that Surat would serve for one of the two, they set to work to procure the other, though they had to surmount many difficulties merely to secure the maintenance of a French factory at Pondichery, while in Europe the war between the Great King and his enemies was going forward. Sivaji's defeat of Sher Khan Lodi, the persistent jealousy of the Dutch, the Company's neglect of its agents in India, all added to their difficulties. Martin however maintained the position. When Baron recalled him to Surat, he convinced Colbert of the commercial value of Pondichery, and, after the Peace of Nimweguen, succeeded in carrying through a little business for the Company. But would he be able to secure all that was needed, and make good the complete lack of goods and money in which he was left by the Company, at a time when the Company was in great straits and obliged to abandon not only Caron's factory at Bantam but also its new factory in Tonkin? Or would he be able with so few people to survive the political and economic crisis through which the Moghul Empire was passing in spite of Aurangzib's early conquests? Pondichery was, indeed, falling into that stagnation which precedes decay, but though Martin knew it, he did not hesitate to return thither in 1686 and to make it again the centre of his activities.

At that moment Colbert's son and successor at the ministry of marine, the Marquis de Seignelay, had just procured for the Company new capital, reorganised its directorate, and restored it to greater activity than it had long known. As, besides, there was peace in Europe, there was at least officially peace also among the European nations in India. Of these favourable circumstances, though counter-

acted by war, famine and pestilence in the country itself, Martin made good use. Not content with enlarging the trade of Pondichery and its dependencies, he laboured to consolidate and extend the French factories. The re-establishment of the French at Masulipatam, the dispatch of Deslandes to Bengal, where a French agent had appeared so early as 1674, and co-operation with the great Siam enterprise which was for a while at this time the pet scheme of the royal government, form the chief evidences of Martin's activity, though they were not all equally successful.

But soon again the outbreak of war in Europe threatened the fruit of his labours. Though the trade of Pondichery was not much hurt by the complete failure of the Siam expedition, it was brought into grave danger by the war between the French and Dutch, and soon after by the close union between the Dutch and English resulting from the Revolution of 1688.

The decay of trade and the abandonment of the project to set up a factory near Cape Comorin were the first fruits of the renewal of the war, although the English governor of Fort St David expressed his desire to maintain peace in India. But soon Dutch hostility took shape in action. When in January, 1691, the French squadron sent out by Seignelay the year before quitted the Bay of Bengal, for lack of a port where the vessels could be repaired, the enemies of France, who had been much alarmed, sought at once to crush this rivalry which they deemed a political danger and an economic injury. Martin had long been endeavouring, in the face of great difficulties, to fortify Pondichery, to make up a little garrison for it, and had procured, though at a high rate, from the court of Jinji the grant of almost all rights of sovereignty; but with all his efforts he could not repel the attack of the Dutch when (23 August, 1693) they besieged the place both by land and sea. Deserted by the natives, and unable to answer the fire of the enemy, on 6 September he had to sign a capitulation, honourable indeed, but one article of which seemed to rob him of all hope of ever making the place a French settlement.

But the event turned out otherwise. Inspired by their Indian servants, the Company desired the king, in the negotiations ending in the Treaty of Ryswick (21 September, 1697), to procure the rendition of "the fort and settlement of Pondichery"; and with some difficulty it was secured. Further negotiations, patiently followed, in the next year ensured to the Company the restoration of the place with "all the additions and improvements made by the Dutch company both in the place and in the neighbourhood". But in India Martin only obtained full execution of this agreement after long discussions, and had to wait till 3 October, 1699, for the Dutch garrison to take its departure.

But thenceforward he was free to act and possessed the base of operations, without which, since 1693, the French had been reduced

to a state of complete impotence. Since the Company, radically reformed once more in 1697, had recovered some activity, and was able to send one after another several fleets into the Indian seas, to which indeed its privileges were now limited, Martin took advantage of this appearance of French vessels to demonstrate to all how brief had been the duration of Dutch naval supremacy; and when a final attempt at diplomatic intervention in Siam had met with a final failure, he sought to develop and strengthen the Company's position at Pondichery, at Chandernagore, where Deslandes had established himself in 1690, and even at Surat, the importance of which factory was, however, daily declining.

For now he saw clearly the situation of the country and discerned the essential conditions for the complete success of the French enterprise, foreseeing the approaching decadence of the Moghul Empire, and planning for the French the acquisition of a political predominance as the essential condition of free commercial development. "Prosperous settlements and a few well-fortified places will give [the Company] a great position among these people", he wrote on 15 December, 1700, to Jérôme Pontchartrain, the new minister of marine. Martin therefore surrounded Pondichery with the solid walls that had hitherto been wanting; and at the same time under his vigorous lead the company's trade made real progress in Bengal, while even the Surat factory itself seemed about to shake off its ever-growing torpor.

Unluckily this promising situation did not last. In 1701 the War of the Spanish Succession broke out, and round the Grand Alliance grouped themselves all who disliked the thought of a son of Louis XIV succeeding to the throne of Spain. The effects of the new war were soon felt in India. Trade was once more interrupted; the factories of Bengal and Surat fell back into inactivity; while at Pondichery the preparation for defence (now completed by the building of Fort St Louis), and the need of checking Dutch intrigue, fully occupied the aged but still active Martin, left to his own resources without the least help from Europe.

Long after the death (31 December, 1706) of the founder of the first French settlements in India, this wretched situation continued and actually grew worse, more owing to the distress of the Company than the events of the war or the worthless nature of Martin's successors. The failure of a fleet sent in 1706 to the western coasts of South America in defiance of the monopoly granted to another Company in 1697 for the trade of the South Seas, the difficulties of meeting the Company's obligations, and at last the cession of its privileges to the Malouins in 1712, were the real, essential causes of the languor of the French factories in India in the early years of the eighteenth century. That condition persisted until the death of Louis XIV (1 September, 1715), or rather till May, 1719, when a

famous edict united the Company of the East Indies and China with the Company of the West founded by Jean Law a little earlier (August, 1717), giving to the united body the name of the *Compagnie des Indes* and confiding to it the whole of French colonial trade.

In Law's mind it was to have been even more than that—the single trading body of the kingdom, and perhaps the most important of the institutions by means of which he hoped to restore French finance. Thus the privileges granted to the great Company which it had just absorbed were extended for fifty years; and besides this it received so many other privileges and so wide an extension of its domain that, as has been said with truth, it became not so much a colonial enterprise as a sort of farm general of the state.[1]

But could even so powerful a *Compagnie des Indes* transform into realities the fair dreams of Colbert? By no means. In fact the speedy bankruptcy of the System ruined all hopes. In order not to burden the state with the shares issued on different occasions, first by the Company of the West, and then by the Company of the Indies itself, the liquidators named by the king (10 April, 1721) had to re-establish the Company in its original form. Two years later (23 March, 1723) its administration was confided to a council of the Indies consisting of a chief, a president, and twenty councillors nominated by the crown; but, soon after, to enable shareholders to have representatives, there were introduced, besides twelve directors and four inspectors named by the crown, eight syndics appointed by the shareholders.

Such was in its main lines the home administration of the Company which, as in the time of Louis XIV, held the exclusive privilege of trade from the west coast of Africa round the Cape up to the Red Sea, the islands of the Indian seas of which two had already been occupied by the French (the Isle of Bourbon in 1664 and the Isle of France in 1721), and finally India itself and the Further East.

For various reasons deriving from the general history of the time and the particular history of the Company, the French had made no progress in India since 1706. No doubt the governors who succeeded Martin were less able than he; but it must also be remembered that from 1707 to 1720 no less than five governors ruled in succession at Pondichery. Each in turn adopted a line of policy different from that of his predecessor, until, in 1720, the new *Compagnie des Indes* put an end to this series of conflicts and inconsistencies by taking possession of the existing factories and imposing an active and coherent policy. Masulipatam, Calicut, Mahé, and Yanam were occupied between 1721 and 1723. Although the attempt to found a settlement on Pulo Kondor—the *Îles d'Orléans*—south of the Mekong delta failed altogether, the Company was able to take vengeance for the insult of the prince Bayanor in driving the French from Mahé. It re-established itself there by force, for ten months its troops victoriously met the

[1] Cultru, *Dupleix*, p. 2.

attempts of Bayanor and four other rajahs to expel them, and obliged them to make peace, first in 1726,[1] and later, after a blockade of eighteen months, in 1741. Clearly there was a change in the attitude of the *Compagnie des Indes*.

It must, however, be observed, that the two governors who held office from 1720 to 1742 (Lenoir till 1735 and then Benoist Dumas[2]) had none but commercial objects in mind. It was with a purely commercial object, the protection of a factory expected to yield a profitable pepper trade, that the Company in 1724 built a fort at Mahé, which was long a source of great expense; it was with a purely commercial object too that Dumas brought to reason by a show of force the governor of Mokha where the French had a factory,[3] and occupied in February, 1739, Karikal, at the request of a native prince. There was nothing in this exclusively interested conduct that allows us to credit the Company with political views and still less ideas of conquest; its factories were more or less fortified, but for motives of simple security; and although it enlisted troops, it used them only for purposes of police. In 1664 perhaps Louis XIV and Colbert dreamt of securing conquests in the Indies; but in 1730 none of the Company's servants dreamt of supplying funds for trade out of the regular revenues of territorial possessions, or conceived the idea of obtaining them by interfering in the lawless conflicts that arose out of the decadence of the Moghul Empire, or attempted to interfere in any persistent, methodical way in the affairs of native princes. Only in the period that begins in 1740 does this notion first germinate and then begin to develop in the admirable brain of Dupleix.

[1] Martineau, *Les Origines de Mahé*. Cf. *Les Mémoires du Chevalier de la Farelle sur la prise de Mahé*.

[2] Martineau, "Benoist Dumas", *Rev. de l'hist. des col. fr.* IX, 145 *sqq*.

[3] Martineau, "La politique de Dumas", *Rev. de l'hist. des col. fr.* XIV, 1 *sqq*.

CHAPTER IV

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600–1740

THE success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative commerce with the East naturally excited a desire among the other nations of Western Europe to follow so tempting an example. The Portuguese, however, had a long start, and it was nearly a century before any rival made an effective entry into the field. The reasons for this were largely political. The papal bulls of 1493, and the subsequent agreement with Spain at Tordesillas, prevented any attempt on the part of the Catholic powers to infringe the monopoly claimed by Lisbon; and if the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal in 1580 exposed the latter to the attacks of the revolted Netherlands, on the other hand it deterred the cautious Elizabeth of England from countenancing too openly the audacious schemes of her subjects for ventures into the forbidden area. For a time, therefore, English merchants concentrated their attention upon the discovery of a new sea-road to the East, either through or round America on the one side or by the northern coasts of Europe and Asia on the other; and either route had the additional attraction that it would bring the adventurers to Northern China, which was out of the Portuguese sphere and would, it was hoped, afford for English woollens a market hardly to be expected in the tropical regions to the southward. The story of these attempts to find a north-eastern or north-western passage to the Indies belongs rather to the general history of exploration than to our special subject, and no detailed account of them is necessary. Their failure directed attention afresh to the Portuguese route by the Cape of Good Hope, especially when in 1580 Francis Drake returned that way from his voyage round the world. New energy was infused into the project by the defeat of the Spanish Armada, by the return (1591) of Ralph Fitch from some years of travel in India and Burma, and by the riches found in Portuguese carracks captured by English privateers. At last in 1591–3 a ship under James Lancaster succeeded in penetrating the Indian Ocean and visiting the Nicobars and the island of Penang. Three years after Lancaster's return another fleet started under Benjamin Wood, but the enterprise ended in disaster. The Dutch, who had already imitated the English in endeavouring to discover a north-east passage, now joined in the attempt to force the Portuguese barrier; and in 1596 a squadron under Houtman reached Java, returning in safety a year later. As a result, in 1598 over twenty ships were dispatched from Holland to the East by way of the Cape.

The merchants of England were in no mood to see the prize they had so long sought snatched away from them by their Dutch rivals.

Preparations were therefore commenced in the autumn of 1599 for a fresh expedition to the East; but this had to be abandoned owing to Queen Elizabeth's fear of prejudicing her negotiations with King Philip for a peace. In the following year, however, these negotiations having failed, the scheme was revived, and early in 1601 a fleet sailed for the East under the command of Lancaster. In the meantime, by a charter dated 31 December, 1600, those interested in the venture had been incorporated under the title of "The Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies", and the monopoly of English commerce in eastern waters (from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan) had been granted to them and their successors for a term of fifteen years.[1]

England being still at war with Spain and Portugal, and the immediate aim being the acquisition of the spices and pepper of the Far East, the First (1601–3) and Second (1604–6) Voyages[2] were made, not to India, but to Achin (in Sumatra), Bantam (in Java), and the Moluccas. However, in August, 1604, peace was at last concluded, though without any recognition of the English claim to share in the commerce of the Indian seas; while it was becoming evident that English manufactures—which it was particularly desirable to export, in order to avoid carrying out so much silver—could find no satisfactory market in the Malay Archipelago. When, therefore, a Third Voyage was under preparation (1606–7), it was resolved that the fleet should, on its way to Bantam, endeavour to open up trade at Aden and Surat. For this purpose the post of second in command was given to William Hawkins, a merchant who had had considerable experience in the Levant and could speak Turkish; and he was provided with a letter from King James to the emperor Akbar (whose death was as yet unknown in London), desiring permission to establish trade in his dominions.

The *Hector*, which was the vessel commanded by Hawkins, anchored off the mouth of the Tapti on 24 August, 1608, and her captain at once proceeded up the river to Surat, the principal port of the Moghul Empire. Early in October the ship departed for Bantam, and four months later Hawkins set out on his long journey to the court. He reached Agra in the middle of April, 1609, and was graciously received by the emperor Jahangir. For some time he was in high favour, and was admitted to share the revels of that jovial monarch, who went so far as to take him into his service and marry him to an Armenian damsel. But the Portuguese, alarmed at the prospect of English competition, were working hard to displace him, both at Agra, where they found willing helpers among the courtiers, and in Gujarat. Their arguments and threats prevailed upon the timid officials and merchants of that province to make representations against the admission

[1] Patent Rolls, 43 Eliz. pt VI.

[2] Narratives of the early expeditions will be found in *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster*.

of the English; and in the end these representations were successful. It was unfortunate for Hawkins that in September, 1609, the *Ascension*, which had been dispatched from England to second his efforts, was wrecked in the Gulf of Cambay, while her crew, escaping to land, created a bad impression by their disorder. But this and other obstacles might have been surmounted, had not the chief merchants of Surat declared that commerce with the English would mean a rupture with the Portuguese and the consequent ruin of their trade. Thereupon Jahangir reluctantly ordered the exclusion of the new-comers. After making vain efforts to induce him to reverse this decision, Hawkins left Agra in November, 1611, and journeyed down to the coast.[1]

Meanwhile the East India Company, encouraged by the grant of a fresh charter in May, 1609,[2] extending its privileges indefinitely (subject to revocation after three years' notice), had sent out in the spring of 1610 three ships under Sir Henry Middleton, with orders to go first to the Red Sea ports and then to those of Gujarat. At Mokha, Middleton was seized by the Turkish governor and imprisoned for nearly six months. Escaping by a stratagem, he blockaded the port until compensation was paid, and then proceeded to India. He reached the mouth of the Tapti in September, 1611, but only to find it occupied by a squadron of Portuguese "frigates" (light country-built vessels, fitted to row or sail), which effectually cut off access to the shore. After some time information was obtained from a friendly Indian official of a pool or harbour among the sandbanks to the northward of the river mouth, where ships might ride close to the shore; and the discovery of this haven—known to succeeding fleets as "Swally Hole"—enabled the English to berth their vessels where their guns could command the shore, and to communicate freely with the country people. Some trade resulted, and the Governor of Surat held out hopes that a permanent settlement would be allowed; but fresh threats on the part of the Portuguese produced a reaction, and the English, who had meanwhile embarked Hawkins and his companions, were roughly bidden to be gone. They sailed accordingly in February, 1612. Middleton was not disposed to put up calmly with this rebuff. He determined to show that the power of the English was not less to be dreaded than that of the Portuguese, and that, if the latter could close the Gujarat ports, the former could do equal injury to the Red Sea traffic—the main dependence of the Surat merchants. Sailing to the Straits of Bab-ul-mandab, he there rounded up the Indian trading vessels and forced them to exchange their goods for his English commodities; while, in addition, the ships from Diu and Surat were obliged to pay a heavy ransom before they were

[1] His own narrative may be read in *Early Travels in India*, p. 60.

[2] Patent Rolls, 7 Jac. I, pt XI. There is a contemporary copy at the India Office (Parchment Records, No. 5).

released. He made no further attempt to trade with the Indian ports, but proceeded straight to Sumatra.

The news of the revenge taken by Middleton produced consternation at Surat. Besides the damage likely to be done to the trade of the port should such reprisals continue, there was a possibility that the large pilgrim traffic to the holy places of Islam might be diverted to other routes. When, therefore, in September, 1612, two ships from England, under the command of Thomas Best, anchored at the bar, unaware of what had happened in the Red Sea, they found a respectful reception and were readily promised full trading privileges. The news of this roused the Portuguese authorities at Goa to vigorous action, and in November a strong fleet appeared to try conclusions with Best's two vessels. The latter put boldly to sea and repelled their assailants with heavy loss, thus greatly raising the reputation of the English. A farman arrived from the emperor early in 1613, confirming the agreement already concluded with the local authorities,[1] and a permanent factory (i.e. a group of merchants, living together) was now established at Surat under Thomas Aldworth, a merchant being also sent up to Agra with presents, to watch over English interests at court.

Disappointed in his endeavours to destroy Best's ships, the viceroy of Goa decided to bring fresh pressure to bear upon the Indians to exclude the English; and with this object in view a Surat vessel of great value, returning from the Red Sea, was captured, although she was duly provided with a Portuguese pass. Jahangir was very indignant at this affront, and dispatched a force to besiege Daman. The arrival (October, 1614) of four ships under Nicholas Downton led the Moghul authorities to expect the active co-operation of the English in a war largely occasioned by the favour shown to them; and Downton's unwillingness to engage in hostilities, without express authority from home, caused much resentment. At this point, however, the viceroy himself unwittingly helped his enemies. Gathering together a powerful fleet, which he filled with soldiers, he sailed in person to crush the English and then punish the Indians for having harboured them. He found Downton's ships snugly ensconced in Swally Hole, where his own larger vessels could not reach them; an attack made by his frigates was smartly repulsed; and in the end he had to retire discomfited. In March, 1615, one of Downton's vessels, the *Hope*, laden chiefly with indigo and cotton goods, sailed for England —the first vessel to be sent home from an Indian port. Not long afterwards the Portuguese, finding their commercial interests suffering from the war, made overtures to the Moghul emperor for peace, offering compensation for the vessel they had seized, but requiring the expulsion of the English as an essential condition. To this Jahangir replied that the latter were too powerful at sea for him to interfere

[1] See Best's journal among the India Office Marine Records (No. xv).

and that, if their recourse to his ports was to be prevented, the Portuguese themselves must undertake the task. In the end, towards the close of 1615, an agreement was reached, without any stipulation on this point.

The position of the newcomers was, however, still precarious, owing to the certainty that the Goa authorities would continue their efforts to induce the emperor to forbid further trade; while, as they well knew, mercantile interests in Gujarat were greatly disturbed by the resultant bickerings, and the Indian officials were asking themselves whether it was worth while, for the sake of the small trade brought by the English, to risk the large and well-established commerce between their ports and Goa. It was, therefore, with much joy that the English factors greeted the arrival (September, 1615) of a new fleet, bringing out an ambassador from King James, in the person of Sir Thomas Roe. The East India Company had decided to make a great effort to establish permanent relations with India, and the surest way of effecting this seemed to be the dispatch of a royal envoy to the Moghul, for the purpose of concluding a treaty which should put the trade between the two countries on a regular footing. This plan had, moreover, the advantage of refuting the allegations of the Portuguese that the Company's attempts to trade in Eastern waters were not authorised by the English sovereign, while it threw the aegis of the latter over his subjects at Surat and thus discouraged further attacks from Goa.

Roe reached the court, which was then at Ajmir, in December, 1615; and for nearly three years he followed in the train of the emperor, striving diligently to carry out the objects of his mission. He found, however, that the conclusion of any form of treaty for commercial purposes was entirely foreign to Indian ideas. Moreover, his demands included concessions for trade in Bengal and Sind, which Jahangir's advisers opposed on the ground that the struggle between the two European nations would thereby be extended to other parts of India; while most of the remaining demands were looked upon as matters coming under the jurisdiction of the emperor's favourite son, Prince Khurram (Shah Jahan), who was then viceroy of Gujarat and was not disposed to brook any interference in his administration of that province. In the end Roe had to content himself with concluding an arrangement with the prince, who willingly conceded most of the privileges desired. The ambassador thus failed in achieving the particular end for which he had been sent; yet he had done all that was really necessary, and indirectly had contributed greatly to the establishment of his countrymen's position. His own character and abilities raised considerably the reputation of the English at court; while his success in obtaining the punishment of the local officials when guilty of oppression taught them and their successors to be circumspect in their dealings with the English traders. His sage

advice to the Company did much also in guiding the development of its commerce along safe and profitable lines, particularly in regard to the commerce with Mokha and Persia.

By the time Roe embarked for home (February, 1619) there were regular English factories at Surat, Agra, Ahmadabad, and Broach. All these were placed under the authority of the chief factor at Surat, who was now styled the President,[1] and who in addition controlled the trade which had been opened up with the Red Sea ports and in Persia. These trade developments led to trouble; the first with the Surat merchants who had so long enjoyed this commerce; and the second with the Portuguese, who, if now hopeless of excluding the English from India, were determined to keep them, if possible, from interfering with the commerce of the Persian Gulf, from which they derived a considerable revenue. In this, however, they failed to take sufficiently into account the attitude of the Persian monarch, Shah Abbas, who had already extended his dominions to the sea and was by no means pleased to find the trade of Southern Persia controlled by the Portuguese fortress on the island of Ormuz. He was desirous of developing the new port of Gombroon (the present Bandar Abbas), which was situated on the mainland opposite to Ormuz; but little headway could be made in this respect while the Portuguese compelled all vessels to pay dues at the latter place. Naturally, too, he welcomed English overtures for a seaborne trade with Europe, since the raw silk of his northern provinces was largely in his hands and he was anxious to divert the trade as much as possible from its ordinary channel through the dominions of his hereditary enemies the Turks. The Portuguese, on their side, far from endeavouring to conciliate him, dispatched an envoy to demand the restitution of Gombroon and other territory conquered from their vassal, the titular king of Ormuz, together with the exclusion of all other Europeans from trade in his country. Both demands were firmly refused, and the shah declared his intention of supporting English commerce in his dominions.

The determination of the Company's factors to take full advantage of the Persian monarch's friendship quickly led to fresh hostilities with the Portuguese; and at the end of 1620 a fight took place off Jask, in which the English ships gained a fresh success. Their opponents once more committed the error of driving an Asiatic power into alliance with the English, for they now declared war against Shah Abbas and sent a fleet to destroy his port towns. The enraged monarch in his turn dispatched an army to turn the Portuguese out of Ormuz and the neighbouring island of Kishm; but this was impossible without the aid of naval power, and when in December, 1621, a strong English fleet arrived to cover the embarkation of the Company's silk, its commanders were practically forced, by threats of exclusion from

[1] *English Factories in India*, 1618–21, p. ix.

further trade, to take part in the operations. The Portuguese castle on Kishm was easily captured, but Ormuz itself only yielded after a siege of over two months (April, 1622). The reward of the English was a small share in the plunder of the place and the grant for the future of half the customs revenue of the port, the Company's own goods being freed from toll in addition.[1] As a matter of fact, though the Persians garrisoned Ormuz, the trade itself was transferred to Gombroon. However, the claim of the English to share the customs of the latter place was recognised and, though the full amount due to them was seldom paid, they for long drew a considerable revenue from this source, in addition to the privilege of exemption from customs.

Whether an English trading company, operating from so distant a base and governed by men who were consistently averse from using any but peaceable methods, would ever have managed to overcome the opposition of Portugal is, to say the least, doubtful; but, fortunately for our fellow-countrymen, during the whole of the struggle their opponents were being increasingly harassed by the Dutch, whose armaments and commerce alike were on a much larger scale than those of any of their European competitors. From the beginning of the seventeenth century the Hollanders had determined to take full advantage of the weakness of the Portuguese and to oust them from their eastern trade; and this object was pursued with all the tenacity and thoroughness of the Dutch character. Though organised, like the English, in the form of a trading company, the Dutch merchants had behind them practically the whole power of the state, and their commerce with the East was recognised as a most important national asset; while the vigorous war which their fellow-countrymen were waging with King Philip gave a special sanction to their attacks upon his Portuguese subjects. These attacks were at first directed mainly to the Spice Islands, the source of the cloves and nutmegs so much in demand in Europe. Here, until their hands were stayed by the conclusion of a truce with Spain in 1609, they made great progress in capturing the Portuguese forts and in concluding agreements with the native chiefs, by which the latter were guaranteed protection against the Portuguese in return for a monopoly of the trade in spices. Naturally this policy aroused much resentment among the English, who found themselves in danger of being excluded from a valuable commerce with a thoroughness that would never have been attained under the Portuguese. On the other hand the Hollanders argued that it was unfair for the English, who contributed in no way to the defence of the Spice Islands against the common foe, to expect a share in the benefits of the trade, under conditions which really gave them an advantage, since they were spared the heavy expenses of garrisons and ships of war. The dispute led to much negotiation between

[1] *English Factories*, 1622–3, p. 13.

London and the Hague, and to actual hostilities in the Far East, confined at first to the Bandas but soon extending over a wider area, though the English settlements in India were not involved. The news of these conflicts roused the governments of both nations to action, and under pressure from them an agreement[1] was concluded (1619) in London between the Dutch and English Companies, which really pleased neither party. By its terms the two bodies were to share in certain proportions the trade of the eastern islands and jointly to bear the cost of defending their interests against the Portuguese; English factors were to be admitted to the Dutch settlements, including Batavia; and each Company was to furnish ten ships for purposes of the common defence.

This agreement did not extend to Western India, Persia, or the Red Sea, except as regards united naval action against the Portuguese; but it embraced the English settlements on the east coast of India, concerning which a few words must now be said. The first attempt to open up communication with this part of the peninsula was made in 1611, when the Company, acting in conjunction with two Dutch merchants who provided a share of the capital and themselves took part in the voyage, sent out the *Globe* to visit the Coromandel Coast and the countries adjacent. An endeavour was made to settle a factory at Pulicat (a little to the north of where Madras now stands), but this was foiled by the Dutch, who had obtained an exclusive concession from the king of the Carnatic for trade in his dominions. The vessel then passed on to Masulipatam, the chief port of the Golconda kingdom, and here a factory was established in September, 1611. The chief object in view was the provision of chintzes and calicoes for use in the Far Eastern trade; and, accordingly, from the beginning the factories on the Coromandel Coast were placed under the superintendence of the president at Bantam, and had little in common with those in Western and Northern India save the geographical tie.

The Dutch notion of defence proved to be much the same as vigorous aggression; for as soon as the Truce of Antwerp had expired (1621) they proceeded to push home their attacks on the remaining Portuguese possessions. Accordingly, in the autumn of that year the joint Anglo-Dutch "Fleet of Defence" left Batavia for the Malabar Coast, to intercept the Portuguese carracks in their passage to and from Goa. In July, 1622, they inflicted much damage on a squadron that was bringing out a new viceroy; and they followed up this success by blockading Goa during the cold weather of 1622–3, thus preventing all intercourse with Lisbon. Before long, however, the co-operation of the two Protestant powers broke down. The English were by no means pleased to find themselves dragged by their allies into a series of warlike operations that brought them much expense and little benefit; disputes arose as to the fairness of the financial charges and

[1] *Calendar of State Papers, E. Indies*, 1617–21, nos. 679–81.

the amenability of the English to the Dutch tribunals at Batavia and elsewhere; while soon money was lacking to pay the English share of the military and naval charges. The result was that the English president and council resolved to withdraw their factors from the various Dutch settlements, since they could no longer carry out their financial engagements. Before this could be effected occurred the famous "Massacre of Amboina" (February, 1623), ten members of the English factory there being tortured and put to death by the Dutch authorities, after an irregular trial, on a charge of conspiring to seize the fortress. This virtually put an end to the alliance, in spite of the fact that at home, after protracted negotiations, a fresh agreement had been concluded (January, 1623),[1] which removed a few of the causes of friction. Early in 1624 the English quitted Batavia and proceeded to form a new head settlement of their own upon an uninhabited island in the neighbouring Straits of Sunda. This, however, proved so unhealthy that a return had to be made (with Dutch assistance) to their former quarters at Batavia; and there they remained until 1628, when they removed once again to their old station at Bantam, the king of which was unfriendly to the Dutch and powerful enough to maintain his independence.

As we have seen, the treaty of 1619 did not extend to Western India, Persia, or the Red Sea, being in fact intended only for the regulation of the spice and pepper trade. But the Dutch had now important interests in those parts, having established themselves at Surat (1616), Ahmadabad and Agra (1618), Mokha (1620), and in Persia (1623); and they were quite aware that the surest way to inflict a damaging blow on their enemy was to attack him in Indian and Persian waters. The war which broke out in 1625 between England and Spain, together with the efforts the Portuguese were making to retrieve their position in those waters, induced the Company's servants at Surat to join the Hollanders in active hostilities. Early in 1625 an Anglo-Dutch fleet defeated a Portuguese squadron near Ormuz, and in the following year a similar joint expedition destroyed the small Portuguese settlement on the island of Bombay. Some desultory fighting took place during the next few years, culminating in an attack on shore at Swally (1630); but here the Portuguese were easily routed by a small force of English sailors, to the surprise of the Indians, who had hitherto deemed the former invincible on land.

In this same year peace was concluded between King Charles and King Philip. It was expected in London that the Portuguese would recognise the futility of their opposition to English trade in the East and would agree to admit its continuance; but the Lisbon authorities proved unyielding on the point, and the Treaty of Madrid left matters

[1] British Museum, Add. MSS, 22866, f. 466 *b*; also *Hague Transcripts* (India Office), series 1, vol. 57, no. 2. The version given in *Cal. S.P., E. Indies*, 1622–24, no. 263, is incorrect.

as they were in the East Indies. However, the viceroy of Goa and his councillors soon began to listen to suggestions of accommodation. Hard pressed by the Dutch and involved also with various Asiatic foes, with ever-dwindling resources in Portuguese India itself, they thought it wise to remove at least one source of difficulty and danger by making a truce with the English. The latter, on their side, were eager for the cessation of a warfare which hampered their commercial operations (already suffering greatly from the effects of the severe famine of 1630–1) and necessitated the employment of costly fleets in maintaining communication with their other settlements and with Europe; and, moreover, they were well aware of the advantages which would result from the opening of the Portuguese harbours to their ships and the Portuguese settlements to their trade. The negotiations extended over a considerable period; but at last, in January, 1635, William Methwold, the English president at Surat, who had been the moving spirit, had the satisfaction of signing at Goa (on his way home) an accord[1] with the viceroy, which established a truce for an indefinite period—as it proved, a lasting peace. The accord was extended by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1642, which also provided for the appointment of commissioners to settle outstanding questions; but it was not until the conclusion of Cromwell's treaty in July, 1654, that the right of the English to trade freely with the Portuguese possessions in the East (with the exception of Macao) was formally recognised.

The Dutch on their side continued the war with increased vigour and almost unvarying success. Year after year they blockaded Goa during the season for the arrival and departure of shipping; allying themselves with the king of Kandi, they captured several of the Portuguese strongholds in Ceylon; and in 1641, aided by an Achinese force, they made themselves masters of the city of Malacca, which controlled the traffic between India and China. By this time Portugal had regained her independence of Spain (December, 1640) and had opened up negotiations with Holland, which resulted in a treaty suspending hostilities for ten years and leaving the Dutch in possession of their conquests (June, 1641). The authorities at Batavia, however, were unwilling to halt in their victorious career, and it was not until sixteen months later that the truce was proclaimed there. Even then there were disputes, and the peace did not become effective until November, 1644. Troubles over Brazil brought about a renewal of the war in 1652, upon the expiration of the truce. Colombo fell in May, 1656, and Jaffna (the last Portuguese stronghold in Ceylon) two years later; while on the coast of India Negapatam and all the Portuguese possessions on the Malabar littoral to the southward of Goa were taken between 1658 and 1663. Peace between the two countries had been concluded in 1661; but the news of this did not come in time to save Cochin and Kannanur. The only consolation

[1] *English Factories*, 1634–6, p. 88.

for the Portuguese was that Dutch schemes for the conquest of their remaining settlements were thus foiled; while the danger of attacks in the future was warded off by an English guarantee, as related below.

Meanwhile England had in 1652 become involved in a war with Holland. At home the Commonwealth fleet proved victorious, after a hard struggle, and Cromwell was able to dictate practically his own terms when peace was made in 1654. In the East, however, the interests of the English had suffered considerably, owing to the preponderance of Dutch naval power in those waters. Though the Company's settlements were not attacked, for fear of offending the monarchs in whose dominions they were situated, ship after ship fell into the hands of the Hollanders, with the result that not only was heavy loss inflicted upon the Company but English prestige suffered greatly, both in India and in Persia. There was, however, some compensation in the outcome of the war; for the commissioners appointed under the Treaty of Westminster to assess damages awarded the English Company £85,000[1] in settlement of its claims against its Dutch rival, decreed the restitution of the island of Pulo Run[2] (in the Bandas), and provided for the payment of damages to the representatives of those Englishmen who had suffered at Amboina in 1623. Of these decisions the most unpalatable to the Dutch was the second, since to allow the English a footing in the Spice Islands meant a serious breach in the Dutch monopoly of cloves. Every mode of evasion was therefore practised; and although the surrender was again stipulated in a fresh treaty concluded in 1662, it was not until March, 1665, that the island was actually made over—only to be retaken in the following November, on the receipt of the news of the outbreak of the Second Dutch War. The long-standing dispute was finally settled by the peace of 1667, which assigned the island to Holland.

A further consequence of the hostilities with the Dutch in 1652–4 was a tendency on the part of both English and Portuguese in the East to draw together for mutual support; and also an increased desire on the part of the former to find some defensible spot on the western coast of India, where they could be secure against both the exactions of Indian officials and the attacks of European foes. The provision of such a retreat came, however, not from any action on the part of the East India Company but from the turn of events upon the accession of Charles II. By a secret article of the marriage treaty with Portugal (1661) England guaranteed the Portuguese possessions

[1] Of this amount the Commonwealth government at once borrowed £50,000, and the loan was never repaid (*Court Minutes of the E. India Co.*, 1655–9, p. v).

[2] This island had been made over to the English by its inhabitants in 1616, in hopes of protection against the Dutch, who, however, took advantage of the subsequent hostilities to effect its capture. By the Anglo-Dutch accord of 1623 it was recognised as English property, but the weakness of the East India Company was such that no serious attempt was made to take over so distant a possession, though proposals to that effect were mooted from time to time.

in the East against the Dutch, and to facilitate this the island of Bombay was included in the dowry of the new queen. Owing to difficulties placed in the way by the local officials, to whom the arrangement was distasteful, the island was not made over to the king's representatives until February, 1665. Experience soon showed that the outlay on the maintenance and development of the new possession would make too heavy a demand upon the royal purse; and on 27 March, 1668, in consideration of a temporary loan of £50,000 at 6 per cent., Charles transferred it to the Company at a quitrent of £10 per annum.[1] The actual date of the handing over was 23 September in the same year.

It is time now to turn our attention to more peaceful topics and to note the progress made by English commerce in India and the neighbouring countries. The friendly relations established with the Portuguese by the convention of Goa (1635) much improved the position of the East India Company's servants in those regions. It became possible to dispatch ships singly to and from England and to develop unhindered the port-to-port traffic, using for this purpose mainly small India-built vessels in lieu of the cumbrous and expensive ships built for the long sea-voyage out and home. The Malabar Coast, too, was opened to English trade, with the result that saltpetre, pepper, cardamoms, and cassia lignea (wild cinnamon) from those parts figured largely in the cargoes of the homeward-bound vessels. The tightening of the Dutch monopoly over the pepper and spice trade of the Far East and Ceylon drove the English to rely chiefly on the Malabar trade for these products. In Gujarat agriculture and the textile industry had not yet recovered from the terrible famine of 1630–1, and the Company's factors were forced to look for fresh sources of supply to make good the deficiency. Now that the menace of the Portuguese flotilla at Maskat was removed, trade was extended to Lahribandar and Tatta in the Indus delta (1635), and to Basra (1640); while at the same time the commerce with Gombroon was largely developed, partly owing to the eagerness with which Asiatic merchants availed themselves of the English and Dutch vessels for transporting their goods between India and Persia, especially during the long war between those two countries over the possession of Kandahar. Ventures were even made to Macao and Manilla; but these were discouraged by the Portuguese and Spaniards respectively, as soon as it was found that the English were not willing to risk trouble with the Dutch by carrying contraband of war; and so no permanent trade resulted. Further, we may reckon among the consequences of the Anglo-Portuguese *entente* the establishment of an English settlement at Madraspatam, on the Coromandel Coast; for, had hostilities continued, it would scarcely have been prudent to settle so near the

[1] The payment of this rent has been traced down to the year 1730. After that the treasury seems to have neglected to apply for it.

Portuguese fortress of St Thomé. Regarding this development something must now be said.

We have already noted that as early as 1611 the English had followed the example of the Dutch in starting a factory at Masulipatam, the chief port of the kingdom of Golconda. The trade here was valuable, particularly in piece-goods for export to Persia and to Bantam; while the grant in 1634 of freedom from all duties gave the Company a considerable advantage over their competitors, including the Dutch. It had already been discovered, however, that most of the piece-goods wanted for the trade of the Far East were procurable at cheaper rates in the Hindu territory to the southwards, under the dominion of the raja of the Carnatic, the shrunken remnant of the once extensive kingdom of Vijayanagar; and in 1626 the factors at Masulipatam established a subsidiary settlement at Armagon, a little to the northward of the Dutch fortress at Pulicat. This place proved to have many disadvantages, especially in the shallowness and exposed nature of the roadstead; and so in 1639 an agreement was made with a local ruler a little further south, by which permission was obtained to erect a fortified factory close to the little town of Madraspatam. Thither the English removed from Armagon in February, 1640; and in September, 1641, Fort St George (as the new station was named) superseded Masulipatam as their headquarters on the Coromandel Coast. In thus acquiring a fortified settlement—a privilege which would never have been granted in Golconda territory—the factors were only just in time; for the Hindu kingdom of the Carnatic was already tottering under the attacks of its Muhammadan neighbours, and in 1647 the district round Madras fell into the hands of Mir Jumla, the leader of the Golconda forces. The English, however, were on good terms with him and easily procured his confirmation of their privileges, which included the government of Madraspatam, subject to sharing with the royal treasury the customs paid by strangers.[1]

By this time English trade on the eastern side of India had been extended from Masulipatam to the seaports of Orissa, and factories had been started (1633) at Hariharpur (in the Mahanadi delta) and at Balasore. In 1650–1, following the example of the Dutch, this commerce was carried into Bengal itself and a settlement made at Hugli. Before long factories were planted at Patna and Kasimbazar; but for some years little benefit resulted to the Company, owing to the large amount of private trade carried on by its servants. However, the commerce on the eastern side of India grew steadily in importance as the merits of the Coromandel piece-goods came to be recognised at home and as Bengal sugar and saltpetre were likewise found to be

[1] This division of the customs continued until 1658, when it was agreed that an annual sum of 380 pagodas should be paid as the royal share. After much dispute, the agreement was revised in 1672 and the amount was raised to 1200 pagodas per annum. For eighty years that sum was regularly paid, and then it was remitted altogether by Muhammad 'Ali, nawab of the Carnatic.

in demand; and a considerable trade was consequently established between the coast and England. In 1652, under the stress of the war with the Dutch, the seat of the eastern presidency was removed from Bantam to Fort St George. Three years after, however, came the partial collapse of the Company described on a later page. Orders were sent out for the abandonment of the factories in Bengal and the reduction of those on the coast to two, viz. Fort St George and Masulipatam, with a corresponding diminution of staff. From a presidency the coast became once more an agency, though Greenhill, who had succeeded to the post of president before the Company's orders arrived, was generally accorded the higher title until his death at the beginning of 1659. The period of his administration was the low-water mark of the Company's trade in those parts, owing to the financial weakness at home and the competition of private ventures. The revival that followed the grant by Cromwell of a new charter will be the theme of a later page.

Meanwhile we must look back to 1635 and follow the course of the Company's affairs at home. The Convention of Goa, which produced such beneficial results in the East, had in England the unexpected result of arousing a dangerous competition. Financially the success of the Company had by no means answered expectations. The earliest voyages, it is true, had proved very profitable; but when the full burden of maintaining so many factories was felt, to say nothing of the losses caused by Dutch competition and the resulting quarrels, the profits fell off and the capital required to carry on the trade was raised with ever-increasing difficulty. The system adopted—that of terminable stocks—each of which was wound up in turn and its assets distributed, had many drawbacks. The plan was perhaps the only practicable one; but it tended to prevent the adoption of any continuous or long-sighted policy, and it concentrated attention on immediate profits; while, since it necessitated a fresh subscription every few years, it exposed the Company to the effects of any stringency prevailing in the money market. Owing largely to political troubles, the period from 1636 to 1660 was one of general depression of trade, especially towards the end of the Commonwealth; and this depression, together with the practical loss of its monopoly, went perilously near to extinguishing the Company. During the twenty years following 1636 the capital raised for four successive Stocks aggregated only about £600,000, whereas in 1631 a single subscription (that for the Third Joint Stock) had produced over £420,000, while further back still (1617) no less a sum than £1,600,000 had been subscribed for the Second Joint Stock.

These financial difficulties, and the small amount of profit earned in comparison with the Dutch East India Company, evoked much criticism of the Company's general policy, together with some impatience that so large a sphere of possible commercial activity should

be monopolised by a body that was apparently incapable of dealing with more than a portion of it. The colonising movement—stimulated by the success of the plantations on the American seaboard and in the West India islands—produced suggestions that something more was required than the leaving of a few factors here and there in the East Indies, and that English trade in those regions would never flourish until it was based, as in the case of the Dutch and the Portuguese, upon actual settlements independent of the caprice of local rulers and strong enough to resist their attacks. The prospect of a considerable extension of commerce as the result of the Convention of Goa, and the apparent inability of the existing Company to take full advantage of this opportunity, provided a plausible excuse for those who were eager to engage in the trade on their own lines; and by the close of the same year (1635) a rival body—commonly known as Courteen's Association, from the name of its principal shareholder—was formed in London to trade with China, Japan, the Malabar Coast, and other parts in which the East India Company had not yet established factories. Endymion Porter, one of the royal favourites, was an active supporter of the project, and it was doubtless owing in great part to his influence that King Charles lent his countenance to the new association by issuing a royal commission for the first voyage and by granting to Courteen and his partners letters-patent which practically established them as a rival East India Company (1637). The promoters of the new venture, however, soon found their expectations disappointed. The result of the first voyage was a heavy loss, for the leaders, Weddell and Mountney, disappeared with their two vessels beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean on their homeward way in 1639. Sir William Courteen had died shortly after the departure of that fleet, and his son had succeeded to a heritage much encumbered by the cost of the venture; still, he struggled hard to maintain the trade, with the assistance of friends and of other merchants anxious to compete with the regular Company. Factories were established at various places on the Malabar Coast—Rajapur, Bhatkal, Karwar; and Courteen's captains did not hesitate, in spite of the limitations in his patent, to visit Surat, Gombroon, Basra, and other places within the sphere of the East India Company. But what was gained in one direction was lost in another; money was wasted in ill-judged enterprises, such as the attempt to establish a colony at St Augustine's Bay in Madagascar (1645–6);[1] and supplies from home were both irregular and inadequate, with the result that one factory after another had to be abandoned. About 1645 Courteen himself withdrew to the continent to escape the importunities of his creditors; and although other merchants continued to send out ships under licence from him, their interference with the operations of the East India Company became almost negligible.

[1] For this see Foster, "An English settlement in Madagascar," in the *English Historical Review*, xxvii, 239.

However, the monopoly of the latter, once broken, was not easily re-established; especially as, after the outbreak of the Civil War, the Company was no longer able to invoke the protection of its royal charter, and the efforts made to induce the parliament to grant a fresh one proved fruitless. An attempt in 1649 to raise capital for a new joint stock was frustrated by the appearance of another rival body (consisting partly of those who had acted with Courteen), headed by Lord Fairfax, with a scheme for establishing colonies in the East, particularly on Assada (an island off the north-western coast of Madagascar), on Pulo Run (when it should be recovered from the Dutch), and on some part of the coast of India—all these being intended to serve as fortified centres of commerce, after the pattern of Goa and Batavia. Under pressure from the Council of State, both bodies agreed to a modified scheme under which the trade was continued by a "United Joint Stock" for five years, much on the previous lines. The attempt to colonise Assada proved an utter failure, and the chief outcome of the new stock was the establishment of trade at Hugli and other inland places in Bengal. In 1653–4 (as already noted) the position of the English in the East was severely shaken by the successes of the Dutch in the war that had broken out between the two nations; and when the five years for which the United Joint Stock had undertaken to send out ships came to an end, it was found impossible, in the disturbed state of England, to raise further capital. Private merchants took advantage of the situation to dispatch a considerable number of ships and, although the Company did not altogether cease its operations, they were on a much diminished scale. The retrenchments made in consequence on the eastern side of India have been already noted; in the Moghul's dominions Agra and other inland stations were ordered to be abandoned; and English trade was practically confined to a few seaports. Such was the state of things when the grant of a fresh exclusive charter by Cromwell in 1657 put new life into the Company and enabled an effective trading stock to be raised.

The commerce of the English in India, though temporarily at a low ebb, was by this time firmly established; and it may be well to examine briefly its general character and the conditions under which it was carried on.[1] When the English commenced to trade in the dominions of the Moghul, they found there a voluminous and valuable commerce and a well-developed mercantile system. Expert merchants, often commanding large supplies of capital, were established in all the principal centres; money could be remitted readily between the chief towns by means of bills of exchange; and marine insurance is mentioned as early as 1622. The chief trend of trade was westwards, either by land through Kandahar to Persia or else by sea through the

[1] For a detailed account see Foster, "English commerce with India 1608–58," in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 19 April, 1918.

profits made on intermediate voyages in Eastern waters, especially to Mokha and Gombroon; as also by the sums earned by carrying native merchants and their goods to and from those ports. Nor did they hesitate to borrow freely from Indian merchants and bankers to fill their ships, though these loans went far to reduce the profits on the trade, owing to the high rates of interest prevailing. The volume of English trade with India was by no means large. In the first fifteen years (1615–29) twenty-seven vessels, averaging rather more than 500 tons apiece, were dispatched from Surat to London; while in the next fifteen (1630–44) the number was only twenty-one. The cost of the cargoes (which generally included goods from Persia and Bantam) is only occasionally given, but it seems to have averaged during the second of these two periods about £50,000 per annum. To this figure must be added the value of the goods sent home from the Coromandel Coast, though as regards this not even an estimate can be framed. Obviously the commerce carried on by the English was only an insignificant proportion of the total seaborne trade of India; and it was not by any means equal to that of the Dutch in the same region. The Company's servants had many difficulties to contend with, even when the land was at peace and no extraordinary obstacle presented itself, such as the attempt made in 1633 to constitute the indigo trade a royal monopoly, or the embargo laid thirteen years later by Prince Aurangzib upon the sale of saltpetre to the English, for fear lest, as an ingredient of gunpowder, it might be used against Muslims. In the purchase of goods the factors were hampered by the intricacies of the monetary system and the varying weights and measures; and these difficulties, combined with their slight knowledge of the various languages—in which few of them attained much proficiency—necessitated the employment of brokers, who fleeced both sides impartially. Again, the producers of the goods were intensely conservative, and when the Company wrote for piece-goods of special sizes or indigo unmixed with sand, great trouble was experienced in persuading the weavers or indigo-makers to depart from their customary practices. There were also difficulties of transport. Goods from up-country had to be carried down to the port either in ox-carts or on the backs of camels or oxen. The roads were mostly mere tracks, impassable in bad weather, and often infested with robbers. The exaction of petty duties on the way, in spite of imperial farmans, proved a constant source of dispute; while in the cities, and especially at the ports, the officials were apt to be overbearing and extortionate. It is true that the European trader suffered no worse treatment than the Hindu or the Armenian; indeed, his position was often strong enough to enable him to resist with success. It was usually easy to make friends at court by the presentation of Western curiosities, and the mere threat of appealing to the emperor was sometimes sufficient to render the local authorities compliant. Above all, the knowledge

that the English and Dutch were mighty at sea and could easily stop the commerce of a port—thereby injuring the customs revenue—formed a powerful restraint. As President Blackman explained in 1652 to the governor of a Malabar port that was undergoing disciplinary treatment in this way, "God hath given us power on the sea that, if wee bee wronged on the land, wee may right ourselves there"; and although such action involved serious risks, neither the English nor the Dutch hesitated to take it when more peaceable methods failed.

One great hindrance to the Company's trade, both outwards and homewards, was the competition of goods brought out or taken home by its own servants. For some time attempts were made to suppress this private trade by requiring the factors and ships' officers to sign penalty bonds and by confiscating their goods when they offended; later on, lists were drawn up of commodities in which the Company's employees might legitimately speculate, while leaving to their masters the trade in the more valuable items. But all was in vain. The articles which the Company wished to engross were naturally those most in demand and yielding the highest profits. Men went to the East to make money—for their meagre wages offered no temptation—and though some refrained from trenching upon their employers' monopolies, most had no scruple in taking advantage of every opportunity that presented itself. Capital was easily procured from friends at home or from Indian merchants, who were only too glad to share thus in the benefits of the privileges accorded to English goods, including favourable terms of freight and freedom from customs at Gombroon, Fort St George, Masulipatam, and elsewhere. At last, finding it hopeless to suppress such competition in the port-to-port trade (which the factors could carry on, if necessary, under the names of Indian merchants), the Company in 1661 resolved to confine itself to the direct trade between England and India. Another step in the same direction was taken in 1664, when the trade, outwards and homewards, in jewels, musk, civet, ambergris, etc., was thrown open, subject to registration and the payment of a small percentage for "permission and freight". After this the Company's efforts were mainly devoted to preventing at home the exportation or importation of forbidden goods, seizing them when found and inflicting penalties on those responsible. Even then its success was by no means great; and at home, as in the East, its profits suffered considerably by this illicit traffic.

Cromwell's hesitation to grant a fresh monopoly of Eastern trade on the lines of previous charters was largely due to an acute difference of opinion amongst those concerned as to the advisability of continuing the joint-stock system. A strong party, including several merchants whose influence with the Protector was considerable, preferred the "regulated system" followed by the Levant and certain other com-

panies, permitting members to trade independently. The controversy lasted long enough to give the system of more or less open trade a trial; for since the United Joint Stock virtually ceased to send out capital after 1654, while the charter restrictions were quite inoperative, for about three years the markets of the East were free to all comers. As we have seen, advantage was taken of this by a number of merchants, including many members of the Company, to dispatch ships to the Indies; but the results were far from satisfactory to those responsible for the ventures. In India itself there ensued a ruinous competition among their agents, both in the sale of their cargoes and in the purchase of goods for the return voyage; while at home the rush to dispose of the latter produced a disheartening drop in prices. The merchants concerned soon realised that after all there were advantages in the old system, under which such competition was eliminated. A further sobering influence was exerted by the continued successes of the Dutch and their evident intention of ousting the Portuguese from their remaining possessions in India. The most likely method of countering such schemes seemed to be to oppose to them a united front such as could scarcely be expected from a "regulated" company; and it may be added that the spectacle of the prosperity attained by the Dutch East India Company—itself working by means of a joint stock—probably went far to remove the prejudice which had been inspired against the system by the poor results secured by the English Company in recent years. It is therefore not surprising to find that by February, 1657, the principal merchants engaged in the trade, including many of the chief "interlopers", were agreed in desiring the continuance of the joint-stock system. At the same time the existing Company resolved to endure no further delay, but to dispose by auction of all its rights and privileges and to withdraw from the trade. This quickly produced a decision on the part of the Protector and his advisers to grant a charter substantially on the lines of those of Elizabeth and James I; and on 19 October, 1657, this document passed the great seal.[1] Thereupon a new joint stock of nearly £740,000 was subscribed, though as a matter of fact only one-half of the capital was ever called up. The new stock, it is important to note, was to be a permanent one, with the proviso that periodical valuations (the first being fixed for 1664) were to be made, when shareholders were to be allowed to withdraw their proportionate shares of the assets. For the first time, therefore, the Company acquired a fixed capital, in lieu of successive stocks raised and distributed at short intervals.

Cromwell's charter of course lost its validity upon the restoration of the monarchy. King Charles, however, made no difficulty about granting a fresh one (3 April, 1661), which repeated with certain modifications and additions the grant of 1609. Power was given to

[1] For its terms see *Court Minutes*, 1655–59, p. xvii.

the Company to seize and send home interlopers: to wage war and conclude peace with non-Christian princes: and to appoint governors, who, in conjunction with their councils, were to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction at the various settlements. Under this authority the agent at Madras was in 1666 created governor of Fort St George; while on the acquisition of Bombay the Company in like manner appointed the Surat president to be governor of that island. In view of later controversies, it is worth noting that the Company begged the king to get the new charter confirmed by parliament. Some steps were taken in that direction, but nothing was achieved. Similarly, in the case of Cromwell's charter, the Protector had promised to obtain parliamentary sanction for the Company's privileges, but had failed to do so.

The East India Company now entered upon a period of great commercial prosperity, due chiefly to the increasing demand for calicoes, tea, and coffee. Although for some years it prudently refrained from distributing its profits, using them instead to strengthen its position, a dividend of 20 per cent. on the paid-up capital was distributed in each of the years 1662–4, and one of double that amount in 1665. The losses sustained in the two wars with Holland (1665–7 and 1672–4) caused a temporary set-back; but in the main a satisfactory rate of dividend was maintained, and in 1682 the Company was able not only to pay 50 per cent. in money but also to declare a bonus of double that figure, crediting each shareholder with the half-payment still due on the original subscription. John Evelyn, who had been one of the subscribers in 1657, records in his diary that he now sold his share of £500 (on which he had paid £250) to the Royal Society for £750. Had he retained it until 1691, it would have given him an annual average of nearly 22 per cent. on his original outlay.

The prosperity enjoyed by the Company throughout the reign of Charles II excited some dissatisfaction among the general body of English merchants, who felt themselves aggrieved that this profitable commerce should be confined by royal charter within so narrow a channel. In the East there were not wanting interlopers who boldly defied the Company's authority; while at home the right of any power other than parliament to impose such restrictions upon foreign trade was continually questioned. Some attempts were made within the Company itself to widen its membership and give greater elasticity; but these had little result, as the majority held firmly to their rights of monopoly. In 1683–5 the issue was fought out in the law courts, with the result that Chief Justice Jeffreys upheld the legality of the Company's privileges and confirmed its claim to seize interlopers. The victory seemed complete. Sir Josia Child, who was the dominant figure in the Company's administration, had secured the favour of both King Charles and his brother James; and the latter, a year after his accession, gave the Company a fresh charter confirming

all its privileges. Then came an unexpected blow in the shape of the Revolution. The new government was largely dependent on the Whig party, and the hopes of the opponents of monopoly rose high. A vigorous campaign was organised in support of the demand for a revision of the existing system; while the press teemed with pamphlets for and against the Company, to whose enemies were now added the various traders who were affected by its importation of printed calicoes and manufactured silks. The battle was long and furious. The Company defended itself ably and at times unscrupulously; but the arguments of its opponents made a great impression, and public feeling was on the whole in favour of their claims. Early in 1690 a parliamentary committee recommended that the trade should be granted to a new joint-stock body, to be established by act; and two years later the House of Commons, after the failure of a bill intended to widen the existing Company by increasing its capital to £1,500,000, presented an address to King William, praying him to withdraw the current charter and grant a fresh one on such terms as he might see fit. This could not be done without three years' notice; but while discussion was proceeding, the Company itself, by omitting to pay punctually a tax recently imposed, forfeited its charter.[1] A new grant was made in October, 1693, which practically carried out the wishes of parliament by doubling the capital, restricting the amount of stock that could be held by any one member, and providing that any merchant might join on payment of £5. This arrangement, however, though it considerably increased the number of shareholders, did not pacify the Company's opponents. Attempts were still made to disregard the charter by sending out private ships; and, upon the Company endeavouring to stop one of these (nominally bound for a Spanish port), the matter was carried to the House of Commons. A committee was appointed which reported that the detention was illegal, and in January, 1694, the House passed a resolution "that all the subjects of England have equal right to trade to the East Indies, unless prohibited by Act of Parliament". This naturally caused much exultation among the Company's enemies, who were now able to allege parliamentary authority for trading in the forbidden area.

In 1695 competition was threatened from an unexpected quarter. Seventy-eight years earlier James I had granted a patent for a Scottish East India Company, but had soon cancelled it under pressure from his English subjects. Now the project was revived, and the Scottish Parliament passed an act incorporating a company for the purpose of trading to Africa and the East and West Indies. By the terms of the act half the capital might be held outside Scotland; and when it was

[1] Sir William Hunter has suggested (*History of British India*, II, 310) that this was done of set purpose, Child being convinced that his lavish bribery at court would enable him to secure a fresh charter on favourable terms. It seems, however, unlikely that the Company would in this way put itself at the mercy of the government, and the actual outcome was that it had to concede many of the demands it had so long resisted.

found that £300,000 had been secretly subscribed in London, the English Company in alarm brought the matter before both Houses of Parliament. National jealousy came at once into play, with the result that the Commons resolved to take drastic action against the subscribers and to impeach the promoters of the scheme. This deterred the English members from paying up their subscriptions, and so the financial position of the new venture was seriously weakened. The dreaded competition in the East Indies never eventuated, for the new Company's energies were exhausted in a disastrous attempt to found a settlement at Darien, in Central America; yet the opposition of England rankled long in Scottish breasts, despite the fact that one of the articles for the union of the two kingdoms provided for the repayment to the shareholders of their capital with interest.

In England the uncertainty prevailing as to the validity of the East India Company's privileges led that body to apply in 1696 for parliamentary sanction to its trade; but this proved unsuccessful. However, two years later the financial needs of King William's government brought the matter to an issue. The monopoly was virtually put up to auction between the contending bodies. The existing Company, which, owing to great losses during the war with France, was not in a position to make a high bid, offered to increase its capital to £1,500,000, and out of this to make a loan to the government of £700,000 at 4 per cent. interest; while its competitors undertook to form a new company which would lend £2,000,000 at 8 per cent. The latter terms, despite the higher rate of interest, proved the more attractive, and a bill providing for a loan on these conditions was introduced. Thereupon the East India Company offered to find the £2,000,000 required, since its privileges could not be saved on any other terms; but the proposal came too late, and the bill received the royal assent in July, 1698. It provided for a subscription of £2,000,000 sterling as a loan to the state, which in return would grant to a "General Society", made up of the subscribers, the exclusive right of trading to the East Indies, with a saving clause allowing the existing Company to continue its operations until the expiry of the three years' notice required by its charter, i.e. until September, 1701. The concession made to the new body was to last until the government repaid the loan, and this was not to be done until after 1711. The members of the "General Society" might either trade separately, to the value each year of the amounts they had severally subscribed, or they might unite in a fresh joint-stock company to which His Majesty was empowered to grant a suitable charter. The great bulk of the subscribers chose the latter alternative, and on 5 September, 1698, they were accordingly incorporated by royal charter under the style of "The English Company Trading to the East Indies". The management was entrusted to twenty-four directors, who were to appoint from among themselves a chairman and deputy-chairman; and we may

note in passing that the shareholders were not required, as in the earlier Company, to pay a separate sum for admission to the freedom.

The new body set to work with energy. Ships and factors were dispatched to the East; while a special ambassador, Sir William Norris, was sent to obtain from the Moghul emperor the grant of all necessary privileges. However, it soon became apparent that to oust the older Company from its well-established position was a task beyond the strength of the new corporation. Its original capital having been lent to the government and the interest received thereon being insufficient to maintain the trade, fresh money had to be raised from the members, and this proved difficult of accomplishment. Moreover, the "Old Company" (as it was now termed) had taken the precaution to subscribe, in the name of its treasurer, £315,000 to the loan, thereby obtaining the right to trade in his name each year to that amount, even after the expiration of its privileges; while the difficulty that the Company would cease to be a corporate body when its notice expired was surmounted in April, 1700, by obtaining an act permitting its continuance under its own name until the repayment of the £2,000,000 loan. This astute move decided the issue. The "New Company" had already made tentative proposals for an amalgamation, and as time went on this was seen on both sides to be the only possible solution. Under pressure from the government, an agreement was reached early in 1702. The actual direction of the trade during the process of amalgamation was entrusted to a body of "Managers", half to be appointed by each Company, the annual exports being provided in equal proportions by the two bodies. This arrangement was to last for seven years, during which the servants of both Companies in the East were to clear all debts and wind up the separate stocks sent out before the union. At the end of the time the Old Company was to surrender its charter and make over the islands of Bombay and St Helena to the New Company, the charter of which was to be henceforth the basis of "The United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies". Further, the Old Company was to purchase from the New sufficient stock to equalise their respective shares; while the latter was to pay to the former half the difference between the values of the respective "dead stocks" (i.e. buildings, etc.) in the East.

This agreement still left room for disputes, to settle which an act was passed in March, 1708, under which the Earl of Godolphin was appointed arbitrator; the term of the Company's privileges was extended by another fifteen years; and it was given the right of buying out those members of the "General Society" who had elected to trade on their own account. In return for these concessions the United Company was required to lend the exchequer a further sum of £1,200,000 without interest—thus reducing the rate of interest on

the whole debt to 5 per cent. Godolphin's award was issued in September, 1708, and the union was consummated in the following March. The struggle was now at an end; and it is interesting to note that its result was to confirm the monopoly of the trade to a chartered joint-stock company, though on an improved basis. The right of parliament to control the conditions of this concession had, however, been established; also the principle of requiring in return some assistance towards the national finances.

Having thus reviewed the course of events at home, we must now follow the development of English trade in India during the same fifty years, a period which synchronised roughly with the long reign of the Emperor Aurangzib. Soon after the Restoration the Company withdrew from the port-to-port trade; and as the factories in Upper India (Agra, Lucknow, etc.) had been abandoned, the English settlements were now in groups centring at Surat, Madras, and Hugli respectively. It will therefore be convenient to deal with them more or less as separate entities.

In Western India the outstanding feature of the period is the gradual rise of Bombay, which had been ceded by the Portuguese to King Charles II in 1661, taken possession of on his behalf in 1665, and made over by him to the East India Company three years later. That its development was slow is no matter for surprise. The island was far from healthy; the neighbouring mainland produced little of commercial value, and the barrier of the Western Ghats—to say nothing of the insecurity resulting from the constant warfare between the Moghuls and the Marathas—precluded any regular communication in that direction with Indian trade centres; while the depredations of the bold pirates of the Malabar Coast were a perpetual menace to shipping. For nearly twenty years, therefore, Surat retained its position as the headquarters of English commerce and the seat of the presidency. Bombay, however, could afford to bide its time. It possessed a magnificent harbour; its security, thanks to its position and its fortifications, afforded a striking contrast to the experience of Surat, which was sacked by the Maratha chief, Sivaji, in 1664 and again in 1670; while the mild and impartial rule of the English proved an attraction to traders who had suffered from the tyranny of the officials on the mainland. Its potentialities did not escape the keen eye of Gerald Aungier, who in 1669 succeeded Sir George Oxenden as president at Surat and governor of Bombay; and he made it the main task of his administration to put the new settlement on a satisfactory basis. Courts of judicature were established; the local revenue was settled on equitable terms; a suitable currency was introduced;[1] and inducements were held out to merchants and craftsmen to settle on the island. As the result of all this, by the time of Aungier's death

[1] The first suggestion for this was made in 1668 (*English Factories*, 1668–9, p. 52). See also Foster, "The first English coinage at Bombay," in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, 4th series, vol. VI.

(June, 1677) Bombay was on the high road to prosperity, and its population (according to the estimate of Dr John Fryer) had risen to 60,000, three times the number of its inhabitants under Portuguese rule.

The one desire of the English merchants was to be left to pursue their calling in peace; but this was impossible in the conditions of the time. The perennial warfare between the imperial forces and the Marathas was quickened in 1681 by the arrival in the Deccan of Aurangzib himself, who thus entered upon the long campaign which was to engross his attention until his death. Unhappily for Bombay, the war was not confined to the land but was carried on at sea as well, the Sidi of Janjira (about 45 miles south of Bombay) acting on behalf of the emperor against his inveterate foes the Marathas. The Sidi claimed the right to make Bombay harbour a place of refuge for his fleets, and this could hardly be gainsaid without offending Aurangzib; but the effect of the concession was to make the neighbouring waters a scene of continual warfare. In 1679 Sivaji seized the island of Khaneri at the mouth of the harbour; whereupon the Sidi fortified its neighbour, Underi, with the result that all vessels entering the bay were liable to attack from one or the other. With the Marathas themselves the relations of the English were on an uncertain footing; while further south the Malabar pirates were a constant source of trouble. Even at Surat, which was distant from the scene of action, the strain imposed upon the Moghul finances was felt in the increased exactions of the local officials and their arbitrary disregard of the protests of the Company's factors.

In these conditions of turmoil it became more and more evident that only by being strong themselves could the English secure the continuance of their commerce; and a few months before his death Aungier, himself no lover of war, wrote to his employers that the trade could only be carried on sword in hand. In earlier times the home authorities had always turned a deaf ear to counsels of vigorous action, and any outlay on fortifications had been looked upon with the greatest repugnance. Now, however, came a change, mainly under the influence of Sir Josia Child, who, after seven years' service in the directorate, became governor in 1681, and continued to be the dominant force in the Company until his death (1699). He held firmly the view that the true line of action was to follow the example of the Dutch, by building up a power on the Indian coast-line which should be sufficiently strong to repel all attacks and to enforce respect from its neighbours, even the Moghul emperor himself. In this scheme Bombay was to be the counterpart of the Dutch settlement at Batavia. It was to be strongly fortified and provided with sufficient military and naval strength to protect English trade; while the cost of all this was to be met from increased rents, customs dues, and municipal taxation. Similar measures were to be taken at Madras; and it was

in a letter to that place (December, 1687) that the aims of the Company were defined, in an oft-quoted passage, as being "to establish such a politie of civill and military power, and create and secure such a large revenue to maintaine both...as may bee the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come".

In the promotion of these designs Sir Josia found a willing agent in his namesake,[1] John Child, who in 1682 became president of Surat and governor of Bombay. The firstfruits of the new policy were, however, disconcerting. The endeavour to raise the revenue and cut down the expenditure at Bombay caused a revolt of the garrison in 1683 under its commandant, Richard Keigwin, who until November in the following year governed the settlement in the name of King Charles, submitting only on the appearance of a naval force with a royal mandate for the surrender of the place. The rebellion having been quelled, the Company proceeded to develop its schemes. Already President Child had been appointed captain-general of the Company's sea and land forces on that coast; and in October, 1686, when the Company, goaded by the injuries received in Bengal (as described later), had resolved to make a firm stand against the exactions of the Moghul officials, whatever the consequences might be, a further step was taken. Child (who had been created a baronet in the preceding year) was given the imposing title of Captain-General,[2] Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces throughout its possessions, as well as Director-General of all mercantile affairs; and he was authorised to proceed to Madras and Bengal to regulate matters in those parts, should he see fit. Ordinarily he was to reside at Bombay, which in consequence (May, 1687) superseded Surat as the headquarters of the western presidency. To complete the organisation of the English possessions (and especially to check the interlopers who were making such inroads upon the Company's trade) a court of admiralty was erected at Bombay in 1684, and another at Madras two years later, both under letters patent

[1] It has been generally stated that the two Childs were brothers; but Mr Oliver Strachey has shown that this was not the case (*Keigwin's Rebellion*, pp. 20, 162).

[2] This designation—usually shortened to "General"—was explained in a letter of August, 1687, as being intended to give to its holder "the same preheminence and authority which the Dutch confer upon their Generall at Batavia". Its subsequent history is worth noting. After the death of Sir John Child, Sir John Goldsborough was sent out (1691) as commissary and supervisor; and two years later he was made captain-general and commander-in-chief, with Madras as his headquarters, while Sir John Gayer was to act as his lieutenant-general and governor of Bombay. On the death of Goldsborough, Gayer succeeded to the post of "General" (1694), remaining at Bombay; while Higginson, the Madras president, became lieutenant-general. Ten years later (Gayer being kept in prison at Surat by the Moghul authorities) Sir Nicholas Waite, the new governor of Bombay, assumed the title of "General"; and upon his dismissal in 1708 his successor, Aislabie, laid claim to the same designation. The title was abolished in 1715, when the new post of president and governor of Bombay was created, with Boone as its first occupant. The title of lieutenant-general had lapsed in 1698, when Thomas Pitt was appointed governor of Madras.

obtained from the king in 1683. Further, in 1688 a municipality was established at Madras, with a mayor and twelve aldermen, including several Portuguese and Indians—a concession intended to reconcile the inhabitants to a system of local taxation.

Into the war with the Moghuls which resulted from the troubles in Bengal the English on the western coast entered only after a long hesitancy and in a feeble manner. The seizure of some Moghul vessels brought about a rupture towards the end of 1688, with the consequence that the factors at Surat were imprisoned. Child in retaliation captured a number of richly freighted ships.[1] Thereupon ensued a siege of Bombay by the Moghul forces, until in 1690 the English put an end to the war by a humiliating submission, involving the payment of a considerable sum. Child, whose dismissal was one of the conditions of peace, died just as the negotiations were reaching a conclusion.

The remainder of the period was filled with trouble, owing largely to the depredations of the English pirates who were swarming in the Indian Ocean and capturing Indian vessels. For these their peaceful compatriots were held responsible, with the result that for some time all the factors at Surat and Broach were kept in prison by the Moghul authorities. On top of all this came the bitter rivalry between the servants of the Old and New Companies, elsewhere alluded to. Before leaving the subject mention should be made of the settlements established during the half-century on the Malabar Coast, mainly in order to obtain a supply of pepper. The chief of these were at Rajapur, which factory was plundered by Sivaji in 1661, subsequently re-established, but abandoned in 1679; at Tellicherri, where the English settled in 1683; at Anjengo, first established about 1694; and at Karwar, where a factory was maintained (with some intermissions) from 1660 until the middle of the eighteenth century and was then withdrawn, leaving Tellicherri and Anjengo to supply the needs of the pepper traffic.

On the eastern side of India the new start, made upon the grant of Cromwell's charter, separated the Coast factories (Fort St George, Masulipatam, etc.) from those in Bengal and Bihar (centring at Hugli), each of these two groups forming an agency, under the presidency of Surat; but this arrangement lasted only till 1661, when Madras became once more the seat of government for all the factories on that side of India. The domestic history of the agency for the next quarter of a century was on the whole one of peaceful progress. The capture of the Portuguese settlement at St Thomé by the forces of the king of Golconda in 1662 drove a considerable number of its inhabitants to the shelter of Fort St George; and about 1670 the population of

[1] In 1693–4 the Company paid into the royal exchequer £16,638 as the king's tenth share of the value of prizes taken during the war (W. R. Scott's *Joint Stock Companies*, III, 537).

Madras was estimated roughly at 40,000. The Second Dutch War (1665–7) produced much disturbance of trade, especially as it synchronised with internal trouble. Sir Edward Winter, who had been superseded in 1665 by a new agent from home (George Foxcroft), in the same year seized and imprisoned his successor, charging him with treason, and reassumed the government in the name of King Charles. For nearly three years Madras remained under his control; then (August, 1668) the arrival of a fleet with a royal mandate induced him to yield his place to Foxcroft, on an assurance that the persons and property of himself and his adherents should be respected. The war of 1672–4 between Holland on the one hand and England and France on the other brought fresh cause of alarm. In 1673 the Company's fleet was defeated and dispersed by a Dutch squadron off Petapoli; while on land there was much fighting round St Thomé, which had been occupied by the French in 1672 but recaptured by the Golconda forces, assisted by the Dutch, in the following year. The incursions of the Marathas into Southern India gave an excuse for strengthening the fortifications of Madras under Sir William Langhorn (agent, 1672–8) and his successor, Sir Streynsham Master (1678–81); while the administration of the latter is also memorable for the reorganisation of the judicial system and the erection of St Mary's church in the fort—the first Anglican church built in India. In 1681 permission was obtained from the Maratha ruler at Jinji for English settlements at Porto Novo, Cuddalore, and Konimedu; while in the following year a factory was established at Vizagapatam. A few years later the kingdom of Golconda was finally subjugated by the Moghul forces, and Aurangzib became the nominal overlord of the English factories on the Coromandel Coast. Negotiations ensued with his general, Zulfikar Khan, who in 1690 confirmed the existing grants for Madras, Masulipatam, and other stations; while in the same year a fort at Devenampatnam (close to Cuddalore) was purchased and made into a new stronghold named Fort St David. In 1693 the boundaries of Madras were enlarged by the grant of three adjoining villages; and during the administration of Thomas Pitt (1698–1709) five more were added, though these were resumed by the Moghul officials in 1711 and were not recovered until six years later, under the grant obtained by Surman from the emperor Farrukhsiyar.

As in the case of the western presidency, Madras suffered much from the rivalry caused by the establishment of the New East India Company; and this is perhaps the most convenient place to narrate briefly the struggle between the two bodies, so far as it affected the settlements in India. The mission of Sir William Norris, to which allusion has already been made, proved a fiasco, and the hopes built thereon by the directors of the New Company were entirely disappointed. After much trouble and delay he reached the camp of

Aurangzib in April, 1701, and was graciously received; but the emperor was irritated by the depredations committed by European pirates upon Indian vessels carrying pilgrims to the Red Sea ports, and the wazir, whom Norris had unwisely offended, threw all sorts of obstacles in his way. The ambassador found that he could only obtain the farmans he desired by undertaking to make compensation for all Indian ships taken by the pirates; and thereupon he quitted the court abruptly and returned to Surat. He died on the homeward voyage in 1702.

Meanwhile the presidents appointed by the New Company had added to the difficulties of their position by quarrelling violently with the representatives of the older body. All three of these new presidents were discharged servants of the Old Company, and this fact added acrimony to the disputes, which were further embittered by the fact that the newcomers had been given the rank of "King's consul", and were not slow to claim jurisdiction over all Englishmen resident in India. This pretension was indignantly repudiated by the servants of the Old Company, who maintained that the privileges of the latter remained intact until 1701 at least. The Indian authorities, while taking little interest in the controversy, were naturally inclined to support the representatives of the older body; and when at Surat the New Company's president, Sir Nicholas Waite, tore down the flag that floated over the rival factory, it was at once replaced under a military guard sent by the Moghul governor. It is true that Waite's charges against the Old Company, of complicity in the piracies from which the Indian traders were suffering, bore fruit in the seizure, by the emperor's orders, of Sir John Gayer and other servants of the older body; but the blow recoiled on the New Company, whose factors in Bengal were also arrested under the same instructions. Most of the Old Company's servants in that province secured themselves in the recently erected Fort William at Calcutta; while Madras successfully resisted the troops sent to occupy it. In the latter presidency John Pitt, the New Company's representative, had established his headquarters at Masulipatam, whence he carried on a violent controversy with his relative Thomas Pitt, the governor of Madras, much to his own discomfiture. The distractions caused by these disputes, and Norris's failure to obtain authority for new settlements, formed powerful arguments for an amalgamation of the two companies; and when once this was effected, the first task of the court of managers was to heal the dissensions in India. Accordingly the grant of consular powers was rescinded; at Madras Governor Pitt was confirmed in his post; in Bengal a curious experiment was tried for a time of a council of four members who were to preside in turn; while on the western side Gayer was to be governor of Bombay and Waite president at Surat. A proviso that, in the event of Gayer's continued imprisonment, Waite was to act for him enabled the latter to take

possession of the post, which he continued to hold until his dismissal in 1708.

It now remains to trace the progress of the English in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Under the arrangements made upon Cromwell's grant of a charter, an agent was appointed, with Hugli as his headquarters, having under his control the factories of Patna, Kasimbazar, and Balasore, the last named being the port at which all cargoes were received or shipped.[1] This arrangement was, however, short-lived, for in 1661 the agency was abolished and the factors were replaced under the agent at Madras. The importance of Dacca, both as the seat of government and as a centre for the purchase of fine cotton goods, led the Company in 1668 to sanction the formation of a factory in that city; while a few years later others were opened at Rajmahal and at Malda. The trade of the English in these parts grew steadily both in volume and in value. The Company looked to Bengal for its regular supply of saltpetre, for which there was an ever-increasing demand in Europe; while great quantities of silk and silk goods were also purchased, artisans being brought from England to improve the methods of manufacture. Sugar and cotton yarn were further articles of export, and by 1680 the annual investment in Bengal had risen to £150,000.[2] In hopes of further development, the Company in 1681 determined to make the settlements there independent of Madras; and accordingly in the following year William Hedges, one of the "committees", was sent out as "Agent and Governor of all affairs and factories in the Bay of Bengal". The experiment did not prove a success. In 1684 Hedges was dismissed and the Bengal factories were once again placed under Fort St George, the agent at which was given the new title of President and Governor for the Coast and Bay.

Now came a time of serious trouble. For many years there had been friction with the local officials over the question of way-dues and customs. From the beginning the English had aimed at securing complete exemption from such imposts, in consideration of an annual present of 3000 rupees; and in 1656 they had obtained from Shah Shuja, who was then governing the province, a grant freeing them from all demands on this score.[3] Such an arrangement was much to the benefit of the factors themselves, since their private trade passed free as well as the Company's, while the necessary presents went down to the account of the latter; and accordingly they made strenuous efforts to secure its continuance. On the other hand the Moghul officials saw no reason why the fast-increasing commerce of the English should escape the tolls levied upon other merchants, nor did they recognise that the nishan of Shah Shuja was binding upon his

[1] The establishment at Hariharpur (in Orissa), the earliest English settlement in those parts, had been withdrawn in 1642.

[2] Bruce's *Annals*, II, 451.

[3] For grants relating to Bengal, 1633–60, see the appendix to *English Factories*, 1655–60.

successors. The factors made several attempts to settle the matter by obtaining an imperial farman in their favour, but without success; and although Shaista Khan, then governor, gave them in 1678 a fresh nishan, with the approval of the emperor, freeing them from dues, these were soon again demanded. Two years later a farman was at last obtained from Aurangzib, which seemed to settle the dispute in favour of the English; but the wording was ambiguous, and the Indian officials declared that it really authorised them to demand the same dues as were paid by the English at Surat. The factors were powerless to resist any exactions the authorities chose to make, since it was easy to enforce the demand by stopping the saltpetre boats on their way down the Ganges or by preventing the native merchants from dealing with the English; and full advantage was taken of both methods to extort money from the factors. Gradually the latter came to the conclusion that force was the only remedy and that it was essential for their security to establish, at or near the mouth of the Ganges, a fortified settlement similar to those at Madras and Bombay. This they might make the centre of their trade, and thither they might withdraw when threatened; while from such a base they could at any time exert pressure upon the viceroy by stopping the sea-borne trade of the province. The home authorities, who (as we have seen) were already persuaded of the necessity of adopting a bold policy, readily fell in with this view, and in 1686 they sent out orders that the Bengal factories should be withdrawn and an attempt made to seize Chittagong, for which purpose they dispatched several ships and a small force of soldiers. At the same time on the western side of India the Moghul coast was to be blockaded and the local shipping seized; while the Coast settlements were to assist with the full strength of their resources. The enterprise was a rash one, though all might have been well if the Company had left the control of affairs entirely in the hands of Job Charnock, its experienced agent in Bengal; not that fighting would have been entirely avoided, but an accommodation would have been reached more speedily and nothing would have been done as regards the absurd plan of attacking so distant a port as Chittagong. In point of fact a rupture was forced by the Moghul governor of Hugli, who in October, 1686, made an attack upon the factory there.[1] The assault was repelled, but Charnock deemed it wise to abandon the place and drop down the river to Sutanati (on the site of the modern Calcutta), from whence he carried on some negotiations with the viceroy. These failing, the English withdrew further down the Hugli river and fixed their headquarters on the island of Hijili, at its mouth; while, in reprisal for the injuries sustained, their ships sacked and burnt the town of Balasore. In their new station they were blockaded by the Moghul forces, while fever made great havoc among

[1] For a detailed account of the operations see the introduction to C. R. Wilson's *Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, vol. I.

the small garrison; but timely reinforcements enabled Charnock to effect an agreement under which, in the autumn of 1687, the English returned to Sutanati, where they remained for a year unmolested. The home authorities, however, were obstinately bent upon the plan of a fortified settlement in Bengal; with the result that in September, 1688, a fresh naval force arrived under Captain William Heath, who had plenary powers to carry out the projected attack upon Chittagong. Despite the opposition of Charnock the new settlement was abandoned, and in January the fleet arrived at Chittagong, only to find it much too strong to be assailed with any chance of success; whereupon Heath decided to retreat to Madras. However, the conclusion of peace in the early part of 1690, on the initiative of the Bombay authorities, paved the way for the return of the English to Bengal; and the new viceroy, uneasy at the loss of trade resulting from the disturbances, wrote to Charnock at Fort St George, inviting him back. To these overtures the agent would not listen until a specific promise was added that the grievance over customs should be redressed—a promise that was redeemed in February, 1691, by an imperial grant of freedom from all dues, on condition of the payment, as before, of 3000 rupees *per annum* in lieu thereof. It was in August, 1690, that the English once more settled at Sutanati and erected a few huts that were destined to grow into the capital of their Indian empire. The site had disadvantages, for it was girdled on the land side by swamps which rendered it unhealthy; but its position on the eastern bank of the river gave it security, while it was accessible from the sea and had good anchorage close inshore. In 1696 a local rebellion provided an excuse for fortifying the factory; and two years later permission was obtained to rent the three villages of Sutanati, Calcutta, and Govindpur for 1200 rupees a year. The fortified factory, which was named Fort William in honour of King William III, was made in 1700 the seat of a presidency, Sir Charles Eyre becoming the first president and governor of Fort William in Bengal.

The domestic history of the East India Company from the time of the union in 1709 to the middle of the century was one of quiet prosperity. The value of its imports rose from nearly £500,000 in 1708 to about £1,100,000 in 1748; while its exports increased from £576,000 (of which £375,000 was in bullion) in 1710 to £1,121,000 (including £816,000 in bullion) forty years later. An act of parliament obtained in 1711 extended the period of exclusive trade until 1733. As the latter date approached, a body of merchants made a fresh attempt to oust the Company from the trade by offering to find the necessary money to enable the government to pay off the existing debt, the new loan to bear only 2 per cent. interest; it was proposed then to organise a new company on a "regulated" basis, open to all merchants but subject to the payment of a percentage on imports.[1]

[1] *Historical MSS. Commission's Reports: Diary of Lord Percival*, p. 65.

The proposal found many supporters, and the East India Company in alarm offered to pay £200,000 to the treasury and to reduce its rate of interest on the government debt to 4 per cent. These terms were accepted, with the result that in 1730 an act was passed prolonging the Company's privileges to 1769. A further extension until 1783 was granted in 1744, at the cost of the loan of a further sum of one million to the government at 3 per cent. An act of 1750 reduced the interest on the earlier loan of £3,200,000 to 3½ per cent. up to Christmas, 1757, and 3 per cent. thereafter. Thus the interest paid by the government on its total indebtedness to the Company was placed on a general level of 3 per cent. The £1,000,000 lent in 1744 was not added to the Company's capital, which remained at £3,200,000 down to 1786, when another £800,000 was raised at a considerable premium. The capital was further increased in 1789 and 1793 by two sums of £1,000,000 each, likewise raised at a high premium; thus making a total of £6,000,000, a figure that was not varied down to 1858.

During the period under consideration the dividend paid by the Company rose rapidly from 5 per cent. in 1708–9 to 10 per cent. in 1711–12. After continuing at that rate till 1722, it dropped to 8 per cent., and in 1732 to 7 per cent. In 1743 it rose again to 8 per cent., and remained at that figure till 1755.

The parliamentary sanction under which the Company's monopoly was exercised effectually debarred other British subjects from any open competition; but there were not wanting enterprising spirits who sought to make profit by taking service with its foreign rivals, particularly the Ostend East India Company. To check this practice the English Company in 1718 obtained an act authorising the seizure of any British subject found trading under such auspices; and further enactments for the same purpose were passed in 1721 and 1723. Owing, however, to the pressure brought to bear by the several governments concerned, this danger was soon after removed (as related elsewhere) by the suspension of the charter of the Ostend Company.

The steady development of the East India Company's trade is shown by the fact that, whereas for the five years 1708–9 to 1712–13 on an average eleven ships were dispatched annually to the East, for the similar period between 1743–4 and 1747–8 the number was twenty per annum, of much larger tonnage. It may be mentioned that at this time, whatever the size of the vessel, the tonnage chartered by the Company was never more than 499 tons. The reason is a curious one. By a clause in the 1698 charter the Company was bound to provide a chaplain for every ship of 500 tons or over; and it would seem that, rather than incur this expense, the directors chose to engage a larger number of vessels, though in effect the cost must have been greater. The obnoxious clause was not repeated in the act of 1773; whereupon the Company began to charter ships at their full

measurements, and later on considerably increased its requirements in regard to the size of vessels.

One feature of importance in the Company's history during the closing years of the seventeenth and the first quarter of the eighteenth century was the agitation excited amongst English manufacturers by the competition of the cotton and silk fabrics imported from India. During the early years of the trade the piece-goods brought into the country competed, as we have seen, mostly with linens from the continent, and the greater cheapness of the former ensured them a general welcome, whether they were plain or printed. About 1676, however, calico-printing works were started near London, and the industry quickly became one of importance, with the result that soon protests began to be heard against the importation by the Company of printed Indian calicoes which undersold those produced in England itself. Similar objections were raised by the silk weavers against India-wrought silks, as being detrimental to another rising industry; while behind both parties stood the woollen manufacturers, who alleged that the growing use of these foreign silks and cottons was ruining the staple manufacture of the country. In the spring of 1696 a bill was introduced to restrain the wearing of Indian silks, printed calicoes, etc.; but the opposition of the East India Company resulted in such vital amendments that the bill was allowed to drop. A fresh measure was then brought in, only to be abandoned owing to a disagreement between the two Houses; and as a consequence serious riots on the part of the artisans affected occurred in November, 1696, and the following spring. The agitation was continued until an act was passed (1700) forbidding the use of Asiatic silks and printed and dyed calicoes, though these goods might still be brought in for re-exportation. This legislation has been represented as a wrong done to India; but it must be remembered that the latter was then in no closer relation to England than any other country, while the encouragement of home industries was looked upon as a primary duty. Moreover, the effect upon the trade of the two countries was not so detrimental as had been feared, for the demand for raw silk, plain calicoes, and cotton yarn was considerably increased. In 1720 came a fresh turn; violent protests from the woollen and silk manufacturers induced Parliament to forbid the use (with certain exceptions) of calicoes dyed or printed in England. This prohibition, though modified in 1736 by permission to print on cotton stuffs having a linen warp, was maintained until 1774, when the British calico printers were once more allowed to dye and print stuffs wholly made of cotton, provided these were manufactured in Great Britain. The rapid rise of the English cotton industry, based upon Arkwright's inventions, soon removed all fear of Indian competition, though as a matter of fact the prohibitory enactments lingered on the statute book until the nineteenth century.

One special feature of the Company's operations during the period under survey was the development of the trade in tea from China and coffee from the Red Sea ports. Both articles came into use in England about the middle of the seventeenth century, and by 1686 the consumption of tea had increased to such an extent that the Company decided to remove it from the list of articles open to private trade and to reserve the commerce to itself. Supplies were at first procured from Bantam; and after the withdrawal of the English factors from that port in 1682, Surat and Madras became the intermediaries. From the beginning of the eighteenth century attempts were made to establish a regular trade with China to meet the increasing demand for tea, and by 1715 these efforts had proved successful. Some idea of the growth of the trade, and of the gradual reduction in the price of the commodity, is afforded by the fact that, whereas in 1706 the sales amounted to 54,600 lb., fetching £45,000, the amount sold in 1750 was 2,325,000 lb., which realised about £544,000. Coffee made its first appearance in the Company's sale lists at the beginning of 1660. This commodity was easily procurable at Surat, whence there was a constant trade with the Red Sea ports; but later it was found worth while to reopen for the purpose the factory originally started at Mokha early in the seventeenth century. In 1752, however, this arrangement was abandoned and the trade was left to be managed by the supercargoes of the ships employed in the traffic.

As in the preceding section, the history of the period 1700–50 may best be treated by examining in succession the records of the groups forming the respective presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Each of these had its peculiar difficulties, but surmounted them with more or less success; and each went on its way without heeding overmuch what was happening elsewhere. The one exception occurred early in the century, when all three presidencies were concerned in an embassy sent to Delhi to obtain a comprehensive grant from the Moghul emperor. The idea originated with Governor Pitt of Madras in 1708, when the emperor Shah 'Alam I was in Southern India; but before the matter could be put in train the court had returned to Delhi. Further delay was caused by the death of that monarch and the subsequent contest for the crown. When, however, the struggle ended in the accession of Farrukhsiyar, who had shown himself well disposed towards the English, it was resolved to go forward with the project; and the mission, which was under the charge of John Surman, reached Delhi in the summer of 1714. The negotiations were so protracted that it was the middle of July, 1717, before Surman was able to quit the capital, carrying with him the farmans he had obtained. His efforts had been largely aided by the services rendered by William Hamilton, the doctor attached to the mission, in curing the emperor of a painful disease; but the story that the concessions were granted as a reward for Hamilton's assistance is one that will

not stand examination. The three farmans brought back by Surman were addressed to the officials of the three provinces—Hyderabad, Gujarat, and Bengal (including Bihar and Orissa)—in which the English were settled. The right of the latter to trade in Bengal free of all dues, subject to the customary payment of 3000 rupees *per annum*, was confirmed: they were to be allowed to rent additional territory round Calcutta and to settle where else they might choose: their long-standing privilege of freedom from dues throughout the province of Hyderabad was continued, the only payment required being the existing rent paid for Madras: certain neighbouring villages, which had long been in dispute, were added to that city: a rearrangement of the Company's land round Vizagapatam was sanctioned: a yearly sum of 10,000 rupees was accepted in satisfaction of all customs and dues at Surat: and the rupees coined by the Company at Bombay were allowed to pass current throughout the imperial dominions. Though Surman had not obtained all for which he had asked, he had secured a great deal, and his embassy stands out as a landmark in the history of the Company's settlements.[1]

The Bengal factors soon discovered that it was easier to obtain an imperial farman than to induce the local officials to obey it, in the disorganised state of the kingdom. Ja'far Khan, the governor of Bengal, openly declared that the English should never enjoy the additional villages round Calcutta specified in the grant; and although possession was obtained of some of them in an indirect manner, it was not until Clive's treaty with Siraj-ud-daula in 1757 that the territory was entirely brought under British control. Nevertheless Calcutta continued to grow in importance and wealth, and by the middle of the century its population was estimated at over 100,000 as compared with the 15,000 of 1704. This, it is true, was partly owing to a great influx about 1742, caused by the invasion of the province by the Marathas. The approach of these raiders created great consternation, for Fort William (finished in 1716) was of little real strength, and moreover its defensive capabilities had just been seriously reduced by the erection of warehouses against its southern face. However, the inhabitants dug a broad ditch round a great part of the town, while batteries placed at various points assisted to secure it from sudden attack. Fortunately these defences were not tested, for the Nawab 'Ali Wardi Khan managed, with the aid of a rival body of Marathas, to clear his province of the invaders; and although the latter returned in 1744, they were then defeated and driven back to their own territories. The general insecurity led to the consideration of many plans for the improvement of Fort William, but the expense, and the natural unwillingness of the owners to consent to the clearing away of the houses that crowded around it, prevented action being taken until

[1] The full story will be found in C. R. Wilson's *Early Annals*, vol. II, pt II.

it was too late. Had greater prevision been exercised, the story of the Black Hole might never have been written.

The domestic history of Calcutta for this period includes also the erection of a church (St Anne's, consecrated in 1709): the building of a fine house for the governor in the fort: and the organisation of a judicial system under a charter granted by George I in September, 1726, which also provided for the appointment of a mayor, sheriff, and aldermen. The courts thus established were similar to those erected at Madras under the same charter, as described later, but they did not come into full operation.

Concerning the subordinate settlements in Bengal there is little to record, save constant quarrels with the local functionaries, who, being now practically uncontrolled from Delhi, made the most of their opportunities to extort money. The trade of the English was very prosperous, alike as regards the regular operations of the Company and the private trade of its servants (which was sheltered under its privileges); and naturally the officials did their best to take toll of it for their own advantage. It was equally to be expected that such exactions should be resisted as far as possible; and hence a lengthy story of disputes and reconciliations.

During this half-century the English settlement at Madras likewise grew and prospered, though its history affords few events that call for notice in the present rapid survey. The absorption in 1717 of five additional villages (originally granted in 1708) has been mentioned already. Twenty-five years later a grant was obtained of Vepery and four other hamlets. The territory occupied by the British was still, however, quite small, comprising a space of about five miles by three; while their only other footholds on the Coromandel Coast were Fort St David at Cuddalore and factories at Vizagapatam and Masulipatam. In 1727 a new charter (this time from the crown, not from the Company) remodelled the Madras corporation, reducing the number of aldermen and appointing a sheriff, to be chosen annually by the governor and council. The mayor and aldermen were authorised to try all civil cases, with an appeal to the governor and council, whose decision was to be final up to 1000 pagodas; when that amount was exceeded, an appeal might be made to the King in Council. The governor and the five senior members of his council were to be justices of the peace for the town and were to hold quarter sessions for the trial of criminal cases.

On the western side of India the commerce of Bombay steadily increased, in spite of the disturbances caused by disputes with the Portuguese and the Marathas, and hostilities with the Malabar pirates, notably the Angrias, who dominated the coast-line between Bombay and Goa and attacked all vessels that offered a reasonable chance of capture. Boone, who was president and governor from 1715 to 1722, not only built a wall round Bombay, to guard against

sudden raids, but also constructed a number of fighting ships for the protection of commerce. During the next forty years several expeditions were fitted out against the pirates; but it was not until the capture of Suvarndrug in 1755 by Commodore James and the destruction of Gheria[1] in the following year by Clive and Admiral Watson that the power of the Angrias was broken. In these operations the English were much aided by the cordial relations that had been established with the Peshwa, whose troops co-operated on both occasions. A much less welcome outcome of Maratha prowess was their capture of Bassein from the Portuguese in 1739, which brought them unpleasantly near to Bombay itself.

Of the internal organisation of that town the most noteworthy developments were the establishment of a bank in 1720: the erection of a mayor's court (similar to that at Madras, and created under the same charter) in 1728: and the formation of a large dockyard a few years later, under a Parsi shipbuilder from Surat. By 1744 the population had risen to 70,000, while the revenues amounted to about sixteen lakhs of rupees. Grose, who arrived on the island in 1750, records that the draining of the marshes had materially improved the healthiness of Bombay, while "the mildness of the government and the toleration of all religions" had drawn thither large numbers of artificers and merchants from Surat and other places on the mainland.

Concurrently with the growth and consolidation of the English settlements came increased competition from other European powers. Of the rivalry of the French, Dutch, and Portuguese nothing need here be said, as the subject is dealt with elsewhere in the volume; but some account must be given of the efforts made by other nations of the West to establish themselves in India and secure a share of the profitable trade resulting. The Danish East India Company was established in 1616, and four years later a settlement was made at Tranquebar, on the south-eastern coast. From thence commerce was soon extended to Masulipatam, and later to Bengal; but adequate support from home was wanting, and for a long time the exiguous trade of the Danes consisted chiefly in carrying goods from India to Macassar and other parts of the Malayan Archipelago. In fact more than once they were on the point of yielding Tranquebar to either the English or the Dutch and relinquishing the trade. A fresh company, however, was started in 1670, and to this body a new charter was granted about thirty years later; but its operations met with so little success that in 1714 the factories in Bengal were withdrawn. On the suspension of the Ostend Company (mentioned later), an endeavour was made to attract its shareholders into the Danish body, though without success, owing to representations made by the English,

[1] Better known as Vijayadrug. Upon its capture it was handed over to the Marathas in exchange for Bankot (renamed Fort Victoria), which thus became the earliest British possession on the mainland of Western India.

Dutch, and French governments. A new company was started in 1729, which in 1732 obtained a charter confirming its privileges for forty years—a term afterwards extended to 1792. In 1755 a fresh settlement was made in Bengal, this time at Serampur (on the Hugli), besides others in the Nicobar Islands and on the Malabar Coast. The principal trade of the Danes was, however, with China for tea, which was largely smuggled from Denmark into Great Britain, until a reduction in the duty on that commodity made this illicit commerce unprofitable. On the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries in 1801 Serampur and Tranquebar were captured by the English, but they were immediately restored under the treaty of Amiens. Six years later, on the renewal of the war, both places were again taken possession of, and they were retained until the general peace restored them to their former owners. Finally, in 1845, all the territory in India belonging to the Danes, viz. Tranquebar, Serampur, and a piece of ground at Balasore, was sold to the English East India Company for twelve and a half lakhs of rupees.

The treaty of Utrecht (1713), which transferred the Spanish Netherlands to the House of Austria, was indirectly the means of adding another competitor for the trade between Europe and Asia. The merchants of Flanders were not slow to seize the opportunity thus presented, and after several private ventures the emperor, in spite of remonstrances from England and Holland, granted (1723) a charter to an association generally known as the Ostend Company. This quickly established a prosperous commerce with Bengal and China, its success being largely due to the extensive smuggling into England that ensued from the proximity of Ostend to our south-eastern ports. The London Company was much exercised at this illicit competition; while the other European nations concerned in the Eastern trade also felt themselves aggrieved. As a result the matter was pushed to the forefront of politics, and when in 1727 a treaty was negotiated for securing to Maria Theresa the inheritance of her father's dominions, the emperor was obliged to agree to suspend for seven years the privileges of the Ostend Company; while the treaty of 1731, by which Great Britain guaranteed the succession of Maria Theresa, contained a clause which stipulated for the definite suppression of that body. Its chief settlement in India, Bankibazar (on the Hugli, three miles north of Barrackpore), hoisted the flag of the Austrian emperor, and trade was continued under its protection; but in 1744 the place was besieged by the faujdar of Hugli (at the instigation, it was alleged, of the Dutch and the English), and the garrison, finding the position hopeless, embarked in their trading ships and departed. Many of them were killed in Pegu, whither the chief, Schonamille, led them; the remainder took to piracy until they fell in with an English man-of-war, when they preferred joining that ship to standing their trial as pirates.

The gap caused by the disappearance of the Ostend association was filled to some extent by a Swedish East India Company, chartered in 1731 and trading almost exclusively with China. Its privileges were renewed from time to time, but it slowly perished when the reduction of the English duties on tea extinguished the profits made by smuggling that commodity into Great Britain. The project of an Austrian East India Company was revived in 1775, when, at the instigation of William Bolts, a discharged servant of the English Company, a charter was granted by the empress Maria Theresa to "The Imperial Company of Trieste". However, after experiencing many vicissitudes during the ensuing ten years, this association became bankrupt. With the mention of two Prussian ventures—the China Company, founded in 1750, and the Bengal Company, started three years later—neither of which proved a success, we may bring to a conclusion the story of the attempts made by the mid-European powers to share in the trade with the East.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

THE War of the Austrian Succession, though in appearance it achieved nothing and left the political boundaries of India unaltered, yet marks an epoch in Indian history. It demonstrated the overwhelming influence of sea-power when intelligently directed; it displayed the superiority of European methods of war over those followed by Indian armies; it revealed the political decay that had eaten into the heart of the Indian state system; and its conclusion illustrated the resultant tendency of European treaties to intrude into a world that had previously altogether ignored them. In short, it set the stage for the experiments of Dupleix and the accomplishments of Clive.

The only part of India affected by the war was the Carnatic. On the coast lay three important European cities—Negapatam under the Dutch; Pondichery under the French; and Madras under the English. Each was a place of large trade; each was inhabited by some 20,000 or 30,000 Indians who had gathered themselves round the small group of Europeans, 400 or 500 in number, who formed the dominant element; each was a place of reputed strength. They had sprung into existence for purposes of trade; and had attracted their Indian population, in part by the opportunities of wealth, in part by the certainty of protection offered by their walls and ships. Behind them the country was divided out between Hindu and Muslim. At Arcot, dependent on the subahdar of the Deccan, was the nawab of the Carnatic. He was busy trying to convert what had in origin been a mere official appointment into an hereditary rule, for his superior, Nizam-ul-mulk, was old, and constantly occupied with his aggressive Maratha neighbours or with the troubled affairs of Northern India. The nawab's territories formed a narrow strip along the coast stretching from Ongole on the north to Jinji on the south, and bounded westwards by the hills that buttress the Deccan. Up these he never attempted to spread his dominions; but southward lay a number of small, feeble states that invited his attack. The first of these was Trichinopoly, which, in 1736, was ruled by a Hindu princess, widow of the last nayak, whose family had established itself there on the break-up of the Vijayanagar Empire at the end of the sixteenth century. This had been conquered by Nawab Dost 'Ali's son, Safdar 'Ali, and his son-in-law, Chanda Sahib, in 1736 or 1737, and this success was followed by the occupation of Madura by Chanda Sahib's brother.[1] Tanjore, however, which had been established as a result

[1] Cf. Orme MSS, Various, xv, 10–15.

of the Maratha invasion of the Carnatic in the previous century, did not fall so readily. It was small, but it was rich and fertile; and although on several occasions Chanda Sahib and his brother-in-law, Safdar 'Ali, besieged the capital and plundered the country round, they never succeeded in mastering it.[1] Their attempts led to the expulsion of their own family from Arcot.

Although the Maratha armies had not set foot in the Carnatic for over a generation, the Peshwa had a standing pretext for intervention whenever it suited Maratha policy. This was the claim to a quarter of the revenues known as *chauth*. In 1740 Fateh Singh and Raghuji Bhonsle, two of the principal Maratha generals, were sent with a large army of horse to levy the largest contribution that circumstances would permit. Their expedition was probably suggested by the complaints of their fellow-Maratha, the raja of Tanjore; but the common rumour was that they had been invited by Safdar 'Ali in jealousy of Chanda Sahib's designs,[2] or that they had been abetted by Nasir Jang, son of Nizam-ul-mulk, in order to get them out of his father's territories. In any case their sudden movement southwards from the neighbourhood of Cuddapah took Dost 'Ali by surprise. He marched with what troops he had at hand to meet them at the Damalcheri Pass, a valley about 800 yards wide, defended by a wall running across it. But the Marathas did not attempt to storm this obstacle. Guided by a local Hindu chief, Chikka Rayalu, they moved by another route eastwards of the nawab's position, and then fell upon him from the rear. His army was destroyed, and he himself with his chief people killed. Moving at once upon Arcot, where was Safdar 'Ali, the Marathas obliged him to come to terms. He is said to have agreed to pay a crore of rupees and to restore to the Hindus their old possessions.[3] After this the Marathas moved westward towards Bangalore as if to return to Poona, where Balaji Rao was finding obstacles in securing the succession to his father Baji Rao. But early in the next year, 1741, they reappeared and attacked Chanda Sahib in Trichinopoly. After a short siege the place capitulated, and Chanda Sahib, being unable or unwilling to pay the ransom that was demanded of him, was carried off prisoner to Satara.

These events shook the rule of Dost 'Ali's family at Arcot to its foundations. Maratha plunder hindered the collection of the revenue and thus prevented Safdar 'Ali from replenishing his treasury. Moreover, he did not receive the formal investiture from his superior Nizam-ul-mulk, so that the bazaars were full of rumours of his impending removal.[4] In the autumn of 1742 he was at Vellore,

[1] Orme MSS, Various, xv, 89–90.
[2] Madras Country Correspondence, 1740, p. 12.
[3] *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses* (ed. Martin), II, 701.
[4] Madras to the Company [ ], February, 1742; Pondichery to the French Company, 1 October, 1741.

demanding a contribution from his cousin Murtaza 'Ali, who was the commandant of the place. Murtaza 'Ali thought the time ripe for the transfer of power into his own more crafty hands. He first attempted to poison his cousin; that failing, he put him to death by violence, and attempted to seize the government of Arcot. But he lacked the nerve to carry through what he had begun. Alarmed by the attitude of the people and troops, he suddenly abandoned the capital and disguised as a woman made his way hurriedly back to Vellore with its crocodile-defended moat. For the moment Safdar's young son, who had been left for safety's sake by his father at Madras with the English, was recognised as nawab, and the administration was carried on by his father's ministers. But these disorders had attracted the attention of Nizam-ul-mulk. He appointed a nawab, and early in 1743 entered the Carnatic in person to restore order. He expelled the garrison which the Marathas had left in Trichinopoly; and finally, his first nominee having died, he appointed an old servant of his, Anwar-ud-din Khan, to the government of Arcot. But the task of restoring order was beyond any but the most vigorous. Relatives of the old family still held most of the chief fortresses and enjoyed large jagirs; and although Safdar 'Ali's son was opportunely murdered at Arcot,[1] Anwar-ud-din's position seemed hardly more secure than Safdar 'Ali's had been. The whole country was in a state of uncertainty, expecting some great event, though none knew what.

Following on these ominous events came the news of the declaration of war between France and England. Four years earlier it would have opened very much to the advantage of the French in the eastern seas. At that time, when war seemed close at hand, La Bourdonnais, the governor of Mauritius, had been sent out with a squadron intended to operate against the English trade; but when the crisis passed, the squadron was recalled; and so it happened that, when war really broke out, the French had no ships of force in Indian waters, and the small squadron equipped by the English immediately after the declaration of war[2] found nothing on its arrival at the close of the year capable of resisting it. Dupleix, who had become governor of Pondichery in 1742, had hoped to be able to arrange one of those irregular understandings such as had been reached between Madras and Pondichery in the previous war, for a neutrality in India. He addressed the three English presidencies in this sense before any news of the English squadron had been received. In this he was following the policy of his masters, the French directors, who had announced their willingness to enter into an understanding with the English Company. But a proposal so calculated to favour the interests of the weaker naval power had been rejected; and the English in India, while willing enough to disclaim hostile designs, which indeed they

[1] Madras Consultations, 26 June, 1744. Cf. Orme MSS, Various, xv, 74.
[2] Minute of 22 March, 1743/4 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 33004, f. 78).

had not the power to execute, warned Dupleix that they would have no control over any king's ships that might arrive. His sanguine mind interpreted this answer as an acceptance of his proposals; and when the news came that English ships under Barnett had not only captured the Company's China fleet but also some richly laden country vessels in which he was largely interested, he felt very unreasonably that he had been tricked by the English.[1]

But if the French had thus lost the first hand in the game, they still had something in reserve. It might be impossible to fit and equip ships on the harbourless coast of Coromandel; but at Mauritius they had an excellent harbour, and a governor of genius. Dupleix had at first desired a policy of neutrality because it was well adapted to the interests of himself and of his settlement. But since neutrality could not be had, the next best thing was to call on La Bourdonnais to come to the rescue. There were a number of French Company's ships at Port Louis; and these, though not swift sailers, were stout vessels quite capable of taking their place in a line of battle. The deficiency of men was made good by sending a number of *coffrees* from Madagascar on board; and with one or two country ships to act as frigates, La Bourdonnais, after some delay and one or two mishaps, succeeded in reaching the coast with his improvised squadron. He found the English ships weakened by their long absence from the dockyard, with their crews depleted by the climate, and above all with their original leader dead and succeeded by his senior captain, Peyton, the most unenterprising of seamen. Moreover, one of his four ships of the line, the *Medway*, which had been leaky even before she left England,[2] had to keep her pumps perpetually going. Against them La Bourdonnais could place eight ships in the line. But the odds were not nearly so heavy as that. The English ships were the better sailers and more heavily armed. The French thus might have been out-sailed and out-ranged. But Peyton failed to use his advantages. After an indecisive action on 25 June, 1746, he made off for Ceylon, partly in the hopes of refitting, partly in the hopes of meeting with reinforcements and perhaps a senior captain to take the responsibility. In August he returned to the coast, and again sighted La Bourdonnais's squadron. The latter had taken advantage of the interval to increase his armament from the stores of Pondichery; and this so alarmed the English commodore that after a hasty visit to Pulicat, which he made in error for Madras, he left the coast and sailed for safety to the Hugli, where he lay until the arrival of reinforcements took the command out of his hands.

His departure delivered Madras into the hands of the French. A besieging force could only be collected by taking a large number of men out of the ships; so that had Peyton even resolved to remain

[1] Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, pp. 5 *sqq*.
[2] Orders to Sir Charles Hardy, 19 March, 1743/4 (P.R.O. Adm. 2–61, f. 103).

upon the coast without coming to action, his presence would have prevented the French from making any considerable attempt. But his absence freed them from all apprehensions. La Bourdonnais appeared with his ships and a part of the Pondichery garrison before Madras on 4/15 September; it surrendered to him, after two Englishmen and four others had been killed by the fire of the besiegers,[1] on the 10/21. Thus the military conduct of the English on this occasion was about on a level with their conduct at sea. But it should be added that the defences of Madras were built rather to protect the place from incursions of horse than to resist a siege in form; and the garrison was weak, untrained, and commanded by officers who did not know their business.[2]

This resounding success led immediately to disputes between the two French governors, Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, about the disposal of the place. It had surrendered under an informal promise of ransom; and in the discussions about the sum that should be paid, mention had certainly been made of a present to La Bourdonnais; but if that scheme were carried out, Dupleix and his friends at Pondichery would reap no advantages from the assistance they had given to the expedition. They therefore put forward a proposal that the place should be kept. Although the matter has often been argued as though national interests had been at stake, the question was really, Who was to make money out of Madras?[3] La Bourdonnais insisted on carrying out his original plan, and concluded a ransom treaty with the Madras council. Dupleix, after trying to seize the captured city by force, appeared to give way. But their discussions had prolonged the stay of the French vessels at Madras. On 2/13 October, a hurricane broke on the coast, crippling La Bourdonnais's squadron, and obliging him to leave behind him a considerable number of men who thus passed under the command of Dupleix. On his departure Dupleix denounced the treaty which had been made; and the garrison and company's servants of Pondichery secured the opportunity for which they had hoped of plundering Madras from top to bottom.[4] Meanwhile, on his arrival in France, La Bourdonnais was imprisoned on the charges which Dupleix had sent home against him; and seems at last to have secured his release by the influence of the Pompadour.[5]

The nawab Anwar-ud-din had not regarded these events with unconcern. Indeed, his interference had been asked by each of the two nations in turn. At first it was Dupleix who wanted him to prevent the English from seizing French ships at sea; and in order if possible to scare their men-of-war into inaction, he procured permission for a country ship in which he was interested to sail under the nawab's flag. Barnett,

[1] Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II, 425.
[2] Barnett to Anson, 16 September, 1745 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 15955, f. 113).
[3] Dodwell, *op. cit.* pp. 15 *sqq.* [4] *Idem*, pp. 18–19.
[5] *Correspondance de Mme de Pompadour*, p. 5.

of course, treated such devices as they deserved. The nawab addressed letters of complaint to the Madras council, who explained that they had no power to control the conduct of the commander of the king's ships. After a while the matter was dropped; and, as Dupleix had no more ships to send to sea, it could not recur. Then, when the French had secured control of the sea, and were preparing to attack Madras, it was the turn of the English to invoke the help of Arcot. It has been said that their application failed because they neglected to send a proportionable present with their request; but I have elsewhere shown that that account is not warranted by the facts.[1] The nawab sent a warning to Dupleix which he ignored. When La Bourdonnais was still before Madras, the nawab demanded that the French troops should be recalled; and Dupleix coolly replied that he was only conquering the place in order to put it into the nawab's hands. When La Bourdonnais had just entered Fort St George, the nawab again demanded his withdrawal, and finally sent troops to compel obedience to his commands. It was as vigorous and prompt action as could have been expected by the most sanguine; and had Madras made a good defence, the French would still have been lying before the walls when the nawab's troops arrived. As it was they found the French flag flying, and all they could do was to attempt to starve the French into evacuation. But as soon as the latter found themselves inconvenienced by the blockade, a sally was made under La Tour, who scattered his assailants and made them retire to St Thomé. Similar success was obtained by Paradis, who was marching up with reinforcements. The nawab's troops, still in St Thomé, tried to bar his way on the little Adyar river; but were hustled out of the way as unceremoniously by Paradis as they had been by La Tour. By this time musketry and field artillery had developed so far that cavalry could make no impression on troops that kept their ranks and reserved their fire. The terror of Asiatic armies had disappeared.

The capture of Madras marked the limit of French achievements in the course of this war. For eighteen months after the fall of Madras Dupleix tried in vain to capture Fort St David, only a few miles south of Pondichery, and certainly no more capable of defence than Madras had been. But he tried in vain. On one occasion even the French troops broke and fled on the apprehension that the nawab's horse, sent to assist the English, were moving to threaten their retreat. Dupleix came to terms with the nawab; he gave him considerable presents, and even agreed to allow the nawab's flag to fly for a week over Madras in token of his submission.[2] But even then when the nawab's sons had retired from the neighbourhood of Fort St David, Dupleix still could not take the place. The fact was, that with the departure of La Bourdonnais the command of the sea had returned

[1] Dodwell, *op. cit.* p. 13.
[2] *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, III, 394.

to the English; a new commander, Griffin, had arrived; and as soon as Dupleix approached the English settlement, his topmasts were sure to appear above the horizon, and the French would hurriedly retreat lest he should make an attempt on Pondichery in their absence.

But for such fruitless episodes the year 1747, and the first half of 1748, passed away without incident. In June, however, affairs began to move. First there appeared a French squadron, under Bouvet, which lured Griffin from before Fort St David, where he was lying, only to disappear altogether from the coast after landing treasure for the French at Madras, while the English ships lay before Pondichery to prevent the enemy from landing there. Then early in August came in gradually the large expedition which had been fitted out in England in order to avenge the capture of Madras. It was commanded by Rear-admiral Boscawen, and consisted of not only six ships of the line and as many smaller vessels, but also of land forces some 1000 strong. Together with the vessels already in the East Indies this was ample on the naval side; but the land forces were of inferior metal. They had been hastily got together for the occasion; the companies into which they were divided had been raised in part by drafts from regiments in Ireland, in part by officers specially commissioned on condition of raising a certain number of men in Scotland. These had found it very difficult to comply with their promises; and in the long-run their companies had to be completed by deserters, criminals, or rebels pardoned on condition of enlistment, so that, although by landing his marines and parties of his sailors, Boscawen could assemble a large force of men, they were not trained military material.[1]

It was decided to begin operations by besieging Pondichery; and had the siege been skilfully conducted, it should have succeeded. But it was managed with a singular want of skill. Unluckily the only officers of experience were disabled or taken prisoner before the siege itself was formed; and the survey made by the engineers was conducted from so safe a distance that they could not judge the strength of the works or the nature of the ground. So it came to pass that the besiegers formed their camp on ground westward of the city, whither all the stores had to be carried with great labour, instead of beginning their approaches on the shore where they would have been covered by the guns of their own squadron. Then also they began their trenches at so great a distance from the town that they were unable to batter the walls, and on ground separated from it by a swamp, so that their works could not be advanced near enough to begin to batter in breach. The attack on Pondichery was scarcely managed with more skill than the defence of Madras. The French on the other hand defended themselves with vigour. Their sorties harassed the besiegers. Their fire remained stronger everywhere than that brought to bear on them.

[1] Fox to Pitt, 6 June, 1747 (P.R.O., W.O. 4-43); same to Capt. Forbes, 7 July, 1747 (*idem*); same to Calcraft, 21 September, 1747 (*idem*).

Finding the land siege progress so slowly, Boscawen resolved to try the effect of bombarding the place with his squadron. But his fire was ineffective; the weather was evidently breaking up for the monsoon; many of his men were in hospital; and at last, at the beginning of October, he decided to raise the siege and return to Fort St David, where his men could be placed under cover. It was a conspicuous success for Dupleix, and a conspicuous failure for the English.

While Boscawen was lying at Fort St David waiting for the weather to allow his recommencing operations, news arrived that the preliminaries of peace had been signed in Europe. This naturally brought all operations to an end; all prisoners were released on their parole; and when at last copies of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle arrived with the necessary papers and instructions, Madras was solemnly handed back to the English, and Boscawen sailed back to Europe. But in spite of this trivial ending affairs were in a very different state from that in which they had been at the beginning of the war. The English, for instance, held Madras under the terms of a treaty, and never again paid for it the stipulated quit-rent of 1200 pagodas a year, of which they speedily procured a discharge from the claimant to the Carnatic whose cause they espoused. The French had secured a high and deserved reputation for their military conduct. They had defied Anwar-ud-din, and he had been unable to coerce them into doing as he demanded. So that while the events which had just preceded the war showed how uncertain and unsettled the Indian government of South India had become, the events of the war itself showed that the Europeans were quite equal to taking a decisive part in Indian affairs, and that they had little to fear from any armies that Indian princes were likely at that time to bring against them. The power which was preponderant at sea might thus become preponderant on land. And the fertile and ingenious mind of Dupleix had for the first time been set to the serious consideration of the Indian political problem. Moreover, the storm which had obliged La Bourdonnais to leave behind him a considerable body of his men had in that manner augmented the forces at the disposal of Dupleix. So that the war did indeed set the stage for the great projects which he began to develop in the very year in which he gave back Madras to the English.

CHAPTER VI

DUPLEIX AND BUSSY

ALTHOUGH by the terms of the peace Madras had been handed back to the English, it did not become once more the seat of their government until 6/17 April, 1752. Till then their affairs continued to be directed from Fort St David, close to Pondichery. One would have thought that so exhausting a war would have imposed on both the neighbours an equal need of living well together; the necessity of reviving trade must have been felt as much by the English governor Floyer as by the French governor Dupleix, and Floyer was not the man to seek quarrels for their own sake. But good will is not always enough to avoid or prevent conflict. Blind forces, which we sometimes call chance and sometimes destiny, may suddenly produce new causes of rivalry that seem innocent until the future has proved their venom. The English had not even re-entered Madras before both governors had each on his own account engaged in relations with Indian princes closely similar in nature but quite distinct, and which were with little delay to bring them into direct collision.

Quite independently Floyer and Dupleix had taken sides in local quarrels at almost the same moment and in common defiance of the policy laid down with similar emphasis alike at Paris and at London. Peace had left both with unemployed bodies of troops who were expensive to maintain but who could not be sent back to Europe because the shipping season had not arrived. Neither governor therefore was sorry to relieve himself of heavy charges by temporarily placing these troops at the disposal of princes who would contribute to their maintenance.

It was Floyer who in all seeming led the way. Early in 1749 Shahji, a dispossessed claimant of the throne of Tanjore, offered the English Devikottai on condition of their helping him to recover the throne.[1] Devikottai was a little place of small importance at the mouth of the Coleroon. The English fancied that its possession would make them masters of the navigable part of the river and enable them to control the inland trade. A first expedition sent in April under Captain Cope failed; the troops of the legitimate sovereign, Pratab Singh, offered an unexpected resistance. But a second, better prepared and led by Major Lawrence in person, succeeded; after a few days of siege Devikottai surrendered (23 June). The English kept it with the country belonging to it; and as for Shahji no one thought of restoring him to his throne. This occupation of Devikottai was nothing more than a

[1] Fort St David Consultations, 10 April, 1749.

belated and rather futile reply to the occupation of Karikal by Governor Dumas some ten years earlier. It restored in that part of the Carnatic the balance which had inclined in the favour of the French.

Quite other was the importance of the expedition that Dupleix was contemplating and preparing to execute at the same time. In the month of March he had learnt that Chanda Sahib, who had been a prisoner with the Marathas for the last seven years, had just been set free and was preparing to recover the possessions of his family in concert with Muzaffar Jang (grandson of Nizam-ul-mulk who had died in 1748) who laid claim to the succession of his grandfather. The two princes were making common cause, and Chanda Sahib had sent his son, Raza Sahib, to Pondichery to obtain from Dupleix the assistance of troops whom the confederates agreed to pay. Dupleix had a grievance against the actual nawab, Anwar-ud-din Khan, who had assisted his enemies during the siege of Pondichery. He therefore accepted with the utmost secrecy the offers made to him on condition of not taking the field until the two princes were themselves prepared to begin hostilities. At last, on 13 July, matters reached the point at which a public agreement could be made, and three days later the troops under d'Auteuil began their march on Vellore, where the allies were to concentrate. Dupleix hoped to conclude matters quickly enough to be able to confront the Company with fortunately accomplished facts, so that there would be room for nothing but praise of his initiative.

All at first went well. The French having joined their allies defeated and slew Anwar-ud-din Khan at the battle of Ambur, south-east of Vellore, on 3 August. After this victory Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib, grateful for the help accorded them, came to offer their thanks to Dupleix at Pondichery, and granted him in full right the territories of Villiyanallur and Bahur, which more than doubled the French Company's possessions round Pondichery, and they added to this on the Orissa Coast the province of Masulipatam and the island of Divy.

In indirect answer to these grants Admiral Boscawen took possession of St Thomé, where he suspected Dupleix also meant to establish his authority. St Thomé is not four miles from Madras, so that its possession was a vital matter for the English. Already men were not paying too much attention to the question, who was the rightful owner of desirable territory? Dupleix held that St Thomé belonged to Chanda Sahib; Boscawen to Muhammad 'Ali, son and heir of Anwar-ud-din Khan, though he had inherited little power enough. After the battle of Ambur, he had taken refuge at Trichinopoly, where he was preparing to oppose Chanda Sahib and his allies. The English, feeling that it was in their interest to support him, from October onwards sent him help. Dupleix too understood that he would never be the real master of the Carnatic under Chanda Sahib's name until

he had got rid of Muhammad 'Ali. In November, therefore, he sent troops against Trichinopoly under the command of his brother-in-law d'Auteuil; but instead of finishing the war by reducing that town as quickly as possible, the French, at the suggestion of their allies, turned off against Tanjore, whence they hoped to draw a large tribute for the maintenance of their forces—a consideration not lacking importance. That town, the capital of the kingdom of the same name, resisted all attacks, and kept the allies before it for three months. The English openly encouraged the king in his resistance, and led him to expect prompt help from Nasir Jang, the rival subahdar of the Deccan.

Nasir Jang was Nizam-ul-mulk's son and so Muzaffar Jang's uncle. As at the time of his father's death he had been able to seize the treasury, he had also been able to secure his accession, and was preparing to dispute his nephew's claims, both of them resting their rights on a real or alleged investiture by the Moghul. Nasir Jang had not at first understood all the importance of the battle of Ambur, and, in spite of the English invitations, had hesitated to take part in a war which after all was not being fought in the Deccan. He only made up his mind when the danger seemed to threaten himself, and at the beginning of 1750 he appeared on the borders of the Carnatic. His approach compelled the French and Chanda Sahib to raise the siege of Tanjore and to retire on Pondichery; while the English took advantage of this retreat to occupy Tiruvendipuram, which adjoins Cuddalore.

The opposing armies found themselves face to face at the end of March, on the banks of the Jinji river, near Valudavur. Nasir Jang had been joined by a few English under Captain Cope, and a battle seemed inevitable, when thirteen French officers, struck with panic, fled to Pondichery on the night of 4 April, and Muzaffar Jang cast himself on the generosity of his uncle, who made him prisoner. The French army was also obliged to withdraw, but nevertheless Dupleix was able to offer his enemy an unbroken front at the bounds of Pondichery. After some short and fruitless negotiations, Dupleix suddenly decided on a night attack on Nasir Jang's camp, which was thrown into panic. That prince, having secured his nephew, thought nothing more was to be gained by fighting with the French, and so quietly retired to Arcot, where for the next six months he lay inactive. In vain did the English and Muhammad 'Ali implore him again to take the field. He only decided to do so when he learnt that Dupleix had occupied Tiruviti, Villupuram, and Jinji, and was moving towards Arcot. The capture of Jinji, thought impregnable but which Bussy took by a brilliant feat of arms, 12 September, 1750, profoundly disquieted him. The English, as they had already done at St Thomé and Tiruvendipuram, replied to the occupation of these places by procuring for themselves a more or less regular cession of Poonamallee

near Madras. As for Nasir Jang, after having painfully set out, he was surprised on the night of 16 December by the French army under La Touche. To this had contributed the treachery of the nawabs of Karnul, Savanur, and Cuddapah, and certain other nobles. Abandoned by some of his troops, Nasir Jang was slain on the field of battle, and Muzaffar Jang, who had been brought prisoner with him, was at once recognised as subahdar. Legitimacy had once more changed sides.

Muzaffar Jang returned to Pondichery as if to receive a sort of investiture from Dupleix, whose power increased daily. To the grants already made was added the province of Nizampatam on the Orissa Coast; Dupleix was recognised as governor of all India south of the Krishna; and, certain of not being allowed to reign over his own states in peace, Muzaffar Jang demanded a few Europeans to accompany him to his capital and aid him to consolidate his power. Dupleix reckoned that his triumphs permitted him now to ignore Muhammad 'Ali, whom he could settle with either by treaty or by force, and so consented. On 15 January, 1751, Bussy, his best officer, set out for the Deccan, with orders to support at any cost the prince to whom the French owed the titles on which they relied for the legitimate possession of the country. Dupleix thought, with a certain *naïveté*, that the English and Muhammad 'Ali would bow before his claims and allow him to regulate the affairs of the Carnatic at his pleasure. Unluckily for him Floyer was no longer governor of Fort St David. He had been replaced (28 September, 1750) by Saunders, formerly chief of Vizagapatam. Saunders was a man cold, silent, and reserved, a man of action rather than of speech. Like his predecessors he had orders to keep aloof from political affairs; but he felt that, if he left Dupleix free to act, it would be all over with British trade. Having adopted a formal resolution in council, he encouraged Muhammad 'Ali not to accept the proposals then being made to him from Pondichery, and on his advice that prince conducted himself with such seeming frankness that he deceived Dupleix himself while the English were making ready their men and munitions.[1]

At last in May, 1751, before the French had made any movement, Captain Gingens set out with 800 or 900 Europeans to support Muhammad 'Ali. Dupleix, understanding that he had been tricked, as indeed he had half suspected, dispatched in his turn a little army with orders to capture Trichinopoly. Then began a long, fatiguing, and commonly monotonous war for the possession of that town, before which the French wasted their strength. The two European armies of course did not appear as principals, but only as auxiliaries, the one of Chanda Sahib, the other of Muhammad 'Ali; but that concession to appearances did not prevent them from killing one another or taking one another prisoners. At first neither side displayed great

[1] Madras County Correspondence, 1751, p. 4.

qualities. D'Auteuil, the French leader, had gout and could not maintain discipline; the English troops were still more unruly, and Gingens himself was not worth much. The march towards Trichinopoly was extremely slow. The English, having been beaten at Valikondapuram, crossed the Kavari on 28 July, and it was only on 25 September that the French, having in turn crossed the river, found themselves before the city.

The English and Muhammad 'Ali once more sought to amuse their opponents with negotiations, in the sincerity of which Dupleix once more seems to have believed. But the fact was that Muhammad 'Ali wanted to gain time. In the course of these discussions the English claimed that their ally had mortgaged Trichinopoly to them in July, 1750, careless of the fact that, were the act authentic, it could have had no value, as he was not the subahdar of the Deccan. At last the siege began. The French were no longer commanded by d'Auteuil, whose health compelled his resignation, but by a young captain, great in name if not in action, Jacques Law, nephew of the famous financier of the Regency. But he did not justify his selection. If the town did not yield to his summons, he had only two courses open—to take it by assault or to subject it to a strict blockade. Neither was easy to execute, for the town was large and the French troops, even with their allies, few in number. Law never attempted more than to prevent provisions from being brought into the town by cutting off convoys. He never completely succeeded; light parties were always bringing in victuals by some unexpected route; and nothing more serious took place than actions of scouts and outposts. Then allies who had been secured by clever negotiations came to strengthen the English position. At the end of the year Muhammad 'Ali secured the help of the raja of Mysore by promising the cession of Trichinopoly, and of the famous Maratha chief Morari Rao by taking him into pay; and soon afterwards the king of Tanjore joined the coalition. Moreover, the English had struck a serious blow at French prestige by Clive's bold seizure of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, the defence of which (September-October) first brought him into prominence. All the efforts of Dupleix to recover the place had been checked by a carefully organised resistance, and in the four or five following months his troops, without encountering an actual disaster, failed to obtain any appreciable success. In that area fortune was evidently turning against him.

This change of situation, though not as yet alarming, nevertheless made an impression on Law, and struck him with a sort of paralysis. He dared not make the smallest movement. Profiting by this timid inaction, the English in April brought into Trichinopoly a large convoy which secured that place for several months, and then, as Law had crossed the Coleroon and taken refuge in the island of Srirangam, they set to work to block him up there. This plan was proposed by

Clive, who had returned from the northward, and warmly approved by Lawrence. Dupleix, seeing the danger of leaving his army besieged in Srirangam, sent reinforcements, but d'Auteuil who led them was forced to surrender (9 June) at Valikondapuram, and three days later Law, demoralised and helpless, became a prisoner with all his troops, 600 according to Lawrence, 780 according to Orme. At the same time Chanda Sahib, trusting to the generosity of his enemies, gave himself up, but was beheaded by the Tanjorean general, Lawrence not caring to interfere. This disaster, news of which reached Europe early in the following January, largely contributed to determine the French court to recall Dupleix and reverse his Indian policy. But in India nothing could shake Dupleix's energy and confidence, or change his resolute attitude. He was indeed at his best amid calamities; he never admitted defeat, and found within himself unexpected resources for the continuance of his struggle with misfortune.

On the morrow of Srirangam, when by a sudden return to the coast the English and their allies could have threatened the French settlements, the Mysoreans and Morari Rao, already sounded by Dupleix, withdrew from the coalition, and Tanjore returned to neutrality. Meanwhile the English, after hesitating a month about their future course, returned to the coast, leaving only a small detachment as a precaution against the defection of the Mysoreans whom they already suspected. They easily took Tiruviti and Villupuram, but failed before Jinji (6 August), and Major Kineer, who was commanding while Lawrence was disabled by sickness, was beaten at Vikravandi by Kerjean, Dupleix's nephew. But this led to nothing. Lawrence recovered, reassumed the command, and pursued the enemy as far as the Great Tank, some eight miles west of Pondichery, in French territory. There an indecisive action was fought; but five days later (5 September) the over-confident Kerjean was surprised and completely defeated beyond Aryankuppam, losing some hundred European prisoners and himself being severely wounded. But for the state of peace between the two nations, the English might then have attacked Pondichery; but, being restrained by the national treaties and not daring to confide the task to Muhammad 'Ali, they went into winter quarters, the rainy season having arrived, at Tiruviti and Fort St David.

Elsewhere, too, the French had encountered checks which, though less striking, had greatly contributed to weaken their authority and prestige. After the affair of Arcot, and when Dupleix perceived that he could not recover the place, he attempted a diversion against Madras, and in January, 1752, Brenier in command of a French force camped at Vandalur; but he only succeeded in plundering the country round St Thomas Mount and Poonamallee; some trifling engagements took place near Conjeeveram; but at last, 12 March, the French force underwent complete defeat at Kavaripak; and all hope of

seriously threatening Madras had to be given up. Law's surrender further weakened the French forces; and while Lawrence took advantage of his success to threaten Pondichery, Clive cleared the country round Madras by seizing Covelong and Chingleput, which the French had occupied as advance posts beyond the Palliar. Clive, fortunate as ever, took these places on 21 September and 1 October, and then the French held in the Carnatic only Pondichery and Jinji with their limited territories.

In these grave but not desperate circumstances, Dupleix still found means of counteracting the English success. After five or six months of laborious discussions, Morari Rao passed over to the French service, and less than two months later Mysore agreed to join the French, pay their troops until Trichinopoly had been taken, and then pay Dupleix thirty lakhs of rupees in return for the possession of the town. Dupleix re-opened operations, 31 December, 1752. But du Saussay, who was placed at the head of the troops, was not the right man for the conduct of war, and at the end of a month Dupleix replaced him by Maissin, on whom he placed the greatest reliance. The new chief besieged Tiruviti, but could not carry the place until 7 May. Meanwhile the Mysoreans had tried to invest Trichinopoly. In mid-April Lawrence suddenly learnt that the town was threatened by lack of provisions. Abandoning Tiruviti, he marched at once. A party of French troops followed him and on 8 May appeared before the place under Captain Astruc. Financial difficulties hindered close co-operation between him and the Mysorean commandant, Nandi Raja; while Morari Rao, making war in his own fashion, was rather plundering on his own account than helping the French; and the new siege of Trichinopoly dragged on as in the time of Law, with futile attack and counter-attack. In July, Dupleix replaced Astruc first by Brenier, a conscientious leader but self-distrustful and unenterprising, who was beaten on 9 August, and then by Maissin, already discouraged by his campaign round Tiruviti and by the failure of his two predecessors. He soon fell sick, and Astruc, who succeeded to the command during his illness, was in turn beaten on 21 September, being himself made prisoner with 111 Europeans. But these were fruitless victories for the English. The French did not repeat the mistake of shutting themselves up in Srirangam and continued to face their enemies. At last on 14 October a new leader arrived. This was Mainville, lately returned from the Deccan.

Mainville was a man of resolution. He believed in Dupleix's plans and was prepared to execute them. After restoring discipline he prepared to carry Trichinopoly by surprise. The attack was prepared with the greatest secrecy for a month, and took place on the night of the 27–28 November. The French easily secured the outer wall; but aroused the English by an act of imprudence and were driven back as they attempted to climb the inner rampart. A large part of them

became prisoners. But instead of being discouraged by this series of misfortunes, luckily discounted by the steady success of Bussy in the Deccan, Dupleix resolved to sacrifice something to ill-luck and agreed to discuss with Saunders terms of peace. Indeed, the authorities at home were weary of this unceasing war, and every packet contained advice and even orders to bring these troubles to an end. A conference was therefore held at Sadras 21–25 January, 1754. As a preliminary the English commissaries, Palk and Vansittart, demanded that their French colleagues, Lavaur, Delarche, and du Bausset, should recognise Muhammad 'Ali as nawab of the Carnatic. The French did not choose thus to derogate from the authority of the subahdar of the Deccan; and after three meetings full of chicane over the validity of the titles of Muhammad 'Ali and those of Dupleix, the negotiations were broken off and war was renewed. It had, indeed, never been actually suspended, but had slackened down as if peace were near. Under Mainville the French troops experienced no further checks. On 15 February they even secured a conspicuous success over the English, taking 134 European prisoners. But like the English victories, this, too, led to nothing. The French still found themselves before Trichinopoly, with too small an army to invest or storm it, and with auxiliaries too unskilled or timid to afford material help. All they could attempt was to cut off the town from the neighbouring country which supplied it with victuals. Mainville therefore carried the war into Tanjore and the Pudukottai country; but achieved no more than fruitless raids, as the enemy declined action. Moreover, the conduct of Mysore gave rise to grave anxiety. By failing to pay the promised sums, Nandi Raja was exposing the French commander to the danger of finding himself one pay-day deserted by his troops. Mainville was thus busier soothing the discontent of his own men than attacking the enemy. He could never rely on the morrow. The coalition was evidently breaking up. Nandi Raja talked of returning to Mysore; and in June Morari Rao quitted the French camp though he did not positively break with them. Mainville met all these difficulties with great firmness, and, like Dupleix, never despaired of taking Trichinopoly, when news came that Godeheu had landed at Pondichery on 1 August.

That meant the recall of Dupleix and the reversal of his policy. Godeheu replaced Mainville, whom he thought over-anxious to continue the war, by Maissin, less self-willed and more pacific. Soon after he concluded a truce, followed by a provisional peace, which ruined all French hopes in the Carnatic. But the whole of Dupleix's policy was not condemned. As we shall see, in spite of their desire for peace, neither the Company nor the ministry at Paris was willing to sacrifice the decisive advantages that had been obtained in the Deccan. But before turning to that region, in which the French fortunes had shone with their greatest lustre, we will attempt to disengage in a few lines the causes of Dupleix's failure in the Carnatic.

It has been seen that Dupleix espoused the cause of Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang without consulting the Company, convinced doubtless that it would not authorise him any more than his predecessors to engage in the politics of the country. Swift success would have relieved him from the necessity of embarrassing explanations. And when he saw that event deferred, he concealed the facts by saying that the war cost nothing and would leave plenty of money free for the purposes of trade. The French Company, though with some scepticism, accepted these roseate prophecies, and sent no money, since Dupleix asked for none. But finance was his stumbling-block from first to last. His reverses, which began in September, 1751, prevented the collection of the revenues he had reckoned on; and he was hard put to it to maintain his army. Each month he could only just secure enough to prevent his troops from disbanding. To meet these urgent needs he used over £350,000 of his own money and that of his friends. It was not, however, lack of money alone that hindered his success; in this respect the English were not much better off than he. What ruined him was his excessive belief in the justice of his cause. Full of the belief that, as Muhammad 'Ali was a rebel, the English government could not support him, he really thought that the English Company would disavow Saunders and leave him free to carry out his policy. All his letters show a confidence that is almost disconcerting.[1] He should have remembered that men do not sacrifice too much to theory and ideals, and that, in view of their threatened trade, the English were justified in resisting his plans. Trusting too much to legal formulas, he did not accommodate himself to the facts; and, while he displayed marvellous skill in negotiating with Indian princes, in his relations with the English he showed an unaccommodating spirit which did much to provoke opposition in Europe quite as much as in India.

Whether the Company ought to have supported him is quite another matter. In truth it could not do so without understanding his plans; but Dupleix, who at first had perhaps been uncertain of being able to carry them through, began by half-concealing them, and did not until 16 October, 1753, formally expound the advantages of possessing extensive territories in India, yielding a fixed, constant and abundant revenue that would relieve the Company from sending funds. But when he was developing this doctrine, which till then he had only sketched, Godeheu already was about to embark for India. No doubt if the Company had entered into the ideas of Dupleix, it could have established at the necessary cost in men and money the empire which he hoped to found; but besides the hesitation always felt before novel and daring ideas—*ignoti nulla cupido*—the Company, or rather the king, had other motives for caution. Disputes were already arising between French and English on the Ohio and Missis-

[1] Dupleix to Saunders, 16 February, 1752 (French Correspondence, 1752, pp. 1–41).

sippi; the preservation of that region seemed more important than hypothetical conquests in India, and this constituted another motive for not endangering the peace for the sake of Asiatic domains which after four years of war Dupleix had not succeeded in subduing. And if a more distant future is taken into consideration, perhaps the king and Company were right.

But in the Deccan affairs wore a different appearance. Peace is usually discussed on the basis of accomplished facts, not of those hopes which the war has either destroyed or realised. The French position at Hyderabad was too strong in 1754 for the English to insist on the ruin of Bussy's work, however much they might desire it. I have already mentioned the terms on which Dupleix had lent his help to Muzaffar Jang; by protecting the legitimate ruler of South India, he hoped above all to secure the rights he had acquired in the Carnatic. Bussy's activities did not lead to direct competition with the English; but his achievements are too important to be neglected. When shortly after setting out a conspiracy of dissatisfied nawabs cost Muzaffar Jang his life (14 February, 1751), Bussy's prompt action avoided any break in the succession and danger to public order; Salabat Jang, uncle of the dead prince and brother of Nasir Jang, was recognised as subahdar; but he needed even more than his predecessor the support of French troops to establish his power, thus born of disorder, and Bussy, who was to have gone only to Hyderabad, in the centre of the Deccan, accompanied him to Aurangabad at its extremity. There he was more than 900 miles from Pondichery. It was a magnificent raid, accomplished with hardly a shot. From the first Bussy had understood how to manage Indian princes, showing due deference and doing nothing without permission. His manners gave no hint of his power; he never seemed to despise the weak or the vanquished. In his hand was armed force; but he always thought that gentleness was better than severity, negotiation than battle, human life than the laurel of victory. As he himself said, he was more of a statesman than a soldier; he was a born diplomatist. But his resolutions were firm, his action bold. When a decision had to be taken, Bussy saw straight to the heart of things, and carried his purpose into effect though without brutality or offence. More than anything else these rare and happy talents established French supremacy at Hyderabad, which reacted on the work of Dupleix by setting up a counterpoise to those sometimes unlucky but always indecisive events of the Carnatic. Dupleix could not sufficiently express his gratitude to his lieutenant. Most of his letters to Bussy are full of thanks and admiration. In order to cement the friendship and confidence between them, Dupleix had hoped to marry Bussy to one of his wife's daughters familiarly known as *Chonchon*; they were actually betrothed; but Bussy's remoteness and Dupleix's sudden departure prevented the completion of the marriage. Thus the administration of affairs in the Deccan was peculiar, being

treated on both sides as a family business quite as much as an affair of state. Bussy, however, was independent enough not to approve blindly all the projects of Dupleix, and he could oppose them when they sacrificed too much to ideals or conflicted too sharply with facts.

After the French reached Aurangabad (18 June), Dupleix dreamt for a moment of pushing his successes in the north, and planned by Bussy's means to place Salabat Jang at the head of the subah of Bengal.[1] He would thus have dominated the greater part of India. But, just when this bold plan was to have been put into action, the Marathas attacked the Deccan, and Bussy had to march against them. In less than a month he had driven them back; a night attack on 4 December, which threw the enemy into confusion, has become famous. Balaji Rao, the Peshwa, at once entered into negotiations, and peace was made at Ahmadnagar, 17 January, 1752. Dupleix then thought of bringing a part of the subahdar's troops against Trichinopoly, and Bussy was to co-operate by attacking Mysore in the rear. But the diwan Ramdas Pandit, who was murdered at that time (4 May), proved to have been in communication with Muhammad 'Ali and the English; and it was believed that the nobles, no longer fearing the Marathas, were seeking the expulsion of the French. The subahdar, whose influence was small, alone was interested in keeping them. Bussy was inclined to recognise this state of things by abandoning the Deccan. What use could be made of people so ungrateful and a prince so powerless? Dupleix thought otherwise. To him the Deccan meant the protection of his rights and authority; and he implored Bussy not to forsake the work which he had begun. At this moment news arrived that Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-ul-mulk and holding high office at Delhi, was claiming his father's territories and marching thither with a large army and the expectation of support from Balaji Rao. Bussy remained to encounter this invasion; but had no need of fighting. Ghazi-ud-din was poisoned by one of his father's wives, and Salabat Jang's throne was thus secured. But that prince was always exposed to underhand attacks from his nobles, who disliked his dependence on the French. The new diwan, Saiyid Lashkar Khan, constantly intrigued against Bussy's influence, and had agreed with Balaji Rao in some mysterious plan in which the interests of his master can have had little part. Bussy, who followed closely all these Indian intrigues, succeeded in avoiding a new war which in November was on the point of breaking out with the Marathas, and having, under the guise of mediator, come to terms on his own account with Balaji Rao, he prepared to enter Mysore in order to assist in Dupleix's plans against Trichinopoly; but now he was checked by the refusal of the subahdar's troops to move; they were tired of fighting without pay; no advance was possible and the army fell back on Aurangabad. Bussy then renewed his proposals to

[1] Dupleix to Bussy, 4 August, 1751 (Archives de Versailles, E 3748).

quit the Deccan and offered his resignation. Ghazi-ud-din was dead, the disputes with the Marathas settled, and the French could withdraw with honour.[1] Dupleix did not have time to answer these proposals. Bussy had scarcely written before he fell seriously ill; and decided to retire to Masulipatam to recover his health (February, 1753). He had not intended to return; but Dupleix's appeals to his affections and his patriotism decided him to continue their common work, and he came back in the following May.

During his absence affairs had gone grievously wrong. Goupil, who had succeeded to the command, had been overpersuaded by Saiyid Lashkar Khan to divide his troops, the smaller part remaining with the subahdar at Aurangabad, and the rest being scattered over the country, after the Muslim fashion, to collect the revenues. The object was to make them hated; and then they were to be ordered to leave the country. In this passive opposition the saiyid was encouraged by Saunders, who was prevented by the state of the Carnatic from playing a more active part. On his arrival at Hyderabad Bussy restored order, and, as the need of money was almost as great as in the Carnatic, he skilfully arranged that each governor was to pay his share towards the maintenance of the troops. He then secured an invitation from the subahdar himself to proceed to Aurangabad, where he arrived at the end of November. There he laid down his terms, and obtained a personal grant of four sarkars—Mustafanagar, Ellore, Rajahmundry, and Chicacole—for the payment of his troops, so that he should have to make no more demands on the subahdar or his officials. The revenues of these districts were reckoned at thirty-one lakhs of rupees; whereas the cost of the army was twenty-five and a half lakhs a year. This was a masterly stroke. Bussy ceased to be at the mercy of the subahdar and his ministers and, having secured the grant in his own name for a specific purpose, he was able to tell the Dutch and English that nothing had been changed in that part of India and that the French had no more than they had had before, although through his control the sarkars had really passed into the hands of the French Company. The English at Ingeram and Vizagapatam did their best to annul the effects of these grants, by making friends with discontented renters and governors, especially with Ja'far 'Ali, governor of Rajahmundry; but they lacked the means of offering a serious opposition.

Bussy consolidated his advantages by reforming the ministry. Saiyid Lashkar Khan was replaced by Shah Nawaz Khan, and the principal posts were filled by nobles friendly to the French. Trouble with Raghuji Bhonsle in Berar (March-April, 1754) was quickly settled, and then, feeling himself secure, he set out for the new provinces, of whose revenues he had never had greater need. He had to maintain 900 Europeans and 4000 sepoys.

[1] *Réfutation des faits imputés au sieur Godeheu*, pp. 41–9.

Arriving at Bezwada, 5 July, Bussy was about to start for Chicacole when he learnt of the arrival of Godeheu at Pondichery. He had been expecting this for six weeks, and, although he felt a certain anxiety, he was not unduly alarmed. Dupleix and Godeheu had been very friendly of old, when in 1738 the latter had visited Chandernagore.

Let us pause to consider the affairs of the Deccan which till then had developed in accordance with French interests, because Dupleix had entrusted them to a man of consummate capacity and wisdom. He himself declared that had he had another Bussy in the Carnatic, affairs there would have gone quite differently. It was not, perhaps, extraordinary that the little French army should have reached Aurangabad without difficulty; but it was extraordinary that it should have been able to maintain itself there. When the new *régime*, resulting from the unexpected accession of Salabat Jang, had consolidated itself, a real national sentiment arose among the nobles of the subah, aiming at the expulsion of the French. That called into play all Bussy's skill. Not strong enough to impose his authority, he maintained it nevertheless by his remarkable tact and his personal prestige. Without seeming to notice the intrigues by which he was surrounded, he contrived to turn them all to advantage. The greatest source of anxiety was the weakness of Salabat Jang. How could he trust a prince whose mind was like a child's? But for Dupleix's gratitude for the grant of the Carnatic, and his need of a subahdar to legitimate his rights, Salabat Jang would, perhaps, have been replaced by one of his brothers, or even by Balaji Rao. Both solutions were considered, and the second was not entirely laid aside. Without previous concert, both Dupleix and Bussy independently recognised that the French would be strengthened in their struggle with the English by an alliance with a nation remote from their frontiers and of proved power and solidity. Bussy was even instructed to lay the foundation of an agreement which in the first case would be aimed only at Trichinopoly but which might be extended to the Deccan. It is impossible to estimate the consequences had Dupleix sacrificed the point of honour and thrown over Salabat Jang.

However that may be, at the moment of his recall the position of the French appeared impregnable; and it would have been so but for the division of their forces, which had already hindered the capture of Trichinopoly, and which might lose them the Deccan if some necessity obliged them to recall their troops. Indeed, this division of his forces was the weak point of Dupleix's policy; and although in the Deccan he secured unrivalled glory and almost incredible territorial possessions, he was disabled from securing the Carnatic, and thus afforded the English both time and opportunity of making that breach by which they were to overthrow the whole structure. It is, indeed, unwise to pursue two objects at once and to attempt more

than one has the means of accomplishing. The French Company shared this intoxication of success, for it did not condemn the policy followed in the Deccan as it did that followed in the Carnatic. Instead of repudiating the conquests of Dupleix and Bussy, it accepted them. Godeheu himself did not wish to leave Salabat Jang without support, for fear that the English would establish their influence with him, and abandoned only conditionally part of the French possessions on the Orissa Coast. The war which broke out two years later between the French and the English prevented his agreement being carried out, and at the end of 1756 the position of the French and English in India was much the same as three years earlier. The French were again threatening Trichinopoly, and the English were devising means of driving Bussy out of the Deccan.

The latter, after some months' stay on the coast, where he reached an agreement with Moracin, chief of Masulipatam, about the establishment of a regular administration, returned to Hyderabad in January, 1755. He found that feelings had changed since his departure. The recall of Dupleix had revealed the weakness of French policy; and the subahdar talked of nothing but asking the English for that military help which he could not do without. Bussy had great difficulty in re-establishing his waning confidence without condemning the policy of his country. An invasion of Mysore, under the plea of arrears of tribute, at once raised French prestige and filled the treasury. Bussy succeeded in obtaining a voluntary payment of fifty-two lakhs of rupees on condition of preventing an invasion by the Marathas, which would have completed the ruin of the country. Thus, in the phrase of Duval de Leyrit, the heir of both Dupleix and Godeheu, the position of Bussy was as brilliant as ever. He was in correspondence with the wazir, and received flattering letters from the Moghul. But the national sentiment was by no means extinct. Like Ramdas Pandit and Saiyid Lashkar Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan from the end of 1755 desired above all else to get rid of Bussy and the French. An expedition against Savanur and Morari Rao gave occasion for the rupture. Morari Rao had acquired extensive territory round Gooty, whence he defied both Salabat Jang and Balaji Rao. The two therefore united to suppress him. Bussy brought the expedition to a successful end, but by reason of the services Morari Rao had formerly rendered to Dupleix was unwilling entirely to crush him. But when he gave him easy terms, Shah Nawaz Khan cried treason and dismissed Bussy.

His position was critical. Though Bussy had few troops, he disliked retreating; and instead, therefore, of marching to the coast as had been expected, he calmly made his way to Hyderabad, where he entrenched himself in the *Chahar Mahal*, a garden on the outskirts of the town belonging to the subahdar. There he awaited reinforcements. Luckily Law, who was sent with 160 Europeans and 700

sepoys, besides five guns, showed more decision than before Trichinopoly. He overthrew the enemy barring his way, and about 15 August, 1756, joined Bussy. Thus Shah Nawaz Khan's plans were upset. But it was not altogether his fault. Bussy's dismissal had been concerted with the English, who were to have sent a detachment to take the place of the French, but who were prevented from doing so by news that on June 21, Calcutta had fallen into the hands of Siraj-ud-daula. The victorious Bussy thus quietly resumed his place in the subahdar's councils as if nothing had happened. He did not even take the trouble to dismiss Shah Nawaz Khan; though he was hostile, would another be more sincere and friendly? He therefore did no more than keep an eye upon him. It was, indeed, a fixed principle with him to avoid as much as possible all appearance of interfering with internal matters and to leave to the subahdar all the forms of independence. Not to labour the point, his ideas are summarised in the following passage of a letter to Dupleix of 26 February, 1754:

> What I can, and think I should, assure you, is that it is of the greatest importance to manage these provinces [the sarkars] at first according to the Asiatic manner and only to substitute a French government for that of the Moghuls gradually and by degrees. We certainly must not begin on the first day of our rule. Experience and practical acquaintance with the country, and with the nature and manners of its inhabitants, show that we should not hasten the assertion of absolute authority, but establish it gradually, instead of exposing it to certain failure by claiming it at our first appearance. I attribute the successes I have gained hitherto principally to my care on certain occasions to observe Asiatic customs.[1]

The remainder of 1756 passed without incident. It was at this time that news arrived of the declaration of war with England; but the war had begun six months or more earlier, if we take into account the events that had occurred in America. Bussy returned to the coast, less to look after the administration than to watch the English, who had important factories at Ingeram, Madapollam, Bandarmalanka, and Vizagapatam. These he took one after the other. For a moment he thought of sending Law up to Bengal to the assistance of Chandernagore, attacked by Clive and Watson; but the fall of the place (March, 1757) made such a plan useless.

All that year Bussy remained on the coast. He desired to accustom the Deccan to his absence, in order one day to abandon it. It no longer mattered, as in the time of Dupleix, that the subahdar was the legitimate ruler of Southern India; circumstances had judged that fiction of legality. But the subahdar could not yet be abandoned. If he and his court were not secured, there was a danger of seeing them fall into the arms of the English, and the war in progress between the two powers would now enjoin the use of every weapon. Bussy knew that the danger had grown during his absence. Shah Nawaz Khan, who had never renounced his design of expelling the French, had by degrees transferred the powers of government from Salabat

[1] Bib. Nat., Nouvelles Acquisitions, 9158, f. 157.

Jang to his brothers, Nizam 'Ali and Basalat Jang, and had secured for himself a place of refuge in Daulatabad, while he was negotiating with the Marathas for external help. The English, in accordance with their interests, gave him good advice until such time as they should be able to do more. All this disappeared with Bussy's return. Without employing force, he found once more within himself the patient powers of persuasion which enabled him to restore order. He secured Daulatabad by surprise; and re-established Salabat Jang in all his rights. But he needed more vigilance than of old. The English successes in Bengal had their reaction in the Deccan. One day his diwan, Haidar Jang, was murdered; and Shah Nawaz Khan was killed in the tumult which followed. These were not propitious omens; no one doubted that a crisis was at hand.

On the declaration of war, the king of France had sent Lally to India to drive the English out. After taking Fort St David, Lally prepared to attack Madras; for the success of this enterprise he considered he had need of all the national forces, even of those in the Deccan. By a letter of 15 June, 1758, he recalled Bussy with his detachment. Salabat Jang felt that this meant his own destruction, as was indeed the case; but Lally's orders were formal; Bussy obeyed, like a disciplined soldier, and set out at once to join him. This did not necessarily signify the ruin of French hopes, even in the Deccan, if Lally triumphed in the Carnatic. In 1758 the position of the French on the coast was as strong as in the best days of Dupleix, and the Carnatic itself with Trichinopoly might have been secured, had fortune favoured the new general. But the check before Madras, then the battle of Wandiwash where Bussy was taken prisoner, destroyed the work of the previous nine years, and left of the work of Dupleix and Bussy only memories on the one side, and hopes on the other. It was by learning from these two great Frenchmen that Clive was enabled to lay the British Empire in India on secure foundations. Their success showed him the weakness of the Indian princes; that the walls of their power would fall at the first push. Frenchmen will ever regret that Dupleix did not confine his efforts to the Carnatic; with united forces he might have triumphed over Trichinopoly before the patience of the Company was tired out, and then, if it was resolved to go farther, the way was open. He lost everything by wishing to hasten the work of time, and by forgetting the certainty of English resistance in India and of public disapproval in France, where men did not know his plans and were alarmed at the endless wars into which he was leading them.

CHAPTER VII

CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756–60

ON 9 April, 1756, died 'Ali Wardi Khan, subahdar of Bengal and Bihar. He had established himself by force of arms as ruler of those provinces after a severe struggle with the Marathas; and when his position was no longer assailable, the Moghul emperor had recognised him as his lieutenant on condition of his paying fifty-two lakhs of rupees a year. Apparently this condition was never fulfilled; but he went on ruling none the less, and in 1752 designated as his successor his great-nephew, Siraj-ud-daula, then a young man of twenty-three. Of the latter neither his English nor his Indian contemporaries have the least good to say; and his conduct confirms their words. Having been proclaimed as nawab at the capital, Murshidabad, he marched almost at once against his cousin, Shaukat Jang, the governor of Purnia, whom he suspected rightly of intriguing against him. On 20 May, when he had reached Rajmahal on his march against Purnia, he suddenly changed his mind, ordered an immediate return to Murshidabad, and directed the English factory at Kasimbazar to be seized. This was carried out on 4 June, three days after the nawab's return to Murshidabad; and on the 5th his army began its march against Calcutta. On the 20th he captured the place.

This extraordinary series of events took everyone by surprise; and when they came to offer explanations to their friends and superiors, personal feeling ran so high, and each member of the Calcutta Council was so visibly anxious to throw the blame elsewhere than on himself and his friends, that little weight can be attached to their evidence. Some declared that Omichand had instigated this attack in revenge for having been excluded from his former share in the Company's business; others attributed it to the reception of a fugitive who was alleged to have eloped with large sums of money, and to the expulsion of the messenger whom the nawab had sent to demand him. Others again asserted that on his deathbed 'Ali Wardi Khan had solemnly warned Siraj-ud-daula against the dangers of European aggression. All these are vigorously asserted and as vigorously denied in the letters describing that eventful twelvemonth which elapsed between the capture of Calcutta and the battle of Plassey[1]. But there is reason to think that fear of European aggression was the main predisposing cause of the attack. Holwell, to whom we owe a detailed account of 'Ali Wardi's deathbed warning, may have been drawing on his imagination or may have been indebted to mere rumour; but it is certain that those who like Watts, the head of the Kasimbazar factory,

[1] Holwell to Company, 30 November, 1756; Watts to the same, 30 January, 1757.

dismissed the story on the ground that orientals were too incurious and indolent to trouble about what happened in distant provinces, had chosen to forget at least two incidents which should have taught them better. We know that when the news of Nasir Jang's death reached Bengal, 'Ali Wardi Khan had threatened to seize the goods belonging to the French.[1] We know, too, that a short time before 'Ali Wardi's death Siraj-ud-daula had accused the English of preparing to resist the government; the English had been repeatedly questioned, and though they had convinced 'Ali Wardi of their innocence they had not succeeded in convincing Siraj-ud-daula; he had ordered his spies to keep a close watch on their doings, and it was common talk at Murshidabad that the vast wealth of the English might easily be captured.[2] The day on which Siraj-ud-daula turned back from his march against Purnia he had received a letter from Drake, the English governor, explaining recent additions to the defences of Calcutta as intended to protect the place against a French attack. That letter has not been preserved in any form, and we cannot tell whether in any other way it was calculated to irritate the nawab; but there was certainly an uneasy feeling in his mind that unless he took precautions the Europeans would turn Bengal upside down as they had done the Carnatic and the Deccan. It is very possible that this feeling was accentuated by other imprudences on the part of Drake, who was at best but a short-sighted mortal. But the main reason for the nawab's attack was the idea that the English had taken advantage of 'Ali Wardi's illness to strengthen their military position, and that he had better check them before they became dangerous.

This idea, as the event was to prove, was ludicrously false. Drake had indeed mounted some guns along the river front, in case French vessels should sail up the river and attempt a landing when war broke out again; but that was no protection against any attack which the nawab might deliver, for that would come from the land, not from the water. Nor, indeed, was any attack anticipated. The common view held by Europeans in Bengal was that expressed in a letter of 4 June, 1743, written by Dupleix and his council at Pondichery to his successor at Chandernagore. The latter, alarmed by the expulsion of Schonamille and his Ostenders, had planned a large and powerful fortress. Dupleix rejoined: "So long as Europeans trade in Bengal, we do not believe that the Moors will directly attack them; they have surer means of making them pay the unjust contributions which they exact".[3] Their river-borne commerce could be stopped at any point; and no fortifications would enable them to carry on trade against the will of the nawab. That was also the view of the English. At the beginning of the century they had built Fort William; but they had

[1] Law, *Mémoire*, p. 52; Cultru, *Dupleix*, p. 353.
[2] Forth to Drake, 16 December, 1756.
[3] *Correspondance...de Pondichéry à Bengale*, II, 288.

been at no pains to make it defensible from the land, or to maintain its original strength. So early as 1725 the timbers of the bastions had become so rotten that they had had to be shored up. In 1729 the south curtain was rendered defenceless by the building of outhouses which masked the flanking fire of the bastions. They had built a church close at hand which commanded the gorges of all four bastions. Private persons had been allowed to build solid brick houses almost adjoining. Then the fort had been found stuffy, and so great windows had been cut in its walls. No soldier or engineer who saw it but foretold that it could never be defended against attack. A captain of artillery in 1755 reported that there was not an embrasure fit to hold a gun or a carriage fit to mount one; on which the council reprimanded him for not sending his letter through the commandant.[1] Nor even was the garrison at its full strength. During those alarming years when Madras and Pondichery were at unauthorised war, many recruits intended for Bengal had been detained at Madras; and this deficiency had not been made good.[2] Finally the officers who commanded the garrison were of the same poor quality, with no more experience of war, and hardly more military spirit, than had been displayed by their brothers-in-arms at Madras in 1746. So far from being prepared to disturb the peace of Bengal, the place was not even capable of defence. Few events have had a more ironical conclusion than Siraj-ud-daula's attack upon Calcutta.

The short interval between the first warning and the appearance of Siraj-ud-daula's troops served no better purpose than to display the lack of military talent in the settlement. All the available Europeans, Eurasians, and Armenians were embodied in the militia; a body of Indian matchlockmen was taken into pay; and plans were made for the defence of the town. But there was no leadership. The projected line of defence was larger than could be held by the numbers present; and nothing was done to render the fort itself defensible. On 16 June, the nawab's troops appeared before the place, and were repulsed in an attack they made on the northern side of the town; but on the 17th they entered the town limits from the east; on the 18th they drove the defenders from their outposts; and on the 19th the fort was deserted by the governor, the commandant, and several of the members of council, who took refuge with a number of women on board the ships in the river. When their desertion was known, the remainder placed the command in the hands of Holwell, the junior member of council; and the defence was prolonged for one more day. But the soldiers, exhausted with their efforts, got out of hand, and broke open the liquor godowns, as had happened at Madras; the enemy's fire from the church and neighbouring houses rendered the bastions untenable; and in the afternoon the place surrendered. After

[1] Wilson, *Old Fort William*, II, 25.
[2] Bengal to Madras, 25 May, 1756 (Madras Letters received, 1756, no. 95).

anxious enquiries about the treasure which the fort was thought to contain, the prisoners were shut up for the night in the military prison generally known as the Black Hole. This was a room 18 feet long by 14 feet 10 inches wide, from which only twenty-three survivors emerged next morning.[1]

The news of this disaster arrived piece-meal at Madras. First, on 14 July, came news of the seizure of Kasimbazar. It was decided to send reinforcements at once; and on the 20th Killpatrick sailed with 230 men. He arrived on 2 August, and found a number of refugees at Fulta, where he was obliged to encamp amidst the swamps of that unhealthy place. Not till 16 August did news come of the fate of Calcutta. At the moment the council was actively preparing an expedition which was to have joined Salabat Jang in the Deccan and replaced French influence there by English. Luckily it had not marched. Admiral Watson, who had come out two years earlier with a squadron and a King's regiment in case the French could not be brought to terms, was called into council, and Clive was summoned up from Fort St David where he was now deputy governor. There was a strong and natural feeling in the council against the dispatch of a large force to Bengal, based partly on the local advantage of expelling the French from the Deccan, partly on the evident approach of war with France with its consequent dangers to Madras. This was overcome, mainly owing to the firm and prudent arguments of Robert Orme, supported by the governor Pigot and by Clive.[2] But there still remained the problems of who was to command the expedition and what were to be his powers. The command was claimed by Colonel Adlercron, the commander of the royal regiment that had come out with Watson. But he refused to agree to the division of the prospective plunder in the shares laid down in the Company's instructions, or to promise to return on a summons from the Madras Council;[3] and so the command was finally entrusted to Clive. As regards his powers, there were obvious objections to entrusting the direction of the Madras forces to persons who had proved themselves so wanting in conduct and resolution as the council of Fort William. At the same time it was contrary to the Company's practice to entrust uncontrolled power to a military officer. It was, therefore, first decided to send two deputies with Clive, who were with him to constitute a council with power to determine the political management of the expedition. But then arrived a member of the Calcutta Council who protested so loudly against this supersession of the Calcutta authorities that that plan was laid aside and Clive was invested with complete military independence, while the funds—four lakhs of rupees—sent

[1] See note at the end of the chapter.
[2] Orme to Payne, 3 November, 1756 (Orme MSS, Various, 28, p. 58).
[3] Madras Public Consultations, 21 September, 1756; Adlercron to Fox, 21 November, 1756 (India Office, Home Misc. 94, p. 210).

with the expedition were consigned to him personally. In fine the Madras council came to the best conclusion possible. In part this was due to luck. It was a miracle of fortune that Colonel Adlercron was so unaccommodating. But the decision to dispatch a large expedition instead of a small one showed high qualities of courage and insight.

These discussions took up a long time. The expedition did not actually sail till 16 October, after the north-east monsoon had set in. Their passage was therefore long and stormy. One of the vessels was driven into Vizagapatam, whence she put back to Madras; so that when Clive reached the Hugli a few days before Christmas and was joined by Killpatrick and the remains of his detachment, he had only about the same number of troops as he had set out with—800 Europeans and 1000 sepoys. He marched up the eastern bank of the river, occupied Baj-baj, recovered Calcutta (2 January, 1757), and plundered Hugli. This brought Siraj-ud-daula once more upon Calcutta. He refused to listen to the embassy which Clive sent to him; but a night attack, though far from a complete success, so disquieted him that he retired and sent offers of terms. Within a week the treaty had been completed and signed. It confirmed the English privileges, promised the restoration of the Calcutta plunder in the nawab's hands, and granted the power of fortifying Calcutta and coining rupees.[1]

This treaty came at a timely moment. News of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War had arrived at almost the same time as Clive had reached Calcutta, and the English were not strong enough to fight the nawab and the French together. Indeed had the French followed the English example, and thrown every available man into Bengal, the immediate course of events must have been very different. But they were entangled in the Deccan. They had already sent all the forces they could spare to assist Bussy in his crisis at the Chahar Mahal; and now had no one to send for the crisis in Bengal. Just as in 1751 the dispatch of Bussy to the Deccan had disabled Dupleix from completing his designs in the Carnatic, so now in 1757 the need of maintaining Bussy's position prevented them from interfering with effect in Bengal. Law, the French chief at Kasimbazar, and the author of an illuminating memoir on the events of 1756–7, had urged the *directeur*, Renault de St Germain, either to agree with the English for a neutrality or at once to join Siraj-ud-daula. "If he makes peace without having received any help from you, you cannot expect help from him should you be attacked."[2] Renault tried to adopt the first alternative. On Watson's arrival he had sent deputies to propose a neutrality; but Watson had replied that he would accept nothing short of an alliance against the nawab. Then when the nawab was

[1] Treaty of February, 1757.
[2] Law, *Mémoire* (ed. Martineau), p. 93.

marching on Calcutta, the English offered to relax this stipulation, and Clive fully expected them to accede to his proposals, unless indeed they "should not be vested with powers to enter into engagements of such a nature, which I somewhat suspect".[1] But no answer was returned to this offer until 21 February, when peace had been made with Siraj-ud-daula. Then they sent deputies again, and a draft treaty was drawn up. But when the question of their powers was raised, it proved that they could bind neither the Pondichery council nor any royal officers who might come out to India. Thus negotiations were broken off on 4 March.

Meanwhile Watts, that "helpless, poor, and innocent man" as Siraj-ud-daula had called him,[2] had been sent up to Murshidabad to act as English resident there and watch over the execution of the treaty. There ensued a duel between him and Law, in which the latter had the advantage of the nawab's sympathy. He was by no means disposed to acquiesce in his defeat, and could not speak of the English without blazing eyes. But the durbar was on the whole inclined to the English and against the French. Then too came news that the Durani Afghans, who had invaded Northern India, were likely to advance on Bengal. Under the alarm caused by this, Siraj-ud-daula wrote to offer the English a lakh a month if they would aid him against the Afghans. This was on 4 March, the day on which the Anglo-French negotiations were broken off and on which also Watson had written to the nawab a very angry letter, demanding the complete execution of the treaty within ten days, or else "I will kindle such a flame in your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish".[3] In these circumstances, on the 10th, a letter was written by the nawab's secretary, bearing the nawab's seal, permitting the attack on Chandernagore. Law asserts that this letter was not written by the order of the nawab.[4] However, it was enough to authorise Watson to move. On the 14th Chandernagore was attacked, though not closely, from the land; on the 23rd the ships appeared off the place and after a day's severe fighting it surrendered.

This deprived the nawab of his natural allies against the English; and nothing can extenuate his folly in allowing their destruction. Indeed, after his reluctant consent had been given, he seems to have changed his mind, and ordered Rai Durlabh to march with a considerable force to relieve the town. But then, on hearing from Nandakumar, the faujdar of Hugli, that the French would not be able to resist the English, the nawab changed his mind again, and in the end did nothing. No conduct could have been feebler or more unwise. He gave open display to his hostile feelings against the

[1] Clive to Secret Committee, 1 February, 1757.
[2] Siraj-ud-daula to Pigot, 30 June, 1756.
[3] Watson to the nawab, 4 March, 1757.
[4] Law, *op. cit.* pp. 121–2.

English while allowing them unmolested to destroy the French. And then as if to emphasise his errors he proceeded to protect Law at Murshidabad together with the fugitives who joined him from Chandernagore, and to write to Bussy to come to his help from the Deccan. These facts are established by the evidence of Law[1] as well as by the assertions of the English.

Although then the English had recovered Calcutta, although they had secured from the nawab promises of privileges which they had long desired, and although they had succeeded in depriving the French of their principal stronghold in Bengal, they were still far from a position of safety. At any time might come news that the French had arrived in strength upon the coast, and then Clive would be obliged to abandon either Madras to the French or Calcutta to the nawab. It was also becoming apparent that many persons besides the English had cause to fear Siraj-ud-daula, and desired a revolution in the government. The chief people in this movement were Hindus. 'Ali Wardi Khan had favoured them, and had promoted many of them to high places in his administration. Siraj-ud-daula did not share his predecessor's feelings, and he succeeded in alienating all the principal men of the durbar. The great Hindu bankers, the Seths, who had contributed largely to the establishment of 'Ali Wardi Khan, had been threatened with circumcision; Rai Durlabh, who had held the office of diwan, had been placed under the orders of a favourite called Mohan La'l; Mir Ja'far, who had held the office of bakshi, had been dismissed with insult, and cannon had been planted against his palace. The first hint of intrigues against the nawab had come to the English through Omichand, when they were still lying at Fulta waiting the arrival of help from Madras. Warren Hastings, who was employed in this first affair, thought poorly of it; and for the moment it came to nothing, partly, it seems, because the English lacked forces and a leader, partly because the Hindus had no suitable candidate to propose. But after the fall of Chandernagore the idea was again brought forward. The nawab, having defeated and slain his only dynastic rival, Shaukat Jang, in the previous October, had lost at once all stimulus to self-restraint in his government and the protection afforded by the hope that he would be overthrown without the trouble and danger of private action. The Seths were at once the persons specially concerned and specially active. Law, who was well placed to view the position with considerable accuracy, says that without them the revolution of 1757 would never have been accomplished.[2] That view is probably correct. The English policy had never been adventurous. They had rather supported existing princes than replaced them by new. In Bengal they would not have attempted a revolution without the certainty of a large Indian

[1] Law, *op. cit.* pp. 112, 131.
[2] *Idem*, pp. 108 *sqq.*; Gleig, Warren Hastings, I, 41; Elliott and Dowson, VIII, 426.

backing; and the Seths' intrigues created the situation, bringing the discontent to a head and the discontented into active contact with one another, without which the English would never have stirred at a time when a French war was visibly impending. The Select Committee declared no more than the truth when it recorded among its other reasons for participating in the plot that

> The Nabob is so universally hated by all sorts and degrees of men; the affection of the army is so much alienated from him by his ill-usage of the officers; and a revolution so generally wished for, that it is probable that the step will be attempted (and successfully too) whether we give our assistance or not. In this case we think it would be a great error in politics to remain idle and unconcerned spectators of an event, wherein by engaging as allies to the person designed to be set up we may benefit our employers and the community very considerably, do a general good, and effectually traverse the designs of the French and possibly keep them entirely out of these dominions....[1]

This matter first came to a definite form when on 20 April Scrafton wrote to Clive that the Seths through Omichand had proposed to set up Yar Lutf Khan as nawab. This man was a protégé of the Seths who had employed him in command of a body of troops to protect them against attacks from the nawab or anyone else. On the 23rd Scrafton's letter was read in committee and Clive was authorised to sound the principal people in Murshidabad about their willingness to co-operate. On the 26th Watts wrote that Mir Ja'far had informed him through Khwaja Petrus, an Armenian, that he and other important persons were willing to assist the English in overthrowing the nawab. This proposal was obviously much more attractive than engaging to support an unknown man such as Yar Lutf Khan. The question was considered in committee on 1 May and at once accepted on the following conditions: an alliance offensive and defensive; the surrender of all French fugitives and factories; restitution of all English losses, public and private, caused by the capture of Calcutta; the admission of all farman rights; liberty to fortify Kasimbazar and Dacca; no fortifications to be erected on the river below Hugli; the recognition of English sovereignty within the bounds of Calcutta; the grant of territories for the maintenance of a proper military force; extraordinary expenses while the troops were on campaign for the nawab to be paid by him; and the residence at the nawab's durbar of one of the Company's servants. Four days later to these terms was added the additional stipulation that "Omychund in consideration of his services should have all his losses made good by an express article in the treaty". But by the time that these proposals had reached Murshidabad, Omichand had fallen into disfavour with the other conspirators. Watts might write on 6 May, "I will conclude nothing without consulting Omichand", but on the 14th he had learnt that the latter had procured from the nawab orders for the restoration of his property, and, when he was shown the proposed articles, he not

[1] Bengal Select Committee, 1 May, 1757.

only insisted on his receiving 5 per cent. on the nawab's treasure, but also demanded many other alterations, "in which his own ambition, cunning, and avaricious views were the chief motives".[1] In consequence of these intrigues both the English and Mir Ja'far resolved to have nothing more to do with the greedy Sikh; but the matter was not so simple as that. Omichand had unwisely been let into the secret, and the immediate problem was to keep his mouth shut until the preparations were more complete. For this purpose the Calcutta council decided on the expedient of a double treaty, in one copy of which Omichand's claims were to be inserted, but which was not to be regarded as the valid copy. In order to make the trick pass, Watson's signature was added by some person, probably Lushington, to the false copy.

Meanwhile, the final terms had been concerted with Mir Ja'far. They were rather more favourable to the English than had been at first put forward; and on 5 June, Watts visited Mir Ja'far in secret and obtained his oath to the treaty. But already doubts had arisen regarding the amount of assistance that might be expected from him and his friends. In words which proved true in the event, Watts wrote:

> We can expect no more assistance than that they will stand neuter and wait the event of a battle. If we are successful they will reap the benefit, if otherwise they will continue as they were without appearing to have been concerned with us.[2]

Nevertheless, the march of events was not suffered to pause. On 11 June the treaty was delivered to the Select Committee; on the 12th Watts and his companions fled from Murshidabad; and the day after Clive began to march towards the nawab's capital.

The matter had not been kept so secret as it should have been. We shall never know whether Omichand revealed the plot to Siraj-ud-daula, or who broke silence at Calcutta; but it was openly discussed at the English capital on 5 June; two days later it was known at Murshidabad; and on the 8th the Frenchman, Sinfray, warned the nawab of what was impending. But he was too irresolute by nature to take advantage of his knowledge. He seems also to have so distrusted his army that he would not venture on the decisive step of seizing Mir Ja'far. Instead of that he visited the latter in person, and accepted, though presumably he did not place much trust in, the conspirator's protestations of fidelity. Meanwhile Clive set out with 3000 men. Of these 2200 were sepoys and topasses; 800 European infantry and artillerymen. The sepoys were men whom he had brought up with him to Bengal; they had been raised and trained under Lawrence in the south and had served well against the French. After a momentary hesitation he reached Plassey at midnight 22–23 June,

[1] Watts to Clive, 14 May, 1757.
[2] Watts to Clive, 3 June, 1757.

and found himself within striking distance of Siraj-ud-daula's army, consisting of some 50,000 men.

His knowledge of the situation was slight and disquieting. He had received letters from Mir Ja'far promising co-operation; but he was by no means certain how far the latter would keep his word. In the first draft of Orme's famous history we find a passage which was afterwards omitted, probably in deference to the susceptibilities of his hero:

> Colonel Clive...saw the morning break with increasing anxiety; at sunrise he went with another person upon the terras of the hunting-house, from whence having contemplated the enemy's array, he was surprised at their numerous, splendid and martial appearance. His companion asked him what he thought would be the event; to which he replied, "We must make the best fight we can during the day, and at night sling our muskets over our shoulders and march back to Calcutta". Most of the officers were as doubtful of success as himself; but the common soldiery, being mostly tried men, who had served under Major Lawrence on the plains of Trichinopoly, maintained the blunt spirit of genuine Englishmen, and saw nothing in the pomp or multitude of the Nabob's army either to admire or to fear....[1]

In view of the spirit of his men Clive seems to have resolved to remain on the defensive during the day, but when night fell to try the effect of a surprise attack upon the nawab's camp. Accordingly, till 2 o'clock in the afternoon nothing was done but reply to the cannonade opened by the enemy. But when the latter ceased fire and began to fall back on their own camp, Killpatrick on his own responsibility ordered an advance. The enemy were soon driven from the mound near the British camp which they had occupied; the next point of attack was another mound close to the nawab's entrenchments. Apparently at about the time when Clive ordered his men to advance to storm this post, the nawab sent word to the small party of Frenchmen with him that he was betrayed, that the battle was lost, and that they should save themselves; immediately after this he fled on a swift camel, and himself brought to Murshidabad the news of his overthrow. All this time Rai Durlabh and Mir Ja'far had been as inactive as the Pathan nawabs with whom Dupleix had concerted the destruction of Nasir Jang. They had hung on the right flank of the English forces, without attacking, but also without giving any sign of their holding other intentions. Not till the next morning did Mir Ja'far venture into the English camp, and even then he was apparently very uncertain of his reception. Scrafton noted that he started when the guard turned out to receive him, and his face did not brighten till the colonel came out and embraced him.[2] That day the new nawab hastened to Murshidabad, of which he took possession; on the 28th Clive entered and conducted him to the *masnad* on which he had not yet ventured

[1] Orme MSS, Various, 164 A, p. 115.
[2] Scrafton, *Reflections*, p. 90.

to seat himself; and on 2 July Siraj-ud-daula was brought back by Mir Ja'far's son Miran, and put to death that same night. So this revolution was completed. Clive wrote of it to Orme, "I am possessed of volumes of materials for the continuation of your history, in which will appear fighting, tricks, chicanery, intrigues, politics, and the Lord knows what".[1] It offers a strange mingling of the admirable and the mean. No series of events could have thrown into stronger relief Clive's insight and the way in which he saw "things and their consequences in an instant"; nothing could have afforded a better illustration of his resolute conduct as soon as his swift mind had been made up; nothing could have better displayed his extraordinary gift of leadership. If once or twice he hesitated in the course of affairs, he was after all but man; and his hesitation took place when there was no immediate call for action. In attacking Siraj-ud-daula he was amply justified not only by the standards of his own time but also by those of our own. But the deception of Omichand has thrown an ugly air over the business. As has been well said, had Omichand sought it he could not have devised a more bitter revenge than the stain which he brought upon the name of Clive.[2] And the large presents with which Mir Ja'far rewarded those who had given him Bengal add the touch of sordidness. It is true that in this Clive and his companions were only following the example of Dupleix and Bussy; that their motives were not corrupt; that they might have had more for the asking; that they were only doing what any of their contemporaries would have done in their place. Here our judgment must fall upon the age rather than upon the individuals; but none the less the acceptance of the presents was of evil example; and could Clive have looked on to 1765 perhaps he would have refrained from laying up for himself untold bitterness.

Clive now found himself installed in the same position and exposed to the same dangers as Bussy in the Deccan. In character Mir Ja'far was much like Salabat Jang—weak and irresolute. The principal people of his durbar were as likely to be jealous of the English as the nobles of the Deccan had proved themselves to be of the French. Intrigue and hostility were certain. In these circumstances, though without any formally declared intention, we find Clive adopting as a definite policy the protection of those prominent Hindus who had assisted in bringing about the revolution, and whom Mir Ja'far wished to despoil as soon as it was accomplished. The two chief persons concerned were Rai Durlabh, who had been diwan and had received repeated promises of being continued in that office, and Ramnarayan, the deputy of Bihar, who was thought unlikely to support the new *régime*. Before the end of 1757 the nawab was already accusing Rai Durlabh of intending to set up a new nawab. On this pretext the

[1] Clive to Orme, 1 August, 1757.
[2] Hill, *Bengal in* 1756–57, I, p. clxxxix.

unfortunate brother of Siraj-ud-daula was put to death; and Rai Durlabh was on the verge of being attacked.[1] Watts, who was still resident at the durbar, interfered and brought about a reconciliation for the time being, which was the more necessary because Ramnarayan was reported to be allying himself with the wazir of Oudh against Mir Ja'far. However, when the nawab took the field to march against Bihar, Rai Durlabh refused to march with him, on the pretext of ill-health, but really because he was afraid to trust himself in the nawab's camp. Clive, who had decided to accompany Mir Ja'far to Patna, visited the diwan at Murshidabad in connection with the Company's claims for payment which were overdue. At first he secured nothing but promises. But when the diwan was warned that he was risking the loss of English protection, an agreement was reached under which the Company was to receive orders on the collectors of the various districts (30 December).[2] Clive and Mir Ja'far now moved towards Patna. At first Clive had been decidedly hostile towards Ramnarayan. Immediately after the battle of Plassey he had sent Coote up with a detachment in order to seize Law and any other Frenchmen whom he could find; and he also issued orders to dispossess Ramnarayan of Bihar.[3] These orders were never carried out, because Coote was dissuaded by Mir Ja'far's friends, who probably thought that the plunder of the deputy had better be left for their own hands. Six months later Clive's attitude had changed. In December he had received protestations of the deputy's fidelity; and on 1 January he had with the approval of the nawab written giving that guarantee of personal safety without which Ramnarayan refused to trust himself within the nawab's reach. Relying on this, Ramnarayan at once came down the river to meet the nawab; and then ensued a pretty trial of strength between the nawab and Clive, the first bent on the spoliation of the deputy, the second on the maintenance of his promise. Clive won, although at one time after his arrival at Patna he had certainly speculated on the possibility of being attacked by the nawab's forces,[4] as Bussy had been at the Chahar Mahal. Ramnarayan received investiture of his office, for which he paid nine lakhs of rupees; and he received a definite promise that so long as he did not intrigue with foreign powers and provided his due share of the revenues, he should not be dismissed. The net result was that the two principal servants of the state depended for their personal security not upon their ostensible master but upon the influence of Clive.

Down to this time Clive had no definite position among the English at Bengal, and still remained a servant of the governor and council

[1] Clive to Secret Committee, 23 December, 1757.

[2] Clive to Secret Committee, 18 February, 1758.

[3] See Coote's correspondence and journal *ap.* Orme MSS, India, VII, pp. 1608-50, and 1673-91.

[4] Clive to Select Committee, 7 February, 1758.

of Madras. On the receipt of the news of the fall of Calcutta, after some deliberation the Company had resorted to that absurd plan, which had been attempted before in the period of confusion at the beginning of the century, of establishing a rotation government. On this occasion there were to be four governors, who were to have succeeded to the chair in successive periods of a month. But the Calcutta Council refused to put this plan into operation; Clive was invited to act as governor till orders should arrive subsequent to the news of the revolution. This sensible decision was taken in June, 1758; and later in the year a dispatch arrived by which the Company appointed Clive to the position which he was already occupying.

Meanwhile the policy of protecting the Hindu servants of the nawab was further developed by the attack made by Miran upon Rai Durlabh. The resident had once more to intervene in order to prevent his house being plundered; and then an intrigue was started with a view to ruining him with the English by accusing him of a conspiracy against the nawab. Clive with great probability on his side refused to credit the accusation, and the minister was allowed to retire to Calcutta. The support of persons whom he wished to plunder must have done much to alienate the nawab; but almost immediately afterwards came a reminder that he depended upon the English for military support. In 1759 appeared on the borders of Bihar 'Ali Gauhar, better known under his later title of Shah 'Alam II, who, flying from the confusion of Delhi, had found a refuge in Oudh and was now hoping to strengthen his position by the occupation of Bihar and Bengal. He laid siege to Patna, but Ramnarayan proved staunch; after temporising as long as he could, he defended the place until succour arrived, on which the wandering prince withdrew into Oudh. This support was the occasion of that great gift of the jagir, which involved Clive in such animated disputes with the Company at a later time. It consisted of the quit-rent which the nawab had withheld when he granted the 24-Parganas to the Company, and which was till Clive's death and later paid to him instead of to the nawab, though he had much ado to secure his rights from the Company when control of the direction passed for the time being out of his hands.

The last striking incident of his first government in Bengal was the attempt of the Dutch to supplant English influence with the nawab. Although the centre of Dutch power and wealth lay not in India but in the islands to the eastward, they had watched with growing disfavour first the French and then the English establishing themselves in a position of political predominance. When Masulipatam had been granted to the French in 1751, the Dutch, who had long had a factory there, made several attempts to assert their independence. On more than one occasion they attempted to hoist their flag—a thing which the French would in no wise permit; and they constantly scrupled to pay the duties which the French imposed on the trade

within their grants.[1] But Dutch interests in the Northern Sarkars were trivial compared with their interests in Bengal. Not only were the piece-goods of Bengal exported in great quantities to Batavia on the account of the Dutch Company, but the Dutch servants enjoyed a most lucrative though secret monopoly of the export of opium to Batavia; and though this never appeared in the forefront of their disputes with the English, we may be sure that it was never far from their minds. On the establishment of Mir Ja'far they had attempted to obtain a price for recognising him as nawab; and as a penalty had seen their trade stopped and their agent seized.[2] Then when Pocock left the Hugli for the Coromandel Coast, the Dutch had been invited to concert measures to prevent French vessels from entering the river; they had not been able to concur; and so the English took their own measures, which consisted in subjecting all foreign vessels coming up the river to a strict search.[3] Then too, Clive had obtained for the English Company a monopoly of the saltpetre produced in Bengal, with a view to preventing that article from reaching the French, and the Dutch protested against this measure, although they had themselves applied for a similar privilege to Siraj-ud-daula. The duties on the export of opium were also raised and workmen were said to have been prevented from working for the Dutch Company. The Dutch were in fact in the same position as the English would have occupied on the Coromandel Coast had Saunders done nothing to counteract the schemes of Dupleix. Bisdom and Vernet, the Dutch leaders, have therefore the same moral justification for attempting to overthrow the English supremacy as Saunders and Clive have for overthrowing that of the French in the south. They committed, however, so many errors of conduct as entirely to destroy any chances that they may ever have had against so wary and resolute a leader as Clive.

The Dutch authorities at Batavia had already resolved to increase their Indian garrisons by some 2000 men, but, before they had put this design into execution, they received news from Chinsura that Vernet had entered into relations with Miran, taking advantage of the disputes over Rai Durlabh, with a view to the introduction of a large force into Bengal; and early in 1759 Vernet had interviews with Mir Ja'far, in which he expressed hatred of the English and a desire to be done with them. In the following June the Dutch governor-general dispatched a small fleet of seven vessels with 300 Europeans and 600 Malay troops, with orders to proceed to Negapatam and follow such orders as they should receive there. The Dutch evidently felt that they could not take decisive action from so remote a station as Batavia; but it was the first of many gross mistakes. The ships lay

[1] Pondichery to Negapatam, 5 August, and 11 and 27 September, 1750, Pondichery Records, No. 15, pp. 424, 442, 443.
[2] Klerk de Reuss, *De expeditie naar Bengale*, p. 6.
[3] Bengal Select Committee, 2 March, 1758.

at Negapatam for a month, during which the English had time to assemble their men to repulse the threatened invasion. Even when at the beginning of October the Dutch reached the entrance to the river, they still had not made up their minds what they would do. They were confronted with a prohibition, in the name of the nawab, of introducing troops into Bengal. They were simple enough to attempt to induce the nawab to withdraw his orders, which were, indeed, the orders of Clive. They evidently did not understand that, as in the days before Plassey, Mir Ja'far could not be expected to show his hand till he saw how things were going. More than a month was thus wasted; and then the Dutch resolved to force their way in. They seized various small English craft near the mouth of the river, thus giving their enemies a better *casus belli* than they could have hoped for; and finally made their attempt, landing the troops on the night of 21–22 November. But they met with complete failure. On the 24th their vessels were all captured by three Company's ships that Clive had equipped for the purpose of defending the river. On the same day Forde, who had returned from Masulipatam in the nick of time, but who, had the Dutch been less supine, would have been too late, routed a party of 400 men marching from Chinsura to meet the new troops; and on the next day he met and completely overthrew the latter body. It is curious to note that the Malay troops were armed with the old plug-bayonets which had been disused in Europe for some sixty years.[1]

These repeated disasters brought the Dutch to their knees. Indeed they had no choice. Their garrison had been destroyed, and now that the issue had been decided Miran had suddenly appeared before Chinsura with a large body of horse, eager to punish them for having lured him on with the hope of changing one master for another. The Dutch acknowledged that they had begun the hostilities, submitted to a demand that the forces they maintained in Bengal should be limited, and promised to pay ten lakhs damages. Thus Clive, taking warning by the events of the Carnatic, had a second time, by his prompt action, crushed the danger of war in Bengal with another European power. The province was not to be fought over, and its revenues destroyed, as had happened in the Carnatic.

He had thus been singularly successful in establishing the English in a position of predominance and had skilfully avoided for three years the various dangers that arose to threaten their position. But he had only done so by virtue of his astounding mastery over weaker minds and his promptitude in crushing each enemy as he arose. But the general position was still uncertain. The English had no moral position in the province. Their power was a matter of personal influence and military force. Clive's dexterity might maintain the

[1] Klerk de Reuss, *op. cit.*; Malcolm, *Clive*, II, 74–90; Price to Pocock, 25 December, 1759 (P.R.O. Adm. 1–161).

balance; had he continued governor of Fort William, he might have continued to maintain it; but it was unlikely that any lesser man would succeed in doing so. Leaving matters in this uncertain position, though no external danger was at the moment to be feared, Clive delivered over the chair to Holwell, and embarked for England on 25 February, 1760.

NOTE ON THE BLACK HOLE. In *Bengal Past and Present*, July, 1915, and January, 1916, will be found an attempt to discredit the accepted version of the Black Hole tragedy by Mr J. H. Little. His principal arguments are (1) that Holwell's narrative contains numerous demonstrable errors; (2) that it lacks contemporary corroboration. He concludes that Holwell, Cooke, and the other persons who vouch for the event concocted the story, and that those who are supposed to have perished in the Black Hole really were killed in the storm of the place. At a later stage in the controversy he even asserted that there was no evidence for the existence of the monument in memory of the Black Hole which Holwell erected. Everyone who has studied the records of the time must have come to the conclusion that Holwell was not a virtuous man; it is even likely that he touched up his story so as to make the part he played as conspicuous as possible. But even when we have made all allowance for this sort of thing, the main outlines of the story still remain. The small divergences which distinguish the story of Cooke from that of Holwell, for instance, are such as constantly occur in the independent accounts of contemporary witnesses; and, so far from throwing suspicion on the whole story, suggest that Cooke and Holwell did not combine to foist a false version of events on the public. Mr Little labours to prove that there could not have been so many survivors in the fort as Holwell says were shut up in the Black Hole; but the truth is that we have not the material to decide what may have been the exact number of persons remaining after the capitulation. His first argument thus casts doubt over certain details only. As regards the silence of contemporaries, he is in more than one respect entirely mistaken. It was natural that the Calcutta Council should avoid mention of the Black Hole which threw such a lurid light over the circumstances of their desertion of the place. It is not the fact that neither Clive, nor Watson, nor Pigot, refers to the Black Hole. Clive does so in some of his published correspondence; Watson does in his declaration of war; Pigot does so in a letter dated 18 September following. But, says Mr Little, the acceptance of the story by uncritical contemporaries proves nothing. However, Holwell's contemporaries were exceedingly critical. Watts, for instance, who disliked Holwell so much, and criticised his assertions so sharply, makes no attack upon this. Drake and the other fugitive councillors could have cast off a load of obloquy had they proved Holwell's story of the Black Hole to be the imposture Mr Little supposes it to have been. Altogether the controversy seems to have arisen from the perplexities of a student unaccustomed to the conflicts of evidence which the historian has perpetually to encounter; and his negative arguments do not seem to me capable of bearing the weight he would lay upon them.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

DURING the negotiations in Europe which finally resulted in the conclusion of Godeheu's provisional treaty with Saunders, Admiral Watson had been sent out to the Coromandel Coast with a small squadron and Adlercron's regiment of foot, in case the French should refuse to come to terms; and in the next year, 1755, Clive returned to India, after a two years' rest at home, with additional troops and rank as lieutenant-colonel in the king's service. His dispatch was connected with a project that had been formed in London in case, as was shrewdly suspected, the French refused to evacuate the Deccan. This project contemplated an alliance with Balaji Rao and an attack on Bussy's position either from Bombay or from some point on the east coast.[1] But this scheme fell through, partly because the dispatches to Madras were delayed by the loss of the *Doddington* conveying the originals, partly because the Bombay Presidency was reluctant to co-operate.[2] The result was that the naval and military forces assembled at Bombay early in 1756 were employed on an affair of mere local interest—the capture, in co-operation with the forces of Balaji Rao, of the pirate stronghold of Gheriah, after which the English and Marathas fell out over the division of the plunder. Clive proceeded to take up his post as deputy-governor of Fort St David, and then, as we have seen, sailed with all the forces that could be spared at Madras for the recovery of Calcutta.

The new war that was opening in 1756 differed much from the preceding struggle. The successes of Dupleix and Bussy had been obtained during an interval of peace between France and Great Britain, that is to say at a time when the French in India did not have to trouble about their sea-communications with Europe, and when there was no possibility of hostile interference with the arrival of munitions and reinforcements. But that favourable situation had disappeared; and success now meant the control of two elements instead of one. Further it was fought out almost exclusively in the Carnatic. First Madras was besieged, and then Pondichery. The only extension of the war into Bengal consisted of Clive's seizure of Chandernagore early in 1757. So that all the advantages which the English had secured by Clive's extraordinary successes remained unimpaired. When funds ran short at Madras, Calcutta could supply the need. In this sense the Seven Years' War may be considered as the attack

[1] Military dispatches to Madras and Bombay, 26 March, 1755.
[2] Madras Record Office, Military Sundry, No. 9.—Private Committees.

and defence of the outworks of Bengal.[1] Had Lally conquered the Carnatic, he would speedily have appeared before Fort William. It was exceedingly lucky for the English that the war should have been fought out in an area of minor financial importance. They stood to gain everything and to lose little.

For the first eighteen months after the news of war had been received in November, 1756, the only outstanding event was the capture of Chandernagore, which has already been described. The English squadron was still lying in the Hugli, and Madras and Pondichery were both too bare of troops to attempt hostilities. Leyrit, governor of Pondichery, had sent all the troops he could spare to assist Bussy at Hyderabad; Pigot, governor of Madras, had sent the major part of the English forces to recover Calcutta. It had, however, been definitely understood that on the outbreak of war Clive was to return to the south with the Madras troops; and as no one in Fort St George knew what momentous designs he was revolving, much annoyance was felt and expressed at his failure to carry out his promises.[2] The French were the first to receive reinforcements. In September, 1757, a squadron of ten vessels arrived under the command of Bouvet, who had made a fugitive appearance on the coast nine years before; and he brought a battalion of the *régiment de Lorraine* under the Chevalier de Soupire. But the season was too advanced for active operations. Within a month or so the north-east monsoon might be expected to set in with the storms which made the harbourless coast so dangerous to ships at that season, and deluges of rain that rendered all military movements impossible. Bouvet therefore made haste to return to Mauritius whence he had come, and Soupire did little except send some troops against Trichinopoly and seize the little fort of Chetpattu.

Operations really began in 1758. In February Pocock, who had succeeded to the naval command on the death of Watson in 1757, sailed from the Hugli and assembled his whole squadron of seven ships of the line at Madras. He then cruised down the coast in order to intercept any fleet that might be making for Pondichery. On 28 April he sighted a French fleet of nine ships of the line a little to the northward of Pondichery. After an action lasting from 3 to 5 in the afternoon, the French bore away, and the English were too crippled to pursue; but the former had lost 400 killed and wounded as against 118 among the English.

This fleet had convoyed the second portion of the French reinforcements, with its leader, Lally. He brought with him his own regiment, and had been invested with the fullest civil and military powers. He was syndic for the company, commissary for the king, and commandant-general of the French settlements in India; and he was

[1] Madras (Military) to the Company, 28 June, 1759.
[2] Madras Military Consultations, 28 April, 1757.

charged with the two-fold task of reforming the French administration and driving the English out of India. However, the control of the squadron was reserved for the commander d'Aché, so that Lally might find himself unexpectedly deprived of its co-operation.

The instant his troops were brought ashore, he hurried them off to besiege Fort St David. He was naturally and properly anxious to lose nothing by delay. Accordingly all the available troops were dispatched and the siege formed on 1 May. After some delay, while the material was being collected, Lally was able to break ground on the 17th. The same day he carried the outworks of the place by storm. On the 27th he began to batter in breach; and on 2 June the place capitulated. This was a disagreeable surprise for the English, who had expected it to hold out much longer. But the place was not really strong. Its extensive outworks demanded more men for their defence than the place could accommodate; there was no bomb-proof shelter for the men off duty; above all the commandant, Major Polier, distrusted and was distrusted by his men.[1] But though the issue was not flattering to English hopes, there were ugly omens on the French side too. Lally had shown great vigour and resolution, but it was something of that *vis consilii expers* which does not lead to victory. When the mortars or fascines were delayed beyond expectation, he would hasten to Pondichery and tell off Leyrit and the councillors, who retained their offices, much as he would tell off a private who appeared dirty on parade.[2]

Fort St David taken, Lally desired to proceed at once against Madras. But d'Aché refused to sail against Pocock; and without his assistance the siege was impossible until the approach of the north-east monsoon should have driven the English squadron off the coast. Meanwhile, therefore, Lally resolved, mainly on the advice of the Jesuit, Père Lavaur, to raise money by attacking Tanjore. In 1749 the raja, when besieged by Chanda Sahib and the French, had given them his bond for seventy lakhs of rupees on condition of their raising the siege. Later developments had relieved him of the need of paying any part of it; Lally decided to demand payment of the bond, sword in hand, and he might doubtless have secured a considerable sum of money had he gone to work a little less ferociously, and with a little more forethought. But he displayed the same inconsiderate haste with which he had marched against Fort St David. He marched his men off down the coast without adequate arrangements for feeding them, and without sufficient quantities of military stores. On entering Tanjore, he seized the seaport of Nagur and sold the plunder of the place to his colonel of hussars. Then turning inland he reached Tiruvalur, a place with a temple famous for its sanctity. Here Lally expected to find great plunder, but got nothing and displayed such

[1] Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, p. 162.
[2] Cf. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, XI, 278.

severity, executing six of the temple Brahmans whom he took for spies, that, when he marched on, the inhabitants abandoned the country through which he passed. When he arrived before the city of Tanjore (18 July), he could not begin the siege for want of powder and shot. He therefore opened negotiations, in the hope that with the assistance of the raja he might be able to attack the English force at Trichinopoly. The raja sat comfortably behind his walls, content to negotiate till famine drove away the enemy. At last Lally grew tired of fruitless discussions. He improvised batteries and opened an attack upon the place. Then on 8 August he heard that Pocock had beaten d'Aché off Karikal; he lacked material to carry through his attack; and at midnight 10–11 August he raised the siege and marched for the coast, having dispirited his men by useless hardships and inflicted a deep wound on his own reputation.[1]

The action at sea, too, had serious consequences. After the first battle d'Aché had been prevented with difficulty from sailing back to the French islands, and only remained on the coast in consequence of the urgent demands of Lally and every other Frenchman in Pondichery. He lay there till 27 July, and then put to sea on the news of Pocock's approach. An action followed on 3 August, which lasted for about an hour, during which the French squadron lost over 500 men while the English did not lose 200. This time d'Aché refused to remain longer on the coast or again to encounter the English ships. After embittered discussions in a council consisting of the chief naval, military, and civil officers, d'Aché called another council consisting of his naval officers only, who resolved with one accord that the squadron could not remain longer upon the coast. Having landed a body of seamen under the Chevalier de Poëte to reinforce Lally's land forces, he set sail from Pondichery on 3 September, and did not reappear for a twelvemonth all but a day.[2]

All that Lally could do for the moment was to wait until the change in the season should compel Pocock likewise to depart, when he might, if the rains were favourable, have a couple of months free in which to besiege Madras. He was still very superior to the English in numbers. The latter were still waiting for their reinforcements, and had received only a detachment of Draper's regiment, together with its commander, an amiable and not unskilful soldier, whose main claim to memory, however, is his courage in venturing to cross pens with Junius. But though their numbers were few, a different spirit reigned in the place from that which had so meekly submitted to La Bourdonnais. The governor, George Pigot, was irascible but resolute; he had the old veteran Colonel Lawrence to command the forces; he had John Call as engineer. The works had been entirely new-drawn; and though they were but earth, faced with turf, and

[1] Cf. Duteil, *Une famille militaire*, pp. 131 *sqq.*
[2] Dodwell, *op. cit.* p. 168.

needed constant repair, they were skilfully designed to frustrate attack. Ever since Lally's arrival Pigot had been busy gathering great stores of munitions and food; and orders had come from the Company that, if ever an enemy sat down before the place, the council was to deliver its authority over to the governor and the four principal military officers. Moreover, they were united, whereas Lally and the French council hated each other worse than they hated the English.

Early in October the French marched to take possession of various posts lying between Pondichery and Madras. This was successfully carried out, with the exception of Chingleput, which remained in English hands. For the moment that place, Madras, and Trichinopoly were the only spots in the Carnatic left to them. Then, when the rains were over, the French advanced and formed the siege (14 December). No attempt was made to defend the Black Town, which was at once occupied, though an unsuccessful sally was made on the news that the besiegers had got drunk on stores of arrack which they found there on their arrival. After this the siege dragged on with few incidents. As usual Lally had been unable to co-ordinate his efforts. The preparation of stores for the attack and their transport to Madras took longer than he had expected; and he was not able to open fire until 2 January, 1759. After a month's steady fire a breach was made, but the fire of the place was still unsubdued, and the breach itself so steep and so commanded by the fire of the neighbouring works that it was deemed impracticable. Neither had the besiegers been able to carry on their work unmolested. While all the French forces were lying before Madras, a detachment of the English had marched up from Trichinopoly to join the Chingleput garrison, and these troops had harassed the besiegers, threatening their convoys and posting themselves near St Thomas Mount, until Lally had been obliged to send out strong detachments against them. The French army was worn out between its work in the trenches and the pursuit of this elusive enemy. Lally hesitated, but did not venture to attempt a storm. Finally, on 16 February, a squadron of ships hove in sight. It proved to be English; and Lally at once quitted his trenches and abandoned the siege. This was the second great blow to his reputation and a proportionate encouragement to the English. Indeed their defence had been gallant. The whole of the garrison off duty as well as on had been exposed, for want of bomb-proof shelter, to the enemy's shell which he threw perpetually into the fort, and many were thus killed in their sleep; but in spite of everything they held on with admirable determination.[1] Indeed their failure would have imperilled Clive's work in Bengal.

This severe check to the French arms was speedily followed by another. Clive, well aware of the importance of keeping the French

[1] The official narrative of the siege is Madras Public Sundry, no. 13.—Diary of the siege of Fort St George, 1758–59 (*Records of Fort St George*, 1915).

at a distance, and yet having no troops that could be permanently spared, decided to help Madras by sending a detachment under Colonel Forde against the French in the Northern Sarkars. Lally, as has been said in a previous chapter, had resolved to recall Bussy and his troops from the Deccan. But he had not fully carried out his first intention. He had insisted on the return of Bussy and Moracin; but he had allowed a body of troops to continue under other and incapable commanders. Lally had urged with great truth the need of drawing together the whole force of the French; and there he had been right. But he had not persisted in his purpose. Bussy joined him without a man of his northern troops, who had been left behind to guard what were probably private interests. The French troops were still separated, and the Deccan detachment was now in incompetent hands. Forde had landed at Vizagapatam early in October, 1758, and was joined by Ananda Razu, the important zamindar of Vizianagram. After a pause spent in collecting provisions and coming to exact terms with his ally, Forde marched south, and completely defeated the French under Conflans at Kondur, a little to the north of Rajahmundry, the capital of the province (7 December). That place was occupied, and there a long delay occurred, owing to the difficulty of getting the promised funds from Ananda Razu, without which the men would not advance. In February, 1759, Forde renewed his march and appeared (6 March) before Masulipatam. There he lay for a month, distressed by news of the approach of Salabat Jang, by shortage of gunpowder, and by a mutiny of his Europeans.[1] But on the night of 7–8 April he carried the place by escalade, capturing a greater number of regular troops than he had under his own command.[2] On 14 May a treaty was signed with Salabat Jang, and Forde remained in undisturbed possession till the following October, when he returned to Bengal just in time to meet and defeat Roussel and his Dutchmen.

The siege of Madras and the capture of Masulipatam marked the turning-point in the war. In the Carnatic the English took the field, although they still could only bring 1000 Europeans against Lally's 2000; nor had they at first a leader able to carry them to victory. Draper went home for reasons of health; Lawrence was too old and worn to take the field, so that the command fell to Major Cholmondely Brereton, who had never had any experience of war as a subaltern.[3] He made a rash attack on Conjeeveram in September, where he was beaten off with considerable loss; but the French were unable to use their strength to press this advantage home because their men were thoroughly discontented with the lack of pay, and in the next month their discontent broke out into a very alarming mutiny, which com-

[1] Forde to Madras, 19 March, 1759, *ap.* Madras Military Consultations, 28 March, 1759.

[2] Forde to Madras, 10 April, 1759, *loc. cit.* 20 April, 1759.

[3] Call to Speke, 30 October, 1759 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 35917, ff. 40 *sqq.*).

pelled the principal people of Pondichery to part with their plate in order to provide a proportion of the arrears.

Shortly before these events took place d'Aché had reappeared for the last time in Indian waters. He had not been able to revictual his ships at Mauritius, which, with its sister island, Bourbon, did not produce enough food for their joint consumption; and consequently he had been obliged to send to the Cape, where he had to pay heavily, thus using up a large part of the funds that had arrived from France for the use of Lally. When at last d'Aché made the Coromandel Coast (2 September), he fell in at once with Pocock who was on the watch for him. Several days were spent in manœuvres. But on the 10th a stubborn battle was joined. D'Aché managed to catch the English at a moment when their ships were widely strung out, so that two of them could take little or no part. For two hours the squadrons continued their action within musket shot. The English suffered severely. Two ships had all their sail shot away, and over 500 men were killed or wounded. But at last the French rear gave way and broke the line, then the flagship was put about by her pilot at the moment when d'Aché himself fell wounded, and the French took refuge under the guns of Pondichery. They had lost nearly 900 men and, though their fleet was still intact, it had been too severely handled to encounter the English again. In that way the action had been decisive. D'Aché lay for a fortnight off Pondichery, patching up his vessels, then on 1 October he sailed never to return.[1] Nothing more would break the blockade of the English squadron before Pondichery.

Meanwhile, at the end of October, Coote had arrived with his regiment, which, even when a detachment had been sent up to Bengal, made up the English forces to 1700 men. With these he took the field as soon as the rains were over, and began reducing the numerous little forts which studded the Carnatic. But his great object was to bring Lally to an action. With this in view, he looked on while Lally invested the fort of Wandiwash which the French had lately lost; and then, when Lally was fairly committed to the siege, Coote advanced swiftly on him. The result was a battle (22 January, 1760) as decisive on land as Pocock's late action had been at sea. Lally was routed, and it was the last pitched battle of the war. The remaining posts in the Carnatic were soon reduced, and in the course of March the French were reduced to Pondichery, Jinji, and Karikal, of which the last surrendered on 5 April.

There remained the reduction of Pondichery. For the moment Coote judged his forces too few to enable him to form the siege of the place. Meanwhile Lally attempted to retrieve his position by means of help from Hyder 'Ali, the rising general in the service of Mysore. A treaty was made by which Hyder was promised certain forts, French assistance to conquer territories to the southward as soon as the English

[1] Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, p. 182, and references there cited.

had been beaten, and two lakhs of rupees a month. On this Hyder sent his brother-in-law with a detachment to Pondichery; but he brought no provisions, he suggested no feasible plans for the destruction of Coote and his army, and after a month's hesitation he departed, giving up the fort which had been delivered to him. Meanwhile Coote had captured the fort of Villiyanallur, and induced the admiral to land a body of marines to reinforce his troops. With them he prepared to drive the French within their bound-hedge.

At this moment the command changed hands. Dispatches arrived with a commission giving Monson rank over Coote who till then had been the senior alike in service and in position. The latter therefore retired to Madras, and prepared to proceed with his regiment to Bengal, whither indeed he had been ordered. That would have meant the abandonment of the siege of Pondichery. Monson offered to leave the army till the place had been captured, and Coote then agreed to leave his regiment behind. Monson drove the French within the bound-hedge, but was severely wounded in the operation, and Coote then resumed the command on the understanding that the other should not rejoin the army before the fall of Pondichery.[1] This was on 20 September.

Pondichery had now been blockaded for several months, and the condition within the place was miserable. Lally and the Company's servants were on the worst possible terms. No money was to be had. Attempts to wring money out of either the European or the Indian inhabitants of the place had proved singularly fruitless; and endeavours to fetch up supplies from the neutral settlements on the coast had been frustrated by the vigilance of the blockading ships. The enemy without pressed nearer and nearer. In December they opened fire on the defences; in the first days of January a storm scattered the English squadron lying in the roads, and for an instant the way lay open for supplies, but before advantage could be taken of this the men-of-war were back at their old posts; the position of the town was hopeless; and on 16 January, 1761, it surrendered at discretion. Jinji surrendered after some weeks of blockade; Mahé, on the west coast, surrendered to an overpowering force which sat down before it, and the French were left without a foot of ground in India.

The principal cause which had contributed to this complete victory was certainly the relentless pressure of sea-power. Although the French fleet was never destroyed, yet the cumulative effect of the three actions which were fought established an irresistible superiority, such as later in 1783 Suffren had just established when the news of peace robbed him of the fruits of victory. While the English received supplies of food and money from Bengal, recruits of men from Europe, and grain from their northern settlements, the French could receive

[1] Dodwell, *op. cit.* pp. 186–7, and references there cited.

nothing but what came to them laboriously by land. The first were constantly strengthened, the second as constantly weakened. And this enabled Coote to establish his military superiority over Lally in the field and to hem him in within the walls of Pondichery. And in this connection we may doubt whether the possession of Mauritius was an unmixed blessing to the French. It possessed an excellent harbour where their squadrons could refit; but it was remote from the decisive area of the war, and was a constant temptation to a faltering commander to abandon the coast to the enemy.

Next to the pressure of sea-power we must set the influence of superior finance. From first to last Lally was embarrassed for means of paying his troops; of obtaining material; of paying work-people. He came out with scanty supplies, nor could the war-ravaged Carnatic make good this crushing disadvantage. But here the control of the Bengal nawab, established in 1757, was a strong help to the English. At more than one critical moment, when our men were on the point of mutiny, Bengal sent down supplies which enabled Madras to carry on. The one good thing which can be said for the revolution of 1760 is that it enabled the siege of Pondichery to be continued to its conclusion. It has been said that had Lally retained Bussy in the Deccan he might have been able to secure funds thence; but I cannot accept that view. The Deccan had never been able to remit money to the south. Whatever had been got there, or from the Sarkars which had been ceded to Bussy, had always been eaten up by the establishments which were maintained there, and, except the lakh and a half of rupees which Bussy sent to Lally in 1758, the place had never provided any resources for the public treasury of the French.

Thirdly, we must place the personal character of Lally among the causes of the French failure. His hastiness, his violent temper, his uncontrolled and cutting speech, his habit of threatening without punishing, were all strong obstacles in his way. Nor was his task made easier by the orders which he received to carry into execution a reform of the Pondichery administration in a time of war. The two things were incompatible. Against such difficulties and such defects his personal gallantry fought in vain.

CHAPTER IX

BENGAL, 1760–72

When Clive quitted Bengal early in 1760, the position of affairs was still very unsettled. 'Ali Gauhar was still lingering on the borders of Bihar, financial relations with Mir Ja'far were still unsatisfactory, and the share which the nawab had taken in the recent attempts of the Dutch, though as yet unknown in detail, was strongly suspected. Moreover, Clive's successor, Holwell, was a man of greater talent than character; he only held his office temporarily and by accident till Clive's permanent successor arrived; and he was not capable of imposing his will, as Clive had done, either on the Company's servants or on the nawab. Consequently the unstable political situation, which had grown up in the last three years as the result of the military power of the Company and the personal character of Clive, was not likely to remain unshaken when the control passed into weaker hands.

The command of the troops had fallen to Caillaud, who had been brought up from Madras at the particular request of Clive. He was a skilful soldier, and under his command the English forces were not likely to undergo defeat; but, like Holwell, he was not a man of any moral vigour or capable of making good the deficiencies of the temporary governor. At the moment he was on campaign against the shahzada, with a battalion of Europeans and another of sepoys, together with a large body of cavalry under the nawab's son, Miran. He succeeded by the action of Sirpur (22 February) in relieving Patna, which had been attacked by the shahzada, but Miran's men did not follow up their success, mainly, Caillaud thought, owing to the inertness of their leader; and then for a week Miran insisted on nursing some slight wounds he had received, while the shahzada, having collected his scattered troops, raided into the province of Bengal. Caillaud followed him so closely that he had little opportunity of doing anything effectual, and again withdrew; but the nawab's horse had again proved unserviceable, and the nawab entered into correspondence with the shahzada, declaring, it was believed, that his resistance was solely due to the insistence of the English. However, when Caillaud had once again relieved Patna, the shahzada finally retired from Bihar.[1] Caillaud and Miran then set out to chastise the zamindars who had afforded him help during his raid into Bengal. But in the course of these operations, on 3 July, Miran perished, probably killed by lightning.[2]

[1] Caillaud's Journal, *ap.* Orme MSS, India, VI.
[2] India Office, Home Miscellaneous, 456 D.

The death of Miran was in itself no great loss. From the Indian historians we gather a conception of his character much resembling that which they attribute to Siraj-ud-daula.[1] But the event at once brought up the question of succession, and placed in a position of great prominence a man of consummate political skill, connected with the nawab by marriage, and generally well-reputed among the English. This was Mir Kasim. He sought at once to obtain a promise of being named either the diwan or the successor of Mir Ja'far; and for the moment Mir Ja'far seems to have acquiesced in his plans. But for some time before this occurrence Holwell and Caillaud had been discussing the political future of the provinces. Holwell had taken up an attitude strongly opposed to the maintenance of the present nawab. He argued that he had betrayed the English both with the Dutch and with the shahzada, that he had failed to make the payments that he had promised the Company, that the country was going to ruin under his government, and that the sooner he was removed the better for the English and for the country. Caillaud, to whom these views were communicated, did not agree with them. He thought the Company was bound to support the nawab and that a revolution would be fraught with ill consequences. Hastings held the same ideas.

"Mr Holwell's censures on the Nabob's conduct," he wrote, "are but too just; but I dread the consequences he seems to draw from them. Let the Nabob be ever so bad, we are bound if not in justice, in honour and policy to support him through these troubles, now we are so far engaged. I do not suppose he is grown a worse man since the commencement of this war....That he is a usurper is certain, and one of our making...."[2]

Caillaud replied with a long letter traversing Holwell's arguments. The latter rejoined:

Had it ever been my wish or intention to have taken our support from the present Nabob and transfer it to any other, your arguments in that case would have all the weight with me they so greatly merit....But my views for the Company went much higher. That the country will never be in a settled peaceful state whilst this family is at the head of it, is a position I lay down as incontestable, and that until the country enjoys that state the Company's affairs must be daily approaching to certain ruin: I therefore judge we could never be possessed of a more just or favourable opportunity to carry into execution what must be done, I plainly see, one time or other, if the Company have ever a secure footing in the provinces, to wit, take this country into their own hands....The situation of the Prince at present is such that I am sure he would readily and thankfully hearken to an overture from us, and without hesitation grant a phirmaund appointing the Company perpetual subas of the province....[3]

Holwell already knew that his term of office was limited, and in those circumstances he could not press views which he knew found little support with his councillors.[4]

[1] *Jami-ut-tawarikh*, *ap*. Elliott and Dowson, VIII, 429.
[2] Hastings to Caillaud, 4 June, 1760.
[3] Holwell to Caillaud, 14 June, 1760.
[4] The correspondence between Holwell and Caillaud will be found in Holwell's *India Tracts* and *Vindication*, and in the Orme MSS, India, XII.

On 27 July arrived the new governor, Henry Vansittart. He was a Madras servant of some fourteen years' standing. He possessed a good knowledge of Persian, and had transacted with success the business between the Madras Council and Nawab Muhammad 'Ali; his tact and dexterity had won him very favourable notice at Madras, and Clive had urged his appointment on the Company in the strongest terms. It proved, however, to be singularly unfortunate. He encountered the sharp jealousy of all the Bengal servants whom he had superseded; and though always well-intentioned, the policy which he adopted proved to be the source of many misfortunes. He was one of that large body of men who can execute the orders of their superiors much better than they can frame a policy of their own. In the present case he adopted the policy suggested to him by Holwell, who by this time had abandoned his original plan in favour of appointing Mir Kasim heir-apparent. It is more likely that Holwell yielded to the material arguments of Mir Kasim than to the reasons which Caillaud and others had produced against the establishment of the Company as subahdar.[1] After prolonged discussions Mir Kasim was invited down to Calcutta. The negotiations with him were confided to Holwell in person; and on 27 September an agreement was reached by which Mir Kasim was to receive the office of deputy subahdar, with a guarantee of succession to the subahdari, while the English were to receive the three districts of Burdwan, Midnapur, and Chittagong for the maintenance of their troops. Mir Kasim also agreed to pay off the outstanding debts of Mir Ja'far to the Company.[2]

He then returned to Murshidabad. Vansittart and Caillaud reached the same place in order to carry the agreement into effect on 14 October. But they then found that Mir Ja'far refused absolutely to place his person and government in the hands of his kinsman. After five days' discussion, Caillaud was ordered to occupy the palace of Motijhil, where the nawab was. In the face of superior force, the latter at last decided to resign his office, on which Mir Kasim was immediately seated on the *masnad*, and the revolution of 1760 was completed. Mir Ja'far went down to reside at Calcutta under an English guard which he demanded, and Mir Kasim grudgingly agreed to allow him 15,000 rupees a month.[3]

Thus the matter ended by pulling down one nawab only to set up another. Nothing was done to reconcile the essentially opposed interests of the nawab and the English. Nor was the agreement with Mir Kasim so full and explicit as to exclude future causes of misunderstanding. In that respect the settlement was most unsatisfactory, and Vansittart merits the severest criticism for having adopted it. It was also followed by the grant of presents which cast a sordid air over

[1] Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, p. 205.
[2] Bengal Select Committee, 11, 15, 16, and 27 September, 1760.
[3] *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, 1, 43, 130, 135, 138 and 140.

the whole business; but except in the case of Holwell, these do not seem to have been stipulated beforehand, as had been the case with the presents that were bestowed after Plassey; nor is it likely that they formed an element in the motives of Vansittart and his followers. There were, as Grant said, "many easier avenues to irregular emolument than the troublesome, hazardous, and...public road of a general revolution".[1]

The unstable nature of the settlement quickly manifested itself in three principal affairs—the question of the shahzada, the question of Ramnarayan, and the question of the internal trade. The shahzada, whose father the emperor 'Alamgir II had been murdered in the previous year, was still in Bihar, while the nawab's troops in that region were mutinous for want of pay. In spite of this, Carnac, who had just arrived as commander of the Company's troops in Bengal, defeated him (15 January, 1761) on the Son, taking Law and most of the other Frenchmen with him, and on 6 February the shahzada, who had assumed the title of Shah 'Alam II, was induced to confer with Carnac at Gaya, and then to accompany him to Patna. Before Mir Kasim had become subahdar, he and the Select Committee had agreed on a project to make peace with and assist the shahzada in marching to Delhi and establishing himself as emperor.[2] The design proves the political imbecility of Vansittart. It mattered nothing to the English who called himself emperor, and it would have been the height of folly to dissipate their unconsolidated power in interfering in the affairs of Upper India. In fact, however, the project came to nothing, because when Mir Kasim had been safely installed, he offered a persistent, though half-concealed, opposition to the design. He was clearly obsessed with the fear that the English would obtain from Shah 'Alam a grant for the provinces on their own account, as Holwell had at first intended and as Rai Durlabh, who had been consulted, had advised.[3] There had, indeed, been from the first a party strongly opposed to Vansittart and therefore to any policy which he advocated; and the substitution of Carnac for Caillaud had strengthened this party. When in April Coote arrived from Madras, and took over the command from Carnac, the change emphasised the opposition, for Coote entertained as his diwan Nandakumar, whom Mir Kasim regarded as pledged to the restoration of Mir Ja'far.[3] When Mir Kasim went up to Patna, more than one misunderstanding arose between him and the military commander; Mir Kasim refused to proclaim Shah 'Alam as emperor till after his departure, and even then was only brought to do so by Coote's threat of doing it himself if Mir Kasim delayed any longer.[4] When the emperor departed in

[1] Grant, *Sketch*, p. 187.

[2] Letter to McGwire and Carnac, *ap*. Bengal Select Committee, 13 February, 1761; letter to Mir Kasim, 2 February, 1761 (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, I, 63).

[3] Vansittart to Mir Kasim, 27 October, 1761 (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, I, 130).

[4] Coote's Journal, Orme MSS, India, VIII.

June, the nawab evidently felt that he had narrowly escaped seeing power transferred over his head to the English by Shah 'Alam. Although there was not a shred of truth in the nawab's suspicions, Vansittart's policy was already beginning to break down under the stress of circumstances and lack of union among the English.

Ramnarayan's case was to demonstrate this even more clearly. In Mir Ja'far's time the English had steadily protected him from the nawab, and his conduct had justified their protection. He had resolutely and at times skilfully resisted the inroads of the shahzada; and the new governor was resolved to continue the protection which Clive had given. Coote's instructions, when he was proceeding to Patna in April, contained a clause directing him to secure Ramnarayan from injustice and at all events to maintain him in his government.[1] However, the tone of the Calcutta government gradually cooled. On 18 June the committee agreed to Ramnarayan's suspension and Vansittart wrote to Mir Kasim that he could do what he liked about the deputy. Coote and Carnac were recalled from Patna. In August Vansittart approved of the appointment of a new deputy, and in September he ordered Ramnarayan to be delivered into the nawab's hands.[2] When as much money as possible had been extracted from him, he was put to death. In this matter Vansittart had acted in plain opposition to the policy of Clive. The latter had desired above everything to strengthen the English position; Vansittart desired to strengthen that of the nawab. The first had therefore made a point of protecting the principal Hindu ministers; the second deliberately desisted from protecting them. He failed to see how far his policy would lead him and how strong a reaction it would provoke.[3]

Having succeeded in getting rid of the emperor and in getting the chief English protégé into his hands, Mir Kasim now proceeded to raise the third question, that of the internal trade of the province. This was a matter which neither Clive nor Vansittart had ever fairly faced. Its history goes back to the days before the battle of Plassey, when the imperial farmans conferred on the English complete liberty of trade exempt from the imperial transit dues. The Company's servants had always interpreted this as authorising them to trade in articles such as salt, betel and tobacco, without paying the tolls imposed on those articles. The nawab had always insisted on their doing nothing of the sort. The Company, having no interest in this matter, had prohibited its servants from following the internal trade, for fear of their provoking troubles with the nawab on that account. The Company's servants felt that they had been kept out of their rights by the strong hand; and when the strong hand was at last on their side

[1] Bengal Select Committee, 21 April, 1761.

[2] Vansittart to Mir Kasim, 18 June and 21 September, 1761 (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, I, 108 and 122).

[3] Cf. Scrafton, *Observations on Mr Vansittart's Narrative*, p. 32.

they resolved to exercise their supposed rights to the full. Clive in 1757 was instructed to procure an express authorisation from Mir Ja'far for their participation in the internal trade free of duties. No such article appears in the treaty; but the parwanas issued by the nawab in execution of the treaty were phrased in such wide terms and included such definite instructions as show that Clive carried out this part of his orders.

Whatever goods the Company's gumastahs may bring or carry to or from their factories, the aurungs or other places, by land or by water, with a dustuck from any of the chiefs of their factories, you shall neither ask nor receive any sum, however trifling for the same. Know they have full power to buy and sell; you are by no means to oppose it....Whoever acts contrary to these orders, the English have full power to punish them.[1]

As the Company's servants had always been thought entitled to enjoy the same privileges as the Company itself, they proceeded to take advantage of their new freedom from control to trade in the articles so long prohibited. Clive on the whole seems to have set his face against this practical extension of English privileges; but it seems clear that under his government it went on, though perhaps not in any great volume, and that at the end of his government Mir Ja'far complained of it. On that occasion, Clive, who was on the eve of his departure, refused to give any decided answer, but the council seems to have decided in favour of the fullest interpretation of English rights; the practice grew; and when Vansittart arrived at Calcutta it was in full swing. In the discussions which preceded Mir Ja'far's removal, the matter never seems to have been mentioned. Indeed, had Mir Kasim proposed its abolition, he would almost certainly have received not a shred of English support. But he was too wise to raise such a thorny matter at a time when the favour of the English meant everything to him. He therefore waited till the emperor had departed, till Ramnarayan had been delivered over to him, and the Hindus could no longer look to the English for countenance and support, and then, in December, 1761, came the first complaints that the nawab's officers were obstructing the trade of the Company and its dependents.[2] In May, 1762, came the first recorded complaint from the other side, Mir Kasim alleging misconduct on the part of the English traders' Indian agents.[3] Vansittart still thought the nawab was making himself uneasy about small matters, and that the whole question could be cleared up by a personal interview; but in fact complaints doubled and redoubled. The officers of the nawab obstructed English trade; the English "did themselves justice"; the nawab claimed the right of himself administering justice. Such different persons as

[1] Dodwell, *op. cit.* pp. 214 *sqq.*
[2] Vansittart to Mir Kasim, 18 and 19 December, and to Mir Sher 'Ali, 19 December, 1761 (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, I, 137).
[3] *Idem*, I, 161.

Scrafton and Hastings both accord in testifying not only that the words of the nawab's parwana quoted above had been steadily acted upon, but also that such privilege was necessary.[1] It had constantly been exercised during the government of Mir Ja'far; it had not been mentioned when Mir Kasim succeeded his father-in-law, any more than had been the question of the internal trade; but now he suddenly discovered that these practices were incompatible with the proper exercise of his powers and complained of them as new and unbearable usurpations. It is, indeed, clear that they were incompatible with Vansittart's policy of strengthening the nawab; but no engagements seem to have been sought or given in 1760; and, indeed, Vansittart had probably not realised what a difficulty they offered.

Out of them sprang the war of 1763 and the restoration of Mir Ja'far as nawab. At the close of 1762 Vansittart visited the nawab at Mongir, where he had established his capital, and made a treaty with him on the subject of the internal trade. In future English merchants were to pay 9 per cent., whereas Indian merchants paid 40 on salt carried up to Patna, but, as against this, disputes were to be heard and determined by the nawab's officers. This agreement was not to have been announced until Vansittart had procured the assent of the council; but Mir Kasim published it at once. It is doubtful whether the council would in any case have accepted it; but the news of the abandonment of the right of "doing themselves justice", received as it was through the nawab's officers, excited a blaze of anger. This was exaggerated by various other news that came in about the same time. One was that Vansittart had been imprudent enough to accept seven lakhs from the nawab, in part as a refund of advances he had made, but in part as a present, and of course everyone declared that the money was the price of abandoning English rights; it is curious that Mir Kasim had instructed his deputy at Dacca to show special favour to Vansittart's agents;[2] perhaps he expected to strengthen his position by setting the English quarrelling; if so, the event must have disappointed him. Ellis, the chief at Patna, had been in constant disputes with the nawab's servants, who had neglected to visit him on his arrival as chief; many of the council were deeply suspicious of Mir Kasim, who had recently entered into relations of an unknown character with the nawab of Oudh. All these things combined to produce a revolt against the authority of Vansittart and the policy with which he was associated. His agreement was rejected; all the absent members of council were called down to Calcutta; and it was resolved that in future the English should trade duty-free except for 2½ per cent. on their salt, and that English agents should be subject to none but English control. When

[1] Scrafton, *op. cit.* p. 34; Hastings to Holwell, 19 February, 1760 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 29096, f. 223 verso).

[2] Mir Kasim to the Naib of Dacca, n.d. (Select Committee Report, 1772, I, (2), App. 34).

the nawab resolved to abolish the duties, the council refused to assent and deputed Amyatt and Hay, two of their members, to insist on large preferential terms for the English trade. These Mir Kasim refused to concede. At the same time affairs at Patna had greatly exasperated feelings on both sides. Ellis, the chief, a man of violent temper, and a bitter enemy of Vansittart, had insisted on the English privileges without any heed to appearances; while Mir Kasim had begun to prepare against those events which evidently drew nearer every day. He closed and stockaded the Patna gate close to the English factory; he assembled troops in Patna; and in June he sent emissaries to seduce the Company's European and sepoy troops stationed there. On 21 June he sent a fresh body of troops from Mongir towards Patna; and on this news Ellis attempted to seize the city; after a temporary success he failed to retain it; his garrison was destroyed; and the war had begun.

Blameworthy as were individuals, it was a war of circumstances rather than intentions. Vansittart had failed to realise that a strong nawab would inevitably desire to reduce the extraordinary privileges which the English claimed, and he had made no allowance for the fact that the English councillors would become uncontrollable if their material interests were attacked. In short he lacked the insight and vigour which his position demanded. The councillors with the exception of Hastings allowed their material interests to colour and distort their policy. Mir Kasim had displayed great political dexterity but little wisdom. But the dominating fact of the situation was that the interests of the English and of the nawab were irreconcilable. There could be no stability in affairs so long as the nawab fancied himself an independent governor and the English claimed privileges wholly inconsistent with that independence.

The war which thus began in 1763 was destined to end this uncertain position. On 10 June Major Adams, an officer of Coote's, took the field at the head of 1100 Europeans and 4000 sepoys against Mir Kasim's army of 15,000 to 20,000 men. Between that date and 5 September he won four considerable victories in the course of his advance upon the nawab's capital of Mongir. Mir Kasim had now lost all confidence in his troops and their leaders. He fled to Patna, where he put to death all the English who had fallen into his hands; and he had already murdered his commander-in-chief, who had been guiltless of any crime but that of failure, and the Seths, who had been guiltless of any crime at all. He was, indeed, displaying that same weak violence which the English councillors had already displayed, though in a less bloody fashion. He then fled into Oudh, where he hoped to find assistance with which to recover the provinces from the English. The nawab of Oudh, Shuja-ud-daula, agreed to assist him, and the emperor Shah 'Alam joined the confederates. But at this point the war came to a pause. On the one side the Oudh troops

were not ready for attack; on the other, the English commander, Adams, retired to Calcutta to die; he was succeeded by Carnac who was hampered, not only by lack of conspicuous military talent in himself, but also by mutiny among his men, by disputes with the council, and by counteraction on the part of the restored nawab, Mir Ja'far, who had been sent back from Calcutta to reign once more at Murshidabad.[1] After a series of very inconclusive events on the borders of Oudh and Bihar, which occupied the first half of 1764, Major Hector Munro, of the 89th, arrived and took command of the army. He spent August and September in restoring the discipline of the army. After executing twenty-five mutineers by blowing them from his guns, and breaking one sepoy battalion with all possible ignominy,[2] he invaded Oudh, and on 22 October, after a stubborn contest, completely defeated the enemy at Baksar. There was no more resistance. Oudh was overrun by Fletcher, who succeeded Munro in the command. Shah 'Alam joined the English camp once more; Shuja-ud-daula fled into the Rohilla country; while Mir Kasim, stripped of his treasure and deserted by his followers, escaped into obscure poverty.

Meanwhile the old nawab had been restored. On 10 July, 1763, was signed a new treaty, by which he agreed to limit the forces he kept up, to receive a permanent resident at the durbar, and to levy no more than 2½ per cent. on the English trade in salt. Advantage was also taken to secure a promise of compensation for all losses, public and private, caused by the war with Mir Kasim. These stipulations regarding private interests were severely criticised by the Company. Nor even were the other provisions found to concede all that was required. The nawab appointed Nandakumar as his chief minister; and in the course of the war the latter was believed to have betrayed the English plans, and in various ways to have obstructed their operations. Accordingly when Mir Ja'far died early in 1765 his son Najm-ud-daula was only recognised on condition of his appointing a minister nominated by the English, and agreeing not to displace him without their approval. The minister held the title of deputy subahdar, and was to have under the nawab the chief management of all affairs.[3] By this agreement the long struggle between the English and the nawab was brought to an end. The nawab survived as a figurehead, in whose name administration was conducted by a nominee of the English, but who of himself could do nothing. Clive, whose appointment as governor of Fort William had already been announced, was very indignant with the council in thus determining an affair of importance before his arrival; but, venal as

[1] Besides the proceedings of the Bengal Select Committee, see also Champion's Journal, *ap.* India Office Home Miscellaneous, no. 198.

[2] Munro's reports, *ap.* Bengal Select Committee, 24 September, 1764.

[3] Bengal Select Committee, 14 and 28 February, and 16 March, 1765.

the council were, in this case their action from the point of view of policy was irreproachable. It would have been very unwise to have left the matter of the succession hanging over until Clive's arrival, and still more so to have invested the new nawab with powers which it afterwards would have been found expedient to diminish. Unfortunately the council marred their conduct by making this settlement the occasion of taking large presents in defiance of the orders of the Company which had already been received.

Clive's victories in Bengal had transformed not only the position of the English in India but also the proceedings of the Company in England. Violent political discussions succeeded to the dull and decorous statements of the course of the trade in the East. Control of the Company and of its policy became a thing worth paying for. Clive on the one side and Laurence Sulivan on the other, entered into a series of campaigns to secure a dominant interest, buying up stock, and subdividing it so as to create if possible a majority of secure votes. The right to Clive's jagir had been the great bone of contention, and the preservation of that valuable property had cost Clive great sums of money. Sulivan, the great friend of Warren Hastings, was a man without an idea in advance of the low level of his time. He almost ruined himself in his struggle with Clive, while his friend Vansittart did so completely; and he then took advantage of his position and following at the East India House to seek to retrieve his position by procuring lucrative posts for his sons and relatives in the East.[1] In 1764 Clive succeeded for the time being in obtaining the control of the Company; and the fact was marked by his acceptance for a second time of the office of governor of Fort William. He went out in order to set right the errors that had evidently been committed by his successors. The revolution of 1760 had been bitterly attacked in England, and so had the war which followed with the new nawab. It was generally felt that unless the Company set its house in order, it would be impossible to prevent the ministry from interfering in Indian affairs, and perhaps abolishing the Company itself.

Clive reached Calcutta in May, 1765, and found two problems awaiting his solution—one political, the future relations of the English with the emperor, the nawab of Oudh, and the nawab of Bengal; and the other administrative, the reform of the swollen profits from illicit or quasi-illicit sources, and the re-establishment of order and subordination, which had disappeared in the revolt of the council against Vansittart. On his arrival the new governor found that Vansittart had promised Oudh to the emperor. It seemed to Clive a foolish step. There was no ground for thinking that Shah 'Alam would be able to maintain himself there without English help, so that the

[1] *Palk MSS*, pp. 91, 126 and 188; Sulivan to Hastings, 6 June, 1781 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 29149, f. 244).

settlement contained within itself all the elements of future complications. Clive therefore sent up Carnac to reopen negotiations until he himself should be able to visit Oudh in person. Carnac soon found himself in communication with the fugitive Shuja-ud-daula, with whom Clive decided to come to terms, restoring to him his old dominions with the exception of Allahabad, on condition of a payment of fifty lakhs of rupees. Allahabad with the surrounding districts was bestowed on the emperor. The settlement has been attacked on both sides—as a breach of faith with the emperor in taking away from him what had been promised, and as bestowing territory on one who would not be able to protect it. As regards the first no formal treaty had as yet been arranged, so that Clive's hands were still free; as regards the second, some sort of provision had to be made for the emperor, and the one which Clive adopted cost the Company nothing, and committed it to nothing. Indeed the grant of Allahabad marks the end of those foolish dreams which had been cherished by almost everyone in Bengal, of restoring the empire to its legitimate holder. Any such attempt would have strained the Company's resources beyond their power. It would have united the princes of India against the English. At the same time the restoration of the nawab of Oudh placed on the frontiers an ally who at the moment was too grateful to attack them, and who afterwards was much too severely threatened by other powers to think of doing so. Clive's settlement was a middle course, which afforded more advantage and threatened fewer dangers than any other that could have been adopted at the time. In Bengal itself Clive decided on a long step forward towards the assumption of ostensible power. He demanded from the emperor as the price of Allahabad and its districts a farman granting the diwanni of Bengal to the Company. That involved the complete control of the finances of the province, and carried to its completion that process of the extrusion of the nawab's power which had been almost secured by the arrangement of February, 1765. The disadvantages of this plan are obvious enough; but they were such as counted for less in those days than they would now. Power was separated from responsibility. But no one at the moment thought of undertaking the administration of large tracts of India, and the fact of bad and corrupt administration appeared one of those natural and inevitable evils which are beyond possibility of reform. As against this the plan offered certain immediate advantages. It secured that control over the nawab which was regarded as the most pressing need of the time; it also promised some protection against the complaints of foreign powers and the demands of the home government. Clive still remembered how the too-ostensible assumption of power contributed to produce the unyielding opposition of the English to the schemes of Dupleix; and farmans of the emperor or parwanas of the nawab, though valueless without the support of English power, could not be fully discounted at Paris or

the Hague without a serious breach of diplomatic etiquette. It was thought too that something short of the assumption of full dominion would be less likely to excite legal difficulties in England or provoke the interference of parliament. In short the grant of the diwanni was designed to secure the full control of Bengal affairs so far as the Company's interests went without incurring the inconvenience of formal and avowed dominion.

The administrative questions that demanded settlement were much more difficult than these political questions. First there were the Company's covenanted servants. They had been demoralised by the conditions under which they had been working and the facility with which wealth could be acquired through the English privileges in the internal trade of Bengal; while a tradition had arisen that each change of nawab should be the occasion of large presents, open or concealed. The accession of Najm-ud-daula had been a particularly bad case, because the succession was normal, and because the precedent of presents from the nawab had been extended to the minister as well. Further, this extension of a bad practice had been made in the face of specific orders from the Company prohibiting the acceptance of presents and requiring its servants to sign covenants agreeing not to accept such in future. Instead of announcing their orders the councillors had quietly left them over for Clive to deal with on his arrival. Indeed they seem to have thought that his previous practice and present influence would have led him to procure the abrogation of the orders before he came out again as governor. But they were mistaken in their man. Clive feared nothing, not even his own past; and he was as fully bent on enforcing the orders of the Company as if he himself had never made a rupee by the revolution of 1757 or were not still in enjoyment of a jagir of £30,000 a year. One of his earliest acts on his arrival at Calcutta was to require the covenants to be signed by civil and military servants alike. That was done, but Champion, and probably many others as well, did so with the idea that this reforming zeal could not last and that their signature was a mere matter of form.[1]

Clive, however, saw as clearly as did Cornwallis twenty years later that if illicit gains were to be abolished, considerable regular advantages had to be provided. On his arrival he found that there was a great lack of senior servants. Since everyone had been held entitled to passes for the internal trade, it had been possible for even junior servants to make fortunes by selling their passes to the Indian merchants of Calcutta. The result was that Clive found the secretary's department in charge of a writer of three years' standing, the accountant was a writer yet younger than the secretary, while the paymaster of the army, with balances of twenty lakhs in his hands

[1] Champion's Journal, 6 August, 1765.

for months together, had also been a writer.[1] Clive resolved therefore to reorganise the internal trade, to place it on a wholly new basis, and to employ the profits so as to secure handsome salaries for the senior servants of the Company; and meanwhile to call up from Madras a small number of covenanted servants to fill the immediate vacancies in council. This last measure produced the sort of uproar that was to be expected. An association was formed; Clive's entertainments were boycotted; memorials were framed. But when the malcontents found that they were promptly deprived of every lucrative office, refused passes, and sent hither and thither very much against their liking, they concluded at last that they had better put up with Clive's tyranny, and the opposition died down. Meanwhile Clive went on with his salt scheme. That had always been a government monopoly, and as such Clive decided to administer it and employ the profits arising out of it in the payment of allowances to the principal civil and military servants. He did so under the form of a trading company, under the close control of the council, and the allowances took the form of shares in the company. This was contrary to the orders of the Company; but Clive considered that those orders had been issued before he had taken over the revenue administration of the provinces, that his new plan could not possibly rouse difficulties with the nawab, and that consequently the main objections of the Company did not apply to his present proposals. In this respect he was guilty of a miscalculation. When the news of what he had done reached England, the Company at once ordered the internal trade to be entirely abandoned; these orders were again suspended, and Clive hoped to procure their reversal on his return to England; but the directors insisted on their views being carried out; and so at last the trading company was wound up. In this matter Clive has been unduly blamed. His proposals amounted in reality to the continuation of the monopoly which had been customary and the assignment of the revenues so raised to the payment of establishment. Although in form his plan seemed to continue the vices of the Vansittart *régime*, in essence it was wholly different and amounted to just that measure of reform for which Cornwallis has received such high praise. The mistake which Clive made was apparently one of tactics. He thought the Company would be less likely to oppose the scheme so long as the payment of the extra allowances did not appear to come out of its own revenues. He forgot that the apparent similarity between his plan and the abuses of the past might lead to its condemnation.

With the military officers Clive had even more trouble than with the civilians. This was natural, because in the latter case he had had only to deal with illicit gains whereas in the former he was required to cut down regular and acknowledged allowances. For some years

[1] Bengal Select Committee to the Company, 24 March, 1766.

the Company had been endeavouring to cut down the batta or field-allowances of the Bengal officers. These allowances were designed to make good the extra cost of living in the field as compared with living in garrison. They originated in the Carnatic, where both Chanda Sahib and Muhammad 'Ali had paid batta to the French and English officers respectively in their service; and difficulties had arisen when Muhammad 'Ali had transferred lands to the English Company in lieu of this batta, and the question of its regulation had arisen between the officers and the Company. Affairs had followed the same course in Bengal, where batta had at first been paid by the nawab and then became a charge upon the Company, who desired to reduce it to the more moderate level paid at Madras. Orders to this effect had reached Bengal when the war with Mir Kasim had been on the point of breaking out; their immediate execution had thus been impossible. But when they were repeated, in 1764, they met with the same fate as those other unpleasant orders prohibiting presents, and obedience was deferred until Clive's arrival. He accordingly prepared regulations on the subject. Officers in cantonments at Mongir or Patna were to draw half batta, as did officers at Trichinopoly; when they took the field they would draw batta while within the limits of Bengal and Bihar, but if they crossed into Oudh they would then become entitled to double batta. For a captain these rates amounted to three, six, and twelve rupees a day. These orders led to a combination among the officers, just as the appointment of covenanted servants from Madras had led to a combination among the civilians. It was agreed that they should simultaneously resign their commissions. In this step they seem to have been encouraged by the commander of one of the brigades, Sir Robert Fletcher, who was not only the friend of Clive's opponents in England, but also thought himself injured by decisions of Clive regarding pecuniary claims which he had put forward.[1] The agitation coincided in time with the trouble with the civilians, and there was talk of a subscription for the benefit of those who should suffer through Clive's conduct. In this matter as in the other Clive overbore all opposition with a bold front. Every resignation was to be accepted; supplies of officers were requested from Madras; everyone displaying the least inclination to mutiny was to be sent down at once to Calcutta. Clive visited the headquarters of the three brigades in person, to assure himself that the men were under control; and the officers gradually fell out among themselves. Those who had already made their fortunes were careless of what might come out of the affair, but those who still had their fortunes to make were more timid, and, when it came to the point, were reluctant to forgo their prospects. In these circumstances the mutiny broke down. Those who were considered the least guilty were allowed to return to duty on condition of signing

[1] Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive*, p. 266.

a three years' agreement, which under the East India Mutiny Act would bring within the penalty of death any who so conducted themselves in future. Of the rest Fletcher and six more were cashiered.

At the same time Clive resolved to apply to the use of the Company's officers a sum of five lakhs which Mir Ja'far was alleged to have desired on his deathbed to be delivered to him. One of the great lacks of the service was some provision for those who were compelled to retire from the service by wounds or ill-health while their circumstances were still embarrassed. Being a legacy the sum was deemed not to come within the Company's prohibition; it was therefore accepted, vested in trustees, and under the name of Lord Clive's Fund did much to bridge over the interval until the Company adopted the practice of pensioning its servants.

Clive quitted India for the last time in February, 1767. It is not necessary to dilate upon the greatness of his character or the results of his work. He had a supreme faculty for seeing into the heart of a situation, undistracted by side-issues, for compelling the obedience of others, and for finding an immediate expedient for the needs of the moment. His principal defect was a certain bluntness of moral feeling which enabled him to perform and defend actions which did not commend themselves even to his own age. But there was nothing small or petty about him. Though he made an enormous fortune, he was not mercenary; though he tricked Omichand, he was trusted implicitly by Indians of every class. His unfaltering will and uncompromising vigour took the fullest advantage of a peculiarly happy concourse of events firmly to establish the Company's power in the wealthiest province of India.

Between him and Warren Hastings come two governors who were hardly more than stop-gaps. Verelst succeeded Clive, and at the end of 1769 Cartier succeeded Verelst. But their combined five years of rule were little more than an introduction to the period of Hastings. The stage was being set for new performers. The Marathas, recovering from their overthrow at Panipat, were beginning once more to interfere in Northern India; the emperor quitted Allahabad, where Clive had settled him, and went off to Delhi under their protection; misunderstandings arose with Shuja-ud-daula, but they did not break the alliance which Clive had established; the English in Bengal began to take a share in the administration which they had so long regarded with suspicion; attempts were made to enter into communication with the Himalayan states and to come to terms with our Maratha neighbours on the south. But in all these ways the time was preparatory only for the time of growth and formation which Hastings was to inaugurate.

CHAPTER X

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE STATE. 1772–86

THE period 1772–86 is the formative epoch of British Indian History. During these years three important questions had to be dealt with: firstly, the relation of the East India Company to the state; secondly, the relation of the home to the Indian administration of the Company; and thirdly, the relation of the supreme government in Bengal to the subordinate presidencies. In this chapter we are concerned with the first of these questions, and it may be pointed out that the fourteen years of our period witnessed all the great statutes which definitely subjected the Company to the control of the crown and parliament, and converted it into a quasi-state department. Between 1786 and 1858 we feel that the constitutional changes are not really fundamental. Even the taking over of the Company's powers by the crown in 1858 was less a revolution than a formal and explicit recognition of facts already existing. Again, this was the period which saw the Company subjected to minute and severe inspection at the hands of parliamentary commissions, the Select and Secret Committees of 1772, and the Select and Secret Committees of 1781. Each occasion was followed by a great statute and an attack upon a great individual. In 1772 we have the attack upon Clive, followed by the Regulating Act of 1773. After 1781 we have Pitt's Act of 1784, followed by the impeachment of Warren Hastings. Lastly, as a result of these inspections a reformation of the civil service was carried through, partly by Hastings himself, and in fuller measure by Lord Cornwallis.

At no time was the question of British dominion in India so closely interwoven with political and party history at home. In Cobbett's *Parliamentary History* a very large space from 1767 to the end of the century is devoted to Indian debates. "The affairs of the East India Company", wrote the editor in 1768, "were now become as much an object of annual consideration, as the raising of the supplies."[1] The Indian question was entangled with a serious constitutional crisis and with the personal rivalry and political ambitions of the two greatest statesmen of the time. It caused the fall of the notorious Coalition Government of Fox and North, gave George III the opportunity to effect a daring *coup d'état*, doomed Fox to almost a lifetime of opposition and put Pitt in power practically for the rest of his life. From 1772 to 1795 Indian affairs were constantly before parliament in both its legislative and its judicial aspect.

[1] *Parliamentary History of England*, XVI, 402.

Now all this was inevitable and, when everything is taken into consideration, not to be regretted. It is easy to paint the interference of parliament as mischievous and misinformed, and to complain that India was made a pawn in the party game; but there was—as some of the most clear-sighted of contemporary statesmen saw—a serious risk of a great empire being created and ruled by Englishmen outside the sphere and control of the British cabinet. "The East India Company", as Burke said, "did not seem to be merely a Company formed for the extension of the British commerce, but in reality a delegation of the whole power and sovereignty of this kingdom sent into the East."[1] No national government could be expected, or indeed ought, to tolerate such a dangerous shifting of the centre of political gravity. Some action on the part of the state was necessary; the question had to be tackled even at the cost of strife, dislocation, and possibly some injustice to individuals. "In delegating great power to the India Company", wrote Burke, "this kingdom has not released its sovereignty. On the contrary, its responsibility is increased by the greatness and sacredness of the power given."[2]

This bringing into relation of the Company and the state was from the nature of the case a very difficult problem. It had to be worked out experimentally, for there were no precedents. We cannot be surprised that many mistakes were made.

> "The British legislature", says Malcolm, "has hitherto but slowly followed the progress of the power of the Company in India. It had legislated for factories on a foreign shore, when that Company was in the possession of provinces; and when the laws were completed to govern these, it had obtained kingdoms."[3]

This was entirely true, but it was inevitable. The rapid developments in the East out-distanced the efforts of parliament to comprehend and to deal with them. According as men visualised the position from the eastern or the western point of view, authority in the East seemed dangerously circumscribed or perilously unhampered. Hastings describes the sphere of his administration as "a dominion held by a delegated and fettered power over a region exceeding the dimensions of the parent state, and removed from it a distance equal in its circuit to two-thirds of the earth's circumference".[4] Its remoteness postulated the necessity of semi-independence, "distant as it is from the reach of more than general instruction from the source of its authority, and liable to daily contingencies, which require both instant decision, and a consistency of system".[5] Burke, on the other hand, from the home aspect, declares, "It is difficult for the most wise and upright government to correct the abuses of remote, delegated

[1] *Speeches...in the trial of Warren Hastings* (Ed. Bond), I, 15.
[2] *Idem*, p. 13.
[3] Malcolm, *The Political History of India*, I, 8.
[4] *Selections from the State Papers of the Governors-General of India. Warren Hastings*. Ed. by (Sir) G. W. Forrest, II, 92.
[5] *Idem*, p. 93.

power, productive of unmeasured wealth, and protected by the boldness and strength of the same ill-got riches";[1] and he puts his finger on the crux of the whole matter, though no doubt he here inculcates a counsel of perfection, when he says, "I think I can trace all the calamities of this country to the single source of our not having had steadily before our eyes a general, comprehensive, well-connected and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true bearings and relations".[2] The question then before the statesmen of the eighteenth century was: How was the Company's quasi-sovereignty in the East to be reconciled with the necessary subordination to the imperial parliament? There were three possibilities. The first was that the Company's privileges and powers should remain untouched, with the hope that some practical *modus vivendi* would in time be worked out. But this was felt by the majority of the nation and even by the more far-sighted of the Company's own servants to be no longer feasible. Both Clive and Warren Hastings suggested tentatively to the prime ministers of their time that it might be advisable for the state to take over the Company's powers. There seemed a danger not only that misgovernment in India might tarnish the name of Great Britain as an imperial state, but that the Indian interest in England, supported by huge revenues and corrupt parliamentary influence, might gain a preponderating and improper power in home affairs.

The second possibility was that the state should take over in full sovereignty the territorial possessions in India and convert the Company's servants into a civil service of the crown. But this was felt to be too great and drastic a change. It was opposed to all eighteenth-century notions of the sacredness of property, and the problem was complicated by all kinds of delicate legal and political questions. It might even be plausibly contended that the Company had no considerable territorial possessions at all. It administered Bengal, Bihar and Orissa merely as the diwan of the Moghul emperor. That was a tenable position for a private corporation; it was not a tenable position for the government of Great Britain. If the "territorial" possessions were annexed by the crown, the act might be represented as sheer usurpation against the Moghul Empire, and Great Britain might be embroiled with the representatives of other European nations in the East.

It remained that the state should take the Company into partnership, assuming the position of controlling and predominant partner in all matters relating to the higher branches of government, but leaving to the Company the monopoly of the trade, the disposal of its valuable patronage under crown sanction, and the details of the administration. What we see going on during the period 1772–86 is

[1] *Works of Edmund Burke*, III, 193–4.
[2] *Idem*, p. 125.

the gradual realisation of this conception. It must be remembered that some attempts in this direction had already been made before 1772. A little band of members of parliament, prominent among whom were Beckford, Barré and General Burgoyne, had long been urging that conquests in India should pass to the crown. Their persistent efforts met with some success in 1767 when five separate acts were passed. These measures amongst other things interfered in the regulations for voting in the General Courts of the Company, regulated the amount of dividends to be paid and the manner of paying them, and, most important, obliged the Company to pay the exchequer an annual sum of £400,000 for two years from February, 1767, for the privilege of retaining their territorial acquisitions (the payment was afterwards extended to 1772). "Thus", says Sir Courtenay Ilbert, "the state claimed its share of the Indian spoil, and asserted its rights to control the sovereignty of Indian territories."[1] These changes were only carried in the teeth of a strong opposition. The protests of the dissentients in the House of Lords showed how strong as yet were the barriers of the rights of property, and the sanctity of contract.

> A legislative interposition controlling the dividend of a trading Company, legally voted and declared by those to whom the power of doing it is entrusted...is altogether without example.[2]

The solution, it may be admitted, was not particularly logical. It was on the face of it absurd that a British chartered company should pay the crown of England an annual sum of money for permission to hold certain lands and revenues of an eastern potentate, and the friends of the Company did not hesitate to describe the payment as mere political blackmail.

But for five years at any rate the attack against the Company was stayed. Then again in 1772 troubles gathered round it, arising from the following circumstances. In March, 1772, a dividend at the rate of 12½ per cent. was declared. In the same month the Company, obviously endeavouring to forestall a drastic reformation from outside, attempted through Sulivan their deputy-chairman to introduce a bill for the better regulation of their affairs. Lord Clive, being assailed, defended himself by taking the offensive and roundly attacked the Company. In the debate some interesting points were raised as to the relations between the Company and the state. Clive had in 1759 proposed to Chatham that the crown should take over the Company's dominions. Chatham, probably because he had no leisure to face the practical and exceedingly thorny difficulties, contented himself with an oracular answer that the scheme was of a very nice nature and, as Clive's agent reported, "spoke this matter a little darkly".[3] Clive

[1] Ilbert, *The Government of India*, p. 39.
[2] *Parliamentary History*, XVI, 356.
[3] Malcolm, *The Life of Clive*, II, 126.

had resented this treatment and now with an imprudence amazing in a man, around whom his enemies were closing, struck out in all directions as though his one aim was not to leave himself a single partisan. With a magnificent recklessness he included the government, the directors, the proprietors and the servants in the East in one comprehensive condemnation:

"I attribute the present situation of our affairs", he said, "to four causes: a relaxation of government in my successors; great neglect on the part of administration; notorious misconduct on the part of the directors; and the violent and outrageous proceedings of General Courts."[1]

The Company had acquired an empire and a revenue of £4,000,000.

It was natural to suppose that such an object would have merited the most serious attention of administration; that in concert with the Court of Directors they would have considered the nature of the Company's charter, and have adopted a plan adequate to such possessions. Did they take it into consideration? No, they did not.... They thought of nothing but the immediate division of the loaves and fishes....They went so far as to influence a parcel of temporary Proprietors to bully the Directors into their terms.

They ought to have forced the directors to produce a plan, or with the aid of Parliament to have made one themselves.

If administration had done their duty, we should not now have heard a speech from the throne, intimating the necessity of Parliamentary interposition, to save our possessions in India from impending ruin.[2]

One of those who took part in the debate, Governor Johnstone, maintained views of some interest. He declared that:

The British legislature should not move in the affairs of Asia, unless she acts with dignity and effect....I am clear we hold those lands by conquest. I think the conquest was lawfully made by the Company and a small part of the King's forces in conjunction. I deny that conquest by a subject, lawfully made, vests the property in the state, though I maintain it conveys the sovereignty.[3]

He went on to advocate that the crown under certain conditions should grant the lands to the East India Company as was done in the case of New England and several other of our chartered colonies. He did not accept the theory that we need consider the susceptibilities of other European nations.

Does any man believe that foreign nations permit us virtually to hold these territories under the magic word Devannee? Can it be supposed they are not equally sensible of the imposition as ourselves, or will it be believed they would not be much better contented to hold their different privileges under the confirmation of a British legislature, than of a cypher of a Nabob, directed by a Governor and Committee whom they can never trace?[4]

In the end leave to introduce Sulivan's bill was refused, and in April, 1772, Burgoyne carried a motion to appoint a select committee

[1] *Parliamentary History*, xvii, 361. [2] *Idem*, pp. 363–4.
[3] *Idem*, pp. 376–7. [4] *Idem*, p. 378.

of thirty-one to enquire into the affairs of the East India Company. The debate testifies to the intensity of feeling against the Company. Burgoyne declared that:

> The most atrocious abuses that ever stained the name of civil government called for redress...if by some means sovereignty and law are not separated from trade... India and Great Britain will be sunk and overwhelmed never to rise again.

Any bill based upon the present state of the Indian Government must be "a poor, paltry, wretched palliative". The committee was to enquire into

> that chaos where every element and principle of government, and charters, and firmauns, and the rights of conquests, and the rights of subjects, and the different functions and interests of merchants, and statesmen, and lawyers, and kings, are huddled together into one promiscuous tumult and confusion.

He ended with an impassioned peroration:

> The fate of a great portion of the globe, the fate of great states in which your own is involved, the distresses of fifteen millions of people, the rights of humanity are involved in this question—Good God! What a call—the native of Hindustan born a slave—his neck bent from the very cradle to the yoke—by birth, by education, by climate, by religion, a patient, submissive, willing subject to eastern despotism, first begins to feel, first shakes his chains,...under the pre-eminence of British tyranny.[1]

It is interesting to note that Burke, who was himself to write some of the most condemnatory reports in the 1781 enquiry, spoke against any investigation at all.

The Select Committee was presided over by General Burgoyne himself, and included among its members Lord George Germain, Barré, Lord Howe, Sir Gilbert Elliot, Pulteney, and Charles James Fox. But the Company's troubles were not yet over. In August, 1772, though it had recently been helped by the bank, it was obliged to apply to government for a loan of £1,000,000. There was a storm of opposition, for this application seemed to show that there was no justification for the dividend declared in March. Parliament was especially summoned. Lord North moved for a committee of secrecy on the ground that complaints had been made of the disclosure of confidential information by the Select Committee. North was careful to state that he himself believed that, however closely pressed the Company might be by present exigencies, it was nevertheless in point of external strength and vigour in full health. Burgoyne rose in defence of the Select Committee, and in the end, though a new secret committee of thirteen was set up, the old Select Committee was continued in being. The Select Committee produced twelve, and the Secret Committee six, reports, all highly condemnatory. Tremendous feeling against the Company was aroused. Horace Walpole records the popular impression: "Such a scene of tyranny and plunder has

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XVII, 454–9.

been opened up as makes one shudder....We are Spaniards in our lust for gold, and Dutch in our delicacy of obtaining it".[1] Responsible statesmen took a view hardly less grave. Lord Shelburne writes to Chatham: "Every man of every party acknowledges a blow to be impending in that part of the world, which must shake to its foundations the revenue, manufactures, and property of this".[2] As the reports continued to appear, Chatham's indignation rose, and we find him writing in 1773, "India teems with iniquities so rank, as to smell to earth and heaven".[3] But mere abuse of the servants in India was of little avail. We have Warren Hastings's authority for the statement that Shelburne was "better informed in India affairs than almost any man in England",[4] and the latter, in a further letter to Chatham, distributed the blame pretty impartially. He declared that though the crimes and frauds of the servants in India were enormous, yet the directors appear to be accomplices throughout, while the proprietors seem to be the most servile instruments of both, "nor", he continues, "has there been found as yet, to speak impartially, anywhere in the House of Commons that firm, even, judicial spirit, capable of administering, much less originating, that justice which the case requires".[5]

The Company now made feverish efforts to conduct its own reformation and, following the precedent of 1769, nominated six supervisors, who, with plenary powers and salaries of £10,000 each, were to proceed at once to India to overhaul the whole system there. But this was more than parliament could stand, and, on the advice of the Committee of Secrecy, a bill was passed in December, 1772, prohibiting the Company from sending out the supervisors. Burke, still as yet the stalwart friend of Leadenhall Street, opposed the bill; Clive, on the other hand, supported it. "I could wish", he said, "the Company had met this house half-way instead of petitioning and quarrelling with the mouth that is to feed them", then, in reference to the supervisors and thinking of his own past history, he added, "had they, Sir, known the East Indies as well as I do, they would shudder at the bare idea of such a perplexing and difficult service".[6] In March the Company again petitioned parliament for a loan of £1,500,000. In May, Burgoyne developed his attack upon Clive in the Commons, and amongst the resolutions accepted by the House was one "That all acquisitions, made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign princes, do of right belong to the State".[7] This was in one sense a definite declaration of sovereignty over the Company's territories, but it might be asked first, what is the exact validity of a resolution of the House of Commons, and

[1] Paget-Toynbee, *Letters of Horace Walpole*, VIII, 149.
[2] *Correspondence of Chatham*, IV, 210.
[3] *Idem*, p. 276.
[4] Gleig, *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, II, 557.
[5] *Correspondence of Chatham*, IV, 271.
[6] Malcolm, *Life of Lord Clive*, III, 313.
[7] *Parliamentary History*, XVII, 856.

secondly, could the claim apply to the anomalous system created in Bengal by the grant of the diwanni? The curious form of the expression used, "under the influence of a military force", instead of some simpler phrase such as "by conquest", was no doubt intended to cover the *de facto* position in Bengal. Burke in various speeches still resisted all attempts to extend state control over the Company. He disbelieved in the motives of the government: "The pretence of rectifying abuses, of nourishing, fostering and protecting the Company was only made with a design of fleecing the Company". The pretext for interfering was the same in 1773 as in 1767, but "Have these evils been rectified? Have any of the criminals been summoned before you? Has their conduct been enquired into? Not one single suspected person has been examined". If these evils really existed, it could only be concluded that ministers

> sanctified this bloodshed, this rapine, this villainy, this extortion...for the valuable consideration of £400,000....This crime tax being agreed to, we heard no more of malpractices. The sinners were arrayed in white-robed innocence; their misdeeds were more than atoned for by an expiatory sacrifice of the pecuniary kind....

And again:

> I have studied, God knows; hard I have studied, even to the making dogs' ears of almost every statute book in the kingdom, and I now thus publicly and solemnly declare that all you have been doing and all you are about to do, in behalf of the East India Company, is impolitic, is unwise, and entirely repugnant to the letter as well as the spirit of the laws, the liberties, and the constitution of this country.[1]

Two acts of parliament were now passed. The first granted the Company a loan of £1,400,000 at 4 per cent. on certain conditions. The second was the important Regulating Act. The latter did three things. It remodelled the constitution of the Company at home, it remodelled the constitution of the Company in India, and it tentatively and incompletely subjected the Company to the supervision of the ministry and the subordinate presidencies to the supervision of the supreme government in Calcutta. The bill was fiercely opposed by the Company and its friends. The Company's own petition declared that the bill "will destroy every privilege which the petitioners hold under the most sacred securities that subjects can depend upon in this country". The act "under the colour of Regulation, will annihilate at once the powers of the...Company, and virtually transfer them to the Crown".[2] The City of London also petitioned against the bill on the ground that "the privileges the City of London enjoy stand on the same security as those of the East India Company".[3] One of the directors in the House of Commons stigmatised the bill as "a medley of inconsistencies, dictated by tyranny, yet bearing throughout each line the mark of ignorance".[4] Burke described the principle of the measure as "an infringement of national right, national faith, and national justice".[5] But the bill was passed by

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XVII, 819—21, 835. [2] *Idem*, pp. 889–90.
[3] *Idem*, p. 889. [4] *Idem*, pp. 890–1. [5] *Idem*, p. 902.

131 to 21 votes in the Commons and by 74 to 17 in the Lords. Its main provisions were as follows: The qualification for a vote in the Court of Proprietors was raised from £500 to £1000 and was restricted to those who had held their stock for at least twelve months. Measures were taken to prevent the collusive transfer of stock, and the consequent multiplying of votes. The directors were henceforth to be elected for four years, and one-fourth of their number must retire every year, remaining at least one year out of office. There was to be a Governor-General of Bengal assisted by four councillors. The vote of the majority was to bind the whole, the governor-general having merely a casting vote when there was an equal division of opinion. The governor-general and council were to have power to superintend the subordinate presidencies in making war or peace. The directors were to lay before the treasury all correspondence from India dealing with the revenues; and before a secretary of state everything dealing with civil or military administration. The first governor-general and councillors, Warren Hastings, Clavering, Monson, Barwell and Philip Francis, were named in the act. They were to hold office for five years, and future appointments were to be made by the Company. The act empowered the crown to establish by charter a Supreme Court of Justice, consisting of a chief justice and three puisne judges. Liberal salaries were granted, £25,000 to the governor-general, £10,000 to each councillor and £8000 to the chief justice.

Something by way of detailed criticism may now be attempted on these clauses. The alteration in the voting qualification of the General Court was introduced with a view to prevent the Company's servants, when they returned from the East, from gaining an excessive influence over the directors. The raising of the qualification meant that 1246 of the smaller holders of stock were disqualified. It was generally held that the clause failed to attain its object.

> "The whole of the regulations concerning the Court of Proprietors", said the authors of the Ninth Report of the Select Committee of 1781, "relied upon two principles, which have often proved fallacious, namely that small numbers were a security against faction and disorder, and that integrity of conduct would follow the greater property."[1]

There was certainly a good deal of point in the argument of those who held that, by abolishing the vote of the £500 stock-holders, the act punished the small proprietors, who could not split votes, and rewarded those who could.

The change in the constitution of the court of directors was made with the view of giving the members of the court greater security of tenure, lessening the temptation to secure votes by a corrupt dispensation of patronage, and encouraging a more continuous and

[1] *Reports from Committees of the House of Commons*, VI, 46.

consistent policy at home and abroad. Hitherto the twenty-four directors were elected each year, and might have been completely changed at each election. As Clive once averred, they spent the first half of their year of office in discharging the obligations by which they had purchased their seats, and the other half in canvassing and preparing for a new election. At the first election after the bill passed, six directors were to be chosen for one year, six for two years, six for three years and six for the full term of four years. In practice the six who retired each year were always re-elected for the following year and the effect therefore was as Kaye notes, "to constitute a body of thirty directors, of whom six, forming a sort of non-effective list, go out every year by rotation".[1] It was of course possible for the proprietors at each election to have chosen six new members, but in practice they never did so.

It was unfortunate that the governor-general was not given in the last resort power to override his council. After 1786 this was found to be necessary, and it has ever since remained a prerogative of the governor-general. Hastings always felt deeply the restrictions on his power and more than once declared that experience would prove the governor-general must have this privilege in reserve. After five years' experience of the working of the act, he writes in 1779:

> I would not continue the pageant that I am...for all the rewards and honours that the king could give me. I am not Governor. All the means I possess are those of preventing the rule from falling into worse hands than my own.[2]

And again:

> What I have done has been by fits and intervals of power, if I may so express it, and from the effects, let a judgement be formed of what this state and its resources are capable of producing in hands more able and better supported.[3]

It was not perhaps the fault of the framers of the act, for the matter was very difficult to define, but the clause giving Calcutta control over the subordinate presidencies worked badly. Calcutta was given powers of superintending and controlling the subordinate governments so far that the latter were not to commence hostilities or make treaties without its consent, but then followed two exceptions of disastrous latitude; namely, unless the case were one of such imminent necessity as would make it dangerous to await the arrival of orders, or unless the local government had received orders direct from home. But the main reason probably was that the other presidencies had been so long independent that it would take some time before a tradition of loyalty to the supreme government could grow up. Hastings records his disappointment at the result of the act in this respect.

[1] Kaye, *The Administration of the East India Company*, p. 123.
[2] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 274. [3] *Idem*, p. 309.

The act gives us a mere negative power and no more. It says the other presidencies shall not make war nor treaties without the sanction of this government, but carefully guards against every expression which can imply a power to dictate what the other presidencies shall do.... Instead of uniting all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of this act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass".[1]

The clause empowering the crown to establish a Supreme Court of Justice by charter was unhappily vague. It left undefined the field of jurisdiction, the law to be administered and, above all, the relations between the council and the court.

It is interesting to note, in view of what happened afterwards, that when the names of the governor-general and councillors were inserted in the act, Lord North recommended the name of Hastings "as a person to whom nobody would object".[2] For the post of councillor General Monckton's claims were advocated against Clavering's, but the other names were accepted without any opposition. The dissentient Lords recorded a protest against the appointment of executive officers in parliament as plainly unconstitutional.

The Regulating Act was in operation for eleven years till it was superseded by Pitt's act of 1784. Warren Hastings was the only governor-general who had to administer India under it. After 1784 we have, as Sir Alfred Lyall has pointed out, a series of parliamentary governors-general with wider powers and a more independent position. The act was probably on the whole an honest attempt to deal with a difficult problem, but it was open to many criticisms. A speaker in the Commons in 1781 said of it not unfairly, "In the mode of applying a reform, Parliament was precipitate and individuals were intemperate".[3]

Certain remedial and supplementary legislation followed on the Regulating Act. It will be remembered that the governor-general and council were appointed for five years. Their period of office would therefore normally lapse in 1779. It also happened that by the act of 1744 the Company's privileges were to determine in 1780 unless definitely extended. The position was a curious one; there was a possibility of the government in India and the existence of the Company at home coming to an end almost simultaneously. North, to call attention to the legal position, moved in 1780 that the state debts to the Company should be paid off (they amounted to £4,200,000) and that formal notice should be given to the Company of its dissolution. The motion was made the excuse for an acrimonious attack from the opposition. Fox asked "whether the Noble Lord was not content with having lost America? Or was he determined not to quit the situation in which he stood, till he had reduced the dominions of the Crown to the confines of Great Britain"?[4] Burke, with characteristic violence, stigmatised the proposal to give notice to the

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 41–2.
[2] *Parliamentary History*, XVII, 896.
[3] *Idem*, XXI, 1194.
[4] *Idem*, p. 310.

Company as "the most wicked, absurd, abandoned, profligate, mad, and drunken intention that ever was formed".[1] North replied coolly that his motion was meant merely "as putting in a claim on the behalf of the public, to the reversion of a right which undoubtedly belonged to them, at that moment when it was especially proper that it should be formally made".[2] By acts of 1779 and 1780 the Company's privileges were extended for a year and it was enacted that no changes were to take place in the offices of governor-general and council at Calcutta. As North had now for some time shown himself hostile to Hastings, the reason for this reappointment is undoubtedly that given by Gleig: "the Minister who had lost America, did not care to risk the loss of India likewise, and therefore sought to represent matters as great and prosperous there".[3] A more permanent act was passed in 1781. This act, besides other less important regulations, extended the Company's privileges to three years' notice after 1 March, 1791, and obliged it to submit to a secretary of state all dispatches proposed to be sent to India relating to political, revenue and military matters. The Company was also to pay £400,000 to the state in discharge of all claims up to 1 March, 1781, to pay dividends out of its profits of 8 per cent., and out of the remainder of its profits, if any, three-quarters were to go to the state.

The year 1781 saw also the appointment of two more committees of enquiry, one select, on the administration of justice in India, presided over by Burke, and the other secret, on the causes of the war in the Carnatic, presided over by Dundas. The first committee resulted in the act of 1781 amending the constitution of the Supreme Court, which will be dealt with later. Both committees poured forth voluminous reports. Twelve were issued by the Select and six by the Secret Committee. The ninth and eleventh reports of the Select Committee were written by Burke himself. The friends of the Company naturally did not like them. Lord Thurlow in the House of Lords said contemptuously that he paid as much attention to them as he would do to the history of Robinson Crusoe. Johnstone in the Commons on a motion for the printing of one of the reports declared that he did not object to the publication of what was "frivolous, ridiculous, and absurd, and fit only to be presented on such a day as this" (it happened to be 1st April). He accused the majority of the committee of "heat and violence,...passion and prejudice".[4] Burke angrily defended the committees; "their conduct", he said, "had been an instance of the most extraordinary perseverance, and the most steady and patient assiduity, that perhaps ever had occurred".[5] Though the reports undoubtedly display a certain amount of prejudice, yet they have often been unduly neglected by the historian, and their value as a storehouse of facts and documents is considerable. At any

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XXI, 313. [2] *Idem*, p. 312. [3] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 469.
[4] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 715–16. [5] *Idem*, p. 717.

rate their effect at the time upon parliament and the nation was very great. In April, 1782, Dundas moved that the reports of the Secret Committee should be referred to a committee of the whole house and followed this up by a long series of forty-five resolutions condemning many of the principles and practices of the Indian administration as censured in the reports. But the attempt of the Commons at disciplinary action proved a dismal failure. Bills of pains and penalties were introduced against Sir Thomas Rumbold and Whitehill, ex-governors of Madras, but these bills after long discussion were finally dropped in 1783 because it proved impossible to keep a quorum in the House to discuss them. Mill says most unfairly that Rumbold "consented to accept of impunity without acquittal".[1] Rumbold, on the contrary, had repeatedly urged that it was unfair to him not to come to a definite verdict, and as late as June, 1783, implored the House in God's name to "put an end to the business speedily, and either send him to condemnation or acquittal".[2] But a stroke was now aimed at greater game. On 30 May, 1782, the Commons resolved that it was the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means, i.e. by representation to the crown, to recall Hastings and Hornby, governor of Bombay, for "having, in sundry instances, acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India, and enormous expenses on the East India Company".[3] According to the Regulating Act, Hastings was only removable by the crown on representation from the court of directors. The Commons therefore could only constitutionally adopt the roundabout course of calling upon the directors to approach the crown. An extraordinary concatenation of events followed, illustrating the cumbrousness of the state's semi-control of the Company. In reply to the House of Commons the General Court on 19 June, 1782, passed a resolution of contemptuous defiance against the recall of Mr Hastings merely in compliance with a vote of one house of the legislature. The directors, however, who naturally in their position of greater responsibility did not find it so easy to flout the government, decided on 2 October reluctantly by a small majority after holding eleven meetings that they would approach the crown for his recall. Scott told Hastings that the governor and deputy-governor carried the vote against him, "the two chairs are against you",[4] and declares that the Company's solicitor had shown him the draft of a resolution by which the directors hoped to soften the blow as much as possible. The resolution, after acknowledging Hastings's many very great and meritorious services, declared

that in no one act of his government hath he been actuated by a corrupt motive, nor is he suspected of peculation; but it is resolved by this court that Warren

[1] Mill, *The History of British India*, IV, 532.
[2] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 985.
[3] *Idem*, p. 75. [4] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 485.

Hastings Esq. hath formed wrong opinions upon points of great political importance, and that he hath acted upon those opinions so as to bring great distress upon this Company.[1]

But the letter of recall was never sent, for the General Court by a large majority rescinded the resolution of the directors. The government upon this refused to pass for transmission to India the dispatch drawn up by the directors informing Hastings of this series of occurrences, though of course everyone was aware that unofficially he would be cognisant of the whole of them. This strange imbroglio showed three things: first that the hold of Hastings on the allegiance of the proprietors, whom indeed he was wont to call his constituents, was very strong; secondly, that the Company still possessed a large measure of practical independence; and thirdly, that the clause in the act of 1781 making it necessary to submit outward dispatches to the secretary of state was liable to result in a rather ludicrous deadlock.

Things could obviously not be left in this inconclusive and unsatisfactory state. The Regulating Act had clearly broken down. It had neither given the state a definite control over the Company, nor the directors a definite control over their servants, nor the governor-general a definite control over his council, nor the Calcutta Presidency a definite control over Madras and Bombay. The whole question was reopened in 1783, for the Company in March was again obliged to petition for financial relief, and the country as a whole was inclined to agree with Burke that "the relief and reformation of the Company must go together. The Company had flown in the face of Parliament".[2]

Three successive proposals were put forward, those namely of Dundas, Fox and Pitt. Dundas introduced his bill in April, 1783. Its main provisions were: That the crown should have power to recall the principal servants of the Company (the power was thus no longer to be consequent on representations from the directors); that the control of Bengal over the other presidencies should be increased; that the governor-general should have the power of acting on his own responsibility in opposition to the opinions of his council, and also be empowered, if necessary, to hold the office of commander-in-chief; that the displaced zamindars in Bengal, i.e. those displaced by the results of the quinquennial settlement, should be restored. The bill was obviously aiming everywhere at centralisation. It strengthened the power of the crown over the governor-general and the control of the governor-general both over his own council and the subordinate governments. It is from this aspect that Malcolm called it a

Bill for appointing a person who, under the high title of Governor-General and Captain-General, should exercise in his own person (under certain checks) complete authority and control over British India.[3]

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 493. [2] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 647.
[3] Malcolm, *Political History of India*, I, 37.

In his introductory speech Dundas already pointed to the desirability of appointing Cornwallis governor-general by a strong panegyric on his character:

that man, of whom all men and all parties were lavish in commendation. A man of family, of fortune, and the most unsullied reputation....On the virtues of this man the late ministry built, and justly built, all their hopes of the salvation of our dying interests in Asia. Here there was no broken fortune to be mended, here was no avarice to be gratified. Here was no beggarly mushroom kindred to be provided for—no crew of hungry followers gaping to be gorged.[1]

But as Dundas was now in opposition there was no chance of his bill becoming law, and after its introduction it was allowed to drop.

On 18 November, 1783, Fox introduced his two famous bills. The first dealt in detail with matters of administration and may not unfairly be said to have definitely forbidden in future most of the characteristic acts of the Hastings administration. The second and better known bill gave the Company a new constitution. In the preliminary debates Pitt himself had clamoured for a bill "not of temporary palliation or timorous expedients; but vigorous and effectual, suited to the magnitude, the importance and the alarming exigency of the case". The bill was in some respects vigorous and effectual enough. It proposed entirely to sweep away both the court of directors and the court of proprietors and to set up two bodies: (1) seven commissioners, or directors, to administer the revenues and territories of India and to appoint or dismiss all persons in the Company's service. They were to be named in the act and were irremovable except on an address from either house of parliament. Vacancies were to be filled by the crown. Fox's reason for this last provision was

that he felt already the inconvenience of Parliamentary appointments; for at present the Governor-General of Bengal, deriving under an Act of Parliament, seemed to disavow any power in the Court of Proprietors, Directors, or the King himself to remove him.[2]

The board was to sit in London and parliament was to have opportunity to inspect the minutes of its proceedings. This was no doubt to meet the criticism that the commissioners were given too independent a power. (2) Nine assistant directors (eight in the original draft) were to be nominated in the act from the proprietors with the largest holdings in the Company. They were to be appointed for five years, and vacancies were filled by the court of proprietors.

The debates on the bills took up a very large measure of parliamentary time and are of great interest. The bills were bitterly opposed by the Company and all the Indian interest. Fox, with his usual lack of political astuteness, had failed to make any terms with the Company, or to take it into his confidence. He avowedly based the necessity for the measure upon the Company's "extreme distress and

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 759. [2] *Idem*, p. 1201.

the embarrassed state of their affairs", his bill "was the only possible means of averting and preventing the final and complete destruction of the Company's interests".[1] It was patent to all the world, as Malcolm says, that Fox's seven commissioners were "to act like trustees to a bankrupt house of commerce",[2] and it was this charge of insolvency that the Company and its friends particularly resented. It was indeed clear that Fox, who never really understood finance, had largely failed to grasp the pecuniary position of the Company, which, as one of its supporters in parliament declared, "so far from being bankrupt, had but a very trifling mortgage on a very fine estate".[3] In contrasting his bill with that of Dundas, Fox declared the latter "aimed at lodging an absolute and despotic power of government in India. This provided a controllable government; but it was a powerful government, and it was at home".[4] He admitted that his bill "was a child not of choice, but of necessity".[5] He was willing at present to leave the question of the right to territorial possessions undecided. The measure was to set up "a mixed system of government, adapted...to the mixed complexion of our interests in India".[6] He met the charge of giving patronage to the crown, or rather to ministers, by the pertinent question, "What great officer had been appointed, but by the advice and influence of Ministers? And ought they to have been otherwise?"[7] But he did nothing to smooth the passage of the bill by his fierce onslaught on the existing government of India, which he described as "a system of despotism unmatched in all the histories of the world".[8] Nor could he refrain from fierce invective against the governor-general,

> a man who, by disobeying the orders of his employers, had made himself so great as to be now able to mix in every question of State, and make every measure of government a personal point in which he had a share.[9]

Both the virulence and the honesty—however mistaken—of his detestation of Hastings shine out clearly in his final speech on the bill.

> The Indian people, he cried, "in spite of every exertion both of the legislature and Court of Directors, groan under the scourge, the extortion, and the massacre, of a cruel and desperate man, whom in my conscience and from my heart I detest and execrate".[10]

Burke delivered one of the greatest of all his speeches in support of the bill. Wraxall, who was no particular friend of his, declared that it was the finest speech delivered in the House of Commons while he was a member of it.[11] Indeed, though the orator's language was

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 1188. [2] Malcolm, *Political History of India*, I, 40.
[3] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 1212.
[4] *Idem*, p. 1276. [5] *Idem*, p. 1262. [6] *Idem*, p. 1200.
[7] *Idem*, p. 1277. [8] *Idem*, p. 1407. [9] *Idem*, pp. 1274–5.
[10] *Idem*, XXIV, 221. [11] Wraxall, *Historical memoirs*, IV, 567–8.

surcharged with passion and emotion, there is no doubt that he struck some shrewd blows at the defects of the Company's administration and testified his own sincere if unbalanced devotion to what he conceived to be the wrongs of the Indian peoples. He spoke of himself with a certain proud humility as

> a member of Parliament, who has supplied a mediocrity of talents by the extreme of diligence, and who has thought himself obliged, by the research of years, to wind himself into the inmost recesses and labyrinths of the India detail.[1]

And again:

> Our Indian government is in its best state a grievance. It is necessary that the correctives should be uncommonly vigorous; and the work of men sanguine, warm, and even impassioned in the cause.[2]

As long as he remains on the abstract plane of political philosophy, his treatment of his subject is lofty and unimpeachable:

> If we are not able to contrive some method of governing India well, which will not of necessity become the means of governing Great Britain ill, a ground is laid for their eternal separation; but none for sacrificing the people of that country to our constitution....I am certain that every means, effectual to preserve India from oppression, is a guard to preserve the British constitution from its worst corruption.[3]

He would have none of the doctrine that it was impossible to act owing to the chartered rights of the Company. Monopolistic rights, granted by a legislature, are something very different from natural rights. The Company's rights were indeed "stamped by the faith of the King...stamped by the faith of Parliament", but if abuse was proved, they must be recalled:

> All political power which is set over men, and all privilege, claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit...such rights, or privileges...are all, in the strictest sense, a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable; and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful existence....[4]

But his indignation too often hurried him into invective. The Company's government was "one of the most corrupt and destructive tyrannies, that probably ever existed in the world".[5]

> There is not a single prince, state, or potentate, great or small, in India, with whom they have come into contact, whom they have not sold;...there is not a single treaty they have ever made, which they have not broken;...there is not a single prince, or state, who ever put any trust in the Company, who is not utterly ruined.[6]

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 1313. [2] *Idem*, pp. 1334–5.
[3] *Idem*, p. 1314. [4] *Idem*, pp. 1316–17. [5] *Idem*, p. 1376.
[6] *Idem*, p. 1322.

The speech contains the famous passage on the Company's servants, how

animated with all the avarice of age, and all the impetuosity of youth, they roll in one after another; wave after wave; and there is nothing before the eyes of the natives but an endless, hopeless, prospect of new flights of birds of prey and passage, with appetites continually renewing for a food that is continually wasting....Their prey is lodged in England; and the cries of India are given to seas and winds, to be blown about in every breaking-up of the monsoon, over a remote and unhearing ocean.[1]

It is the fashion to discount such a passage as mere rhetoric and prejudice, but it is after all its universality and its total want of relief that makes it misleading. To prove the large residuum of truth behind the burning words, we need only cite the evidence of Warren Hastings himself. In the first year of his governor-generalship he wrote:

Will you believe that the boys of the service are the sovereigns of the country, under the unmeaning title of supervisors, collectors of the revenue, administrators of justice, and rulers, heavy rulers of the people?[2]

and eight years later, after all his attempted reforms, he speaks in a moment of unwonted candour of the sphere of his administration as:

a system charged with expensive establishments, and precluded by the multitude of dependents and the curse of patronage, from reformation; a government debilitated by the various habits of inveterate licentiousness. A country oppressed by private rapacity, and deprived of its vital resources by the enormous quantities of current specie annually exported in the remittance of private fortunes....[3]

Are these admissions of the administrator at all at variance with the terrible invective of the orator?

It is, however, clear that what really ruined the bill was the tremendous unpopularity of the Fox and North coalition. Most of the speakers hardly made any attempt to discuss it on its merits at all, but were never tired of reflecting obliquely on the recent amalgamation of the two statesmen. One member suggested that Hastings and Francis should be associated in the government of India, "and thus make a new coalition".[4] Fox at last was stung into a protest:

The coalition is...a fruitful topic; and the power of traducing it, which the weakest and meanest creatures in the country enjoy and exercise, is of course equally vested in men of rank and parts, though every man of parts and rank would not be apt to participate in the privilege.[5]

Generally speaking, the language of Fox's opponents seems to modern ears grotesque and insincere. Grenville, for instance, said that the aim of the bill was "no less than to erect a despotic system which might crush the free constitution of England".[6] Pitt's attack was the most effective, though he, too, when he described the bill as "one of the boldest, most unprecedented, most desperate and alarming attempts at the exercise of tyranny, that ever disgraced the annals of

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 1333-4. [2] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 234. [3] *Idem*, II, 329.
[4] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 1308. [5] *Idem*, p. 1422. [6] *Idem*, p. 1225.

this or any other country",[1] was yielding to the unreal histrionic atmosphere of the debate. Apart from this, he dwelt mainly on the danger of conferring the patronage of India on the nominees of a party, and the want of co-operation between the seven commissioners and the cabinet. The former were

> a small *junto*, politically connected, established in a manner independent of the crown, by whom India was to be converted into one vast political engine, an engine that might be brought to bear against the independence of this house.[2]

Jenkinson put the same point more temperately when he objected to the bill as "setting up within the realm a species of executive government, independent of the check or control of the Crown".[3] There was undoubtedly some truth in this, and seven commissioners did not appear to be properly subordinated to the imperial government; but it must be remembered, first, that there was no easy solution of the problem, and if Pitt afterwards succeeded in solving it, he was able to profit by Fox's errors and experiments.

The government found it difficult to meet the charge that they were destroying the East India Company. Burke declared that their aim was to cure not to kill. In sly allusion to this metaphor, Wilberforce compared the seven directors and eight assistant directors to seven physicians and eight apothecaries come to put the patient to death *secundum artem*.[4]

The commissioners nominated were Lord Fitzwilliam, F. Montague, Sir Henry Fletcher, R. Gregory, Colonel North, Viscount Lewisham and Sir Gilbert Elliot. Professor Holland Rose declares that all these were partisans of Fox or North. "If Fox and North", he says, "had chosen the seven commissioners fairly from among all three parties, the mouths of gainsayers would have been stopped."[5] This seems inherently reasonable and probable, but it would not appear from the parliamentary debates that this particular point was made by any one of the opponents of the bill. In his final speech Fox answered his critics and ended by declaring:

> I risk my all upon the excellence of this Bill; I risk upon it whatever is most dear to me, whatever men most value, the character of integrity, of talents, of honour, of present reputation and future fame; these, and whatever else is precious to me, I stake upon the constitutional safety, the enlarged policy, the equity and the wisdom of this measure.[6]

The words proved true in a sense perhaps other than he had intended. He had indeed risked—and lost—almost the whole of his future career upon his ill-fated measure.

The bill was passed in the Commons by 208 to 108, but was defeated in the Lords by nineteen votes through the daring intervention of George III, who was determined to stick at nothing in his

[1] *Idem*, p. 1279. [2] *Idem*, XXIV, 411. [3] *Idem*, XXIII, 1238.
[4] *Idem*, p. 1247.
[5] G. Holland Rose, *Life of William Pitt*, Part I, p. 146.
[6] *Parliamentary History*, XXIII, 1433.

efforts to free himself from the hated control of the Coalition. He had consulted Lord Temple and commissioned him to show to the peers a letter in which he stated that he would regard anyone who voted for the bill as "not only not his friend, but his enemy". The ministry was dismissed on 18 December.

Pitt came into office and brought in his India bill, January, 1784. It was treated contemptuously by the opposition, who still had a large majority in the Commons. But Fox made his terrible tactical mistake of opposing a dissolution; his only chance was to appeal to the country as soon as possible in the hope that popular disapproval of the king's unconstitutional action might counteract the unpopularity of the Coalition. Instead of this he resisted every suggestion of such a course, and so enabled Pitt to display to the world his wonderful skill and adroitness in holding his enemies at bay. At the right moment Pitt dissolved parliament, came back with a triumphant majority, re-introduced his bill with some slight modifications and passed it in August, 1784. The act established six "Commissioners for the Affairs of India" popularly known as the Board of Control. They were to consist of the chancellor of the exchequer, a secretary of state and four privy councillors appointed by the king and holding office during pleasure. They were unpaid, for Pitt hoped that "there could be found persons enough who held offices of large emolument, but no great employment, whose leisure would amply allow of their undertaking the duty in question".[1] The secretary of state was to preside; failing him the chancellor of the exchequer, and failing him the senior of the four privy councillors. Urgent or secret orders of the commissioners might be transmitted to India through a secret committee of directors, and the court of proprietors was deprived of any right to annul or suspend any resolution of the directors approved by the board. The government of India was placed in the hands of a governor-general and council of three, and the subordinate presidencies were made definitely subject to Bengal in all questions of war, revenue and diplomacy. Only covenanted servants were in future to be appointed members of council. The experiment of appointing outsiders had been too calamitous.

It is interesting to note how largely Pitt had profited both by the experience under the Regulating Act and by the criticism directed against Fox's India bills. In his introductory speech he compares his own bill with that of his rival, as

> affording as vigorous a system of control, with less possibility of influence,—securing the possessions of the East to the public, without confiscating the property of the Company; and beneficially changing the nature of this defective government without entrenching on the chartered rights of men.[2]

The Board of Control obviously represented Fox's seven commissioners, but there is a fundamental difference. They do not stand

[1] *Parliamentary History*, XXIV, 1093.

[2] *Idem*, pp. 319–20.

apart as an independent executive body, they are linked up with the government of the day, for the two most important members at least change with each ministry. Further, they had no patronage, and did not appoint or dismiss the Company's servants in India. In other respects, though their power was veiled, it was nearly as extensive as that of Fox's commissioners, for they had access to all the Company's papers and their approval was required for all dispatches relating to other than commercial business. In case of emergency they could send their own drafts to the secret committee of the directors, to be signed and sent out in the name of the Company. This secret committee was a curious device by which the court of directors kept a show of independence, though liable to the complete control of the board. According to the act, it was to consist of not more than three directors. In practice, it nearly always consisted of two, the chairman and the deputy chairman of the court. Clearly the ultimate direction had passed to the cabinet, and when Pitt was pressed to the point, he frankly and openly acknowledged it, the public control of India "could not, with safety or propriety, be placed in any other hands than those of the genuine and legitimate executive power of the constitution".[1] The directors were mainly satisfied, because they were left with the patronage and the right of dismissing their servants. They had recognised that something would have to be sacrificed, and they might well be satisfied with what they had been allowed to retain. For, though Fox declared that "if ever a charter was completely and totally annulled, it was the charter of the East India Company by the present bill",[2] and that "it worked upon the Company's rights by slow and gradual sap",[3] yet, besides the patronage, the directors were left with considerable powers of revision and initiation. As Mill says:

> The power is considerable which appears to remain in the hands of the directors ...whenever there is not a strong motive to interfere with business of detail, there is always a strong motive to let it alone. There yet has never been any great motive to the Board of control to interfere....Of the power which the directors retain, much is inseparable from the management of detail.[4]

In any case Pitt had taken the wise precaution of neutralising, as far as possible, opposition from the Company.

> "In proposing", he said, "a new system of government and regulation, he did not disdain to consult with those, who, having the greatest stake in the matter to be new-modelled, were likely to be the best capable of giving him advice. He acknowledged the enormous transgressions of acting with their consent, rather than by violence;....He had not dared to digest a bill without consultation."[5]

In January he had a conference with representatives from Leadenhall Street. The act in the end was based on resolutions which were drawn

[1] *Idem*, p. 322. [2] *Idem*, p. 1124. [3] *Idem*, pp. 1127–8.
[4] Mill, *Histor of India*, IV, 396. [5] *Parliamentary History*, XXIV, 318–19.

up and accepted by a General Court. Pitt was therefore able to claim that the bill came forward "fortified and recommended by the consent of the Company".[1]

The act was drafted with great skill. Burke admitted that it was "as able and skilful a performance for its own purposes, as ever issued from the wit of man".[2] Pitt, as Sir Courtney Ilbert has pointed out, had done two things; he had avoided the charge of conferring patronage on the crown, and also the appearance of radically altering the constitution of the Company. He himself declared "that to give the Crown the power of guiding the politics of India with as little means of corrupt influence as possible, is the true plan for India, and is the true spirit of this Bill".[3] He had linked up the East India Company and the imperial government. "Sir", he said in the House, "I do wish the persons who shall rule India to maintain always a good understanding with administration". Fox had compared the powers of the Board of Control to those of a new secretary of state, and had lamented that such an office should be created. "I accept of his comparison", said Pitt, "and I say that the power of government over India ought to be in the nature of that of a Secretary of State". Fox's bill, he averred, only ensured a permanency of men, his own act meant a permanency of system.[4]

The most questionable and ineffective clauses in the act were those requiring the Company's servants to declare on oath the amount of property they had brought back from India, and establishing a special court, consisting of three judges, four peers and six members of the House of Commons for trial of offences committed in India. The greatest opposition was raised to this clause. "The tribunal", said Fox, "might fairly be called a bed of justice, for justice would sleep upon it."[5] It was attacked as inquisitorial and as violating the Englishman's right of trial by jury.

On the whole we may admit that it was a great bill. It did in spite of all defects answer the main questions as propounded by Erskine in the House of Commons in 1783: "Was it fit that private subjects should rule over the territories of the state without being under its controlling powers"?[6] Pitt never pretended that his solution was a perfect one.

> "Any plan", he said, "which he or any man could suggest for the government of territories so extensive and so remote, must be inadequate; nature and fate had ordained in unalterable degrees, that governments to be maintained at such a distance, must be inadequate to their end."[7]

Scott, Hastings's agent in London, believed that the passing of the bill heralded a change for the better in his patron's fortunes. He tells Hastings that Dundas has now become his friend, that Lord Thurlow

[1] *Parliamentary History*, xxiv, 412. [2] *Idem*, xxv, 206. [3] *Idem*, xxiv, 408.
[4] *Idem*, pp. 409–10. [5] *Idem*, p. 1135. [6] *Idem*, xxiii, 1293.
[7] *Idem*, xxiv, 321.

is anxious to make him an English peer by the title of Lord Daylesford, that Burke and Francis are entirely discredited. He only regrets that the lack of opposition in the Lords prevented Lord Thurlow from "giving Mr Francis a precious trimming".[1] A little later he writes that, though Pitt has pronounced Hastings to be a very great, and indeed a wonderful man who has done very essential service to the state, "and has a claim upon us for everything he can ask", yet the resolutions of the House of Commons, standing upon the Journals, are at present a bar to the granting of an honour "until the sting of those resolutions is done away by a vote of thanks for Mr Hastings's great services".[2] But Hastings himself, writing and watching with anxiety and expectancy in the East, came to a very different conclusion. He read the bill and the speeches in the debates with the deepest disgust.

"I have received and studied Mr Pitt's bill", he wrote, "and receive it as so unequivocal a demonstration that my resignation of the service is expected and desired, that I shall lose no time in preparing for the voyage."[3]

He was perhaps too apt to regard all the attacks upon the Indian system as directed against himself personally:

It has destroyed all my hopes, both here and at home....What devil has Mr Pitt dressed for his exemplar, and clothed with such damnable attributes of ambition, spirit of conquest, thirst of blood, propensity to expense and troubles, extravagance and improvidence...disobedience of orders, rapacity, plunder, extortion....And am I this character? Assuredly not; but most assuredly was it the declaimer's intention to fix it upon me.[4]

The logical supplement to Pitt's act was contained in three short measures passed in 1786. The first repealed the provisions requiring the Company's servants to disclose on oath the amount of property they brought home from India. The special court to try in England offences committed in India was remodelled, but it was in fact never constituted. The second act made the approval of the crown for the choice of the governor-general unnecessary, though the king of course had still the power of recall. The third empowered the governor-general in special cases to override the majority of his council—the dissentient councillors having the privilege of recording written protests—and enabled the governor-general to hold also in emergencies the office of commander-in-chief. Lord Cornwallis had made this measure a condition of his acceptance of the post of governor-general. The bill was fiercely opposed by Burke, who declared that the principle of it was

to introduce an arbitrary and despotic government in India...the preamble of the clause which laid it down...that arbitrary power was necessary to give vigour and dispatch, was a libel on the liberties of the people of England, and a libel on the British constitution.[5]

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* III, 107, 170, 172.
[2] *Idem*, p. 174.
[3] *Idem*, p. 217.
[4] *Idem*, pp. 224, 226.
[5] *Parliamentary History*, XXV, 1274.

Pitt argued that the bill was only the logical development of the act of 1784. He always thought that the power of the governor-general ought to be put on a different footing:

in the former Bill, therefore, his powers had been enlarged by diminishing the number of the Council,...and in the present Bill the same principle was still adhered to and farther followed up.[1]

[1] *Parliamentary History*, xxv, 1290.

CHAPTER XI

THE EARLY REFORMS OF WARREN HASTINGS IN BENGAL

IN 1772 Warren Hastings was appointed governor of Bengal. He had already been twenty-two years in India. Born at Churchill in Oxfordshire on 6 December, 1732, he had been educated at Westminster School and reached Calcutta in 1750 as a writer, the lowest grade in the Company's service. In the troubles in Bengal, 1756–7, he was imprisoned at Murshidabad by Siraj-ud-daula, but was soon released. After Clive's reconquest of Calcutta he was made Resident at Murshidabad. In the revolutions in the Muhammadan government in 1760 and 1763 he seems to have played an entirely honourable part. Burke is wrong and unjust when he says: "He was co-existent with all the acts and monuments of that revolution, and had no small share in all the abuses of that abusive period".[1] Lord North declared more truly that at this period Hastings "though of flesh and blood, had resisted the greatest temptations".[2]

Hastings returned to England in 1764. His hands were clean, but it is unnecessary to speak of his conduct as a miracle of self-denial. He did indeed bring home an amount of wealth honourably moderate in comparison with that of some of his contemporaries, and every credit should be given to him for it; yet at the age of thirty-two he had acquired by legitimate means in fourteen years a competence of £30,000—a rather striking commentary on the normal emoluments at this time of an Indian career. Of this sum he soon lost £25,000 in an unwise and thoroughly characteristic investment, for he was incurably imprudent in the conduct of his own money matters.

In 1766 the directors were impressed by the ability with which he gave evidence before a committee of the Commons, and in 1769 he was sent back to India to be second of council at Madras. There he won further favour by the skill with which, as export warehouse-keeper, he improved the plan for the Company's investments. At the end of 1771 he was appointed governor of Bengal, "a station", as he said himself, "of more éclat, but of more trouble and difficulty".[3] We cannot wonder that Hastings felt no undue elation at his prospects. He would have a council of twelve or thirteen members, and all questions would be decided by a majority of votes. The governor's chance of controlling his colleagues depended on his own personality, on his being the sole executive official when council was not actually sitting, and on an undefined but traditional influence over the exercise

[1] *Burke's Works*, VII, 55. [2] M. E. Monckton Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 104.
[3] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 225.

of patronage. He had in fact, as he himself declared, "no other pre-eminence beside that of a greater responsibility".[1] Hastings, however, almost dominated his council. The truth is that as long as a majority of votes could decide all questions, the governor-general was more secure against unreasonable opposition in a large, than in a small, council, for in the former there was more chance of finding a certain number of men of good will, and a wider sphere within which his personal powers might exert themselves. In the smaller council the governor-general's position was insecure till the state in 1786 reluctantly consented to grant him in the last resort the power to override a hostile majority. We must add that Hastings's control over foreign relations was strengthened by the fact that they were managed by a select committee of himself and two others. It is evident that down till October, 1774, he was allowed almost unhampered control.

What was the exact position of the British in Bengal in 1772? The British dominions consisted of a curious conglomeration of territories, held by a curious variety of titles. We may divide them into three classes. The first class consisted of Burdwan, Midnapur, Chittagong, acquired in 1760, which were held free of all revenue tax. The second class was made up of Calcutta itself, won in 1698, and the 24-Parganas, acquired in 1757. The Company held these territories on a zamindari title paying an annual revenue to the nawab. But by a curious legal fiction the 24-Parganas would after 1785 pass into the first class. This came about as follows: The revenue paid for them by the Company was assigned by the Moghul emperor in 1759 to Lord Clive as a jagir. The directors stopped payment of it to him in 1763, but in 1765, wishing to make use of his services again, they made an agreement with him by which he or his representatives were to enjoy the revenue of the jagir for ten years, after which time it would lapse to the Company. When, however, he returned home in 1766, they granted to him or to his representatives another period extending to 1785. In the third class we must place Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, over which provinces the Company held the diwanni, or right to collect and administer the revenue, which had been granted to them in 1765. They paid at this time twenty-six lakhs of rupees to the emperor for the right to administer the diwanni, and thirty-two lakhs to the nawab of Bengal for the expenses of government, retaining the surplus for themselves.

From 1765 to 1772 the actual administration was in the hands of two Indian officials known as naib diwans, or deputy finance ministers —the Company itself being the actual diwan—Muhammad Reza Khan in Bengal and Shitab Rai in Bihar. Their activities were to a limited extent regulated by British supervisors who were to have "a controlling though not an immediate, active power over the collections",[2] first appointed in 1769. The holders of this office must

[1] Monckton Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 200. [2] *Idem*, p. 89.

of course be distinguished from the three eminent ex-servants of the Company, also called supervisors, who were sent out this same year with almost autocratic powers to reform the whole administration of the Company, but whose ship after leaving the Cape sank somewhere in mid-ocean. This system of Indian executive officers under a vague British control was the famous dual system. It was now in ill repute, for while the Company itself was in serious financial straits, its servants were returning to England with great fortunes. For its failure in India we have to go no further than the admissions of some of the Company's servants who were endeavouring to administer it.

> "It must give pain to an Englishman", wrote Becher, Resident at Murshidabad in 1769, "to have reason to think, that since the accession of the Company to the Diwani, the condition of the people of this country has been worse than it was before; and yet I am afraid the fact is undoubted....This fine country, which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government, is verging towards its ruin, while the English have really so great a share in the administration."[1]

And again:

> I well remember this country when Trade was free and the flourishing state it was then in; with concern I now see its present ruinous condition....[2]

Furthermore, the directors strongly suspected that the naib diwans were intercepting a great part of the revenue that ought to have reached the Company's exchequer.

Such was the state of things with which Hastings was called upon to deal. He was definitely appointed to put an end to the dual system. He was, in fact, selected to take the place of the three supervisors, Scrafton, Forde and Vansittart, to whose tragic end we have just referred. "We now arm you with our full powers", wrote the Company, "to make a complete reformation."[3] The responsibility therefore was very great. Though he was given definite instructions on most points, it is to a certain extent true, as Lord Thurlow says, that he was ordered "to destroy the whole fabric of the double government ...he was to form a system for the government of Bengal, under instructions so general, that I may fairly say the whole plan was left to his judgment and discretion".[4] So, too, Hastings claimed for himself: "The first acts of the government of Bengal, when I presided over it, were well known at the time to have been of my formation, or formed on principles which I was allowed to dictate".[5] For good or ill, then, the internal reforms in Bengal prior to 1774 are mainly in their details at any rate the work of Warren Hastings and bear the stamp of his personality.

[1] *Idem*, p. 85. [2] *Idem*, p. 83. [3] *Idem*, p. 145.

[4] *Debates of the House of Lords, on the evidence delivered in the trial of Warren Hastings*.... London, 1797, p. 132.

[5] *Selections from the State Papers of the Governor-General...Warren Hastings*, Ed. Forrest, II, 63.

He had great difficulties to confront. Something like an Indian Empire had grown up, but it had no administrative framework. "The new government of the Company consists of a confused heap of undigested materials, as wild as the chaos itself."[1] "Our constitution is nowhere to be traced but in ancient charters, which were framed for the jurisdiction of your trading settlements, the sales of your exports, and the provision of your annual investment."[2] "I found this government in possession of a great and rich dominion, and a wide political system which has been since greatly extended, without one rule of government, but what descended to it from its ancient commercial institutions."[3]

He had to attack strong vested interests, and, what is more, he had to try to strengthen an overweakened central government against a too-powerful exterior ring of provincial powers. The political centre of gravity had got seriously displaced. The government of the country, he wrote, consisted of the supervisors, the boards of revenue at Murshidabad and Patna, the governor and council at Calcutta. Hastings is, of course, naming these powers in exactly the reverse of their theoretical position in the hierarchy of administration, but, as he says, "the order in which I have named them is not accidental, but consonant to the degree of trust, power and emolument which they severally possess".[4] In the government of Bengal "all trust, power and profit are in the hands of its deputies, and the degree of each proportionate to their want of rank in the service".[5] He tells us elsewhere that "every man capable of business runs away to the collectorships or other lucrative stations.... At the Presidency, where the best assistance is required, the worst only can be had...".[6]

The reforms themselves fall under three heads, first the commercial reforms, secondly, the reform of the judicature and the settlement of land revenue, dealt with elsewhere, and thirdly, all those measures which followed on the abolition of the dual government in pursuance of the Company's professed intention "to stand forth as Diwan".

Hastings's commercial reforms involved the following changes. He abolished in March, 1775, the fraudulent use of the dustuck or free pass under which the goods of the Company's servants or their agents were exempted from dues. Thus the old problem which had haunted so disastrously the administrations of Vansittart and Verelst was at last settled. He suppressed the custom-houses (or chokeys) in the zamindaris, which were a great impediment to the free circulation of goods. Only five central custom-houses were henceforth maintained, at Calcutta, Hugli, Murshidabad, Patna and Dacca. Lastly, he carried out a uniform lowering of the duties to 2½ per cent. on all goods, except the monopolies of salt, betel-nut and tobacco, to be

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 317. [2] *Idem*, p. 368. [3] *Idem*, II, 148.
[4] Monckton Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 148.
[5] *Idem*, p. 146. [6] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 300.

paid by all Europeans and Indians alike. These reforms were entirely beneficial. It is true they were all ordered by the court of directors, but Hastings entirely assented, carried out the details with expert knowledge and adroitness, and smoothed away all opposition by his tactful methods. They did much to revive the decaying internal trade of Bengal. Hastings could with some justice boast that "goods pass unmolested to the extremities of the province".[1]

Hastings's modification of the land revenue system and the reform of the judicature will be dealt with elsewhere. But something must be said of the abolition of the dual government. Formally it meant no more than that the Company should henceforth collect the revenues through the agency of its own servants. But in reality, and in the peculiar political and economic position of Bengal, it meant becoming responsible for the whole civil administration. Hastings hardly exaggerated when he described it as "implanting the authority of the Company, and the sovereignty of Great Britain, in the constitution of this country".[2] The first step was the abolition of the offices of naib diwan of Bengal and Behar, and the prosecution of Muhammad Reza Khan and Shitab Rai for peculation. After undergoing a long trial and being kept in custody for rather more than a year they were both acquitted. Shitab Rai was entirely cleared, and Hastings declared he scarce knew why he was called to account. He was reappointed to high office in Patna as rai-raian of Bihar, but died soon afterwards, largely it was supposed from illness brought on by the anxieties and discredit of his imprisonment. Hastings recorded his epitaph and revealed his own regret for the whole proceeding when he wrote:

> He ever served the Company with a fidelity, integrity and ability which they can hardly expect to experience in any future officer of government, whom they may choose from the same class of people.[3]

Muhammad Reza Khan was also acquitted, but Grant held that he had for years intercepted much of the revenue due to the Company. Hastings believed that he was culpable but that it was impossible in view of his wide connections and past precautions to bring him to account. The whole incident is a curious one and not very easy to understand. The least reputable feature of it was the expedient of using "the abilities, observation and active malignity of Maharaja Nandakumar" to attack Muhammad Reza Khan, but the responsibility for that lies with the court of directors and not with Hastings. It is clear that the latter looked upon the whole business with the greatest distaste. "These retrospections and examinations", he wrote, "are death to my views".[4] He was eager to get on with his work of reformation, and he could foresee clearly enough that he

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 304.
[2] *Idem*, II, p. 30.
[3] Monckton Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 199.
[4] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 283.

would not escape censure for having brought the trials "to so quiet and unimportant an issue".[1] In this he was not mistaken. Among the charges afterwards brought against him by Nandakumar was one that the two accused men had offered Hastings and himself enormous bribes for an acquittal.

A third reform was the reduction from thirty-two to sixteen lakhs of rupees of the sum paid to the nawab from the revenue of Bengal. This was the third reduction of this tribute; originally in 1765 it had been fifty-three lakhs, in 1766 it had been reduced to forty-one, and in 1769 to thirty-two. As this change was carried out under direct orders of the court of directors, neither credit nor discredit can fairly be attributed to Hastings for the principle involved, but the skill with which he so reformed the administration that the nawab actually received more than before for his personal requirements, is all his own.

Fourthly, we have a reform which in the eyes of Hastings was of the greatest importance, namely, the removal of the treasury or *khalsa* from Murshidabad to Calcutta. This was the method taken by Hastings to rectify that displacement of the political gravity of the British administration which has been already referred to.

> "The Board of Revenue", wrote Hastings, "at Murshidabad, though composed of the junior servants of the Company, was superior before this alteration, to the governor and council of the presidency. Calcutta is now the capital of Bengal, and every office and trust of the province issues from it."[2]

Again:

> The seat of government [is] most effectually and visibly transferred from Murshidabad to Calcutta, which I do not despair of seeing the first city in Asia, if I live and am supported but a few years longer.[3]

Fifthly, we come to an expedient which is much more difficult to judge. In reorganising the household of the nawab of Bengal, who was still in his minority, Hastings decided to appoint as his guardian not only a princess, which considering the secluded position of women in the East was itself unusual, but one who was not even the nearest relative to the nawab. He passed over the prince's mother and he appointed the widow of a former nawab, Mir Ja'far, who was known as the Munni Begam. Rajah Gurdas, son of Nandakumar, was at the same time appointed steward of the household. For these appointments Hastings was afterwards vehemently censured, and indeed they do seem to require justification. The princess was said, apparently with truth, to have been originally a dancing girl in the court. Burke stigmatised Hastings's act as "violent, atrocious and corrupt",[4] and one of Hastings's own justifications—that the begam's "interest must lead her to concur with all the designs of the Company, and to solicit their patronage"[5]—may itself be described as of a highly questionable

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 391. [2] *Idem*, p. 271. [3] *Idem*, p. 285.
[4] Bond, *Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings*, II, 32. [5] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 254.

there been a complete purification of the service, there would surely have been nothing for Lord Cornwallis to do, when he came to India in 1786, but we know that there was abundant material for his reforming hand. The quotation from Sir John Shore proves, if any proof were needed, that a vigorous attempt at reform was made, but as regards results, it probably records the exaggerated apprehension of a junior servant of the Company, rather than an actual fact. Certainly we may say that the effects anticipated by Shore did not follow.

All this, however, is consistent with the assumption that Hastings made a strenuous and loyal endeavour, as far as in him lay, to amend and purify the service. Probably, short of staking his retention of office upon the question, he did as much at first as was humanly speaking possible. He may well have argued that to quarrel with the court and to throw up his office, because more power was not allowed him, would merely have ruined his own career without improving the service. The trouble was that he got no consistent support from home. One party among the directors were genuinely desirous of a reform, but there was always another party from time to time in the ascendant, who were prepared to connive at misconduct in their servants, provided that the value of their own patronage was not diminished. The plunder was to be had, and, as Cornwallis said, they hoped in their struggle with Hastings to secure the greater part of it.[1] Hastings in 1772 gives as one reason for abandoning his desire to remove the collectors altogether, that,

> there were amongst them so many sons, cousins, or *élèves* of Directors, and intimates of the members of the Council, that it was better to let them remain than provoke an army of opponents against every act of administration....They continue, but their power is retrenched.[2]

In the end, therefore, Hastings seems to have compromised to a certain extent with evil, and to bind men to his interests, he freely used the means of patronage at his disposal. To some extent he gave up the struggle for reformation.

> "I will neither be responsible", he wrote in 1772, "for the acts of others, nor stand forth as the general reformer, and make every man whose friendship and confidence are necessary for my support my inveterate enemy."[3]

Again we find him writing of Wheler in 1781: "I have made it a rule to give him the first option in most vacant appointments, and have provided handsomely for all his friends".[4] It seems likely, too, that having been obliged, if he wished to retain his power, in the days of Francis's ascendancy in the council, to use questionable means to win support, his finer feelings became blunted. His carelessness in money matters and his incapacity to keep any kind of accounts, or

[1] Ross, *Correspondence of...Marquis Cornwallis*, I, 306.
[2] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 269. [3] *Idem*, p. 319. [4] *Idem*, II, 384.

to recognise the need of doing so, were proverbial, and amounted to a grave fault. His own regulations had strictly forbidden that the banyan (or agent) of a collector should "be allowed to farm lands or directly or indirectly hold any concern in any farm". Yet his own banyan was found, with his knowledge and consent, to be farming the revenues on a large scale. In regard to contracts and commissions, Hastings undoubtedly entangled himself in financial transactions of so questionable a nature, that it taxed the abilities of his counsel to the utmost to defend him at the impeachment. There can be no doubt, too, that by the end of his administration many of his supporters among the Company's servants were enjoying emoluments entirely disproportionate to the services they rendered. Francis pointed out in parliament in 1785 that the cost of the civil establishment of Bengal had risen from £251,533 in 1776 to £927,945 eight years later. There can be no possible doubt about these figures, for Major Scott, who rose later in the debate to answer Francis, was not able to call them in question, and, if it had been possible, he would surely have done so. The rise was largely due to the enormous emoluments of many of the Company's servants. The chief of the board that controlled the salt office received £18,480 a year. The salaries of five other members ranged from £13,183 to £6257. Again, salaries at the Board of Customs amounted to £23,070 among three persons, and at the Committee of Revenue to £47,300 among five persons.[1] These statements are corroborated by a later speech of Pitt in which it is mentioned that among the offices which were at that time open to the servants of the East India Company, apart from the governor-generalship and the office of councillor, were one place of £25,000 a year, one of £15,000, five of £10,000 and five of £9000.[2] Now Hastings's defence in the case of the salt office was that down to 1780 the Company had gained no profit from its salt monopolies, but that after he had hit upon the expedient of allowing 10 per cent. on the profits, the Company in spite of the huge commissions paid to its servants acquired a net revenue of £540,000. It seemed to him that these facts were a complete answer to Francis's charge, but there was surely reason in the latter's contention that before the commissions had risen to this height they ought, while still being fixed at a generous scale, to have been retrenched. Apart from this, it may well be asked at what cost to the ryots were these enormous revenues derived from one of the prime necessities of life.

To return to the reforms of 1772–4. In judging them it is not always easy to specify how many were due to the initiative of Hastings himself, how many to the suggestions of others, and how many to the direct orders of the court of directors. It is certainly clear that the majority of them were enjoined from home. "I am little more",

[1] *Parliamentary History*, xxv, 146.
[2] *Idem*, p. 538.

said Hastings on one occasion, "than the compiler of other men's opinions."[1] But what is also clear beyond any doubt, is the immense ability, the tact, the urbanity with which they were carried. In every period of history any notable political or social improvements, if carefully investigated, will be found to be largely derived from a common stock of enlightened contemporary opinion. Many of them are in the air of the time. But to argue from this that credit must be withheld from the statesman who finally carries them into actuality is extremely unfair. The general impression forced upon any enquirer by a perusal of the innumerable minutes, letters, consultations and dispatches of these two years is that Hastings carried along parallel lines, and contemporaneously, a great series of reforms, economic, fiscal, judicial and social. They form a fine record of devoted and laborious work and reveal in their author administrative capacities of a unique kind. He is master of every branch of the enquiry, endlessly fertile in resource, convincing in argument, reasonable in discussion. He toiled ceaselessly and encountered all opposition dauntlessly. Yet the bitter tragedy of the whole thing was that, before the work could be completed, power and authority were snatched away from him, and years that would naturally have been devoted to the further development of his great task were spent in a desperate and sometimes almost a despairing effort to protect his position, career and honour against a vindictive and cruel assault. He speaks of his work by the metaphor of an unfinished building, "a great and weighty fabric, of which all the parts were yet loose and destitute of the superior weight, which was to give them their mutual support and their...collateral strength".[2]

[1] Monckton Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 151.
[2] *Selections from the State Papers of the Governors General...Warren Hastings*, ed. Forrest, II, 64.

CHAPTER XII

EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THE ROHILLA WAR

HAVING abolished the dual government set up by Clive, Hastings had next to overhaul the system of relations established with Indian princes. Clive's policy in this field had worked well for five years, but changing circumstances had made revision necessary. At the time of Clive's settlement northern India had been temporarily free from the Maratha terror. It was the imminent renewal of that menace which entirely altered the whole situation. The Marathas, who in 1761 had been driven headlong into the Deccan after their terrible rout at Panipat at the hands of Ahmad Shah, once more recrossed the Narbada in 1769, and came surging northward again to occupy Delhi in 1771. They offered to restore Shah 'Alam to his throne and make his imperial title a reality. The emperor consulted the English, who implored him to reject so dangerous and deceptive a proposal. In spite of this, he agreed to the Maratha terms, and left Allahabad in May, 1771. Though the English had protested, they parted with him amicably. It was to prove a momentous and calamitous decision, and the misguided emperor was never again to return to British territory. For thirty-two years he was practically a state prisoner in the hands of the Marathas or the Afghans. A year after his restoration, the Marathas forced upon him a minister of their own choice, and obliged him to make over to them the districts of Kora and Allahabad. A new and delicate problem now confronted the Company's servants. To continue to pay the tribute was practically to subsidize its most formidable enemies. The Company was bound to suffer for its own quixotic generosity. It had bound itself to pay tribute, as Hastings said, to an idol of its own creation, "not one of his natural subjects offered any kind of submission to his authority, when we first fell down and worshipped it".[1] With regard to the districts there were four possible courses; to let the Marathas occupy them, to take them ourselves, to keep them for Shah 'Alam, or to give them back to Oudh. It was finally decided to discontinue paying the tribute of twenty-six lakhs to Shah 'Alam on the ground that "his desertion of us, and union with our enemies, leaves us without a pretence to throw away more of the Company's property upon him",[2] and to restore Kora and Allahabad to the nawab of Oudh (by the treaty of Benares) for fifty lakhs of rupees.

[1] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 59.
[2] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 360.

Hastings had no doubts and no reservations as to the desirability of this course: "I am not apt to attribute a large share of merit to my own actions, but I own that this is one of the few to which I can with confidence affix my own approbation".[1] He thus sums up the advantages of his policy:

> By ceding them to the [Nawab of Oudh], we strengthen our alliance with him, we make him more dependent upon us, as he is more exposed to the hostilities of the Marathas; we render a junction between him and them, which has been sometimes apprehended, morally impossible, since their pretensions to Korah will be a constant source of animosity between them; we free ourselves from the expense and all the dangers attending either a remote property, or a remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited system laid down by the Honourable Court of Directors...we provide effectually for the protection of our frontier, and reduce the expenses of our army, even in employing it; and lastly we acquire a nett sum of 50 lacs of rupees most seasonably obtained for the relief of the Company's necessities.[2]

This solution met with the support both of the council and the directors, and it is difficult to see what other course was possible. Yet it has been condemned, and was opposed by Sir Robert Barker. Burke described it as a "shocking, horrible, and outrageous breach of faith".[3] Mill says:

> Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor,...the representative of so illustrious a race, who now possessed hardly a roof to cover him. Justice too, or something not easily distinguished from justice, spoke on the same side.[4]

But Hastings and his council clearly require no defence. The districts and the tribute, which was purely eleemosynary, had only been granted to Shah 'Alam to support his imperial dignity while under the protection of the British. When he handed them over to the Marathas, morally—if not legally—he forfeited his right to retain them. The Company's course would no doubt have been clearer, and its case stronger, if it had definitely warned the emperor, as it might well have done, when he marched away to Delhi, that it would not continue to pay tribute or allow him to retain the districts, should he become dependent upon its enemies. It should also be remembered that, before the decision to withhold the revenues was taken, Shah 'Alam was asked to send representatives to Benares to state his case, but that he omitted to do so.

The only other question worth consideration is whether there was any possible alternative. Might not the Company have retained Kora and Allahabad for itself? To this Hastings had two objections; in the first place, it would be unwise to retain in our own hands the administration of provinces entirely separated from the rest of our territories. Secondly, as he afterwards said before the

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 355.
[2] Forrest, *Selections from State Papers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, I, 50.
[3] Bond, *Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings*, IV, 759.
[4] Mill, *History of India*, III, 397.

House of Commons, we should then have excited the jealousy of the nawab of Oudh, to whom the districts had formerly belonged, and so have endangered our alliance with him. It is always worth while to remember that the central pillar of Hastings's foreign policy was the alliance with Oudh.

The other important problem of foreign affairs before the arrival of the new council was the Rohilla War. Rohilkhand, a fertile country lying along the base of the Himalayas, marched with the north-west frontier of Oudh. Its area was about 12,000 square miles and its population about 6,000,000. The bulk of the people were Hindus, but the ruling race were Rohillas, that is mountaineers, or Pathans, or Afghans, the words signifying much the same thing. The country was governed by a loose confederacy of chiefs under the headship of Rahmat Khan, generally known as Hafiz Rahmat Khan because he had been guardian (hafiz) of the sons of the late ruler 'Ali Muhammad and had ultimately usurped their rights. The Rohillas had established their power early in the eighteenth century.

The events leading up to the war must be briefly summarised. In 1772 the Marathas invaded and ravaged Rohilkhand. The Rohillas thereupon appealed to the nawab of Oudh. They did so reluctantly, for there was no cordiality between him and them. The nawab had long notoriously coveted their territory. They knew that if it paid him to do so, he would not hesitate to combine with the Marathas against them, just as they in their turn had considered the possibility of making peace with the invaders, by giving them a free passage through their territory into Oudh. But both parties for the moment dreaded a Maratha invasion more than anything in the world, and this drove them into an uneasy alliance. In reality, as Sir John Strachey observes, "The Vizier, the Rohillas and the Marathas were all utterly unscrupulous and each knew that no trust could be placed in either of the others".[1] We find, for instance, that the nawab asked Hastings "whether he should persuade the Rohillas to attack the Marathas...and take his advantage of both when they should have weakened each other by mutual hostilities". British officers of a later date would probably have improved the occasion by a homily on political rectitude, and it is rather typical of Hastings—both of his cynicism and his frankness—that, in his own words, "I commended the project, but expressed my apprehension of the consequences".[2]

Finally, after the usual interval of intrigue and finesse, during which the advice of Sir Robert Barker just availed to prevent the nawab from joining the Marathas, a treaty of alliance was made 17 June, 1772, between the Rohillas and Shuja-ud-daula. The Rohillas agreed to pay him forty lakhs on his obliging the Marathas to retire from their country "either by peace or war". The treaty was really due to the initiative and intervention of Sir Robert Barker, the British

[1] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 49.   [2] *Idem*, p. 113.

commander-in-chief, an intervention not at first welcomed by Hastings and the Select Committee, and was signed in his presence. Almost before the signatures were appended, the Marathas evacuated Rohilkhand, and the Rohillas reoccupied the country.

The *casus foederis* arose in 1773. In the spring the Marathas re-entered Rohilkhand at Ramghat. The nawab of Oudh, with a British brigade in support under Sir Robert Barker, advanced to repel the invasion. After some manœuvring and counter-marching the detachments of the Marathas which had crossed the Ganges (the main body seem to have remained on the other bank) recrossed the river on 28 March. In May the revolution at Poona, which broke out on the death of the Peshwa, Madhu Rao, caused the Marathas to return to the Deccan, leaving only a few small garrisons in Northern India. The nawab of Oudh now demanded from the Rohillas the sum due to him, but they refused to pay. They claimed that the Marathas had really retired of their own accord, and that there had been no collision with the allies.

It seems clear that the nawab and the British protected Rohilkhand mainly by their presence on the spot, for Hastings on one occasion acknowledged that "the Marathas (i.e. the main body) lay during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army, but without daring either to cross the river or to approach the borders of Kora".[1] It was claimed—and technically no doubt the claim was indisputable—that the Rohillas still owed the forty lakhs, for the treaty stipulated that they were liable if the Marathas retreated "either by peace or war". The Rohillas, however, fell back upon a second line of defence by questioning whether the Marathas had really been driven out at all: "they might return the next year, when our joint forces were not in the Rohilla country to defend them: that we had done little, meaning that we had not destroyed the Maratha armies". Legally no doubt the Rohillas were in the wrong, but it must be admitted that European nations have often evaded treaty obligations on no better grounds.

Nothing further was done till Hastings held his conference with the nawab of Oudh at Benares in August and September, 1773. There he concluded a public treaty which made no direct mention of the Rohillas. By it Kora and Allahabad, as already mentioned, were ceded to the nawab in return for fifty lakhs of rupees, and it was stipulated that, whenever he employed a British brigade, he should pay a subsidy of 210,000 rupees a month. At the same time a secret agreement was made by which the British were to furnish a brigade, to help the nawab punish the Rohillas for their evasion, and conquer the country for him. In return the nawab was to bear all the expenses of the campaign and to pay a sum of forty lakhs. Almost as soon, however, as the treaty had been concluded, the nawab began to doubt

[1] *Selections from the State Papers of the Governors General... Warren Hastings*, ed. Forrest, II, 311.

whether he could bear the pecuniary burden involved, and since Hastings had some heart-searchings as to its expediency, they mutually agreed to postpone the expedition. The thought came to the governor-general, as he said years afterwards in his defence before the House of Commons in 1786, that:

all my actions were to be viewed through a very remote medium, with a thousand refractions of private interest, secret misrepresentation, general prejudice, and the precipitation of unformed judgement.[1]

In November, 1773, the nawab having, with his usual fickleness, changed his mind, asked for the aid stipulated in the treaty. Hastings laid a minute before the council in which he pointed out the advantages of intervention and among them that "our ally would obtain by this acquisition a complete state shut in effectually from foreign invasions by the Ganges, all the way from the frontiers of Behar to the mountains of Tibet". On the other hand he expressed doubts as to its expediency:

arising from the circumstances of the Company at home, exposed to popular clamour, all its measures liable to be canvassed in Parliament, their charter drawing to a close and...ministers unquestionably ready to take advantage of every unfavourable circumstance in the negotiation for its renewal.[2]

Accordingly he proposed to agree to the expedition but on terms which were likely to make the nawab relinquish the design. The council, which, through Hastings and his Select Committee, had been committed to the whole business without much choice on their part, declared: "We concur heartily in wishing to avoid the expedition proposed, without entering into the discussion of the propriety of such an enterprise on general principles".[3] They added rather meaningly that they were sensible of the embarrassment that Hastings was under "from what passed on the subject between him and the Vizier at Benares".[3] The upshot was that the nawab on 10 January, 1774, declined the conditions laid down. But on 3 February, 1774, a letter arrived from the vacillating nawab agreeing to everything and asking that the brigade should be sent. So after all the policy of bluff had broken down, and the Bengal government found themselves committed to the expedition.

The British army under Colonel Champion marched into Rohilkhand supported by the forces of Oudh on 17 April. Six days later a battle took place at Miranpur Katra, called by the victors the battle of St George because of the date on which it was fought. Hafiz Rahmat Khan was killed fighting bravely at the head of his troops. The valour of the Rohillas extorted the admiration of the British commander. They showed, he said:

great bravery and resolution...they gave proofs of a good share of military knowledge by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time and

[1] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 112.
[2] *Idem*, p. 121. [3] *Idem*, p. 123.

endeavouring to call off our attention by a brisk fire on our centre...it is impossible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed.[1]

The action was entirely decisive. About 20,000 Rohillas were driven out of the country, which was incorporated in the dominions of the nawab of Oudh, a small portion only, together with Rampur, was left in the possession of Faizulla Khan, son of 'Ali Muhammad, the founder of the Rohilla power, whose sons had been dispossessed by their guardian, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and a treaty was made with him 7 October, 1774, before the campaign was over. Champion brought serious charges against the nawab of Oudh and his troops for cruelties inflicted on the peasantry and the family of Hafiz Rahmat Khan.

The Rohilla War was the subject of the first attack on Hastings in Parliament in April, 1786, but as the Commons refused to accept the charge, it was not made one of the articles in the impeachment. The war has earned the strong condemnation of all the older school of Indian historians. Their view, in its extreme presentment, was that Hastings deliberately sold the lives and liberties of a free people and condoned horrible atrocities on the part of the armies of the nawab of Oudh. Sir John Strachey in his *Hastings and the Rohilla War* has put forward a complete and elaborate defence. He contends that the Rohillas were a plundering Afghan tribe who had only established their power over the Hindu population of Rohilkhand for about a quarter of a century. The Rohillas, he says, were as much foreigners in Rohilkhand as Frenchmen in Spain or Russians in Poland in the time of Napoleon; that the aim of the nawab of Oudh and the English was to "exterminate" the Rohillas only in the literal sense of the term, that is, to drive them over the frontier, not to massacre them; that Champion failed to substantiate his serious charges against the conduct of the allies by definite details; that he began the campaign in a thoroughly discontented frame of mind, and that he was extremely jealous of the plunder acquired by the soldiers of his ally; that, since the Rohillas declined to pay the forty lakhs they had promised in the treaty of 1772, the nawab of Oudh had a good legal and moral case against them; that Hastings can be entirely defended from the charge of callousness and brutality, for he took prompt measures to make a serious protest to the nawab; that as a matter of fact, the campaign in Rohilkhand "had been carried on with an absence of violence and bloodshed and generally with a degree of humanity altogether unusual in Indian warfare";[2] finally, that Hastings's motives in the war were statesmanlike and defensible. They were first, to punish the Rohillas for a serious breach of a treaty, secondly to protect Bengal by giving the nawab, the Company's ally, a scientific and natural

[1] Forrest, *Selections from the...State Papers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, I, 97.

[2] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 233.

frontier; thirdly, to acquire for the Company the valuable pecuniary benefit of a subsidy for the maintenance of one-third of our army. Summing up generally, Strachey asks the question:

> Is a British Governor justified in making war upon a confederacy of barbarous chiefs, who, not long before, had imposed their rule on a population foreign to themselves in race and religion; through whose country the only road lies open for attacks by savage invaders upon a British ally, whose security is essential to the security of British possessions; who are too weak and too treacherous to be relied on to close this road; and who have injured that ally by breaking a treaty with him, negotiated and attested by the British general, and approved by the British Government?[1]

Clearly he assumes an answer in the affirmative, and we may certainly admit that we have fought many wars on grounds far less adequate.

But though Sir John Strachey makes good most of his points, it is absurd to say that either the policy leading up to the war or the actual conduct of operations was beyond temperate criticism. Hastings was obviously himself doubtful about the expediency of the whole transaction, and his council still more so. He seems to have allowed himself to be drawn into the matter without having carefully thought it out. The whole question in its initial stages was weakly handled. For a statesman to commit himself to a course of action while hoping that the need for it may not arise, is not the happiest or the most efficient kind of political expedient. The truth is Hastings was always tempted by novel and daring schemes. We shall frequently encounter the same characteristic in his later history. Sir Alfred Lyall speaks truly of "the hardy and self-reliant spirit of political enterprise that is so strongly diffused through his whole career and character".[2]

It is no less true that Mill and Macaulay wasted a good deal of sentiment, and falsified a good deal of history, in painting a picture of the Rohillas as an ancient people long inhabiting a peaceful and happy valley, but the fact that the Rohillas had only established themselves for about twenty-five years has really nothing to do with the justice or injustice of the war. Their rights were quite as good as that of most of the ruling powers of India at this time, and quite as good as those of the East India Company itself. The more important question is whether the rule of the nawab of Oudh, which we were now imposing over the peasantry of Rohilkhand, was better or worse than that of the chieftains we were dispossessing. The evidence as to the condition of the country under Rohilla sway is conflicting, but the weight of it is undoubtedly in their favour.

The only writer hostile to them is Charles Hamilton, who depends mainly on sources inimical to Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and even he only condemns their *régime* when their control was relaxing. As Hafiz Rahmat Khan's power weakened, he says, "the Hindu farmers, and

[1] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 260.
[2] Sir Alfred Lyall, *Warren Hastings*, p. 174.

other inhabitants of the country, groaned under the worst species of military vassalage".[1] There seems to be no other corroboration of this view. Hafiz Rahmat Khan was a ruler of ability, courage and considerable culture. Sir John Strachey himself concludes that under his strong personal rule and that of his brother chiefs, "the mass of the Hindu population were treated with greater consideration and received better protection than was the case in any of the neighbouring provinces, excepting those in the possession of Najib-ud-daula"[2]—himself, be it noted, a Rohilla. Elphinstone declares that their kindness to their Hindu subjects cannot be denied, and that the state of improvement to which they had brought their country excited the admiration of our troops. In 1781 the British Resident at Rampur described that district as "what the whole of Rohilkhand was under the government of the Rohillas, a garden without an uncultivated spot".[3] Major Hannay in evidence given before the council in 1774 said that "the country appeared to be in good cultivation....It is in general one of the best cultivated countries I have seen in Hindostan". In any case, whatever the rule of the Rohillas had been, it was better than that of the nawabs of Oudh, which, especially in the time of Shuja-ud-daula's successor, was unspeakably bad and vile.

As regards the alleged atrocities perpetrated by the nawab and his army, there is little doubt that Champion greatly exaggerated them, partly out of pique that he was not allowed to control the political relations, which were left in the hands of Middleton, partly from envy of the booty that fell into the hands of his allies. At the same time there was probably a modicum of truth in the strong statements to which he committed himself, that the nawab did not "cease to overspread the country with flames till three days after the fate of Hafiz Rahmat Khan was decided";[4] that "the whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described";[5] and that "I have been obliged to give a deaf ear to the lamentable cries of the widow and fatherless, and to shut my eyes against a wanton display of violence and oppression, of inhumanity and cruelty".[6] Middleton too, who was friendly to the nawab, admitted that he could not acquit him of severe treatment of Hafiz Rahmat Khan's family or of wanton ravages of the country. But Champion was curiously loth to give details when Hastings demanded them, and when twelve years later he was interrogated on the matter before the House of Commons, though he repeated his allegations, he declared that his memory was too much weakened by long illness to recall any definite instances of cruelty. In any case there can be no doubt that as soon as the reports and complaints of the commander-in-chief reached him, Hastings took

[1] C. Hamilton, *An historical relation of the origin, progress and final dissolution of the Government of the Rohilla Afghans*, p. 209.
[2] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 30.
[3] *Reports from Committees of the House of Commons*, VI, 30.
[4] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 196. [5] *Idem*, p. 203. [6] *Idem*, p. 191.

all possible measures by strong representations to the nawab to ensure that this conduct should cease. Hastings afterwards was inclined to speak of the Company's honour as "pledged implicitly by General Barker's attestation", but this is not accurate. Barker had merely witnessed the signatures, though it is probably true enough, as Sir John Strachey says, that without his "active interference and persuasion"[1] no treaty would have been made. But even supposing that it was the duty of the British to coerce the Rohillas into payment, was so drastic a method as the conquest of the whole country necessary? Surely, as Fox suggested, a lesser penalty might have sufficed.

It must be admitted that there is something rather repellent about the finance of the whole operation. Hastings himself was frank enough to avow that the question of money was one of his main motives.

> "The absence of the Marathas", he wrote, "and the weak state of the Rohillas, promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home, added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces, that saves so much of their pay and expenses."[2]

There is a certain truth in the acrid comment of the majority of the council: "The expectation in sharing in the spoils of a people who have given us no cause of quarrel whatsoever, is plainly avowed to be a motive for invading them".

It seems unlikely that it was really within the power of the Rohillas to produce the original sum of forty lakhs for the nawab, and the weight of evidence goes to show that in the end Shuja-ud-daula was demanding two crores, or five times that sum. Their country had recently been ravaged by the Marathas. The Rohilla War was condemned in mild terms by the court of directors, and it was the one occasion on which Hastings lost the support of the proprietors. The fact that even they felt bound to record a reluctant disapproval, testifies clearly that disapproval was very widespread:

> "Notwithstanding", they said, "this court hath the highest opinion of the service and integrity of Warren Hastings, and cannot admit a suspicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct without proof; yet they are of opinion with their Court of Directors, that the agreement made with Shuja-ud-daula for the hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla country, and the subsequent steps taken for carrying on that war, were founded on wrong policy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company, frequently repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their territories...."[3]

Even Sir John Strachey admits that his policy was somewhat cynical, and there was a certain substratum of truth in Francis's comment: "we do not enquire into, nor think ourselves concerned in,

[1] Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 55.
[2] *Idem*, p. 113.
[3] *Idem*, p. 273.

the justice of the cause in which the troops are to act".[1] Sir Alfred Lyall notes that the war was the last occasion upon which British troops have joined in a campaign with Indian allies without retaining control of the operations, and his final verdict seems not unreasonable that "the expedition against the Rohillas was wrong in principle, for they had not provoked us, and the Vizier could only be relied upon to abuse his advantages".[2] But it was at its worst an error in judgment, which could only be proved to be such after all the consequences had developed.

[1] Forrest, *Selections from the...State Papers in Foreign Department of the Government of India*, I, 127.

[2] Lyall, *Warren Hastings*, p. 49.

CHAPTER XIII

WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES

THE Rohilla War was the last important event in Hastings's first period of office prior to the Regulating Act. The judges of the Supreme Court arrived on 17 October, 1774, the councillors two days later. The new council began badly by quarrelling with the governor-general on some petty detail of their reception, which merely exemplified the spirit with which they approached their work. They embarked from the very outset, in Barwell's words, upon "a predetermined, pre-concerted system of opposition".[1]

The six years' struggle which now ensued between Hastings and the majority of the council can hardly be paralleled in history. There was room, no doubt, for reasonable criticism of the administration; there should have been no room for the personal vindictiveness which was designed to hound the governor-general from office. "Every page of our public records", wrote Barwell, "teems with matter of private and personal discussion which neither directly nor remotely bear relation to the interests of the country."[2] Such was the lamentable result of the policy embodied in the Regulating Act of sending out as councillors men without Indian experience. It should be remembered that Hastings was the only governor-general who was subjected to this regulation. It need not, however, be supposed that parliament could have expected that such dire results necessarily followed from such a policy. Had the councillors been men of reasonable goodwill and of reasonable modesty—had, we might almost say, Philip Francis not been one of them—they would have found a way either of agreeing with Hastings, or at least of disagreeing with him with sanity and moderation. They came out imbued with a self-righteous conceit and a fixed determination to overthrow the government, which they had condemned before examination. Something must now be said about their individual characters. Philip Francis has been described once and for all by Lord Macaulay as

> a man clearly not destitute of real patriotism and magnanimity, a man whose vices were not of a sordid kind. But he must also have been a man in the highest degree arrogant and insolent; a man prone to malevolence and prone to the error of mistaking his malevolence for public virtue.

The first part of this verdict may appear to some to err on the side of generosity. Sir James Stephen, while he quotes it with approval,

[1] *Bengal, Past and Present*, XII, 74.
[2] *Idem*, XIII, 78.

adds that Francis was capable "not only of the faults of undying malignity and ferocious cruelty, but also of falsehood, treachery, and calumny".[1] Francis himself, it may be added, soon after his arrival in Bengal, acknowledged to a friend that his aims were flagrantly personal. "I am now", he wrote, "I think, on the road to be Governor of Bengal, which I believe is the first situation in the world attainable by a subject."[2]

Sir John Clavering has been described as "an honest, straightforward man of passionate disposition and mediocre abilities". Hastings' first impression of him was that he was honourable, but brought strong prejudices with him. His opinion, however, gradually changed for the worse, and after his death he could only write: "May God forgive him all the injuries which he has heaped upon me, and me, as I forgive him".[3]

Monson had served in southern India from 1758 to 1763. Impey described him as "a proud, rash, self-willed man, though easily misled and very greedy for patronage and power".[4] Again, in this case also, Hastings had to modify unfavourably his first impression. At first he wrote, "Colonel Monson is a sensible man",[5] but afterwards he came to believe that Monson was almost his worst enemy. In March, 1775, he says of him: "Colonel Monson, with a more guarded temper, and a more regular conduct, now appears to be the most determined of the three".[6]

Richard Barwell, the only one of the new councillors already resident in India, was the regular type of the Indian official of those days. His family had been connected with the East for some generations. His father had been governor of Bengal and a director of the Company. He himself had been in India since 1758. He was a man of many merits and considerable, though not pre-eminent, ability. He made a great fortune in India, and, as Sir James Stephen says, this fact of itself raises a presumption against his official purity. His letters show that in the year 1775 alone he remitted £40,000 to England. Barwell probably acted up to his lights, but his standard was low. We find him, for instance, writing to his sister in 1769: "I would spend £5,000 to secure to myself the chiefship of Dacca, and to supervise the collection of the revenues of that province".[7] In another letter he states that he considers himself justified in evading the law which prohibited the Company's servants from trading, by engaging in salt contracts under the names of native Indians. Barwell, as we know, became Hastings's staunch supporter, but at first they

[1] Stephen, *The Story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey*, I, 30–31.
[2] *Dictionary of National Biography.*
[3] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 179.
[4] Parkes, and H. Merivale, *Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis*, I, 376.
[5] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 477.
[6] *Idem*, p. 517.
[7] *Bengal, Past and Present*, x, 233.

were by no means in sympathy. Hastings found him tedious and punctilious. He wrote in 1772:

> There is a gentleman of our Council who seems to think that every subject that comes before the Board, or that he can obtrude upon, ought to go through a long discussion.[1]

And again:

> Mr Barwell has made it necessary to declare that although I have the justest deference for his abilities, I have not yet had an opportunity of experiencing their effects but in points of controversy or opposition, nor derived any benefit from his assistance.[2]

The distrust was reciprocated. Barwell wrote in 1773:

> I think there is a probability of our continuing friends, or more properly speaking upon good terms, for it certainly is prostituting a name for the most sacred tie to say Mr. Hastings is my friend, which he never was, and I verily believe, never will be. A duplicity of character once detected and known, as his is by me, proves an insuperable bar to any cordial intimacy ever taking place.[3]

Gradually, however, the two men drew together and Barwell was entirely won over by the tact, and impressed by the capacity, of his chief. We find Hastings writing in 1777: "Francis...must be grossly misinformed indeed if he entertains any hope of change in Barwell's conduct, after the proofs which he has given of his steadiness and fidelity".[4] Again he writes in 1778: "I owe much to Barwell, and to his steady friendship",[5] and a little later he pays him a generous tribute by saying: "He possesses much experience, a solid judgment, much greater fertility of official resources than I have, and his manners are easy and pleasant".[6]

Before dealing in detail with the disputes between Hastings and the council after 1774, it may be useful to sketch in outline his relations with his councils generally till the end of his period of office. For two years, 1774–6, he was steadily outvoted and overruled, and for all practicable purposes he had ceased to be governor-general. His position is best described in his own vivid words:

> My situation is truly painful and mortifying, deprived of the powers with which I have been invested by a solemn Act of the Legislature,...denied the respect which is due to my station and character, denied even the rights of personal civility by men with whom I am compelled to associate in the daily course of official business, and condemned to bear my share in the responsibility of measures which I do not approve, I should long since have yielded up my place in this disgraceful scene, did not my ideas of my duty to you and a confidence in your justice animate me to persevere; and if your records must be dishonoured and your interests suspended by the continuance of such contests as have hitherto composed the business of your present Council, it shall be my care to bear as small a part in them as possible.[7]

[1] Monckton Jones, *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 201.
[2] Forrest, *Selections from...State Papers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, I, 39.
[3] *Bengal, Past and Present*, XI, 51.
[4] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 185.
[5] *Idem*, p. 224.
[6] *Idem*, p. 243.
[7] Forrest, *Selections from...State Papers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, II, 279.

Yet he held on his way with marvellous fortitude and tenacity, and at last came relief. In September, 1776, Monson died, and Hastings now held the mastery though only by his casting vote, he and Barwell opposing Clavering and Francis. In 1777 came the curious and confused incident of Hastings's conditional resignation. The facts were as follows: Hastings had first given, on 27 March, 1775, and then on 18 May withdrawn, discretionary powers to his agent in England, Colonel McLeane, to signify to the directors his intention to resign. McLeane came to the conclusion that Hastings could not long hope to withstand the opposition growing up against him at home, and, having obtained the promise of certain conditions from Lord North, signified to the court of directors the intention of his chief to resign. The court accepted the resignation. By the terms of the Regulating Act, Clavering, as senior councillor, would normally succeed till the five years of the original appointment were over. Wheler was appointed to fill the place in council that would be vacated by Clavering's succession, but before he sailed the news came of Monson's death and he was now appointed to fill that vacancy. Soon after these events, McLeane, owing to the granting of a knighthood of the Bath to Clavering without any corresponding honour to the governor-general, came to the conclusion that Lord North did not really intend to fulfil the conditions of the agreement, and he therefore wrote to Hastings advising him not to resign. The position apparently was that Hastings, through the action of his agent, and though he himself had recalled his original instructions two months after they were sent, had signified his intention to resign, but had fixed no date. When the news came to Bengal in June, 1777, Francis and Clavering at once assumed that Hastings had resigned; Clavering claimed the governor-generalship, took his seat in council at the head of the table, demanded the keys of the fortress and the treasuries, and in general acted with the greatest precipitation and violence. Hastings was stung into a flat resistance, and declined to vacate the seat of authority, though he declared that, but for Clavering's presumptuous and absurd haste, he would have held himself bound by his agent's action. The deadlock was so hopeless that both sides agreed to refer the question to the Supreme Court, who decided "that Mr. Hastings had not resigned". Not content with this decision, which saved him from ruin, Hastings next contended that Clavering by his action had forfeited even his seat in council, but here the Supreme Court decided against him. Thus ended what Hastings himself called the "convulsion of four days, which might have shaken the very foundation of the national power and interests in India".[1]

Clavering died on 30 August, 1777, and Hastings's control over the council was greatly strengthened, though Wheler at first was inclined to act with Francis, the usual division being Hastings, Barwell and

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 159.

the casting vote against Francis and Wheler. Clavering was succeeded in 1779 as commander-in-chief by Sir Eyre Coote, who, though often intractable and difficult, acted quite independently of Francis. Hastings, therefore, was still able by the exercise of his casting vote to make his views prevail, and it is at this period that he writes of his rival: "Francis is miserable, and is weak enough to declare it in a manner much resembling the impatience of a passionate woman, whose hands are held to prevent her from doing mischief".[1] In 1779 Barwell retired. Hastings had prevailed upon him to stay till he had made, as he supposed, an accommodation with Francis that the latter would not oppose measures for the prosecution of the Maratha War or for the general support of the present political system of government. In July, 1780, he accused Francis of violating this compact, and in a minute laid before the council, said: "I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be void of truth and honour":[2] he accepted the inevitable challenge from Francis to a duel, and wounded him rather severely. Though Hastings spoke of this incident with a certain compunction, writing: "I hope Mr. Francis does not think of assuming any merit from this silly affair. I have been ashamed that I have been made an actor in it",[3] yet he had forced on the meeting with great deliberation and most clearly intended to disable his adversary. As regards the accommodation a few words must be said. Francis, as we have seen, was not over-scrupulous, but he always hotly declared that he had never been party to any such engagement as Hastings pretended.

> The agreement I meant to enter into, with respect to the Maratha War, was to prosecute the operations actually existing on the Malabar coast, which, since the campaign was begun, and General Goddard had already taken the field, I thought should be pushed as vigorously as possible.[4]

He flatly denied that he had ever promised any general support. It is probable that Francis's account of the matter is mainly correct. Hastings seems to have been far too easily content with a vague acceptance of his proposal, and it was surely the height of folly, if he really wished for a compact, after his experience of Francis's character, not to get a definitely signed agreement from him. It almost appears as though Hastings, despairing of any other method of freeing himself from his opponent, was purposely content with a mere verbal promise, intending afterwards to force a quarrel upon Francis for not fulfilling it. Whether this were true or not, he had at last attained his object.

[1] *Idem*, p. 263.
[2] Forrest, *Selections from... State Papers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, II, 712.
[3] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 310.
[4] Forrest, *Selections from... State Papers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, II, 715.

Francis left India in November, 1780, and Hastings wrote in exultation:

In a word, I have power, and I will employ it, during the interval in which the credit of it shall last, to retrieve past misfortunes, to remove present dangers, and to re-establish the power of the Company, and the safety of its possessions.[1]

Hastings's position was now indeed much easier and his chief tribulations were over; for some time the council was reduced to three, and as Sir Eyre Coote was generally absent from Calcutta on military expeditions, Wheler was practically the governor-general's only colleague, and he found him very amenable to guidance. At first, as we have seen, Hastings had formed a poor opinion of him. He wrote in 1777: "He is now, and must be, a mere cipher and the echo of Francis, a *vox et praeterea nihil*, a mere vote".[2] But his opinion of him gradually improved: "I treat him", he writes to a friend, "with an unreserved confidence, and he in turn yields me as steady a support as I could wish",[3] and again: "I cannot desire an easier associate, or a man whose temper is better suited to my own".[4] It is clear that Wheler was gradually won over by the dominant personality of the governor-general; and it is during this time that Hastings, uncontrolled by opposition, enters upon those proceedings in regard to Chait Singh and the begams of Oudh which have done so much to blemish, fairly or unfairly, his reputation. The truth seems to be that Wheler was an honest and conscientious man, who tried to view each question on its merits. As Sir Alfred Lyall says: "Wheler feebly tried to do his duty, and was rewarded by a sentence in one of Burke's philippics against Hastings, where he stands as 'his supple, worn-down, cowed, and, I am afraid, bribed colleague, Mr. Wheler'".[5]

Two new councillors appeared in due course, John Macpherson in September, 1781, and Stables in November, 1782. Macpherson first came to India nominally as purser of an East-Indiaman and entered the service of the nawab of the Carnatic. He returned to England on a secret mission and was sent out to India again, this time in the East India Company's service, in 1770. Seven years later he was dismissed the service, and returned to England. He sat in parliament from 1779 to 1782 for Cricklade, and he was supposed to be in receipt of a salary from the nawab of the Carnatic. In January, 1781, the Company reinstated him in its service—an appointment which was severely criticised. Macpherson was a shrewd and worldly man, endowed by nature with extreme good looks and with pleasant manners. At first Hastings found in him "every aid and support that I expected, and an ease with a benevolence of disposition ...far exceeding my expectations".[6] With Stables he was far less pleased, and he complains of "his coarse and surly style".[7] For a time Hastings found his relations with his later council easy and pleasant, but we cannot but see that his approval or disapproval of

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 330–1. [2] *Idem*, p. 186. [3] *Idem*, p. 384. [4] *Idem*, p. 387.
[5] Lyall, *Warren Hastings*, p. 168. [6] Gleig, *op. cit.* II, 450. [7] *Idem*, III, 151.

his colleagues varied accordingly as they were prepared, or refused, to sink their individuality in his. Towards the end of his administration he found them inclined to oppose him on certain questions, as for instance—and it must be added most properly—when he proposed in 1784 to intervene in the troubled affairs of the Moghul Empire. "You will wonder", he writes, "that all my Council should oppose me. So do I. But the fact is this: Macpherson and Stables have intimidated Wheler, whom they hate, and he them most cordially."[1] Hastings acknowledged at this time that "I have not that collected firmness of mind which I once possessed, and which gave me such a superiority in my contests with Clavering and his associates."[2] As time went on he railed against them more and more bitterly: "I in my heart forgive General Clavering for all the injuries he did me. He was my avowed enemy. These are my dear friends, whom Mr Sulivan pronounced incapable of being moved from me by any consideration on earth".[3] Again he complains that the councillors have received a hint from their friends not to attach themselves to a fallen interest. Even Wheler for a time fell into disfavour.

These unfortunate dissensions led Francis in a speech in the House of Commons to claim with a certain amount of superficial justification that "the opposition to Mr. Hastings has not been confined to General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and myself. His present colleagues... have exactly the same opinion that we had of him and of his measures".[4] But this of course is untrue. The opposition now was at times vexatious, but it was occasionally justified, and it was very different from the persistent, unremitting and bitter hostility of the old *régime*. The truth is that, as Sir Alfred Lyall said: "It would have puzzled any set of Councillors to hit off the precise degree and kind of opposition that Hastings was disposed to tolerate".[5] Like all men of pre-eminent ability and dominating personality, he could not bear to have his purposes thwarted; and there is probably a substratum of truth in the verdict of Barwell—friend of Hastings though he was—written in 1774:

> The occasions of difference between us that did exist were not sought for by me, but proceeded wholly from the jealousy of his own temper, which cannot yield to another the least share of reputation that might be derived in the conduct of his Government. Unreasonable as it may be, he expects the abilities of all shall be subservient to his views and [that all shall] implicitly rely upon him for the degree of merit, if any, he may be pleased to allow them in the administration of Government.[6]

It must be remembered of course that none of the councillors appointed under the Regulating Act were in any sense men of first-rate ability except Philip Francis. Barwell probably stood next to him in capacity; Clavering, Monson, Wheler, Macpherson and Stables were all thoroughly mediocre men. But the fact remains that, while Hastings

[1] *Idem*, p. 121.
[2] *Idem*, p. 122.
[3] *Idem*, p. 129.
[4] *Parliamentary History*, XXIV, 1175.
[5] Lyall, *Warren Hastings*, p. 164.
[6] *Bengal, Past and Present*, XII, 71.

was capable of inspiring the most intense affection and fidelity from some with whom he came into close personal contact, it is also true that he had a certain propensity to fall foul of men—and they were sometimes men of ability and repute—with whom he was called upon to work in public life. Sir Robert Barker, Sir Eyre Coote, Charles Grant, Lord Macartney, and even Sir Elijah Impey all were at times seriously at variance with him. (Hastings himself never doubted that he was in the right and his contemporaries in the wrong,) and through every disappointment and defeat he still clung with characteristic tenacity to a defiant approval—generally, it must be added, entirely justified—of his own actions.

I have now held the first nominal place in this Government almost twelve years. In all this long period I have almost unremittedly wanted the support, which all my predecessors have enjoyed from their constituents. From mine I have received nothing but reproach, hard epithets and indignities, instead of rewards and encouragement....Yet under all the difficulties which I have described, such have been the exertions of this Government, since I was first placed at the head of it, that in no part of the Company's annals has it known an equal state, either of wealth, strength, or prosperity, nor, let it not be imputed to me as a crime if I add, of splendid reputation.[1]

(The points upon which the new council at once came to grips with the governor-general were the Rohilla War and the measures to be taken for terminating it, the conclusion of the Treaty of Faizabad, and the charges brought against Hastings by Nandakumar.)

"Upon our arrival", they wrote, "the first material intelligence that came before us, concerning the state of the Company's affairs, was, that one third of their military force was actually employed, under the command of Sujah Dowlah, not in defending his territories against invasion, but in assisting him to subdue an independent state."

(Without waiting for any reasonable investigation, they condemned the war as

carrying, upon the face of it, a manifest violation of all those principles of policy which we know have been established by the highest authority, and till now universally admitted...as the basis of the Company's counsels in the administration of their affairs in India.[2]

They inflicted upon Hastings, in his own words, "a personal and direct indignity"[3] by recalling Middleton from Lucknow, and demanding that the whole of his correspondence, some of which was confidential, should be laid before the council. They ordered Champion to demand at once the forty lakhs, which the nawab had promised, and to withdraw from Rohilkhand. "They denounced", it has been well said, "the Rohilla War as an abomination; and yet their great anxiety now was to pocket the wages of it."[4] Hastings in vain

[1] Forrest, *Selections from...State Papers of the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, III, 902–3.
[2] *Idem*, I, 120–1.
[3] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 474.
[4] Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, II, 365.

endeavoured to set up some kind of barrier against this wild flood of censure and criticism. He claimed with good reason that, whatever the rights or wrongs of the matter, since the Rohilla War was begun and all but concluded by the past administration, the new councillors should have been satisfied with recording their formal disapproval of it, and should not have attempted to prevent its conclusion. He declined to produce the correspondence between himself and Middleton, though he offered to submit all passages dealing with public policy to the council, and to send the whole of it for inspection to Lord North, the Prime Minister.)

If the conduct of the majority seemed unreasonable on the question of the Rohilla War, it appeared still more perverse on the occasion of the death of the nawab of Oudh, which took place on 26 January, 1775. Their one aim seemed to be to press hard upon the Company's ally. They decided that the existing treaty was personal to the late ruler, and they took the opportunity to conclude a new treaty—the Treaty of Faizabad—by which all his successor's liabilities were increased. He had to pay a heavier subsidy for the use of British troops; the tribute paid by the zamindar of Ghazipur passed to the Company; and the sovereignty of Benares was also ceded to it. Hastings opposed the treaty, but was outvoted.) In view of what was to follow it is interesting to note that on his suggestion it was made a condition of the treaty that the raja of Benares should exercise a free and independent authority in his own dominions subject only to the payment of his tribute. (On 11 March, 1775, Nandakumar brought against Hastings his charge of having received from the begam a bribe of 354,105 rupees for appointing her guardian of the young prince. There followed the famous scene, in which the majority of the council welcomed the accusation, and Hastings withdrew in fierce anger, refusing to be arraigned at his own council board "in the presence of a wretch, whom you all know to be one of the basest of mankind".[1]

What are the facts of the allegations against Hastings? It is best perhaps to begin with everything that can possibly be said in his disfavour. Hastings at once drew up a long minute, which according to Burke and Gilbert Elliot bore every sign of conscious guilt.) Even Sir James Stephen admits that it suggests that there was something to explain. Hastings never at any time actually denied in so many words the truth of Nandakumar's statement. In his written defence, read to the House of Commons, he "entered upon a kind of wrangle equally ill-conceived and injudicious".[2] In a letter to Lord North he uses the curious expression: "These accusations, true or false, have no relation to the measures which are the ground and subject of our original differences".[3] We must assent to Sir James Stephen's comment that "Hastings's character would no doubt have stood better,

[1] Stephen, *Nuncomar and Impey*, I, 53. [2] *Idem*, p. 72.
[3] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 518.

if he had boldly taxed Nandakumar with falsehood". The begam acknowledged that she had given 150,000 rupees, and Hastings admitted that he had received the sum as entertainment money, but it is not clear why so much mystery was made about the transaction.

On the other hand, for Hastings, it must be said that he had every right to object to the whole procedure of the majority: "I could not yield [to their claim to investigate the charge at the council board] without submitting to a degradation to which no power or consideration on earth could have impelled me".[1] He saw with bitter scorn that his enemies were hot upon the despicable trail, and he had no doubt as to the master hand.

At the impeachment, the Lord Chancellor, who was not favourable to Hastings, commenting upon the whole of the evidence, admitted that the managers had failed to prove that Hastings had ever received any part of the 354,105 rupees except the 150,000. There is no question that he had accepted that sum, but there is no ground for holding that it was a bribe for the appointment of the begam. He contended that, when he received the money, the act prohibiting presents was not yet passed; the allowance was customary, and he could show that it had been received by Clive and Verelst when they visited Murshidabad. This was in reality the weak part of Hastings's case. The Company had forbidden presents long before the Regulating Act. It was really a monstrous abuse that, when the governor of Bengal, whose salary and allowances amounted to between £20,000 and £30,000, visited Murshidabad, he should receive from the nawab an allowance amounting to £225 a day. That it had been taken by Clive and Verelst was very little justification, and in any case it must be noted that at least in their day the nawab received a revenue of fifty-three lakhs, while it had now been reduced to sixteen. There can be little doubt that we have here the reason for Hastings's failure to deny the charge; he could not deny that he had received part, and therefore preferred to deny nothing. Even Sir James Stephen admits that the transaction, "if not positively illegal was at least questionable",[2] and we cannot wonder that in the impeachment the Lord Chancellor, while acquitting Hastings of corruption, said: "He hoped that this practice, which however custom might have justified in some degree, no longer obtained in India".[3] The whole incident illustrates the exactions made upon Indian powers at this time by the Company's servants, whenever opportunity offered.

When Hastings had withdrawn from the council, the majority resolved that "there is no species of peculation from which the Governor-General has thought it reasonable to abstain". They declared that he had received the sums specified, and ordered him to

[1] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 515–16.
[2] Stephen, *Nuncomar and Impey*, I, 72.
[3] *Debates of the Lords on the Evidence*..., p. 147.

In Europe Napoleon planned eastern expeditions—in 1805 three squadrons and 20,000 men;[1] in 1807 a triple plan which was to have combined land expeditions through Central Asia and Egypt with a sea expedition round the Cape[2]—but these fell through, in part because of the English command of the sea, in part because of Napoleon's continental preoccupations. It was in preparation for the second of these that the embassy of General Gardane to Persia was arranged. In 1803 war had broken out between Persia and Russia; and in 1805 the latter power had joined England in the Third Coalition. Persia naturally turned to France for help, and on 4 May, 1807, was signed the Treaty of Finkenstein, by which Napoleon guaranteed the integrity of Persia, engaged to use every effort to compel Russia to evacuate Georgia, and promised supplies of field guns and small arms; while the shah engaged to break off all relations, political and economic, with the English (thus subscribing to the Continental System) and to give all facilities and assistance to French military and naval forces on their way to attack the British in India. On this agreement, Gardane was sent to Teheran, to promote Persian hostility against England and Russia, and to collect information about routes and resources for the projected expedition. But Gardane's mission, like Decaen's, was foredoomed to failure. When the Treaty of Finkenstein was signed Napoleon was already contemplating peace and even alliance with Russia; and when he realised these ideas by the Treaty of Tilsit and the entente with Alexander, he was no longer willing to do anything to support the Persians against his new ally. Here was one more example of the way in which the interests of a world power are apt to diverge and become irreconcilable. So long as the Persians could hope for French support in the recovery of Georgia, they remained willing to exclude the English from Persia, as Malcolm found in 1808, when he was sent by Minto to counter the French mission but failed even to get a footing in the country, although backed by an armed force; but when in the autumn of that year the Persians perceived that they would have to negotiate with Russia direct, and that the French would not even act as mediators, they concluded naturally that the advantages of the French alliance were all on one side; on the arrival of Harford Jones to replace Malcolm, not even Gardane's threats of departure could prevent the reception of the new English mission; and so, early in 1809, Harford Jones replaced Gardane at Teheran, while Napoleon, involved in continental interests, abandoned his schemes of emulating the exploits of Alexander the Great.[3]

The time had now come also for the complete expulsion of the

[1] Prentout, *op. cit.* pp. 402 *sqq.*

[2] Gardane's Instructions, 10 May, 1807, *ap.* Gardane, *Mission du Général Gardane*, pp. 81 *sqq.*

[3] Gardane, *Mission du Général Gardane*; Kaye, *Life of Malcolm*, I, 395, etc., *Minto in India*, pp. 55 *sqq.*

French from the East. The English squadrons at the Cape and in India were strengthened. The French islands were blockaded by English vessels; and although over-rashness on the part of their commanders led to the loss of two sunk and two taken, in the course of 1810 both the Isle of France and the Île Bonaparte (as Bourbon had been renamed) were compelled to surrender to Admiral Bertie and General Abercromby; while in the next year another expedition occupied Java, to which island a French regiment had been sent some time before by Decaen. These captures brought to an end the activities of the privateers, who thus lost the bases at which they had refitted, revictualled, and sold their prizes; and wiped out the French reputation in India. The settlement brought by the treaties of 1814 and 1815 confirmed the position established by force of arms. The French and the Dutch recognised for the first time British sovereignty over the Company's possessions; the French agreed to maintain no troops and erect no fortresses; and so the Company was at last completely freed from European menace just at the moment when it was, under the leadership of Lord Hastings, about to establish an unquestioned predominance in India.

CHAPTER XX

TIPU SULTAN, 1785–1802

BY that "humiliating pacification" (as Hastings called it), the Treaty of Mangalore, Tipu appeared as a conqueror. Grant Duff, years afterwards, asserted that the governor-general was

only prevented from disavowing and annulling it by the confusion which mus have resulted to the Company's affairs in consequence of the fulfilment of a part of the terms, before it could have been possible to obtain their ratification.[1]

There is no doubt, indeed, that Hastings regarded it with the dislike and disapproval with which he viewed almost the whole of the policy and actions of the rulers of Madras; but, on the other hand, when he wrote his *Memoirs relative to the State of India* during the long journey home which began on 5 February, 1785, he seemed not to anticipate any immediate consequences of danger.

It is not likely that Tipoo should so soon choose to involve himself in a new war with us, deprived of all his confederates, and these become his rivals; nor that, whenever he shall have formed such a design, he will suffer it to break out in petty broils with our borderers.[2]

None the less it was quite evident that war was pending between Tipu and the Marathas. The Nizam and Nana were known to be in negotiation if not in alliance: the power of Sindhia cast its mantle of supremacy over the Moghul. The claim which Tipu, as it seemed with unjustifiable audacity, advanced upon Bijapur—which meanwhile Nana had promised to surrender to the Nizam—may have been based on an imperial grant to Hyder of a portion of the Deccan, and was certainly not one which in 1785 could be confirmed or made effective. But, while wisdom would have persuaded Tipu to be content with the successes he had won, his inherent passion and restlessness urged him to new aggression. Thomas Munro, when he summed up his career in 1799, said "a restless spirit of innovation, and a wish to have everything to originate from himself, was the predominant feature of his character".[3] Upon the success of the war which ended in 1784 he formed the designs first of crushing the Nizam and the Marathas and then turning, flushed with victory, upon the English. This project he avowed to the French.[4] Early in 1785 he attacked the hill-post of Nargund, belonging to a Brahmin desai, with whom he had already had unfriendly relations, the one making extravagant

[1] Grant Duff, II, 469.
[2] Forrest, *Selections from the State Papers of... Warren Hastings*, II, 54.
[3] Gleig, *Life of Munro*, I, 233.
[4] Wilks, *Historical Sketches of Southern India*, II, 535 *sqq*.

demands, the other claiming tribute.[1] In vain the Marathas intervened to save Nargund and Kittur: by guile as well as force Tipu made a successful conquest. Nana, alarmed, looked for help from the English in the conquest which he foresaw. He appealed to the Treaty of Salbai and asked for aid against Tipu: Macpherson, in the cautious spirit of the non-intervention policy which was now ascendant in the counsels of the Company, replied that the treaty

did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of the two States should be mutual, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the other, and that by the treaty of Mangalore the English were bound not to assist the enemies of Tipu.

Thus he gave the sultan of Mysore reason to think that he could proceed undisturbed.

But Nana was not going to fall without a struggle. He applied to Goa for alliance: a step which alarmed Macpherson into establishing a resident (C. W. Malet) at Poona.

By the fifth month of 1786 the Marathas were in alliance with the Nizam and ready to move. Their forces joined on 1 May, and on 20 May they took Badami. Against Tipu also were Holkar and Mudaji Bhonsle: Kittur was recovered: the victors returned home flushed with success: Hari Pant advanced, and relieved Adoni, while Tipu captured Savanur. The end was a peace which hardly modified the *status quo*. The Marathas retained important districts (Nargund, Kittur, Badami) and Tipu recovered others. His brother-in-law regained Savanur, and a kinsman of the Nizam Adoni. On the whole the treaty of 1787 was a rebuff for Tipu. He had begun to perceive that the English were more dangerous than he had thought. Malet at Poona and the military preparations of Cornwallis gave him pause.

Hardly had Cornwallis arrived in India when his attention was turned to Tipu. His knowledge of international politics made him consider India as a vital point in the enduring rivalry between England and France: perhaps he was the first English statesman in India who fully grasped its importance. A letter of March, 1788,[2] shows that he had considered the situation in all its bearings.

"I look upon a rupture with Tipu as a certain and immediate consequence of a war with France", he wrote to Malet, "and in that event a vigorous co-operation of the Marathas would certainly be of the utmost importance to our interests in this country."

The settlement of the Guntoor Sarkar affair caused a new settlement with the Nizam, and this, embodied in a curiously disingenuous message—which kept the non-intervention order of the act of 1784 in the letter but broke it in the spirit—brought about the war which

[1] See Kirkpatrick's *Letters of Tipu*, referred to by Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, II, 535.
[2] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 345.

Cornwallis had foreseen. Wilks,[1] the historian of Southern India at this period, sardonically remarks that

> it is highly instructive to observe a statesman, justly extolled for moderate and pacific dispositions, thus indirectly violating a law, enacted for the enforcement of these virtues, by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance.

Cornwallis, of course, knew well what he was doing, and was convinced that he could do nothing else with any regard for the safety of the English in Madras: he expressed himself strongly to Malet[2] on the danger of having to make war without efficient allies.

The actual ignition of the flame (foreseen by Tipu, who had long ago promised the French to attack the English, as well as by Cornwallis) was caused by Tipu's attack on Travancore, 29 December, 1789. The ostensible reason for this was the sale of Jaikottai and Kranganur to the raja by the Dutch, Tipu asserting that they belonged to his feudatory the raja of Cochin. The raja of Travancore said that the Dutch had held them so long ago as 1654 and acquired them from the Portuguese, and he applied to Hollond, the governor of Madras, for aid. It seems probable that Hollond was already warned of what was about to happen, and had taken a bribe from Tipu; he certainly delayed preparations and endeavoured to persuade the governor-general that they were unnecessary.[3] Then when Tipu attacked Travancore, the raja, though included by name among England's allies in the Treaty of Mangalore, was left to his fate. Tipu carried all before him till Cornwallis, indignant at the disgraceful sacrifice "that had been made of British honour", intervened in person, preluding his action by a letter condemning the conduct of the Madras Government in the most vigorous terms.[4] Orders had been disobeyed, preparations not made, and allies betrayed. Now the resources of the Carnatic must be exploited: even the sums set apart for the payment of the nawab's enormous debts must be seized; at the same time the necessary alliances with the Marathas and the Nizam must be immediately stabilised; Cornwallis hoped, that "the common influence of passion and the considerations of evident interest" would draw them to his side. And so it proved. On 1 June, and 4 July, 1790, treaties were made with the Marathas and the Nizam in view of the imminent war with Tipu. These formed "the Triple Alliance"; and the war began in May, 1790.

Briefly the objects may be expressed as follows. Tipu was continuing his father's attempt to win supremacy in Southern India. The Nizam and the Marathas were in greater fear of him than of the English. Cornwallis saw danger near and far, to all British interests in India, and in the wider international spheres of Europe and America. His experience had accustomed his mind to world-wide maps.

[1] Wilks, *op. cit.* III, 38.
[2] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 496.
[3] Cf. Malcolm, *Political History of India*, I, 72.
[4] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 491.

The war lasted for nearly two years, and the result was both disastrous to Tipu and the prelude to greater and final disaster. It fell into three campaigns. The first was commanded by General Medows, whose devotion to duty and universal popularity were contrasted by Cornwallis[1] with the qualities and estimation of the late governor of Madras. Transferred from Bombay (where Ralph Abercromby replaced him) to Madras, this gallant but precipitate officer was to lead the principal force of the Carnatic to seize the Coimbatore district and then to penetrate through the Gazzalhatti pass to the heart of Mysore. Colonel Kelly was to watch over the safety of the Carnatic and the passes that led into it most directly from Mysore. To General Abercromby with the army of Bombay was given the task of subjugating the territory of Tipu on the Malabar Coast, a task which he accomplished in a few weeks. Medows was less immediately successful. A chain of forts stretched from the Coromandel Coast to the Gazzalhatti Gorge; all these were eventually captured and by July, 1790, Medows stood at Coimbatore sixty miles from his nearest support and ninety from the farthest. Then Tipu suddenly descended the famous pass and with rapidity and skill inflicted sharp blows on the British troops in different quarters. On 10 November he was narrowly prevented from destroying the force of Colonel Maxwell, successor to Kelly; six days later Medows came up and the British force was saved. But Tipu, moving rapidly, was still a source of considerable danger, and it was thought well that Cornwallis himself should come to the scene of action. The Marathas and the Nizam, however, were giving useful aid, and the capture of Dharwar added greatly to the allies' security and power.

The year 1791 found Cornwallis in command, and in politics the project broached of deposing the usurper Tipu in favour of the heir of the old Hindu rajas of Mysore. The governor-general recovered in India not a little of the military reputation he had lost in America; it is not insignificant that the favourite portrait of him shows a background of eastern tents and turbaned soldiery. Taking a new point of attack he moved by Vellore and Ambur to the capture of Bangalore, which he achieved on 21 March, 1791; and by 13 May he was within nine miles of Seringapatam. But the campaign ended in disappointment. Tipu showed unexpected generalship, and Cornwallis when the rains came was compelled to retreat by the utter failure (as Wilks reports) of all the equipments of his army: Madras, incompetent and sluggish, again at fault. It seemed necessary to open negotiations with Mysore, but Cornwallis was not disposed to yield, and when Tipu sent a propitiatory offering, it was with delight that "the whole army beheld the loads of fruit untouched and the camels unaccepted returning to Seringapatam".

When the fighting was resumed, though Tipu succeeded in cap-

[1] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 429.

turing Coimbatore (3 November, 1791), which had been most gallantly defended, the troops of Cornwallis, gradually removing all obstacles, and after arduous efforts (recounted with enthusiastic vigour by Wilks), occupying the chain of forts which was interposed, drew near to the capital; and on 5 February, 1792, the lines were drawn round Seringapatam. Cornwallis's letters give graphic descriptions of the attacks which followed. Tipu displayed much military and diplomatic skill, the native allies were urgent with Cornwallis to conclude the war by negotiation, and the governor-general was never keen completely to crush an enemy. Three days before peace was signed he wrote to Sir Charles Oakeley, governor of Madras, that "an arrangement which effectually destroys the dangerous power of Tipu will be more beneficial to the public than the capture of Seringapatam, and it will render the final settlement with our Allies, who seem very partial to it, much more easy"; and the Secret Committee had anticipated such an arrangement with approval.[1] Half Tipu's territory was surrendered,[2] and a large portion of this went to the Nizam (from the Krishna to beyond the Pennar river with the forts of Ganjkottai and Cuddapah) and to the Marathas (extending their boundary to the Tungabhadra); while the English secured all his lands on the Malabar Coast between Travancore and the Kaway, the Baramahal district and that of Dindigul, and Tipu was obliged to grant independence to the much persecuted raja of Coorg. At home great interest was aroused by one provision: two sons of Tipu were surrendered as hostages for his good faith. A popular picture represents them being presented to Cornwallis amid an assemblage of perturbed Muhammadans. They were nurtured carefully at Calcutta: their portraits, not uninteresting, are still at Government House. In England also the treaty seemed a most satisfactory example of "our old and true policy",[3] presumably one of deliberate avoidance of territorial acquisitions beyond the necessities of safety—for it was on this ground in his letters home that Cornwallis justified his seizures; but he was utterly deceived in thinking that Tipu recognised defeat or ceased to plan renewed aggression. Yet the English alliance with the Nizam undoubtedly received a new accession of strength; it may be said to have now reached something of the traditional stability which in Europe linked Portugal and England in unbroken alliance. The jealous Poona Marathas "saw with regret the shield of British power held up between them and the Nizam": new seeds for future war were planted though they did not grow up for some years. Cornwallis was not blind either, though he did not go much beyond declaring[4] (to Sir C. Malet at Poona) that the allies were bound mutually to guarantee what each had won from Tipu. But before he left India a cloud was beginning to rise on the horizon towards

[1] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, II, 159. [2] *Idem*, p. 537.
[3] *Annual Register*, 1792. [4] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, II, 176 *sqq*.

Mysore.[1] Early in October, 1793, the governor-general returned to England, and his successor had none of his military interests or international experience, and little of his political sagacity.

The war between the Marathas and the Nizam (1794–5), in which Shore not unnaturally avoided intervention, ended in the Nizam's defeat and in Sir John Shore's belief that he was a less valuable ally than his conquerors, with the inept anticipation that there was "no immediate probability that we shall be involved in war".[2] He had, says his biographer,[3] anticipated no danger from the union of the Marathas and Tipu against the Nizam, and contemplated without apprehension the total collapse of the latter's government. It is sufficient comment on Sir John Shore's political wisdom that it, alone of the three, survives to-day.

The results of Shore's non-intervention were speedily seen. The Nizam dismissed his English troops and increased the French, and but for his son's rebellion, which the English had remained long enough to suppress, would have thrown himself entirely on the French side, and thus have come inevitably into alliance with Tipu. Shore returned to England in 1798. A very careful and conscientious administrator, he was succeeded by a man of genius, who became one of the makers of British India. Himself without Indian experience, Richard Wellesley, Earl of Mornington (who arrived on 26 April, 1798), approached the problems of the East with a mind unbiassed though not uninformed. He was already on the Board of Control and had studied the history, politics and government of India assiduously. He had accepted the governorship of Madras, and had therefore observed the difficulties of Southern India particularly, on Lord Cornwallis being appointed governor-general a second time (1 February, 1797); but when Cornwallis accepted the lord-lieutenancy of Ireland a few months later, Wellesley was sent on instead to Calcutta. His earliest letters to Dundas,[4] on his way out to India, evince a remarkable knowledge of Indian affairs, and on 28 February, 1798, though he did not know of Tipu's recent negotiations with France, he saw that in the power of Mysore lay the key to the whole position. Since Cornwallis had left India the fruits of his successes had disappeared.

> "The balance of power in India", he wrote, "no longer exists upon the same footing on which it was placed by the peace of Seringapatam. The question therefore must arise how it may best be brought back to the state in which you have directed me to maintain it."

But he soon saw that the balance of power, if such there were to be, must stand on a very different footing from that on which Cornwallis, or Shore, or even Dundas, believed that it would rest securely.

[1] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, II, 219.
[2] See his state papers, Malcolm's *History*, II, App. II, XLIV *sqq.*
[3] The second Lord Teignmouth, *Life*, I, 320.
[4] From Cape of Good Hope: *Despatches*, I, 25. Cf. *The Wellesley Papers*, vol. I.

An admirable paper written years after by the Duke of Wellington —Mornington's younger brother Arthur, who arrived in India in January, 1797—describes the condition of the country when the new governor-general arrived. To Wellesley, actively though he intervened in the affairs of other countries, especially those of the Nizam, the centre of interest was Mysore. He landed on 26 April, 1798, and immediately learnt of the negotiations of Tipu with France and her dependency Mauritius.[1] Tipu had sent envoys to Versailles (where they were received with almost as much mirth as satisfaction), called himself "Citoyen", and addressed the most urgent and flattering applications to Malartic, the governor of Mauritius, for alliance and aid. In the name of the French Republic one and indivisible, the governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon issued a vigorous proclamation to the "citoyens de couleur libres", announcing Tipu's desire for an offensive and defensive alliance, and welcoming his assistance to expel the English from India. Tipu's ambassadors returned home and landed at Mangalore accompanied by a small French force on the very day (26 April, 1798)[2] that Sir John Shore received a letter from him desiring "to cultivate and improve the friendship and good understanding subsisting between the two states and an inviolable adherence to the engagements by which they are connected". The new governor-general was not deceived. He addressed a friendly letter to Tipu and received an effusive reply; but he left no ground for doubt as to the seriousness of his intentions, of which he desired the sultan to be aware. On 18 October he heard of Bonaparte's landing in Egypt, and two days later he ordered Lord Clive, governor of Madras, to prepare for war. He was now secure on the side of Hyderabad[3], and he began a series of exploratory operations (as surgeons might say) in the direction of Mysore. He wrote: Tipu replied: more than once: the governor-general courteous with a touch of imperiousness, the Muhammadan despot evasive and deceitful. At first Mornington's plan was merely to require a repudiation of the French alliance; it developed, through increasing requirements of territory, into a determination utterly to annihilate the power of the usurper of Mysore.

The Mysore War with the destruction of Tipu has often been criticised as unjustifiable and unjust, precipitate and unwarranted by the conduct of the vanquished. The great majority of contemporary opinion is entirely against this view. Indeed it may be said that hardly a single writer or speaker who had personal knowledge of India doubted that the war, and its object, were absolutely necessary. England was already in danger from France, and the danger for several years grew greater; how much greater would it have been had the life and death struggle been carried on in India as well as in Europe! Already a French force was in Egypt. Did not the classical

[1] *Wellesley Despatches*, I, 213. [2] *Idem*, I, App. pp. viii-xi. [3] Cf. p. 328 *supra*.

models which the ambitious pedants of the Revolution delighted to follow point towards the creation of a new western dominion in the East? The armies of Tipu, daily growing in numbers and efficiency, were ready implements to make this achievement possible. "His resources", said the Madras Government to Mornington, "are more prompt than our own." Yet war was embarked on by the English only after serious attempts at negotiation, and it seemed to the governor-general that it needed the vindication which the course of events would afford.

"It will soon be evident", he said, "to all the powers of India that the fundamental principle of our policy is invariably repugnant to every scheme of conquest, extension of dominion, aggrandisement or ambition either for ourselves or our allies."

It may be wondered whether the serious attempts at negotiation were ever regarded by Tipu as anything but endeavours to gain time. His letters to Lord Mornington were no doubt amusing from their fulsome professions of sincerity and friendship mingled with denunciations of the French, to one who already possessed authentic information of all that had happened in the Isle of France. They continued all through the winter of 1798–9, and were in no way influenced by the vigorous letter sent from Constantinople by the sultan, Selim III, urging the necessity of opposing the faithless French, enemies of the Muhammadan faith. Mornington suffered them to continue, for, as early as 12 August, 1798,[1] he had drawn up a minute in the Secret Department sketching measures necessary for "frustrating the united efforts of Tipoo Sultaun and of France". Yet he was still anxious to defend himself against any charge of aggressiveness. "The rights of states applicable to every case of contest with foreign powers", he asserted,[2] "are created and limited by the necessity of preserving the public safety." This necessity was now obvious. By the beginning of 1799 both sides were ready for the contest. Tipu retorted to Constantinople the charges made against his allies (10 February): Mornington issued to General Harris at Madras his instructions for the political conduct of the inevitable war (22 February). A commission was appointed to negotiate with any neighbouring chiefs, to conciliate the population and to watch over the family of the ancient Hindu rajas, whom the governor-general already thought of restoring to the throne of Mysore. On this commission Colonel Arthur Wellesley served. It was the first important political work of one who was to become England's prime minister as well as commander-in-chief. On the same day there was issued from Madras a declaration by the Governor-General in Council of the causes of the war, and Mornington addressed from Fort St George an order to General Harris not to delay the march of the army one hour, but to enter Mysore and march upon Seringapatam.

[1] *Wellesley Despatches*, I, 159. [2] *Idem*, p. 171.

The circumstances were favourable. The armies of the Nizam and the Peshwa might be useful, and relations with the Nizam at least were cordial. But the chief dependence was on the British troops. The army of the Carnatic was believed to be

> the best appointed, the most completely equipped, the most amply and liberally supplied, the most perfect in point of discipline, and the most fortunate in the acknowledged experience and abilities of its officers in every department which ever took the field of India,

and the Malabar force was also efficient. The object of the war was plain: the general in command had full powers, and the country was well known from the experience of the earlier war. British ships were at sea, successfully scouring it of French vessels. The governor-general himself was at Madras masterfully directing every step in advance, and acting in cordial association with the governor, the son of the great Clive. On 3 February General Harris moved from Vellore, and General Stewart from Kannanur. On 8 March Stewart defeated Tipu at Sedasere, and on the 27th he was again defeated at Mallavelly, by Harris. The raja of Coorg,[1] Tipu's bitter enemy, witnessed the achievements of Stewart with enthusiasm. Arthur Wellesley was in command of the contingent from Hyderabad, largely troops of the Nizam. Tipu was utterly out-generalled, and could do no more than turn to bay in his capital. The English armies met before Seringapatam early in April, and on 17 April the siege began. The English were compelled to hurry operations owing to the lateness of the season and the inadequacy of supplies—then a common fault in the organisation of all South Indian campaigns. A letter of General Harris dated 7 May describes the siege, and the assault and capture on 4 May. By the evening of the 3rd the walls were so battered that a practicable breach was made, and the assault was decided on for the 4th in the heat of the day. At one o'clock the English troops, with two hundred men from the Nizam's forces, crossed the Kavari under very heavy fire, passed the glacis and ditch and stormed the ramparts and the breaches made by the artillery; Major-General David Baird, who had been a prisoner of Tipu's till the Treaty of Mangalore, was in command. Tipu's body was found in a heap of hundreds of dead. His son, formerly a hostage, surrendered himself, and the Muhammadan dynasty was at an end.

Tipu was regarded by ignorant pamphleteers in England as a martyr to English aggression, and James Mill in later years attempted to vindicate his ability if not his character. But his Indian contemporaries rejoiced at his fall. He was a man of savage passions and vaulting ambition, whose capacities were not equal to his own estimation of his powers. He ruled, as a convinced Muhammadan, over a population of Hindus, whose ancient sovereigns his father had

[1] See Wilks's *Sketches*, III, 493.

dispossessed and whom he had bitterly persecuted. The district around Mysore abhorred him, and though the English found signs of prosperity within his dominions these were certainly due to no inspiration of his own. His character was a contrast to that of his father, who was wise and tolerant.

"Hyder", says Colonel Wilks,[1] "was seldom wrong and Tipu seldom right in his estimate of character....Unlimited persecution united in detestation of his rule every Hindu in his dominions. In the Hindu no degree of merit was a passport to his favour; in the Mussulman no crime could ensure displeasure....Tipu in an age when persecution only survived in history revived its worst terrors....He was barbarous where severity was vice, and indulgent where it was virtue. If he had qualities fitted for Empire they were strangely equivocal; the disqualifications were obvious and unquestionable, and the decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysore, 'that Hyder was born to create an Empire, Tipu to lose one'."

In a letter from Thomas Munro to his father[2] facts are given which support a judgment fully as severe. It is shown that through the means Tipu had taken to strengthen his power, by employing men of different races and being himself responsible for their payment, and by keeping the families of his chief officers as hostages at Seringapatam, he had made the stability of his government depend entirely upon himself, and with him it collapsed; and "also he was so suspicious and cruel that none of his subjects, none probably of his children, lamented his fall".

At the fall of Seringapatam practically the entire sovereignty of Mysore fell into the English hands. How was this power to be exercised? Mornington was not disposed to annex the whole, as he might well have done. Nor did he desire to add to obligations which it was not easy either to estimate or to discharge. He wrote that

owing to the inconveniences and embarrassments which resulted from the whole system of government and conflicting authorities in Oudh, the Carnatic and Mysore, I resolved to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers.

Thus the family of Tipu was swept into obscurity but with ample provision and dignity. Then came provision for all the territory that had been conquered. Mornington set himself at once to the serious task of providing for the future government of the country. He decided

that the establishment of a central and separate government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Marathas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties, to secure to the Company a less invidious and more efficient share of revenue, resources, commercial advantage and military strength than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power, and to afford the most favourable prospect of a general and permanent tranquillity in India.

[1] Wilks, *op. cit.* III, 464.

[2] Gleig, *Life*, I, 228 *sqq.*: a most interesting and valuable letter.

Thus Tipu's territory was divided, leaving only a small and compact possession for the descendants of the ancient Hindu rajas, of which the Company was to undertake the defence, occupying any forts it might choose. Beyond that, the division of territory had results of considerable political as well as geographical importance. To the English dominions were added the province of Kanara, the districts of Coimbatore, Wynad and Dharapuram, and all the land below the Ghats between the coast of Malabar and the Carnatic, "securing", said Wellesley, "an uninterrupted tract of territory from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea-coast of the kingdom of Mysore". The fortresses commanding all the heads of the passes above the Ghats were also secured, and, in addition, the fortress of Seringapatam. Thus it was made certain that no ruler should arise in Mysore like Tipu who could intervene in a contest of sea-power, or hold out a hand to European enemies of England to give a landing for troops which might threaten British power in the south of India, as it had been threatened in the days of La Bourdonnais and Dupleix.

This rearrangement greatly increased the responsibilities of the presidency of Madras, a fact which the directors of the East India Company did not at once appreciate. The governors and the council were not generally men of wide vision or practical sagacity. Lord Clive was a useful subordinate to the governor-general; not so much could have been said of all his successors. Nor was the military organisation of Madras satisfactory; it took a long time to provide a permanent system of recruiting, commissariat, and command. Sir Hilaro Barlow, afterwards governor-general, had a difficult task with regard to the army, and it may at least be said that he discharged it with greater wisdom than several of his contemporaries. In Sir Thomas Munro, however, the Company soon found a servant of the very highest ability, and so long as he was in authority in the province of Madras the improvement was rapid and continuous.

> "Perhaps there never lived a European more intimately acquainted", says his biographer, Gleig,[1] "with the characters, habits, manners and institutions of the natives of India, because there never lived a European who at once possessed better opportunities of acquiring such knowledge, and made better use of them."

It was not till twenty years later than the conquest of Mysore that he became governor of Madras, but his growing influence over Southern India can be traced in all the years which intervene. On the acquisition of Kanara he was its governor, and he made a deep impression on the inhabitants of that rugged and wild district which stood between the Portuguese, the Marathas, and the sea. It was a time when the power of the Marathas began visibly to decline. The share of Tipu's territory which was offered them they refused, the Peshwa already scheming for an occasion of attack upon the English;

[1] Preface to *Life*, p. xii.

the land then was divided between the English and the Nizam. As the Marathas became more clearly alienated from the English—though, as will be seen later, the process was not continuous, the Nizam—again with interruptions—became more definitely their ally. The Treaty of Hyderabad, Mornington's first achievement in constructive statesmanship, had brought the Nizam close to the English government in India; his aid in the Mysore War had not been inconsiderable and now his position was consolidated by the acquisition of the districts of Gurramkonda and Gooty and the land down to Chitaldrug, and other border fortresses of Mysore. Thus the process begun in the Treaty of Hyderabad was continued after the overthrow of Tipu, and the Nizam was established as a strong and independent support of the English in the south. In the words of Arthur Wellesley a few years later, "our principal ally, the Nizam, was restored to us"; and affairs in the south were placed "on foundations of strength calculated to afford lasting peace and security".

Towards this security the settlement of Mysore was an essential factor. Mornington had for some time considered the wisest course to adopt. He felt that a native state must remain; but that it should be unable to embroil itself and its neighbours with the Company. When Mornington announced the results of the war and the peace to the directors of the Company, he said:

> Happily as I estimate the immediate and direct advantages of revenue and of commercial and military resources, I consider the recent settlement of Mysore to be equally important to your interests, in its tendency to increase your political consideration among the native powers, together with your means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order among your subjects and dependents, and of defending your possessions against any enemy whether Asiatic or European.

And the settlement was this. The family of the ancient Hindu rajas was searched for, discovered, restored. There was a story years before of how Hyder selected the fittest child of a baby family to be its head, though he had never given him real power. Among the children he threw a number of baubles, of fruits and ornaments, and among them concealed a dagger: the child who chose this was to be the chief.

> "In 1799 the future raja", says Colonel Wilks,[1] "was himself a child of five years of age, but the widow of that raja from whom Hyder usurped the government still remained, to confer with the commissioners and to regulate with distinguished propriety the renewed honours of her house."

By the change of dynasty the sentiments of the Hindu people of Mysore were attached to the British power which had restored to them the representatives of their ancient religion and government, and the stability of the new government was secured by

> the uncommon talents of Purniya (the very able financial minister of Hyder) in the office of minister to the new raja, and that influence was directed to proper objects by the control reserved to the English Government by them in the provisions of the treaty.

[1] Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, III, 470.

By the treaty of Seringapatam, 1 September, 1798, between the Company and "Maharaja Mysore Krishnaraja Udayar Bahadur, Raja of Mysore" the raja was to pay an annual subsidy, and if this were unpaid the Company might order any internal reforms and bring under its own direct management any parts of his country; and the raja undertook to refrain from correspondence with any foreign state and not to admit any European to his service.

The Earl of Mornington, for this achievement, was created Marquis Wellesley in the peerage of Ireland, an honour which he described as a "double-gilt potato". He was indeed highly indignant at so slight a recognition of such considerable services.

The settlement of the territory newly acquired by the British, and the establishment of the government of Krishnaraja, the new ruler, a child of seven, proceeded apace. On 24 February, 1800, the governor-general sent Dr Francis Buchanan to make an extensive survey of

> the dominions of the present raja of Mysore, and the country acquired by the Company in the late war from the Sultan, as well as that part of Malabar which the Company annexed to their own territories in the former war under Marquis Cornwallis.[1]

Drawn up by the Marquis Wellesley himself, who during all his rule was keenly interested in Indian agriculture, the instructions show the care with which the governor-general provided for his successors full information as to the condition of the country. Agriculture was the chief subject investigated, in such detail as "esculent vegetables" and the methods of their cultivation, including irrigation, the different breeds of cattle, the farms and the nature of their tenure, the natural products of the land, the use of arts, manufactures, medicine, mines, quarries, minerals, the climate and the ethnology of the country. The record of the investigation is a work of very great value and extraordinary minuteness, and throws considerable light on the cruel and erratic government of Tipu as well as on the just and well-organised system introduced by Colonel Close, the British Resident at Seringapatam. The thoroughness of the investigation, with the large tracts of country it covered, shows the spirit in which the English rulers entered on their task, and justifies the statement made by Arthur Wellesley[2] six years later.

> The state in which their government is to be found at this moment, the cordial and intimate unity which exists between the Government of Mysore and the British authorities, and the important strength and real assistance which it has afforded to the British Government in all its recent difficulties, afford the strongest proofs of the wisdom of this stipulation of the treaty,

namely, "the most extensive and indisputable powers" which the governor-general had reserved to the Company by the provision "for the interference of the British Government in all the concerns" of

[1] The results were published in 1807 in three volumes.

[2] Mem. by Sir A. Wellesley 1806, *ap.* Owen's edition of *Wellesley Despatches*, p. lxxxii.

the Mysore state "when such interference might be necessary". This satisfactory result, however, was not achieved immediately or without a period of difficult guerrilla warfare. Accounts of this are to be found in the letters of Arthur Wellesley and Thomas Munro.

Though Tipu's sons remained in retirement and Seringapatam was tranquil under the wise government of Colonel Close, the districts at a distance from control were soon overrun by freebooting bands. The chief of these was led by Dundia Wagh, a Maratha by birth but born in Mysore. This vigorous and savage personage had been trusted by Hyder, but degraded, compulsorily converted to Islam, and imprisoned, till the very day of the capture of Seringapatam, by Tipu. When he escaped he collected a band of desperate men and thought to establish for himself, as Hyder had done, a kingdom in the south. Arthur Wellesley pursued him, step by step, taking and destroying forts, clearing districts, endeavouring to force the bandit into the open field. The private letters of Colonel Wellesley to Thomas Munro show the difficulty of the task which he at last successfully accomplished, and the determined sagacity with which he achieved it. Dundia had almost established a kingdom: he was extraordinarily energetic, capable, and acute. But he was no match for the persistent vigilance of Wellesley. Employing troops from Goa, the pledge of the firm alliance with Portugal which he was afterwards to vindicate and cement, Wellesley pursued the foe till he was defeated and killed. Alike in the personal letters to his friends and in the official dispatches Wellesley showed the calm unbroken perseverance which was to make him the greatest English general of his age. The tranquillity of the Mysore kingdom, which has been practically unbroken for a century, was due to him, it may well be said, more than to any other man. Without the brilliancy and the political genius of his elder brother, Arthur Wellesley had qualities which endured longer and which brought him at length to the highest place in his country's service. When he became famous in the Spanish Peninsula the portrait painted of him as a young general in India was early sought for reproduction; and this in a figure represented the beginnings of his great military career. The rough work of Indian warfare supplied lessons which he never forgot, and a study of it is indispensable to the understanding of his later achievements.

The governor-general as a statesman, David Baird and Harris as soldiers, Close as administrator, played great parts in the story of conquest and settlement, but Arthur Wellesley is the real hero of the re-establishment of Mysore as a Hindu state.

CHAPTER XXI

OUDH AND THE CARNATIC, 1785–1801

I. Oudh, 1785–1801

THE condition of Oudh under Sir John Macpherson very speedily aroused the suspicion and then the indignation of Cornwallis. Corruption was rife, perhaps even more flagrantly than in the Carnatic. Cornwallis vented his anger in a letter to Dundas.[1] "His government", he said, was "a system of the dirtiest jobbing—a view shared by Sir John Shore[2]—and his conduct in Oudh was as impeachable, and more disgusting to the Vizier than Mr Hastings'." To Lord Southampton he wrote a year later[3] that as soon as he arrived in India he had in Macpherson's presence tied up his hands "against all the modes that used to be practised for providing for persons who were not in the Company's service, such as riding contracts, getting monopolies in Oudh, extorting money for them from the Vizier, etc.". Of his honest determination there could be no question, but he did not find it easy to carry out. Asaf-ud-daula was as corrupt as any native prince of his time could possibly be, and, so far as it was possible for foreigners to judge, as popular. He was certainly as cunning and as determined. In 1787[4] Cornwallis wrote a description of him to Dundas as extorting

> every rupee he can from his ministers, to squander in debaucheries, cock-fighting, elephants and horses. He is said to have a thousand of the latter in his stables though he never uses them. The ministers on their part are fully as rapacious as their master; their object is to cheat and plunder the country. They charge him seventy lacs for the maintenance of troops to enforce the collections, the greater part of which do not exist, and the money supposed to pay them goes into the pockets of Almas Ali Khan and Hyder Beg.

It was with no favourable ear, therefore, that the governor-general listened to the request of the wazir for the alteration of the arrangements made by Hastings. The claim was that the temporary quartering of the British (Fatehgarh) brigade should be withdrawn, leaving only one brigade of the Company's troops in Oudh, and that his "oppressive pecuniary burdens" should be reduced. Cornwallis had a conference with the wazir's minister, Haidar Beg, and then (15 April, 1787) addressed a letter to him in which he offered to reduce the tribute from seventy-four to fifty lakhs, if this should be punctually paid, but he refused to withdraw the troops from Fatehgarh. The

[1] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 371.
[2] *Life of Lord Teignmouth*, I, 128.
[3] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 445.
[4] *Idem*, p. 247.

condition of the nawab's own troops was a standing menace to the security of the British territory; Cornwallis demanded that they should be greatly reduced.

"I was obliged", wrote Cornwallis to the Directors,[1] "by a sense of public duty to state to him my clear opinion that two brigades in Oudh would be indispensably necessary for the mutual interest and safety of both governments. The loss of Colonel Baillie's and several other detachments during the late war has removed some part of that awe in which the natives formerly stood at the name of British troops. It will therefore be a prudent maxim never to hazard, if it can be avoided, so small a body as a brigade of Sepoys with a weak European regiment at so great a distance as the Doab; and from the confused state of the upper provinces it would be highly inadvisable for us to attempt the defence of the Vizier's extensive territory without a respectable force."

His minute on the subject, rightly regarded by Sir John Malcolm[2] as a very clear view of the connection between the Company and the wazir, states his opinion that it "now stands upon the only basis calculated to render it permanent". He relied for the continuance of the condition of affairs, which he viewed so optimistically, upon the fidelity and justice of the nawab's very able minister, exposed though he was "to the effects of caprice and intrigue". Sir John Malcolm regarded the arrangement "as happy as the personal character of Asaf-ud-daula admitted of its being". So it remained in outward tranquillity at least, unshaken by an insurrection by the Afghans still—in spite of the first Rohilla War, so greatly exaggerated in England—remaining in Rohilkhand. There was a sharp contest, in which British forces supported the nawab. The end was the restoration of their possessions to the Afghans under Hamid 'Ali Khan. The restoration of tranquillity tended to the maintenance of the nawab's administration undisturbed by the very necessary intervention of the Company; but Sir John Shore was fully aware of the condition of affairs. He wrote to Dundas (12 May, 1795)[3] that the dominions of Asaf-ud-daula were

in the precise condition to tempt a rebellion. Disaffection and anarchy prevail throughout; and nothing but the presence of our two brigades prevents insurrection. The Nawab is in a state of bankruptcy, without a sense of his danger, and without a wish to guard against it. The indolence and dissipation of his character are too confirmed to allow the expectation of any reformation on his part;

and the death of Haidar Beg in 1794 had put an end to all hopes of reform. In 1797 Asaf-ud-daula died. Early in the year Sir John Shore had paid a visit to Lucknow, of which a letter of his aide-de-camp and brother-in-law preserves a vivid impression.[4] The nawab seemed still to be "the most splendid emanation of the Great Mogul now remaining", but he had "an open mouth, a dull intellect, a quick propensity to mischief and vice", and "the amusements of Tiberius at Capua must, in comparison with those of their feasts, have

[1] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 276.
[2] *History of India*, I, 110.
[3] *Life*, I, 332.
[4] *Bengal Past and Present*, XVI, pt II, 105 *sqq*.

been elegant and refined". He had still an able minister who acted for him at Calcutta, had translated Newton's *Principia* into Arabic, was a great mathematician, and if he had had sufficient influence with the nawab could have "made his country a paradise".

Lucknow at the time Shore visited it contained at least two persons of peculiar interest. The nawab himself, Asaf-ud-daula, with all the faults of idleness and luxury, in many respects ignorant, and in all subtle, cruel and unsound, was yet, after the fashion of his age, a man of cultured tastes. The remarkable building, the great Imambarah, whose stucco magnificence still, after long years and many dangers, remains impressive, was built by him in 1784, its great gate after the model (it is said) of the gate of the Sublime Porte at Constantinople, which it far surpasses in dignity. In the great hall the remains of the nawab still lie under a plain uninscribed slab. Another memorial of that time is the Martinière, the college founded by General Claude Martin, which was his own house till he died and for which Asaf-ud-daula is said to have paid him a million sterling. Martin from 1776 had been in the service of the nawabs of Oudh; he had made a fortune out of their necessities; he had been a maker of ordnance and a speculator in indigo, and he still retained his position in the Company's military service; he lived till 1800, and was buried, with plainness equal to the nawab's, in the house he had built.

The nawab died a few weeks after Shore's visit, which might seem to have been in vain. At first the governor-general recognised Wazir 'Ali, in spite of some doubts as to his legitimacy, as his successor. Asaf-ud-daula had acknowledged him as his son; there was also the sanction of the late nawab's mother, and appearance of satisfaction among the people. But it was not long before all these appearances were reversed. Shore re-examined the question of right, and came to an opposite conclusion. "Ali", his biographer says, "was surrounded by a gang of miscreants." Other and more important old ladies shrieked their protests into the governor-general's ears. The good man was terribly confused.

> "In Eastern countries", he said, "as there is no principle there can be no confidence. Self-interest is the sole object of all, and suspicion and distrust prevail under the appearance and profession of the sincerest intimacy and regard."

General Craig, who had for some time commanded the British forces in Oudh, and Sir Alured Clarke, the commander-in-chief, warned him of the danger he was in if he changed his decision, and Tafazzul Hussain Khan, with agitated emphasis, told him "this is Hindustan, not Europe: and affairs cannot be done here as there". Lucknow showed every sign of an outbreak, and in the city were "many respectable families who live under the protection of British influence". But Shore took the risks, declared the deposition of 'Ali and the substitution of his uncle, Sa'adat, and escorted him through the

city mounted on his own elephant. Not content with declaring the spuriousness of 'Ali, he included in the same disgrace all the other sons of Asaf-ud-daula. On 21 January, 1798, Sa'adat 'Ali, now on the *masnad*, entered into a treaty which considerably strengthened the English power. This seemed to be necessary through the recurring threats of an invasion from Afghanistan by Zaman Shah, of whose power and ferocity the English letters of the time are full. He had already occupied Lahore, and, though this had not been followed up, it showed the weakness of the northern frontier. At home as well as in India the danger was thought to be grave. Dundas, writing on 18 March, 1799, regarded it as of the first importance to guard against it, and proposed to encourage and foment "distractions and animosities" in his own territory to keep Zaman Shah employed, and was tempted, he said, to direct that our own forces and those of the wazir should never go beyond his territories and our own, so as to be ready to repel any attack.

The treaty may have been necessary and just; but it was certainly a departure from the policy, if not the principles, associated with its author. Yet the directors evidently approved it, and the ministry gave Shore an Irish peerage, as Lord Teignmouth—a precedent followed, and bitterly resented, in the case of his successor. The terms of the treaty included an increase to seventy-six lakhs of the annual payment to the Company by the wazir of Oudh; the placing of an English garrison in the great city of Allahabad; the increase of British troops to 10,000, who were given the exclusive charge of the defence of the country, and the strict limitation of the wazir's own troops; and finally the nawab agreed to have no dealings with other powers without the consent of the English.

The praise of the treaty was not universal. Burke seemed for a while to be taking the war-path again. There was a threat of impeachment; and, indeed, Shore seemed to have been at least as autocratic as Hastings. "I am playing, as the gamesters say, *le grand jeu*", he said, "and with the same sensation as a man who apprehends losing his all." But nothing came of it. Wazir 'Ali had undoubtedly been overawed by force: a proceeding against which, in the case of the Carnatic, Shore had himself piously protested, and Sa'adat, equally under pressure, agreed to pay for any increase of English troops that might be necessary. It was the last act of Lord Teignmouth as governor-general, and certainly the most vigorous, but it was no more effective than his less emphatic actions.

When Mornington arrived in India the condition of Oudh was represented to him as tranquil. The directors in May, 1799, thought that Shore's settlement bade fair to be permanent. They were not disturbed by the subsidy, during the first year of Sa'adat 'Ali, being in arrear; yet this was the very eventuality for which Shore's treaty had provided a remedy. They were ready even to counter-order the

established integrity" to attend first to other work.[1] In the mind of Cornwallis the administration of justice was of greater importance than that of revenue. Perhaps he did not realise how closely revenue administration, like that of trade, was bound up with the welfare of the people. Other reasons also were advanced—above all the encouragement it would give to the development of the land and the reclamation of the waste—but the fact that it would make possible better judicial administration seems the final factor. With such explanations, therefore, the ten-years' settlement was sent home for the decision of the point of difference between Cornwallis and Shore. At the end of 1789 Shore left Bengal for England, so the authorities at home could consult him if they wished.

The completion of the Decennial Settlement took longer than Cornwallis had expected. It was not until the autumn of 1791 that a full code of regulations could be issued: and in some districts the system did not come into force until nearly two more years had passed.

By the end of 1790, however, the final arrangements were in sight, and Cornwallis fully intended to return home at the beginning of the next year. He was well satisfied with his work. He had laid the basis of a sound system by his administrative purification; his reforms of justice, of revenue, and of trade had gone far enough to show the character of the structure which he had planned. What was now needed was to carry out schemes already started; and to maintain the principles of no patronage, and no corruption: and further to develop the judicial and administrative systems. But from the autumn of 1790 until June, 1792, he was absorbed in the Mysore War. Then he had fifteen months of peace, till he left for home in October, 1793.

These last years, however, saw the culmination of his work in several directions. They were the years of the proclamation of the Permanent Settlement of the land revenue, and of the promulgation of comprehensive regulations regarding the police system.

Of the first it is not necessary to say much. The minute of 10 February, 1790, announcing the Decennial Settlement, had contemplated its transformation into one for perpetuity. A perpetual settlement had formally been promised "provided such continuance should meet with the approbation of the...court...of directors... and not otherwise". The decision lay therefore with the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. The answer came in a letter from the court of 29 August, 1792. But the decision had been reached by the board. Dundas waited for a year, fully conscious of the importance of the matter, and in the end he went to Pitt for the decision. At Pitt's house in Wimbledon they went into the details and the principles of the plan, for ten days, and Charles Grant (the commercial adviser of Cornwallis) was with them "a great part of the time".

[1] Minute by Cornwallis, 10 February, 1790. Printed *ap.* Ross, *op. cit.* II, 459–74.

They decided in favour of permanence. In principle the matter was prejudged; for the idea of permanence lay behind the agitation of the 'eighties. But respect for Shore made Dundas hesitate; and he and Pitt seem to have been genuinely undecided in 1791.

The authorisation reached Cornwallis in 1793, and the change was immediately announced by proclamation (22 March). All that remained therefore was to watch the working out of this contested system. So far the full effect had not been seen. Some of the dangers of the system were, however, apparent in the frequent sales of zamindari estates and in the oppressions of sub-tenants by the zamindars. Regulations in 1793 attempted to deal with these, but without much effect.

One accidental result followed the settlement. In 1793, Cornwallis was about to leave Bengal: and at last a successor had been found for him. The choice was Shore. The man who was to see the first results of the Permanent Settlement, was the man who had opposed its permanence. And the decision was deliberate. Cornwallis had written home in 1789 that their differences had been marked by great good humour. Dundas and Pitt, in their discussions with Shore, were struck with his "talents, industry and candour". And so Shore was appointed to take the lead at Calcutta, expressing himself characteristically as ready to step aside and "become second in Council" if on further enquiry someone else seemed more suitable. It is the best defence of the administration which Cornwallis "purified" that it contained such men as Shore and Grant, who were willing to do their best to ensure the good working of schemes of which they disapproved in principle. If not perhaps the qualification best suited to a governor-general, the humble-minded zeal for duty that characterised Shore was an excellent testimony to the Bengal service.

The authorisation of the Permanent Settlement reached Cornwallis in time to head the list of great reforms that mark the year 1793. It is regulation I of the long series of regulations passed by the Supreme Council on 1 May, and known collectively as "the Cornwallis Code".

For by this time Cornwallis had prepared the series of changes that mark his second period of reform. Some, indeed most, of them were the result of his earlier work: either elaborating or reversing what had been done. The chief new reform was the reorganisation of the system of police. Cornwallis had long realised that the police system of Calcutta was defective, and he had drafted a scheme for reform as far back as 1788. He thought, however, at this time that his legislative powers were not sufficient for this, and he proceeded therefore by drafting an act to be laid before parliament. As this, however, involved considerable delay, he decided at the end of 1788 to appoint a committee to enquire into the complaints that had been made. As the result, a scheme was drawn up, and it was published in October, 1791. The regulations were said to be provisional,

pending the reply from home relative to the passing of an act of parliament.

The regulations applied only to the town of Calcutta. By the new system, superintendents of police were appointed, with functions confined to the maintenance of order and to the arrest of suspected persons. They were no longer to share the attention of the superintendents with magisterial and judicial functions. By subsequent regulations of December, 1791, duties were defined and salaries fixed.

The next stage was the application of the new system to the whole province. This, the work of April to December, 1792, involved a further exemplification of the principle of employing Europeans in the place of Indians. The zamindars were relieved of their responsibilities for maintaining the peace and were ordered to disband their local police forces. In each district small areas were to be portioned off, and placed under the control of a *daroga* or superintendent, under the supervision of the Company's representative in the district. These regulations were issued provisionally in December, 1792. They were accompanied by a project for the erection of gaols in all the collectorships of the province. The police regulations were provisionally confirmed from home early in 1793, and were embodied in the general restatement of the regulations, the Cornwallis Code of May, 1793.

The regulations of 1 May, 1793, covered the whole field of administration. In many respects they were of importance merely as defining the existing system. This work of definition Cornwallis and the directors agreed was of first importance. His reforms were in a precarious position if they depended only upon personal support. One year of negligence would destroy the whole system. The exhaustive regulations of 1793 aimed at stereotyping the rules which Cornwallis had introduced. They dealt with the commercial system, with civil and criminal justice, with the police and with the land revenue. While restating the existing position, they contemplated further changes, for by regulation xx special procedure was laid down for the proposal of new regulations by the officials charged with working the present system. And, even where in substance the regulations restated former rules, minor alterations showed a readiness to profit by experience.

Among the changes effected by the code one of the most important was the separation of the judicial from the revenue administration. The junction of the two, which had given unprecedented power to the collector from 1787 to 1790, had been due to the need both of economy and of simplification. In the hierarchy of the administration the collector had become by 1790 the bottle-neck through which all lines of control must pass. Though in all his functions responsible to some superior authority, he was in practice virtually independent. As early as 1790 Cornwallis realised the dangers of this position, even

though he was then making it still more powerful. As it stood, nothing but the character of the collectors was a real safeguard to the subject. He had long been of opinion, he wrote, that this was a mistake.

> ...No system will ever be carried into effect so long as the personal qualifications of the individuals that may be appointed to superintend it, form the only security for the due exercise of it.

In his view the conclusion of the Permanent Settlement was a necessary preliminary to change: and it was not therefore until 1793 that change could be made. In the regulations of May detailed instructions prescribed the action of the Company's servants, and a system of check and counter-check was substituted for the quasi-independence of 1787. By regulation II of 1793 the Board of Revenue and the collectors were deprived of all judicial powers. The new courts of 1790—of mal adalat—for the trial of revenue causes were abolished. These causes were transferred to the other district courts, those of diwanni adalat. These, too, had hitherto been presided over by the collector. But now the offices of judge and collector were separated. Judges were to be appointed to preside over the courts, renamed *zillah* or district courts, responsible for all civil cases. From them appeal was to lie to four provincial courts of appeal, situated, like the criminal courts, at Patna, Dacca, Murshidabad and Calcutta. From them in the larger causes appeal lay to the Supreme Council in its capacity as a court of sadr diwanni adalat. Over each of these provincial courts were three English judges. And these judges, it was provided, were also to preside over the criminal courts of circuit stationed at the same towns. The administration of justice, both civil and criminal, was therefore vested in the same hands. To make the system of checks upon the revenue administration more complete, it was provided that

> the collectors of revenue and their officers, and indeed all the officers of Government, shall be amenable to the courts for acts done in their official capacities, and that Government itself, in cases in which it may be a party with its subjects in matters of property, shall submit its rights to be tried in these courts under the existing laws and regulations.[1]

In the reforms of the early period the chief aims had been economy, purification and simplification. Cornwallis had come to India assured that to purify the Company's service it was essential that the holders of office should be Englishmen, adequately remunerated, and not foisted on the Company by influence. In the interests of economy and simplification he had given to these Englishmen almost unparalleled powers. It seems to have been felt that while he was in office no great danger would result. But now in this second period of reform the outstanding aim was the safeguarding of the Indian from oppression. Cornwallis himself had completed the process by which Bengal swarmed with Englishmen in commercial or administrative

[1] Ross, *op. cit.* II, 558.

offices; he seems to have reflected that it was at least necessary that they should not be free to add to the oppression of Indians the old practice of making a fortune. So the Company's servants and all other English residents were to be subject to the courts. The revenue and judicial systems were separated, and the collector of revenue confined rigidly to the position suggested by his name

Such a change operating without delay might well be expected to rouse discontent in the Company's service. But Cornwallis was able to allay this. The new district courts required judges, and it was part of his scheme that the collectors of the district, chosen formerly as being "of the first abilities and most established integrity", were transferred to this office. As judges of the *zillah* courts they exercised jurisdiction in revenue and other civil causes: upon them was conferred the magisterial power of the collector. The revenue duties, which they left, devolved upon the assistants in the various districts. Thus, under the new system, judicial administration was marked as separate from, and as of much more importance than, revenue and the executive functions associated with it.

The new system then created three branches of the service, instead of two. The "commercial line" remained unchanged: the commercial residents lived still at the various factories or stations, responsible to the Board of Trade, and ultimately to the Supreme Council. The revenue service, shorn of the important duty of the assessment, was now the sole function of the new collectors of revenue. They were responsible as before to the Board of Revenue, and then to the Supreme Council. The district judges exercised civil jurisdiction and the petty criminal jurisdiction of the magistrate. They were responsible to the judges of the provincial courts in civil causes, and to those same judges in the courts of circuit in criminal causes. The system did not lack simplicity. It was not extravagant and it observed the important principle of responsibility towards the inhabitants which had been one of the chief characteristics of the new policy Cornwallis came in to enforce.

With the Cornwallis Code the work of Cornwallis in India was ended. But he was fully aware that it was only a beginning. He had set up the machinery: established the recognition of certain principles: but there was still no provision of a code of law. The resolutions of December, 1790, and the regulations of 1793, had done something to amend what seemed the greatest deficiencies of the existing system. The law administered remained, however, in its main features unchanged. The regulations of 1793 improved the position a little by defining the qualifications of the Indian interpreters of the law, who were attached to the various courts. But Cornwallis judged rightly that no greater innovation was possible at present. "A good system of laws" was a thing more hard to come by even than "a due administration of them, and a well-established

peace". Sir William Jones was preparing the way by his treatise on Indian laws. Cornwallis hoped that something would be done by the building up of a case-made law on the findings of judges of the courts. The developments of the future alone could fulfil the aim of Cornwallis. He had created the machinery: upon the spirit that informed it depended its success.

For twenty years after the retirement of Cornwallis, the system of his code remained substantially unaltered. The periodical renewal of the Company's Charter was due in 1793, but it took place without any of the close scrutiny of administration which had heralded the acts of 1773 and 1784. Cornwallis himself was of the view that little real change was necessary; and the Company kept for another twenty years its dual character as a commercial monopolist, and an instrument of administration. It is in the events of this period that the strength and weakness of the Cornwallis Code are most clearly seen.

The continued observance of Cornwallis's principles of administration was due to some extent to the pressure of political cares. But the lack of revolutionary change was in large measure a deliberate policy. The preference for "steady adherence to almost any one system" had become an accepted tenet: and the rulers of British India did not attempt either a reversion to older ideas or the formulation of new ones. The permanent settlement of the land revenue, the severance of judicial from revenue administration, and the restriction of Indians to offices of lesser responsibility were faithfully observed by Cornwallis's successors. In the first half of the period, indeed, the respect for the Cornwallis Code was so great that it was introduced to the furthest degree possible into the new lands of the Ganges basin, and even applied to Madras. Yet even the greatest reverence could not hide the defects of the code, nor the utmost piety avoid some attempt to correct them. The regulations of the period 1793 to 1813 are filled with amendments. Some were necessitated by the faulty wording of the code, for which Barlow rather than Cornwallis was responsible; but many were due to the defects and the rigidity of Cornwallis's own principles. In the last three years of his rule he had added distrust of the covenanted servants of the Company to his initial dislike of Indian agency. He deliberately placed confidence in the system rather than in individuals, and he seems to have ignored the fact that systems, like individuals, are bound to be faulty. The great fault of his system was that he confounded courts of justice with justice itself. In a land where the laws were still vague and unknown, and the new system of administration was alien to the ideas of the natives, the multiplication of court-made justice was no advantage in itself. In theory, the Indians were protected by courts of justice from the oppression of officials: zamindars and talukdars against revenue collectors, ryots against zamindars. But the courts were both unsuited and inadequate for the task. Delays were so serious that

suits, it was said, were not decided in the normal course of a lifetime. Protection of this kind was not of much value, and, without the gravest unconcern for the welfare of the people, it was impossible to disregard the need for reform.

The changes of the period 1793 to 1813 were mainly in two directions, in connection with the Permanent Settlement, and with the speeding up of civil and criminal justice. The reform of the system of police was left over to the next period, but measures, on the whole successful, were taken to deal with dacoits.

The general approval of the Permanent Settlement by the authorities in India and at home did not hide the defects that resulted from the system. It was soon found that the evil of "balances" continued as before: that the efforts made to prevent the oppression of tenants and ryots led only to the complete blocking of the courts of justice: that the attempts made to realise the revenue without personal coercion of the zamindars resulted in frequent sales of estates. Moreover the provision that talukdars could claim exemption from the zamindars' control increased the business before the courts, and led to the cutting up of estates.

The measures taken by Shore were in two directions. A regulation of 1795 modified the rules as to the actions of zamindars in collecting rents from their tenants and ryots. In effect, their powers of coercion were increased. Secondly, additional civil courts were established, and additional powers granted to the Indians who were responsible for deciding minor causes. By these two measures it was hoped that the "balances" would diminish and sales become less frequent. Above all, they would remedy the existing state of affairs by which "the determination of a cause could not...be expected...in the ordinary course of the plaintiff's life". Despite these measures, however, the delays in the settlement of suits continued; and so did sales and the dismemberment of estates. The latter were due to the numerous claims of exemption from the control of zamindars on the ground of talukdari rights, and, in 1801, Lord Wellesley met this by a regulation giving a date after which no such claim could be recognised. The evil of sales was not so soon settled. A regulation passed by Wellesley in 1799 gave still further powers of coercion to the zamindars, and over them the former practice of arrest was reinstated. The latter measure was a return to the procedure of Cornwallis, the regulation of 1793 making the zamindar liable to arrest as well as to the sale of his land having been amended by Shore. Now, in 1799, the practice of personal coercion was restored, again with the object of checking the flood of sales. Even so, Lord Minto found the same defect, and attempted further to restrict sales by a regulation of 1807. In fact the position was intrinsically difficult, and no mere regulation would alter it. By Lord Minto's time the difficulties were beginning

to grow less, but this was due more to the greater goodwill of the zamindars than to the revised regulations. So long as the system was regarded with suspicion the difficulties continued. In fact it is clear that in the years following its establishment the Permanent Settlement was neither profitable to government nor popular with the people. Such advantages as it had did not begin to operate until a later time.

In his advocacy of the Permanent Settlement, Cornwallis had put high among the advantages the freeing of the Company's servants from their absorption in revenue matters. In fact the difficulties in the working out of the system made the task of a collector much less simple than had been intended. Moreover, the mass of revenue suits filled the *zillah* courts beyond measure, and the old collectors who were now judges in these courts were certainly no freer than before to concern themselves with the interests of the people. One of the first and most pressing changes was therefore the limitation of suits. Various regulations with this object date from the years 1795–1802. They start with the reimposition of a fee upon registering a suit. This was the work of Shore, as was also the increase in the number of courts, and of Indians qualified to settle minor suits. Then, under Wellesley, the regulation as to appeals was stiffened, and assistant judges were appointed. The seriousness of the pressure extended even to the sadr court, and Lord Wellesley thought it undesirable that the governor-general and council should continue to act as its judges. A reorganisation therefore took place in 1805, and three judges took over the responsibilities of the court. The reforms of Wellesley, like those of Shore, did not stop the evil of delay. Lord Minto attempted further to remedy it. In 1807 the number of judges in the sadr court was increased to four: in 1811 it was enacted that the number of district judges should be increased as necessity occurred. Another expedient for remedying the congestion of business was the reorganisation of the system of circuit. According to the regulations of 1793 the provincial court of appeal was necessarily closed while the three judges went on circuit in their capacity of circuit judges. A regulation of 1794 provided for the unbroken session of the court. A further change of 1797 made possible the trial of appeal cases during the absence of the judges on circuit. Similar congestion in the trials of criminal cases was met by the increase in the power of magistrates in petty cases, and by conferring on them the right of delegating power to their assistants. Special rules for the punishment of dacoits were enacted in 1807.

None of the changes, however, did more than palliate the evils of the system. These evils were still formidable when they were submitted to the clear scrutiny of the next few years.

The unhesitating acquiescence in the Cornwallis system ended in 1808, and the work of reform started in earnest five years later.

Unlike the act of 1793 the Charter Act of 1813 made important changes in the position of the Company; and, again unlike that act, it was the result of the careful examination of several years. This new reform movement started on 11 March, 1808, when Robert Dundas moved the appointment of a select committee to enquire into the affairs of the Company. The committee issued five reports, and the fifth, issued in 1812, contained a detailed analysis of the Bengal system. Together with its appendices (and with some of the material contained in the second report of 1810), it is a valuable exposition of the history and the results of the Cornwallis Code. Above all, it makes clear some, if not all, of its defects.

The period of the Select Committee saw also the beginning of an enquiry in Bengal. The defects of the early system forced themselves especially on the judges of the courts, and in the summer of 1809 Lord Minto set on foot an enquiry as to the best lines of change. The investigation, however, was not completed by him. In 1813 he was succeeded by the Marquess of Hastings and it was in the ten years of his rule that the most thorough enquiry was made. In 1813 the Charter Act embodied one aspect of the new reform movement. On 9 November, 1814, a dispatch of the court of directors[1] emphasised the other.

The act of 1813 abolished the Company's monopoly of trade in India. The change in administration involved was not at first of much importance, since the monopoly and not the trade was abolished. The Board of Trade continued its work until 1835: the commercial residents remained at their factories, although their number decreased as the trade diminished. The most immediate alteration was at the presidency offices, for the act required a rigid separation of the commercial and administrative accounts.

The instructions of 9 November, 1814, prescribed a far more radical change. The pressure on the civil courts dictated a resumption by the collector of his powers in civil justice: the difficulties found in administering criminal justice and in the regulation of the police demanded that the collectors should once more have magisterial powers, and be responsible for the superintendence of the police. With the same object of improving the administration of justice, additional powers were to be given to Indian agents: and by increasing the criminal jurisdiction of the *zillah* judges the pressure on the higher courts would be relieved. At the same time the judicial interference of the collector would serve to increase the protection of the ryots; and with the latter object in view the Board of Control added a clause to the directors' dispatch urging the observance "in all possible cases" of "the principle of realising the revenues from the ryots themselves".

The recommendations of the dispatch were a denial of Cornwallis's principles in several respects. If they were carried out, the separation

[1] I.O. Records, Bengal Despatches, vol. LXVII, Judicial Despatch of 9 November, 1814.

of revenue from judicial administration would once more disappear. The collector would resume in some measure his position of 1790 as the bottle-neck through which all administration must pass. It was impossible to set back the Permanent Settlement as fully as this, but the dispatch showed at least that the authorities at home were alive to its dangers. Even the prejudice of Cornwallis against the employment of Indians was set aside. Such revolutionary measures did not commend themselves to the government of Bengal. The mistake of Cornwallis in carrying out his reform without sufficient investigation was not repeated. The new instructions were referred for opinion to all the boards and courts in Bengal, and to the principal servants of the Company. The repeated pressure of the court of directors did not obtain an answer to their dispatch until 22 February, 1827, and then in several respects the attitude of the government of India was more conservative than that of the authorities at home.

In the meantime, however, much had been done to modify the existing system. The period of Hastings's rule saw a number of regulations which improved the working and loosened the rigidity of Cornwallis's Code, while still paying rather more than lip-service to his principles.

The first changes were already accomplished when the reforming dispatch arrived.[1] Regulations of 1813 and 1814 had provided a fairly efficient police system for the large towns. In 1813, in the cities of Dacca, Murshidabad and Patna, and in 1814 at the headquarters of every district, police chowkidars were appointed under the control of the superintendents of police. The system was said to be working well in 1816. In 1817–19 the system of village watch was reformed. These police reforms were regarded by the government as the most urgent and the most satisfactory of the reforms.

The necessity for lessening the burden of the civil courts was met by a series of measures. The powers of Indian *munsiffs* and *sadar amins* in civil justice were defined in 1814 and extended in 1821. The doctrine that no class of Indian officers should be vested with final powers was, however, maintained, and other measures were necessary to remedy the position. The procedure in appeal was laid down by a regulation of 1814; and steps were taken to relieve the pressure in the higher courts. The burden of the Calcutta appeal court was diminished by the establishment of a separate court for the Western Provinces, but the most important steps were the appointment of a fifth judge and the systematic division of labour between the judges. The difficulties of the lesser courts were met partly by the establishment of special commissions to administer justice in the new parts of the province. But the more effective measures for relief were the increase in the number of *zillah* judges, and the transfer of certain

[1] I.O. Records, Bengal Letters Received, vol. LXX, Judicial Letter of 29 November, 1814.

judicial functions to the revenue authorities. The latter expedient was adopted very slowly, the proposal for the re-establishment of *mal adalats* being disregarded. In unsettled districts the judicial powers of the collectors were fairly extensive, but they were still slight in Bengal. There, the new powers were chiefly in connection with the sale of liquor and the manufacture and sale of opium. Even in Bengal, however, the collectors had some judicial business in connection with the land revenue. In 1819 the collectors were authorised to deal with cases relating to claims to freedom from assessment, and in 1822 to rectify errors committed at the time of sales.

Closely connected with the measures to facilitate civil justice, are those for the protection of the ryot. One of the chief reasons asserted by the directors (and emphasised by the Board of Control) for conferring power of civil justice on collectors had been the greater protection that would be given to the ryot. The increased function of the collectors would not be enough to secure this, and further measures were urged. What was done was rather to prevent further encroachment than to reverse what had already taken place. The offices of kanungo and patwari were re-established in the years 1816–19, and the institution of the *mufassal* record committees aimed at stabilising the position of the various classes concerned in land. This was furthered also by the comprehensive definition of the rights of the various classes concerned in land by regulation VIII of 1819. That more was not done was due to the fact that the Permanent Settlement made a satisfactory system impossible.

The aspect of the directors' instructions to which least observance was secured, was that which was concerned with criminal justice. The principles of Cornwallis here died hard. As late as 1827 the separation of the administration of criminal justice from the work of the revenue officers was looked upon with respect as the chief "principle on which the civil administration framed by Lord Cornwallis" was founded. The length of time that that system had been in force made in itself a substantial argument against reversing it, since the collectors of the 1820's were practically all without experience in judicial affairs. Another principle also was involved. The collectors were assisted in most districts by Indian *tahsildars*, and to entrust magisterial powers to them would be to abandon Cornwallis's refusal to vest real power in Indian hands. What was done in this direction was therefore of a tentative character. In criminal justice, as in civil, pressure of cases necessitated an increase in the number of *zillah* judges and the addition of a fifth member in the appeal court. But all that was done to meet the instructions to reunite justice and revenue was the permissive regulation of 1821. In 1818 the first step in this direction had been taken when three collectors were specially empowered to act as magistrates. Now by regulation IV of 1821 such power might be granted to any collector

at the discretion of the Supreme Government. In the following years a few collectors and sub-collectors were granted power under the regulation.

When Hastings left India in 1823, despite his absorption in political affairs, considerable changes had taken place in the system of Cornwallis. The chief need as Cornwallis estimated it was still no nearer completion. "A good system of law" was not yet established, for Sir William Jones had died in 1795, and little had been done to continue his work. It is true that the code which Cornwallis had promulgated had been simplified, and redrawn where its ambiguities were greatest. But a vast body of new regulations had followed, and the courts had piled up judicial precedents. No comprehensive code had been issued: what had really been done was to follow up the reforms of Cornwallis by further changes and experiments. In criminal and civil justice, perhaps above all in the police system, many improvements had been made. The position of the collector had once more been changed: for if he had not recovered the overwhelming power of 1790, the degradation of 1793 had been considerably mitigated. The collector was climbing back to his position as the state's man of all work; and was well on his way to reach it in time to be the chief instrument of the next reform movement. Yet much of the work of Cornwallis was still standing. The building had been extended and improved, and the original plans had been modified; but all the early work had not been destroyed. The reforms of the civil service had not needed to be done again. By his cleansing of the administrative system, Cornwallis had established a lasting tradition. After thirty years the best of his work, the result of his uprightness and zeal for the public service, was still in being. In spite of his mistakes, therefore, Cornwallis, like Warren Hastings, had left a lasting impression on the system of government: and it was one of the merits of his successors that they were slow to experiment in change.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE TO 1818

THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century up to the last decade no power in South India felt itself secure enough to spare serious attention for the improvement of the territories under its authority. The more energetic rulers found their time fully occupied with the task of suppressing rivals and rebels and raising the armies and revenues necessary for this end. The rest were content to make hay while the sun shone. Thus in time of peace the chief concern of every ruler was the collection of the revenue and especially of the land revenue, which usually produced more than nine-tenths of the total state income. The insecurity of the ruler's position compelled him to raise his demand as high as possible and to take the quickest and easiest means of collecting what he claimed without thought for the future. Checks and precautions were relaxed and abuses sprang up on all sides. A strong ruler like Hyder of Mysore preferred to collect through officers of his own appointment, amildars having jurisdiction over large areas containing some hundreds of villages. The amildar usually dealt with the village through the village headman and the village accountant, whose records were supposed to show what the villagers should by custom pay. As it was difficult to prevent the village accountant from falsifying his accounts the amildar frequently struck a bargain with the village headman, or, if he would not rise to the amildar's terms, rented the village to a powerful outsider who was left to collect what he could.

If the amildar could not trust the village officers, neither could the ruler trust the amildar, who took presents and levied extra cesses for which he rendered no account, securing the acquiescence of the villagers partly by terror, partly by lowering the public demand on the plea of a failure of the crop. Hyder met the difficulty by allowing the amildars to grow rich and then flogging them till they disgorged. Milder-mannered princes, such as the nawab of Arcot, tended to supplant the amildars by renting out whole districts to rich or influential speculators. Where this was done, all the authority formerly exercised by the amildar in practice devolved upon the renter, since any restriction upon his proceedings was made an excuse for withholding the sum contracted for. Neither the amildar nor the renter enjoyed any security of tenure. As a rule they looked only for immediate profit regardless of longer views.[1]

But South Indian rulers were not everywhere strong enough to

[1] Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar, *Memorandum*, App. pp. xx *sqq*.

collect the revenue on the system which suited them best. Half the Northern Sarkars and elsewhere many of the less accessible tracts were under local chiefs who had never been completely subdued, feudal nobles who had succeeded in retaining their feudal status, local officials and adventurers with local influence who had seized power and asserted a partial independence. These poligars and zamindars exercised within their own territory all the functions of a sovereign, even making war on their own account upon their peers. But they acknowledged an obligation to pay tribute or *peshkash* to the sovereign and to serve in his campaigns with a certain number of armed retainers. The *peshkash* was sometimes fixed, sometimes it varied from year to year with the state of cultivation. But its amount and the regularity with which it was paid depended less upon the resources of the poligar's territory than on the ease with which he could be coerced.

Unlike the renters and the amildars the zamindars and poligars had an hereditary interest in the territories under their control. But their traditions and upbringing were as a rule essentially martial. "Eat or be eaten" was the condition of their existence. Their grand aims had always been to extend their territories at the expense of their neighbours and to strengthen themselves to resist the central power. Many of them were too spirited to exchange uncontrolled if precarious authority for the assured income of a peaceful landlord, and very few of them were capable of believing that the central power would continue to allow them to intercept a share of the land revenue once they had been disarmed. The central power usually aimed at extirpating these territorial chiefs, as opportunity offered. Hyder and Tipu of Mysore were especially active in pursuing this policy. It is unlikely that the cultivators often regretted their poligar when he was hanged. For he had to consider first the interests of his armed retainers and he was often under the necessity of satisfying their demands for arrears of pay by giving them authority to collect the land revenue direct from the villages.[1]

The workers of South India, the agriculturists and the artisans, living for the most part in villages, hoped little and feared much from their rulers. So narrow was the margin on which the cultivators were living that advances of seed-grain had often to be made to enable them to raise a crop. In many South Indian villages the land revenue depends upon the upkeep of the irrigation works and some amildars spent pains and money on this account. But as a rule the works seem to have been neglected or maintained only by the villagers. Even for protection the villagers relied chiefly on their own mud walls or thorn fences which could be defended by stone-throwing against the predatory horse and the camp followers of the period. Whether these owed allegiance to an invading power or to the country's prince made little difference in the feelings which they inspired among the

[1] *The Fifth Report of* 1812, pp. 80 *sqq*.

villagers. There were no made roads, no bridges, and no wheeled vehicles outside a few large towns. Trade was carried on by pack cattle. There was no code of law generally recognised as being in force; and even where Hindu or Muhammadan law-books were supposed to have authority, there were no regular courts in existence to interpret or give effect to them, or to solidify custom and precedent into law. Petty crime was dealt with by the village headman and most civil disputes were settled in the village by the award of arbitrators or by the decisions of village *panchayats* or juries. Caste offences were punished by caste headmen or caste *panchayats*, the state only interfering to raise revenue by leasing out the right to levy fines. Grave crimes could be brought before the amildar, who might inflict any punishment short of death. There were no gaols, and imprisonment was not a recognised form of punishment. Mutilation for the poor and fines for the rich were the order of the day. The proceedings of the amildar were controlled not by law, but by his sense of equity. The powers of the amildar were also exercised not only by zamindars and poligars, but also by renters and military officers, and indeed by any person who had at his command the force necessary to give effect to his decision. The same authorities could sometimes be induced to appoint arbitrators for the decision of important civil disputes. There was always the possibility of an appeal to the sovereign, but access to him was difficult, and the chance of a careful enquiry small.[1]

For police in the more orderly tracts the villagers relied chiefly on the hereditary village-watchman. But where criminal tribes or the retainers of a poligar lived in the neighbourhood, they usually found it expedient to invite one of their tormentors to become their *kavalgar* or guard, and to pay him to save the village from theft, or at least to obtain restitution of the stolen property for a reasonable consideration. A poligar or other person of local influence often had himself recognised as a *head-kavalgar* controlling the village *kavalgars* throughout his sphere of influence and sharing their emoluments. In one or two districts this system was reported to work well, but in general it seems to have been a convenience to the criminal classes rather than to the cultivators.

But if the sovereign concerned himself little with most aspects of his subjects' lives, his interest in the produce of their agriculture was close and persistent. Everywhere a share in the produce of the land was claimed either by the sovereign, or by a grantee of the land revenue deriving his right from the sovereign, or by a zamindar or poligar who claimed this among other rights of sovereignty. In the absence of any court of law, the nature of the sovereign's rights and the cultivators' tenure was determined not by law but by the interplay of three forces—the power of the sovereign, the custom of the village, and the economic condition of the district. The Hindu family system and the lack of stock tended to divide up the land into small holdings.

[1] Cf. Gleig, *Munro*, I, 405 *sqq*.

In many villages, especially in the irrigated tracts, there was a tradition of a joint settlement and a common ancestry, and the whole village was owned in shares, the lands in some of them being periodically re-distributed[1]. In such villages there was a habit of common action which enabled the villagers to oppose a certain resistance to the sovereign and his agents. Elsewhere rights were derived from the individual occupation of waste land, and the power of resistance was very small. Almost everywhere there was more cultivable land than could be cultivated by the labour and stock of the inhabitants. The ruler therefore had seldom any reason to assert a claim to the land itself or to oust a cultivator from it. His anxiety was to find cultivators for the land and to secure the largest possible share of the product of their industry. The share of the crop which he succeeded in obtaining was usually so high as to leave the cultivator no more than a bare subsistence. This, taken together with the presence of land waiting to be brought under cultivation, prevented the land from acquiring any saleable value except in Tanjore and in a few other specially favoured localities. The cultivator therefore had all the security of tenure that he desired. Hereditary rights were seldom in question. The ryot was more concerned to assert his right to relinquish a holding—a right which the amildar was at pains to deny. To the ruler's demands for an increasing land revenue the cultivator could oppose an ill-defined village custom and sometimes the records of an old assessment which showed what the cultivator ought to pay. But the state's admitted share was itself very high, amounting often to more than half the whole crop; and the cultivator was unable to resist the imposition of all manner of extra cesses to meet the needs of the ruler, the amildar and the village officers.[2] It was said that in practice the ruler and his agents took all that they could get, sometimes even the whole crop, and that the cultivator often kept no more than he could conceal. But it must be remembered that, in the circumstances of the time, it was easy for the cultivators to conceal the extent of cultivation and to misrepresent the out-turn of their crops. The village accountants and the revenue underlings who estimated or measured the out-turn could usually be propitiated at no very extravagant cost. At the opening of our period the uncertainty and the inequality of the incidence of the demand was probably at least as great an evil as the magnitude of the total sum collected.

To prevent fraud, it was clearly in the interest of the ruler that his claim should be commuted for a fixed sum of money or a fixed quantity of grain payable annually in good and bad seasons alike, and in some districts there were in the hands of the village accountants records of old surveys in which the sum payable on each field or on each holding was defined. Elsewhere attempts had been made to

[1] Ellis, Mirassi Paper, *ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel.* I, 810.
[2] Graeme's Report on N. Arcot, 31 March, 1818, *ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel.* I, 959.

fix the sum payable by each village. But so long as the state's demand in average years left the cultivators little more than a bare subsistence, it could not be paid in bad years. The revenue underlings and the village officers opposed a system which tended to curtail the sources of illegitimate gain; and the cultivators feared that the fixed demand might operate merely as a minimum and would not protect them against extra cesses.

The most important crop in South India was the rice crop cultivated on the irrigated lands. The state's share of this crop was usually calculated each year in grain. The villagers were sometimes required to buy back the state share at a price fixed at the discretion of the sovereign's agent. Sometimes the state's share was stored in granaries to be consumed by the state servants, or sold when prices rose.[1] To eliminate competition the villagers were often forbidden to sell their grain till the state had disposed of its stock. The unirrigated lands of South India were far more extensive than the irrigated. A great variety of crops was raised and many of these crops were harvested piecemeal. To assess, collect, store and market the state's share in all these crops would have been an impossible task. It was therefore commuted for a money payment. This was sometimes fixed on each field, sometimes for each kind of crop cultivated; and sometimes it varied with the state of the season.

The net result was that every year saw a struggle between the state's agent and the villagers to raise or lower the assessment, and a good crop well cultivated might cost the village dear. When the demand on the whole village had been fixed for the year, the apportionment of it among the villagers was usually left to the discretion of the village headmen, or other principal inhabitants, who might or might not be charitably disposed to the poor, but were very unlikely to encourage exceptional enterprise, industry, or thrift. There was thus everything to discourage improvement and the cultivator lost all interest in his land. So much was this the case that there had grown up among the revenue officers a tradition that the cultivator was idle, and that it was their duty to drive him and to force him to cultivate more land than he was willing to be responsible for.[2] The cultivator on his side was often on the look-out for an opportunity to relinquish old land in order to take up waste that happened to be more leniently assessed. He would even leave his village for this purpose. Indeed the most effective check on the activities of the revenue officers was the readiness of the cultivator to fly to some adjoining district where the administration was less exacting.

Beside the land revenue there were a host of miscellaneous taxes, licences and monopolies, designed to secure the sovereign a share in

[1] Revenue letter from Madras, 6 February, 1810, *ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel.* I, 502.
[2] Cf. Moreland, *India at the death of Akbar*, p. 97.

the income arising from every source. Thus there were taxes on houses, on looms, on oil presses, on stonemasons, on dancing girls, and on most petty industries; taxes on forest produce; monopolies of salt, of liquor, and of ghee, and duties on the transport of goods. The revenue derived from these sources was small, partly because of the prevailing poverty, partly because the machinery for collection was neither trustworthy nor efficient. By far the most important of these miscellaneous taxes were the duties levied on the transport of goods. The right to levy these taxes was usually farmed out. The rates of duty and the location of the stations at which they were levied were governed partly by custom, partly by the discretion of the farmer. The stations were very numerous. On some routes they were on the average not more than ten miles apart, and duties had to be paid at each one. But trade is more easily killed or frightened away than agriculture, and the farmers of the transit duties were therefore less oppressive than the land revenue officials.[1]

In European eyes the three radical evils in South India were the insubordination of the zamindars and poligars, the lack of recognised laws and law courts, and the uncertainties of the land revenue system. Since 1775 the court of directors had been pressing the Madras Government to take steps towards correcting these evils in the territories under their control, that is in the Northern Sarkars and the jagir.[2] But when Lord Cornwallis came to India, there was as yet little to distinguish the administration of these territories from that of the adjoining native states. A blank ignorance of the people, their customs, and their languages, inclined the Company's servants to give unlimited discretion to the persons whom they chose to exercise authority in their stead. All business was transacted through interpreters.[3] There was no incentive to exertion. Money was the chief consideration, and it could only be acquired by corrupt means. But a new spirit was soon to be infused. In 1792, the defeat of Tipu Sultan and the annexation of the Baramahal and Dindigul to the Madras Presidency made it plain that the administration of the Company's territories would henceforth be the chief duty of the Company's servants, and that there was a career for those who equipped themselves for this work. A stimulus to industry was supplied by the fact that for lack of civil servants with a knowledge of the languages and customs of the people, Captain Read with three military assistants was appointed to take charge of the land revenue administration of the Baramahal. A central Board of Revenue had been set up in 1786, and the working of the new spirit led it to fall foul of the corrupt and inefficient chiefs and councils in the Northern Sarkars, who had allowed their territories to go from bad to worse,

[1] Cf. *Baramahal Records*, section VII.
[2] *Fifth Report of* 1812, pp. 78 *sqq.*
[3] Arbuthnot, *Selections*, p. xxxvii.

obstructing every effort towards reform. In 1794, the governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, was induced to abolish these authorities and to substitute district collectors, subordinate to the Board of Revenue.[1] In the same year the whole of the jagir was put under a single collector, Lionel Place. The district collector, having an interest in his work and exercising a wide discretionary authority much the same as that which was vested in the amildar under native rulers, soon showed himself far better fitted to overawe opposition and to obtain information than the councils and committees that had preceded him.[2] Light began to flow in on the foundations of the land revenue system, the land tenures, and the customs of the villages. These things had hitherto been regarded as impenetrable mysteries, but the district officers now began to understand them, and to see that it was possible and advantageous to work through the indigenous institutions, reforming and adapting them to suit their ends.

In the jagir, Place found the villages owned in heritable shares by *mirasdars* who exercised the right of disposing of their shares by mortgage, gift, or sale. This discovery upset the then accepted theory that the state was the owner of the soil, and that the cultivator was little more than a tenant-at-will with at most a preferential right to cultivate on the terms which the state chose to offer. The principal *mirasdars* had been accustomed to act together on behalf of the village, and it was found convenient and profitable to abandon the old practice of renting out the jagir in parcels to speculators, and to settle instead with the *mirasdars* of each village for a lump sum calculated to be equivalent to the state's share of the crop. Place exerted himself to restore the efficiency of the village accountants, and he acquired a close knowledge of the affairs of the villages under his control. The system, therefore, worked smoothly enough and gave an increasing revenue during the four years of his administration. A similar system was applied in the government villages in the Northern Sarkars. But the results there were less satisfactory, partly because the villagers were less capable of joint action, partly because the collectors had not Place's knowledge.

The conditions with which Read had to deal in the Baramahal were widely different from those which Place had found in the jagir. In the latter was a tradition of an original colonisation, and the *mirasdars* of each village traced their titles to a joint-occupation of its lands. The main crop was rice, which was threshed on a common threshing-floor. The state's share was calculated in grain on the total produce of the village, and its amount or its equivalent in cash was demanded in the lump from the village, the apportionment of the demand being left entirely to the *mirasdars*. But in the Baramahal the rice crop was of minor importance. The majority of the cultivators

[1] *Fifth Report of* 1812, pp. 89–90, and App. 14.
[2] *Idem*, App. 16; cf. *Wellesley Despatches*, I, 230.

drew their living from the unirrigated lands. The population was sparse, the waste lands extensive, and titles were derived from the individual's occupation of waste. The ties which bound the villagers together were therefore comparatively weak, and the habit of joint action less highly developed. Instead of a committee of the principal *mirasdars*, there was a village headman who collected the state's dues, sometimes in his capacity as a state servant, sometimes as the renter who had leased the village from the amildar. In either case he dealt separately with each individual cultivator, and each cultivator's dues were assessed and paid in cash. Read was a man of extraordinary integrity and industry. He studied the history and the details of the land revenue system in force in his district, and observed its effect on the cultivators. The scheme which he devised for its reform based itself on existing practice and deviated but little from the lines marked out by the best Indian administrators in dealing with such tracts. He determined to dispense with all renters and middlemen, and to deal direct with the individual cultivator through his own servants, among whom he included the village accountant and the village headman. To relieve the cultivator from all uncertainty, to give him confidence, and to protect his improvements, he wished to fix the land revenue due from each field once for all in terms of money, and to leave the cultivator free to take up or relinquish such fields as he chose. For this purpose a detailed survey field by field was necessary, and such a survey was undertaken and carried through.[1] Read actually published a proclamation outlining his scheme of land revenue administration, and promising the cultivators an assessment fixed in perpetuity. His proclamation was neither confirmed nor cancelled by superior authority. He was left in the district and tried to give effect to his plan. But he had made certain miscalculations. In proposing to fix a money assessment in perpetuity he had ignored the chance of a permanent change in the price of grain. In fact the fall in the price of grain during the next fifty years would have converted even a moderate money assessment into an intolerable burden. But the standard of assessment which Read took for his guidance was far too high for the success of his scheme; he took into consideration the theoretic claim of the state, which in this district was usually about half the crop, and the actual collections made by Tipu; he aimed at fixing rates that would be a little below the average collections made by Tipu. But by discovering concealed cultivation and improving the machinery of collection he actually drew from the country as much as Tipu and his officers had drawn to prepare for war and to satisfy private greed. To maintain taxation at such a level would have been a fatal obstacle to improvement, and,

[1] Arbuthnot, *Selections*, pp. xxxix–xl; cf. Munro to his father, 21 September, 1798, *ap.* Gleig, *Munro*, I, 204.

even if improvement had been no object, it was simply impossible to collect such an assessment in bad seasons from cultivators who had no capital. Again, the agency which Read had at his disposal was neither sufficiently trustworthy, nor sufficiently experienced, to make a survey which could be accepted as final. The assessment was very unequal, and required to be revised as mistakes came to light. The result was that the plan of a fixed assessment was never rigidly adhered to. Remissions had to be allowed on account of poverty, loss of crops, loss of cattle, death of working members of the family, and such like reasons. Nor did Read succeed in fulfilling his intention to protect the cultivator's improvements and give him full freedom to relinquish the land he did not want. Half a century had to elapse before the obvious wisdom of Read's ideas could overcome the bad traditions of the revenue administration.

But though Read's plan could not be carried into effect in its entirety, it was worked in a modified form and gave good results. Among Read's assistants was another soldier, Thomas Munro, who was Read's equal in industry and integrity, and had besides a clear head and a reflective disposition. After the fall of Seringapatam, Munro was transferred to the newly annexed district of Kanara to take charge of the land revenue administration there. Kanara was in many respects very unlike the Baramahal, but the native land revenue system had been even more definitely ryotwari. A money assessment had been fixed on each holding centuries before and, though extra assessments had been superimposed upon this, the original assessment was still known and recorded. Munro was thus confirmed in the belief that the ryotwari system was the indigenous system of South India, and therefore presumably the system best suited to the needs of the country. Under his direction it gave good results in Kanara. There, too, Munro found surviving a strong sense of private property in land, of which he had seen no trace in the Baramahal. He traced the existence of this sense of property to the original low level of the land assessment. He held that the development of this sense of property was the only road to the improvement of the country. He argued that it could not exist where, as in the Baramahal and throughout the Carnatic districts, the assessment was so high as to swallow up the whole of the economic rent, and thus became a steady advocate of a policy of lowering the assessment. But he held that it was for government to decide whether the standard of assessment should be lowered to promote improvement, and that his duty as collector was to be guided by the standard set up by previous rulers, taking care only to see that his demand was not so high as to discourage the cultivator or encroach upon his stock, and thereby occasion a future deterioration of the revenue. Acting on this principle, he allowed at once a small remission on his own responsibility, and recommended government to grant a further remission later, though he gave reason to

believe that the government's demand in Kanara was lower than that usual on the east coast.[1]

From Kanara, Munro was transferred in 1800 to the Deccan districts newly ceded by Hyderabad. These districts were overrun by poligars and extraordinarily lawless, but otherwise conditions were not unlike those with which Munro had been familiar in the Baramahal. The ryotwari system was clearly applicable. Starting with four surveyors, and training his men as he went along, Munro surveyed and assessed the tract field by field. As elsewhere the standard assessment fixed was intended to be a little below the average actual collections made under the native rulers. But the tract had suffered from a decade of anarchy under the Nizam, and Munro won the Board of Revenue's applause by the patience with which he nursed its revenue, keeping the demand low at first and raising it gradually to the standard as the ryots accumulated stock, gained confidence, and extended their cultivation.[2] Munro himself was not wholly satisfied. He still held that a general lowering of the standard of the assessment was the crying need of the country, and he was alarmed by the pressure from above for increased revenue. He obeyed this pressure, but when he left the district in 1807 he put on record a recommendation for a 25 per cent. reduction in the standard assessment.

In 1799 Tanjore and Coimbatore, and in 1801 Malabar and the territory of the nawab of Arcot, were annexed to the Madras Presidency. The ryotwari system of management was as a rule found easily applicable, but in some tracts, notably in Tanjore, the village organisation resembled that which Place had found in the jagir, and village settlements were customary. But the Board of Revenue was at this time much impressed by the tyranny exercised by the principal inhabitants under the village settlements. Preference was therefore given to the ryotwari system, and in 1805 it was at least nominally in force in all these districts, and surveys had been or were being carried out in most of them. Many of the collectors of districts had been trained under Read or Munro, but not all of them showed equal discretion in adapting the system to the circumstances of their districts. In Malabar, Macleod provoked a fresh outbreak of rebellion by trying to raise the land assessment nearer to the standard recognised on the east coast, ignoring the peculiar history of Malabar where the land tax was an innovation introduced after the Mysore conquest.[3] In South Arcot the Board of Revenue supported the collector in demanding a share in the crop which the government later condemned as "excessive beyond measure and we hope beyond example

[1] Cf. Munro to Cockburn, 7 October, 1800, and to Read, 16 June, 1801, *ap.* Gleig, *Munro*, I, 288, and III, 161.

[2] Cf. Munro to Board of Revenue, 30 November, 1806, and 15 August, 1807, *ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel.* I, 94 *sqq.*, and 115 *sqq.*

[3] Logan, *Malabar Manual*, p. 540.

in other parts of the Company's territory". Nowhere was it found possible to give full effect to Read's original plan. Annual settlements had everywhere to be made not only because cultivation extended and shrank with the rainfall, but because the survey assessment could only be treated as a maximum. Collectors had to exercise their discretion freely in granting remissions in view of the poverty of the cultivator or the failure of his crop. Still the system did work. If the state demand was not rigidly fixed the collector had a standard for his guidance in making the annual settlement. The cultivator at least knew his maximum liability before he began to sow, and later on he could get a bill under the collector's signature showing the details of the demand upon him for the year. It was thus easier for him to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised exactions, and to explain his grievance when he had been wronged. Above all, the system had in itself the seed of improvement. The government and the collector felt a direct responsibility for all that was done or left undone in the assessment and collection of the land revenue. They were therefore impelled to reform abuses rather than to treat them as inevitable. The collectors were brought into close touch with the affairs of the village. They learnt to know something of the cultivator's needs, his rights, and the wrongs he suffered. They had to make frequent reports to the Board of Revenue, and a store of experience and information thus accumulated steadily year after year.

Where the ryotwari system was in force, civil and criminal justice usually continued to be administered much as it had been under the native rulers, the collector taking the place of the amildar. But the authority of poligars and *kavalgars* in police matters was no longer recognised, and the fees formerly paid to them were claimed by government. Reliance was placed instead on the village headman and the village watcher, who was restored to his emoluments where these had been encroached upon by the *kavalgar*. The work that could not be done by village police was entrusted to the collector's revenue subordinates assisted where necessary by armed irregulars locally levied. This concentration of all authority in the collector's hands was useful not only in enabling him to overawe poligars and protect the cultivator against their retainers, but also because it made it easier to brush aside a rank growth of inconvenient customs such as that by which the same village office might be shared among different members of a family.

But before Place, Read, and Munro had had time to show what could be done by working along the lines of indigenous systems, the Bengal Government was pressing for the introduction into Madras of the exotic revenue and judicial systems it had recently planted in Bengal.[1] The Madras Government wished to move slowly, but in 1798 the governor-general, Lord Wellesley, ordered the Madras

[1] Malcolm to Lord Hobart, *ap.* Kaye, *Malcolm*, I, 176; and *Wellesley Despatches*, II, 121.

sale. In 1844 De la Condamine, district assistant, Amherst, drew the pay of vacant clerkships, and kept no account of timber revenue received in kind, while his clerks traded in timber and usury with capital attributed to himself and Maingy. In 1848 the adjutant, Talaing Corps, recovered from his sepoys money lent them by his native mistress. Captain Impey, district assistant, Amherst, submitted no treasury accounts for nine months, misappropriated 21,880 rupees, refunded two-thirds on detection in 1850, and disappeared into the Shan states.

Control from Calcutta was so slight that the commissioner might have evolved a system of indirect government which allowed native institutions proper scope. But even had that functionary been creative, such native institutions as survived Burmese misrule and Siamese devastation showed little vitality. Freedom from Calcutta thus ended simply in an undeveloped copy of the non-regulation model.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57

THE period 1818 to 1857 is important as that in which our relations with the Indian states were finally placed upon practically that basis on which they still rest. This policy, initiated by Lord Wellesley, but abandoned by his successors, Cornwallis, Barlow and Minto, was revived by Lord Hastings who carried it on to its logical conclusion. When Lord Wellesley left India in 1805 our military superiority had been proved beyond question; the huge state armies, led in great measure by European officers, had melted away; while a series of treaties defined our relationship with all the important rulers in India. The foundations of the system which obtains to this day had thus been laid, and Wellesley himself wrote in 1804:

> A general bond of connexion is now established between the British Government and the principal states of India on principles which render it the interest of every state to maintain its alliance with the British Government...and which secure to every state the unmolested exercise of its separate authority within the limits of its established dominion, under the general protection of the British power.[1]

The earlier system, of treating the states as if they stood on an equal footing with us, was finally abandoned; and our political, as well as our military supremacy, was specifically recognised. It is, of course, unquestionable that this supremacy would ultimately have been attained, probably only after conflict, but it is also beyond doubt, that the policy followed by Lord Wellesley during the seven years of his office simplified its establishment, and shortened the period required for its attainment.

Lord Moira, afterwards Marquess of Hastings, landed in India in 1813, in avowed opposition to the policy pursued by Lord Wellesley, but, as he himself remarks, he soon changed his views. Writing in 1815 he says: "It was by preponderance of power that those mines of wealth had been acquired for the Company's treasury, and by preponderance of power alone would they be retained". The policy of non-interference with the Indian states was, he saw, a futile policy; for no highly civilised state, placed in the midst of less civilised or less developed states, can ever hope to pursue it without disastrous results. In 1817, four years after his assumption of the governor-generalship, the Maratha confederacy was again intriguing actively against us, and Central India was overrun by hordes of plunderers. By May, 1818, however, Sindhia had been forced to make terms, these hordes had been dispersed, and Holkar defeated, while the Peshwa's power had been extinguished. Other important Indian states, though in

[1] Dispatch of 13 July, 1804, *Despatches*, IV, 177.

no sense enthusiastic on our behalf, had welcomed our change of policy and signed treaties of friendship and subordinate alliance with the Company. The British Government thus became the acknowledged suzerain, though the Moghul emperor still sat upon the throne of Delhi. A period of reconstruction now commenced, directed by Lord Hastings and carried out by a group of men whose names are still household words in the areas in which they worked; Malcolm in Central India, Elphinstone in the Deccan, Munro in Madras, and Metcalfe, Tod and Ochterlony in Rajputana.

The chief centre of disturbance had been in Malwa, the high level tract comprising the group of states which now forms the "Central India Agency", with the addition of the Gwalior state. To understand the process of reconstruction initiated by Sir John Malcolm, in Central India, it is essential to grasp the conditions prevailing in this tract. The territories of the Indian states and estates in this area were then, and are indeed to this day, mixed in inextricable confusion as regards their boundaries, while they are at the same time linked together by political agreements which enormously complicate administrative procedure. The settlement of the great Maratha generals in Malwa at the close of the eighteenth century led to the subjection of the Rajput landholders, who were ousted from the greater part of their possessions, by the formation of the Maratha states of Gwalior, Indore, Dhar and Dewas, such lands as they were allowed to retain being held on a tributary or feudatory basis. These tributaries included the more important Rajput states such as Ratlam, as well as a large number of small estate-holders belonging to the same class. This subjection to Maratha overlords had always been strongly resented and in early days tribute was never paid except under compulsion. Disputes, moreover, were continuous and boundaries were constantly changing, as one or other party temporarily predominated. During the Pindari War the Rajputs tried to make all they could out of the disturbed conditions prevailing. Then came our intervention, the rapid sweeping aside of the marauding hordes and the sudden imposition of peace, which resulted in the crystallisation of the territorial distribution as it chanced to be at that moment. The effect of this sudden termination of hostilities was to leave the whole of Malwa parcelled out, in a very haphazard way, among the various owners, and the territorial patchwork thus created persists, in spite of some adjustments, to this day. The territories of the various landowners appear, indeed, to have been shaken out of a pepper-box, so that, when travelling in this region, it is difficult to say whose property you are traversing.

When Sir John Malcolm took up the task of settling Malwa he found that, besides the payment of tribute demanded by the great Maratha overlords, the Rajput thakurs, as the smaller landholders are termed, claimed certain payments, called *tankha*, from these same

overlords, payments which were in origin a form of blackmail, paid in order to induce them to abstain from raiding and pilfering. Those who received such payments were called *grasias*, or those receiving a *gras* or "mouthful". Owing to the distracted condition of their own administrations, after the late struggle, the Maratha rulers were quite incapable of maintaining order or enforcing payment of their demands and, in consequence, welcomed the assistance offered by us in asserting their claims, and "unfeignedly resorted to us for aid".[1]

Malcolm at once took up the task of adjusting these claims and while securing to the Maratha rulers the tribute due to them also secured to their tributaries the *tankha* they demanded, at the same time guaranteeing them in the permanent possession of the land they then held, so long as they kept the peace and carried out the conditions in their *sanads*, or deeds of possession. These agreements were mediated by Sir John between the Maratha overlord and the Rajput ruler or thakur. They were drawn up in the names of the Maratha suzerain and his Rajput feudatory and bore the overlord's seal, but carried in addition an endorsement, signed by Sir John or one of his assistants, usually over the words "Confirmed and guaranteed by the British Government".

The basis on which these agreements were drawn up is thus enunciated by Lord Hastings. It was, he says, therefore,

> easy, when no acknowledged usages stood in the way, to establish principles between the sovereign and the subject advantageous to both, giving these principles a defined line of practical application, a departure from which would afford to either party a right of claiming the intervention of our paramount power. While the Sovereign had his legitimate authority and his due revenue insured to him, the subject was protected against exaction and tyrannical outrage.[2]

The effect of these agreements was immediate and the most distracted population in India became in a few months a comparatively law-abiding community. It may be of interest, however, to mention briefly the subsequent history of the "guarantee" system. As has been pointed out above, the agreements thus "guaranteed" were made out as between the Maratha ruler and his feudatory, the British Government merely undertaking to see that each side carried out its part, intervening only if the conditions were disregarded. Actually, however, the confusion which existed for many years after peace was introduced prevented the Maratha overlords from exercising any real supervision and, in consequence, the Rajput feudatories fell directly under the control of the British residents and political agents in a way never contemplated by Lord Hastings, or in any sense warranted by the terms of the *sanads*. They, in fact, were treated by these officers as if in all respects under their direct charge, and not simply as regarded adherence to the conditions laid down in the

[1] Hastings, *Summary*, p. 48. [2] *Idem.*

agreements. A form of political practice thus grew up which became very galling to the Maratha overlords, and especially to the Gwalior durbar, in which state by far the greater number of "guaranteed thakurs" held their estates. Remonstrances were continually made and a good deal of irritation was displayed until finally in 1921 the government of India admitted the correctness of the Gwalior durbar's contentions. The thakurs were then officially informed by the viceroy, in a special durbar held at Delhi on 14 March, 1921, that they would in future be wholly under the control of the Gwalior state, which would exercise full suzerainty over them, the government of India, however, reserving the right to intervene should the conditions of the "guarantee" be in any way disregarded by either side.

Two Musulman states exist in the same area, Bhopal and Jaora. The former, which had loyally supported us since 1778, was rewarded with a grant of territory, while Jaora was created a separate entity by the twelfth article of the Treaty of Mandasor[1] made with Holkar, certain lands in that state being granted on service conditions to Ghafur Khan, son-in-law of Amir Khan, nawab of Tonk, in return for assistance rendered to Sir John Malcolm.

Of the two important Maratha states, Gwalior and Indore, Sindhia had very reluctantly come to terms in 1817, while Holkar, defeated in the battle of Mahidpur (December, 1817), had been obliged to accept the terms offered to him.

In Rajputana the process of settlement was far simpler, as the Marathas, though claiming tribute from the rajas, had never settled in that area which, being mainly arid and uninviting in comparison with Malwa and the Deccan, did not attract them as a place of residence. Moreover, the states were fewer, larger and more compact in form and more homogeneous in character.

The conditions obtaining in each state were carefully examined, and arrangements made in accordance with those conditions. Considerable objections were raised at the time to our assuming this responsibility, the freeing of the Rajput lands from marauding bands being considered the utmost we should engage to do for them, while our undertaking to see that the tribute claimed by the Marathas was punctually paid was held to be inconsistent with our general policy and indefensible in principle, in view of the fact that this tribute was nothing but blackmail levied by force, without any real overlordship to support the claim. The alternative would have been to leave these states to settle their own disputes on the Utopian theory of non-interference, which had invariably plunged them in disaster. The pages of Tod but too clearly show how hereditary jealousies, family feuds, not to mention ordinary motives of ambition and avarice, would have made a peaceful settlement impossible except under the aegis

[1] Aitchison, *Treaties*, IV, 199.

of our strong controlling authority. The result of Lord Hastings's policy fully justified its adoption.

This payment of tribute to the Marathas was continued on the grounds that we accepted the *status quo* at the time when we first entered Rajputana and Central India, as we could have no concern with conditions obtaining before the war. Adherence to this principle had also insured the co-operation of the Marathas and facilitated arrangements at the outset of the campaign. Payment of tribute was in future made through the British authorities. Secondly the payment of the tribute was a recognised mark of fealty, exacted by all suzerains, including the Moghul emperor, whose place we had taken, while it was also a fair return for the obligations we had assumed in protecting the states from aggression: the amount, moreover, was henceforth fixed in perpetuity and this, together with the financial advantages of peace, rendered these payments in no way burdensome. At the same time each state was recognised as a separate unit, independent internally but prohibited from forming any relations with another state in India or any outside power. The settlement was effected without difficulty except in Jaipur where internal dissensions were rife.

Apart from these two great groups of states in Rajputana and Central India there remained the Peshwa, the nominal head of the Maratha confederacy, and the more important states of Nagpur, Satara, Mysore, Oudh, Hyderabad, Baroda, Travancore and Cochin.

After very careful consideration Lord Hastings decided

> in favour of the total expulsion of Baji Rao from the Dekhan, the perpetual exclusion of the family from any share of influence or dominion and the annihilation of the Peshwa's name and authority for ever.

This was an important step, as it removed even the nominal head of the Maratha confederacy. It was, moreover, thoroughly justified by Baji Rao's conduct. By nature timid, indolent, suspicious, and fond of low companions, Baji Rao had proved himself uniformly untrustworthy. He had never adhered to the Treaty of Bassein (1802), sending out his agents to intrigue against us in every state that would receive them. The lesson was sharp but salutary.

In Nagpur the crimes and perfidy of Appa Sahib met with their just reward in his deposition and the confiscation of the Sagar and Narbada districts of his state. Later on, in 1853, when Lord Dalhousie was governor-general, Nagpur was finally extinguished, for lack of direct heirs, and became the nucleus of the present Central Provinces.

The effete descendant of Sivaji at Satara was, as a concession to Maratha sentiment, given a small estate round his hereditary capital.[1] In 1848, however, Lord Dalhousie abolished the arrangement.

The Mysore state, restored to its Hindu rulers in 1799, on the defeat of Tipu Sultan, supported us with troops in the Pindari War. But the raja was a spendthrift and destitute of ability.

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1847–8, XLVIII, 327–31.

The state of Oudh calls for more detailed notice. Lord Hastings, whose experience in England with the prince regent had, as it was said, inclined him to "sympathise with royalty in distress," treated the nawab wazir with unusual consideration. Nawab Sa'adat 'Ali, who, by severe exactions and parsimonious expenditure, had amassed a hoard of thirteen millions sterling in eleven years, was averse to all reforms, badly as his administration needed them, but Lord Hastings abstained from pressing him. In July, 1814, Sa'adat 'Ali died and was succeeded by his son Haidar-ud-din Ghazi. The new wazir interviewed the governor-general at Cawnpore in October, 1814, and, in consideration of the sympathetic attitude of Lord Hastings, and his own anxiety regarding a Gurkha invasion across his northern border, was induced to lend the British Government a crore (£1,000,000) of rupees, for the prosecution of the war against Nepal. When this was expended by the governor-general's council on other objects a second crore was lent, but only under great pressure.

Differences arose between the Resident and the nawab on the subject of administrative abuses, but Lord Hastings recalled his officer and left the nawab to his own devices. The inevitable result of non-interference followed, the administration rapidly going from bad to worse. In 1818, however, Lord Hastings, somewhat inconsistently, urged the nawab to assume the title of king, and so formally break his allegiance to the emperor of Delhi, to whom his family owed its elevation. In the governor-general's opinion this act would benefit the British Government by causing a division between these important leaders of the Muhammadan community. The change was, however, regarded with the greatest contempt and aversion by the Indian princes and unfavourably contrasted with the conduct of the Nizam of Hyderabad who had refused to accede to a similar suggestion made to him, as being an act of rebellion against the emperor. It also met with the disapproval of all experienced British officials, Sir John Malcolm freely expressing the opinion that it was most impolitic and a deliberate reversal of our previously well-considered treatment of the imperial house of Taimur, and very likely to nullify the sentiments of gratitude entertained for us by the princes of this family, owing to our generous assistance in their distress. From his subsequent behaviour it is clear that our support of his assumption of this new honour evoked no sense of gratitude in the newly-created king.

The Baroda state, which had benefited materially by the Treaty of Poona (1817) and gained certain acquisitions of territory in 1818, lost its minister, Fateh Singh, who had long managed its affairs during the lifetime of the imbecile Anand Rao Gaekwad. A new treaty was made in 1820, and no difficulty was experienced in connection with this state.

Serious trouble soon arose in Hyderabad. The Nizam and his

minister Munir-ul-mulk took no interest in the administration, which was left in the hands of a Hindu, Chandu Lal. He was capable but extravagant, his extravagance being left unchecked by the Resident. The Nizam's sons, moreover, were entirely out of hand and committed many atrocities. Chandu Lal was at length forced to borrow and contracted a heavy debt with Palmer and Co., a British firm in Hyderabad. By the act of 1796[1] no European could enter into financial transactions with an Indian prince without the express sanction of the governor-general. It was understood that Palmer and Co. were prepared to lend money at a lower rate of interest than Indian bankers and, therefore, in 1816, Lord Hastings sanctioned the transaction on the understanding that his government would not be responsible for the repayment of any sums lent. In 1820, when sanction for a further sum was asked for, the directors demurred, became suspicious of these loans and cancelled permission for them.[2] Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had succeeded Mr Russell as Resident, went very carefully into the matter and found that nearly a million sterling had been lent and then wasted in highly irregular expenditure, including even the grant of pensions to members of the firm, while as much as 24 per cent. was being charged as interest. Lord Hastings, who had relied on the former Resident's recommendation and was entirely ignorant of the details of the transactions, no sooner learned the truth than he condemned the whole arrangement.[3] Unfortunately an entirely unjustifiable colour was placed on the affair because one of the partners in Palmer and Co. was married to Lord Hastings's ward, for whom he had a great affection. The correspondence on the subject with the directors shows that, though they condemned the policy followed, they exonerated the governor-general.[4] But Lord Hastings, disgusted with the implied censure, resigned in January, 1823.

Except in Cutch, where we had to intervene on account of a dispute over the succession, no other state gave cause for interference.

To summarise Lord Hastings's work. His greatest claim rests upon the pacification and opening out of all India (except the Panjab) to British access, for Central India, Rajputana and the Deccan had, to all intents and purposes, remained hitherto sealed areas to us, the Marathas interposing a compact barrier between the three presidencies. To Lord Hastings must be assigned, therefore, credit for the consolidation of our empire, which completed the work of Lord Wellesley. This policy he had pursued indomitably in spite of great opposition from the directors. Arriving in India to find marauding

[1] Act 37, Geo. III, Cap. 142, S. 28.
[2] Letter to Bengal, 24 May, 1820, *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 6.
[3] Letter of governor-general to Resident, 13 September, 1822, *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 186.
[4] Letter from Palmer and Co., 19 May, 1820, to Resident, and letters from directors, 24 May and 16 December, 1820, *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 42 and 70. Mill and Wilson, *History*, VIII, 344–57.

bands sweeping across Central India, Nepal arrogant, the Marathas conspiring against us and the Rajput states divided by internal feuds and depressed under the Maratha yoke, he left India, with Nepal an ally, and one that has never since receded from that position, the Maratha power broken, Central India pacified and self-respect restored to the states of Rajputana. Above all it is to Lord Hastings that we owe the founding of that policy of partnership and friendly co-operation which now determines the relations of the government of India with the Indian states.

Lord Amherst (1823–8), who succeeded Hastings, initiated no new policy and most of his time was occupied by the war with Burma. This war did, however, react on the states, the view that our downfall was near being freely circulated. As a result of this some disturbances took place in Alwar, in the Sondhwada tract of Central India, and at Bharatpur.

The Bharatpur disturbance alone was important. In 1823 Sir David Ochterlony had sanctioned the succession to the Bharatpur *gaddi* of Raja Baldeo Singh, a minor. His cousin, Durjan Sal, opposed him and Sir David ordered troops to move from Delhi to support his nominee. But Lord Amherst, who was very nervous about the effect of a Burmese War, countermanded these orders, denouncing the Resident's action as premature and enunciating the principle that the mere fact of recognising Baldeo Singh during his father's lifetime imposed no obligation on our government to support him against the wishes of his subjects. Ochterlony, considering this as a censure on his conduct, resigned, dying not long after. He was succeeded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who soon proved that Durjan Sal was, in fact, plotting against us with the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha states, and he pointed out the impolicy of allowing a small unimportant state to flout the paramount power.[1] On this, troops were sent up under the commander-in-chief, Lord Combermere, and after a desperate resistance the Bharatpur fort was captured on 18 January, 1826. Durjan Sal was deported.

When, in July, 1828, Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck succeeded Lord Amherst, the inevitable reaction had set in in England, and Bentinck came out with instructions to revert to the fatal non-interference policy of Cornwallis and Barlow, a policy already, in the last thirty years, conclusively proved to be disastrous in its results. Once more, the fallacy of adhering to this policy was proved and the governor-general was driven to interfere far more drastically than he would have had to do had steps been taken in time.

The administration in Hyderabad and Oudh continued to deteriorate. In Indore the death of Tantia Jogh, the minister who had introduced a regular administration into that state, left its control

[1] Kaye, *Life of Metcalfe*, II, 140.

in the weak hands of Maharaja Malhar Rao, and disturbances at once commenced. In Gwalior the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia in 1827, and the succession of the youthful Jankoji Rao, led to the formation of antagonistic parties and the fomentation of endless intrigues. Bentinck visited the states and announced his support of the young maharaja, but his remonstrances had no effect in the face of the regent maharani Baiza Bai's ill-advised policy, and troubles continued to augment till they led to the *dénouement* of 1843. The Supreme Government, however, contented itself with enunciating the policy that it was immaterial to it who held the reins of power in a state, provided that hostilities did not break out.

The Gaekwad of Baroda had become openly hostile, while the Rajputana states, left wholly to their own devices, were in a condition of ferment, the good work done by Tod and his colleagues being rapidly undone. Finally, attention was forcibly drawn to the conditions obtaining in this tract by an attack at Jaipur on the Resident and his assistant, in which the former was wounded and the latter killed. This actually took place just after Bentinck had embarked for England in 1835. In Mysore the governor-general was obliged to take over the administration owing to the incompetence and extravagance of Raja Krishna Udaiyar and the consequent outbreak of disturbances. The administration remained in our hands until 1881.

Some absorption of state territory also took place. The raja of Jaintia in Assam sacrificed three British Indian subjects to the goddess Kali, for which act his lands were annexed, while those of the raja of Cachar, in the same province, were taken over for gross maladministration. Coorg, near Mysore, where the raja openly declared his hostility towards us and plotted to seize the station of Bangalore, while at the same time murdering his relatives wholesale, was also annexed.

Bentinck handed over temporary charge to Sir Charles Metcalfe, who acted as governor-general until the arrival of Lord Auckland in March, 1836.

Most of Lord Auckland's energies were taken up by the Afghan War and he devoted little attention to the states.

However, when the debauchee king of Oudh died in 1837, advantage of this was taken to conclude a new treaty, further mention of which is made below.

The raja of Satara, to whom Lord Hastings had given a small area in 1816, was deposed for intriguing, his brother being elevated to the *gaddi* in his place.[1] The territory of the nawab of Karnul, in Madras, was annexed for attempting to make war.

Lord Ellenborough succeeded as governor-general in 1842. Only one case of importance arose in connection with an Indian state, but

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1844, XXXVI, 351–453.

that was of the first importance. The troubles in the Gwalior state, referred to in Bentinck's time, had continued to increase and now came to a head. Jankoji Rao Sindhia died in 1843, to be succeeded by an adopted son, a minor, Jayaji Rao. Intrigues multiplied and the army, some 40,000 strong, became all powerful. The minority was in the hands of Krishna Rao Kadam, the Mama Sahib, or maternal uncle of the late ruler. He was opposed to Dada Khasgi-wala (the administrator of the family estates of the maharani), who succeeded in engineering his downfall. Dada was, indeed, expelled from the state on the demand of the governor-general, but this step failed to put an end to the intrigues.

Lord Ellenborough's remonstrance fell mainly on deaf ears, while the few sardars who were prepared to assist us in restoring order were powerless in the face of the army, which had complete control of affairs. The governor-general, therefore, decided to act and accompanied by the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, crossed the Chambal and advanced on Gwalior. To their surprise (for no proper reconnaissance had been made) the British troops suddenly found themselves face to face with the state forces, and after two simultaneous battles at Maharajpur and Panniar, the state army was broken up.[1] A fresh treaty was made and a council of regency appointed to conduct affairs during the minority of the maharaja, then nine years old. Lord Ellenborough's action in the Gwalior case was the object of much criticism, and the main reason for his recall. But whatever criticism may be levelled at his methods, there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the policy pursued. When he landed in India, Lord Ellenborough inherited, as a legacy from his predecessor, the Afghan War. In addition, the assembly of a menacing army of Sikhs, some 70,000 strong, just across the Satlej river, made him nervous, and he felt that it would be courting disaster to leave a hostile, undisciplined force in his rear, close to the important town of Agra, especially in view of the weakness of our own army.[2] The best reply to the strictures levelled at him is to be found in his own letter to Lord Ripon, written on receiving the news of his recall.[3] He refers to the criticism passed on him by the court of directors in which his conduct was stigmatised as "wanting in decision and inconsistent with itself", and says in reply, that he is unable to controvert this opinion because he has not "the remotest idea to what supposed facts it can possibly refer". He then turns to the two objections raised by the court, firstly that he should have supported the regent, who was appointed with our approval, and secondly that he should not have crossed the Chambal river against the expressed wishes of the maharani and the sardars of the states. The Mama Sahib (the regent), he points out, was offered military support but refused

[1] *Calcutta Review*, 1844, I, 535. [2] *Parliamentary Papers, loc. cit.* pp. 143–344.
[3] Law, *India under Lord Ellenborough*, p. 28.

it, and, when his fall came, it was so sudden as to preclude any possibility of such assistance reaching him. On 19 May (1843) he was in full control of the administration, on the 21st he was removed from the regency and by 5 June had left Gwalior, a fugitive. It would, moreover, have been impossible to carry out military operations at the end of May, with the rains imminent and many streams to cross, including the great Chambal river.

With regard to the second point, the crossing of the Chambal in December against the wishes of the durbar, he remarks that at that season the winter rains were expected which would have made the river difficult, if not impossible, to cross; provisions were not obtainable for the troops at his encampment; while the deep ravines which surrounded his position made it dangerous. To have withdrawn the troops would have led to an immediate cessation of all negotiations, as the Gwalior army, which was *de facto* ruler of the state, would never have submitted quietly to disbandment, even if the durbar had really intended to assist us. The court's view was, he notes, too limited, in regarding

> the movement as an insulated transaction, which with an army in the field the Governor-General could deal with at his leisure.... It should rather be considered as a movement upon a field of battle extending from Scinde through the Punjab even to the frontiers of Nepaul.

Delay in dealing with the situation would have induced the Sikhs to advance, and to have left a hostile force of 40,000 men within a few marches of Agra would have been the height of folly. He concludes by saying that no negotiations would ever have been effected without the presence of a force and it had always been apprehended that its use would be necessary.

The weak point in Lord Ellenborough's procedure was his reliance on the Treaty of Burhanpur,[1] of 1804, which, though never denounced, had been objected to by Lord Cornwallis, and treated as a dead letter when new compacts were made with Gwalior in 1805 and 1817. By article 6 of this treaty we undertook to support the maharaja, should necessity arise, with a subsidiary force; and the governor-general, in view of the maharaja's youth, construed the disturbances of 1843 as falling under the spirit of this article.

In July, 1844, Lord Ellenborough was recalled and Sir Henry Hardinge succeeded him. The Sikh War engaged most of the governor-general's attention but he visited the king of Oudh in a fruitless endeavour to induce him to overhaul his administration, informing him that unless reforms were introduced at an early date, the British Government would be obliged to take over the state. The warning, however, fell on deaf ears. Hardinge also urged the abolition of sati in the Indian states, following the lines of Lord W. Bentinck's enactment in British India.

[1] Aitchison, *op. cit.* IV, 53; *Parliamentary Papers*, *loc. cit.* p. 146.

In January, 1848, Lord Dalhousie assumed the governor-generalship. His name is, even now, apt to be invidiously coupled with the so-called "annexation policy" in connection with the Indian states. But, indeed, in all probability, no criticism would have been roused by his action had not the Mutiny, following so closely on his retirement, called for a scapegoat.

The cases on which this adverse criticism is mainly based are the absorption of Satara (1848); Nagpur (1853); Jhansi (1854) and Oudh (1856). There were also some other but less important instances. Of all these only that of Oudh was strictly speaking a case of deliberate annexation; in every other case Lord Dalhousie based his decisions on the fact that no direct heir existed to inherit the state, which was, moreover, "dependent", that is created by ourselves or held on a subordinate tenure. In each case, also, a decision was only arrived at after infinite pains had been taken to ascertain the facts, and was invariably carried out with the full approbation of the court of directors.

The Satara state was created by Lord Hastings in 1818, the treaty on which it rested (1819)[1] containing no clause conferring the right of adoption, while Sir James Rivett-Carnac in installing the raja had warned him that, being childless and no longer young, the state would lapse at his death, unless as a mark of special favour he was permitted to adopt a successor. Lord Dalhousie left no stone unturned to arrive at a just decision; no argument for or against adoption escaped his scrutiny. His policy was based on the well-established Hindu doctrine, still followed by the ruling princes of India, which denies the right of succession by adoption in a subordinate state or estate unless the previous sanction of the suzerain has been obtained, a rule applying equally to old-established or recently-created holdings. Thus, in Central India it is followed by the big Maratha durbars with respect to Rajput feudatories, who were established much earlier than their masters. This permission to adopt must in every case be given by the suzerain before the ceremony of adoption is carried out, otherwise the adoption is not legal. On the other hand it is not, in Indian states, customary to enforce an escheat, so that the actual absorption of an entire holding is very rare, although the terms of the tenure are often modified by the area being reduced, the tribute raised or some new conditions imposed. A succession fee called *nazarana* is invariably levied, amounting often to one year's revenue or even more.

This well-known principle was disregarded by the raja of Satara, who, just before he died, in 1848, adopted a son without informing the British Resident or obtaining the permission of the governor-general. Hence Lord Dalhousie would have been fully within his rights in ordering escheat, simply on the basis of this omission,

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, xxxix, 267.

especially as the court of directors had, in 1841, enunciated the principle, that the right to political succession was an indulgence which should be the exception and not the rule, and be granted only as a mark of special favour and approbation, adding that the Company should "persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue, while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously respected".[1]

Lord Dalhousie consulted all his most experienced colleagues and found that he was supported by the majority of them in refusing to recognise the adoption. But before passing orders he referred the case to the court, which agreed with his view, as "being in accordance with the general law and custom of India".[2]

The Nagpur case was in many ways similar. The raja died heirless in 1853. He had not adopted any one and no lineal descendant in the male line survived. In a long, careful minute[3] Lord Dalhousie pointed out that the original state was of recent creation and was founded on usurpation and conquest; its ruler had always been hostile to us, and after the campaign which ended in his defeat it had lain entirely with us to deal with this territory as we thought fit. Lord Hastings had then, as a concession to Maratha sentiment, recreated the state from the conquered territory, after deducting a considerable portion of it. Nagpur, like Satara, was thus a state of our own making. In this minute Lord Dalhousie classed the Indian states as being tributary and subordinate, of our own creation, or independent. In the first case he considered that our assent was necessary to an adoption, in the second case that adoption should not be allowed, while in the third case we had no right to interfere.[4]

Lord Dalhousie found, however, that in the Nagpur case many of his advisers were against him, especially Colonel Low,[5] who quoted the views of Lord Hastings, Elphinstone, Munro, and Metcalfe, all of whom considered that the adoption of heirs to states by Indian princes should be recognised by us. The main grounds of dissent were, that our rule was generally unpopular; that the absorption of a state invariably meant that the aristocracy ceased to find employment and became a discontented body; that the rigorous enforcement of the doctrine of lapse would only lead to misgovernment, as every childless raja, feeling that his state must come to an end, would oppress his subjects, extorting the last penny from them for his own use. The case was referred to the court, which upheld the escheat.

The Jhansi case (1854) stood on quite a different footing. The subhedar of Jhansi had originally been a provincial governor under

[1] Minute of 30 August, 1848, *Parliamentary Papers*, *loc. cit.* pp. 224–8.
[2] *Parliamentary Papers*, *loc. cit.* pp. 272–98.
[3] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854, XLVIII, 317 *sqq.*
[4] Minute of 28 January, 1854, *idem*, pp. 337–53.
[5] Minute of 10 February, 1854, *idem*, pp. 355–67.

the Peshwa, and was in no sense a ruling chief. When in 1818 all the Peshwa's lands fell to us the province of Bundelkhand passed with them, and the subhadar with it. In submitting the case to the court the governor-general laid stress on this aspect of the affair.[1]

One case which Lord Dalhousie took up cannot well be brought into the same category as the three just mentioned, and that is the case of Karauli. This state lies in Rajputana and was founded in the eleventh century. Sir Frederick Currie in his minute on the case points out how Karauli, an old Rajput state, differed entirely from "Satara the offspring of our gratuitous benevolence". Lord Dalhousie, however, recommended the escheat, but the directors decided that their policy was inapplicable to Karauli, which was not a dependent state but a "protected ally".[2] It may be remarked here that the absorption of Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi caused no real alarm amongst the Indian princes.

The crowning act of Lord Dalhousie's administration was the annexation of Oudh, a genuine case of annexation, and undoubtedly one which did stir the hearts of the princes of India. It is only fair to the governor-general to show how averse he was to the procedure he was ordered to follow.

Our relations with the state of Oudh were governed by the treaty of 1801 which required the nawab to reform his administration and follow the advice of the Company's officers. Succeeding governors-general had warned him that unless he reformed his administration we should be obliged to interfere, but, though abuse increased year by year, we took no steps to enforce our admonitions. Wellesley,[3] when granting the treaty of 1801, had remarked prophetically that our support of the nawab only protected the vile and that no effective security could be provided against the ruin of the province of Oudh until we took over the administration. In 1837 Lord Auckland made a new treaty with the nawab by which we were empowered to intervene in case of misrule and put our own officers in charge. The king accepted, but the directors refused to ratify it. Lord Auckland, however, never informed the king that the treaty was a dead letter, though he did report to the directors that he had not done so.[4] Lord Hardinge, nevertheless, when he warned the king, in 1847, that he must reform, cited this treaty in his memorandum as if it was still in force and confirmatory of the treaty of 1801.[5]

Convinced by the reports of Sleeman and Outram of the need for immediate action, Dalhousie, although his term of office was just expiring, and he might well have left this unpleasant duty to Lord Canning, investigated the case with his usual minute care. He was

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854–5, XL, 87–103. [2] *Idem*.
[3] Wellesley, *Despatches*, II, 426—Despatch of 22 January, 1801.
[4] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1857–8, XLIII, 307–65.
[5] *Idem*, p. 368, para. 8.

informed by Mr Dorin and General Low, members of council, that though the treaty of 1837 was a dead letter, this fact was unknown to the king of Oudh. Mr Grant, another member, urged that the king should be informed of this fact. Dalhousie referred the point to the directors who replied that the best course to take was to leave things as they were until circumstances arose necessitating the disclosure.[1]

Long afterwards, writing to Sir George Couper on 6 January, 1858,[2] Dalhousie refers to this question. He remarks that it was really a matter of indifference to the king and the people of Oudh, when we actually took over the state, whether it was done under the treaty of 1837 or by the strong hand: "for every human being knew the assumption would be permanent", and so the degree of their knowledge could not have affected the result. But he held that the authorities had no right, at the time, to withhold the information.

In a long and careful minute[3] the governor-general discussed the whole case. He put the treaty of 1837 aside as being a dead letter, and pointed out that "for tolerating so long this total disregard of the obligation of a solemn Treaty [of 1801]...the British Government is heavily responsible". We had warned and counselled but never acted, abuses had grown, while our own troops in Oudh protected the king from justifiable revolt on the part of his subjects. He then suggested four courses:

(*a*) that the king should abdicate, Oudh being incorporated in British India;

(*b*) that the king should be allowed to retain his titles but should vest the administration in us in perpetuity;

(*c*) that the administration should be made over to us for a time;

(*d*) that the Resident should take over general control of the state administration.

Lord Dalhousie declared that he believed the first course would lead to the happiest issue, but added:

> yet I do not counsel the adoption of this measure. The reform of the administration may be wrought and the prospects of the people secured without resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory and the abolition of the throne and I for my part do not advocate the advice that the province of Oudh be declared British territory.

He held that in spite of maladministration the consistent loyalty to us of successive nawabs of Oudh precluded annexation. So he urged the second course that the king should vest control in us but retain his titles and rank, as this course would be "perpetual in duration as well as ample in extent"; but the king must himself do this, not be forced to do it. Different views were held by the members of his council but the general opinion was against Lord Dalhousie and in

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1857–8, XLIII, 307–65. [2] Dalhousie, *Letters*, p. 393.
[3] Minute of 18 June, 1855, *Parliamentary Papers*, *loc. cit.*

favour of the king's abdication. The case was sent to the court, and the directors rejected Dalhousie's proposal, ordering annexation and the abolition of the throne.[1]

Dalhousie undertook to carry out this thankless task, although Lord Canning had just arrived in India to succeed him as governor-general. Outram, the Resident, was asked to induce the king to sign a document voluntarily transferring the kingdom to us. Outram was confident that he could do so, but the king refused in tears, and the proclamation annexing Oudh was at once issued. No disturbance arose. Minute directions were also given to Outram as to disarming the province but these were, at his suggestion, not carried out, owing to the approach of the hot season, and the order was later on cancelled by Lord Canning. Had it been carried out, Oudh with an unarmed population would have been a less formidable factor in the disturbance of 1857. Lord Dalhousie refers to this in a private letter to Sir George Couper of 5 February, 1858;[2] he says: "Lord Canning's Government made a fatal blunder in not disarming Oude in 1856, when it might have been done easily and completely". He adds that no official record exists of his determination to carry this out because it was a task for his successor, and hence it only appears in his confidential demi-official correspondence with Outram, in these words:

> It is my intention that not a single fortified place should be left in Oude, with the exception of those that belong to Government. It is further my intention that the whole population should be disarmed...as was done with such excellent effect in the Punjaub in 1849.

It is thus clear that Lord Dalhousie, while he deprecated half-measures, was strongly opposed to the policy of annexation, though he was convinced that, so far as the people of Oudh were concerned, it would be far the best course to take.

In a letter to Sir George Couper written on 15 December, 1855,[3] before the orders of the court had arrived, he says:

> I understand that they [the Directors] mean to *force* the King to form a new treaty or to assume the government of his country. This is all very well for the home authorities but it was not for me to suggest it....The course proposed by the Court is not warranted by international law. It would be either conquest or usurpation of the power of government by force of arms.

This argument of international law would not in these days be raised in connection with the Indian states.

Sleeman, however, Outram's predecessor as Resident at Lucknow, expressed the opinion that the annexation was a political blunder, holding that we should have acted under the treaty of 1837, abrogated though it was. The confiscation of the state would, he said, "cause our good name to suffer", and "that good name is more valuable

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1857, XI, 109–17.
[2] Dalhousie, *op. cit.* p. 399.
[3] *Idem*, p. 363.

to us than a dozen Oudes". We had used our giant's strength like a giant, he said, and had injured our reputation in the eyes of all India. This opinion was largely instrumental in leading to the grant of "Adoption sanads" in 1862. But any such step would have been impossible in Dalhousie's day as it would have savoured of interfering with the "independent" states.

The other cases with which Lord Dalhousie had to deal were the extinction of the pension granted to Baji Rao, the last Peshwa, the disappearance of the Carnatic and Tanjore titles, and the question of the Hyderabad contingent.

Baji Rao died in 1852 leaving no heir, and the governor-general ruled that the pension, being personal, terminated with his death, though the large private fortune accumulated by Baji Rao would pass to his adopted son, Dhondu Pant, who later on became notorious in the Mutiny, as Nana Sahib.

Trouble arose in regard to payment of the Hyderabad contingent force by that durbar, and in 1853 the Nizam under pressure placed the administration of the Berar province of his state under our control so that its revenues might be devoted to the up-keep of that force. This arrangement, made with such reluctance in the first instance, has since been the cause of much contention and is likely to remain so.

The nawab of the Carnatic, in 1855, died leaving no son and, on the ground that his state was created by us in 1801, and on the fact that his title was personal, his estate escheated and the title did not descend to his successors, who have since then been styled Princes of Arcot.[1] A similar case arose on the death of the raja of Tanjore.

Reviewing Lord Dalhousie's administration in so far as it affected the Indian states, it is clear that the policy of absorbing them in cases of failure of direct heirs was not of his making but was inherited by him, and, whether right or wrong, was at that time the avowed policy of the Company, whose one anxiety was to consolidate its possessions.

Lord Dalhousie was careful to confine action under this policy to the "dependent" states. Thus, when he was urged by the directors, soon after he reached India, to take a strong line and interfere in Hyderabad, he threatened to resign; while in Bahawalpur, when the newly-installed ruler was ousted by his brother, he refused to support the fugitive nawab, although we had recognised his succession, in view of the fact that the people of the state did not wish to have him as their ruler, and it was for them alone to decide. These two cases occurred in "independent" states. Lord Dalhousie was one of the most scrupulous and conscientious governors-general who ever guided the destiny of India; he was absolutely incapable of doing an injustice. On the other hand, a sincerely religious man, he was convinced of the desirability of substituting our rule for that of the Indian princes,

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1860, LII, 531–78.

whenever it could in fairness be effected. He says himself, writing on 21 July, 1857, to Sir George Couper:[1]

> I never advised annexing any principality unless it lapsed naturally for want of heirs or was forfeited for misconduct. But when a principality does so fall to our disposal it does seem to me to be cruel to hand over its inhabitants to be squeezed and skinned by a native despot, merely that our own subjects may be able to compare their own lot favourably with that of those whom we have abandoned....

His unflagging warfare against abuses of all kinds and his desire to extend to all the benefits of the new era he had introduced into British India certainly dimmed his perception of other points of view; as for instance that of the hereditary ruling princes themselves, that of their subjects with the innate reverence for their natural rulers which then did (if it does not now) distinguish the people of India, and by their preference, in spite of abuses, for the less rigid government of an Indian state. Never did his administration justify the fancifully fierce condemnation levelled at it as being "more like counting out the spoil of brigands...than...the acts of English statesmanship",[2] nor did any man ever merit less the stigma of being called the "very worst and basest of rulers".[3] We must not judge those days by these. Besides an entire change of policy on our side, the Indian states have themselves, for the most part, travelled far administratively since 1856, and, though still in the main autocratic, have reached a much higher standard than they then possessed, while they are now subjected to the glare of criticism and the antiseptic of publicity to a degree impossible in those days of a limited public press and very inadequate communications.

The sudden upheaval which followed so soon after his departure was quite unforeseen by Lord Dalhousie who in his farewell minute[4] considers that he is justified in saying that he leaves India "at peace without and within".

To summarise the results of the policy pursued towards the Indian states between 1818 and 1856.

This period is by far the most important in the history of the relationship of the states to the British Government. It witnessed their metamorphosis from a congeries of quasi-independent units, some openly hostile, most, at heart, antagonistic to us, and all doubtful and resentful of our intentions towards them, into a body with so complete an acquiescence in our paramount position that even the shock of the Mutiny could not subvert it. This result we owe mainly to Lord Hastings, who built so carefully on the foundations laid by Lord Wellesley, the structure being completed by the generous policy adopted when India came directly under the crown. For Lord

[1] Dalhousie, *op. cit.* p. 381.
[2] Edwin Arnold, *The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India*, p. 199.
[3] Major E. Bell, *The Empire in India*, p. 26.
[4] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1855–6, XLV, 107–52.

Hastings introduced those distinct relations of supremacy and subordination which still fundamentally control the position between us and the states. In his time those parts of India not directly under our administration passed equally under our sovereignty; and our ascendancy, as also our indefeasible right to interfere if the peace and security of India was menaced, became henceforth unquestioned. Step by step, sorely against its will, the Company had been driven, by inexorable fate, to abandon its policy of the ring-fence and of non-interference, and so we passed through the system of subordinate alliance to the wise and generous policy of co-operative partnership which holds at the present day.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN BRITISH INDIA

"BRITISH authority in India", says Ilbert, "may be traced to a two-fold source. It is derived partly from the British crown and parliament, partly from the Great Mogul and other native rulers of India."[1] The development has been slow and at times obscure. It has lent itself to much misinterpretation, and has involved strong contrasts between facts and theories. One of the great difficulties has arisen from the fact that in the East public law has not been subject to the same scrutiny and definition that it has undergone in Europe. Technical terms, such as sovereignty, and their Persian equivalents, seem to have been used with the greatest laxity, both by Indians and by Englishmen in India; while in most of our documents the needs of current controversies are predominant, and one is seldom sure whether Hastings and Clive were laying down general principles which they were prepared to support in every case or only drawing temporary arguments from an ambiguous position in order to defend a particular action.

It is clear that from the first the position of the English in India was variable and uncertain. The fact may be illustrated by the different positions held by the English in the seventeenth century in their principal settlements of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta respectively. In the first the Company exercised sovereign powers under the English crown, to whom the island had been ceded by the Portuguese. The right to fortify and defend the place, to maintain troops there, to administer justice, to levy taxes, to coin money, was clear, full and indisputable. All inhabitants, whether English or Indian, were presumably subjects of the English crown.

Madras fell in another category. That place was held under a grant of the chief of Wandiwash, who empowered the English Company to build a castle and fortress, to mint money, together with

> full power and authority to govern and dispose of the government of Madraspatam for the term and space of two years next insueing after they shall be seated there and possesst of the said fortifications; and for the future by an equal division to receive half the custom and revenues of that port.[2]

After the Hindu power had been overthrown by the Muslim kingdom of Golconda, the grant was in effect continued; but, as complaints perpetually arose over the division of the customs, a new grant was

[1] *The Government of India*, p. 1. [2] Love, *Vestiges*, 1, 17.

made in 1672, which commuted the share of the customs for a quit-rent of 1200 pagodas; the grant continues:

> Neither shall any avaldare or any of the diwan's people ever be kept or placed in the town of Chinapatam, and, as I have done, that no person whatsoever shall have to do in the least with the town of Chinapatam, but that it shall remain wholly and for ever under the English, where they may accordingly act all the command, government and justice of the said town as they shall think necessary and most convenient to be done.[1]

When, in 1687, Golconda was conquered by Aurangzib, no change seems to have been made in the English status. Here then was a position quite different from that at Bombay. The English exercised all the powers of sovereignty subject however to Indian superiority shown by the payment of quit-rent. Here too it should be noted, that as the local coinage bore no superscription, but only the figures of Hindu deities, it did not carry with it the same implications that it would have done in Northern India; and when the Moghul authorities permitted the coinage of rupees at Madras, those coins bore the usual marks of Moghul supremacy.

At Calcutta the position was again different. There the English had been allowed to purchase the zamindari of the three villages that grew into the capital of British India. Their jurisdiction, as at Madras, was therefore two-fold. Over Englishmen the Company relied upon its chartered powers; but over Indians, and especially over Muslims, in whom alone the local government took any great interest, its authority was that of a minor zamindar under the local faujdar. The position is shown with special clearness by the fact that the Company could not, till the treaty of 1757, obtain the right of minting coin at Calcutta, and by the jurisdiction of the law courts there. The Company's criminal court, established by the royal charters of 1727 and 1753, was limited to Europeans. Indians were tried in the zamindar's court. In theory all sentences of death should have been submitted to the faujdar of Hugli and the *Nazim* at Murshidabad before being put into execution.[2] In practice this does not seem to have been done; but the Calcutta Council was clearly very cautious of putting Muhammadans to death. We must discount Bolts's story, that they were flogged to death instead of being hanged, out of deference to Muslim opinion;[3] but one case at least is on record, where the Muhammadan members of a party of criminals were spared for fear of the nawab's interference.[4]

This position at Madras and Calcutta was profoundly changed by the course of events which may be dated from the War of the Austrian Succession. Madras was the first to be affected. During the war it passed into the hands of the French by right of conquest, in defiance

[1] Love, *op. cit.* I, 345. "Chinapatam" is Madras.
[2] Committee of Secrecy, 1773, Sixth Report, pp. 2 and 11.
[3] Bolts, *Considerations*, I, 80.
[4] Long, *Selections*, p. 51.

of the prohibitions of the nawab; it remained in French hands during the war, although Dupleix agreed to make a formal recognition of the nawab's position by flying his flag over the place for a week.[1] At the end of the war it was restored to the English by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. From that time the English might have claimed to hold it independently of any Indian prince. However, they were on the best of terms with Muhammad 'Ali, whom they were seeking to establish as against the French nominee; and so, in 1752, as a mark of gratitude the quit-rent was abolished, and with it went the last fragment of dependence upon an Indian prince at Madras.[2]

That, however, only applied to Madras itself and a very narrow strip of land round its walls. The rest of the country lay within the undisputed control of the nawab under the nominal sovereignty of Delhi. When, in 1780, the nawab applied to Hastings to secure a settlement of outstanding questions, he was specially eager to secure declarations from the English that he was hereditary prince of the Carnatic, with full power over the administration of his country and the right to nominate his successor, under the general protection of the Company and the English nation.[3] It is apparent that all thoughts of the Moghul emperor have disappeared, although doubtless his name was still recited in the Friday prayers at Arcot, and for that matter at Madras. In fact the very application shows that the Company, and not the emperor, was now suzerain. In 1792 the old nawab died and was succeeded by the son whom for so many years he had striven to disinherit; but the succession took place with the approval of the Company. Finally, ten years later, for reasons which have been explained in a previous chapter, on the next demise of the nawabship, the Company intervened decisively. Its representative refused to recognise any succession except on terms which at a stroke reduced the nawab to the same position to which the nawab of Bengal had only fallen after a term of years.[4] He became a pensioner. On this occasion we hear no mention of Delhi or the emperor. Sovereign powers over the Carnatic passed to the Company, not indeed by conquest, but in virtue of a long-established political situation, in which the Company was in fact, though not in name, the overlord. For three generations the old title and dignity were allowed to survive; but in 1855, in the time of Dalhousie, they were deliberately extinguished, as a "semblance of royalty without any of the power is a mockery of authority which must be pernicious".[5]

The case of Bengal was much more complicated, partly because of the inferior status from which the Company set out, partly because

[1] P. 122 *supra*.
[2] Madras Public Consultations, 31 August, 1752.
[3] Requests of the Nawab Walajah of the governor-general, Madras Military Consultations, 22 August, 1781, p. 2280.
[4] P. 361 *supra*.
[5] Lee-Warner, *Dalhousie*, II, 140.

it offered the first example of something like territorial acquisitions on a large scale, and partly because of the conflicts and hesitations of the crown and Company in England. The status of zamindar persisted at Calcutta until the year 1756. But when at the close of that year Clive recovered the place, we may suppose that the logic of events had already begun to modify the position. It was recovered by force; and we may infer that when the English returned, they returned no longer as humble dependents of the nawab. The change is clearly indicated in the treaty which Clive made with Siraj-ud-daula on 9 February following. In future the place might be fortified as the English thought proper; the privilege of a mint was granted; and the English nation and Company agreed to live on good terms with the nawab so long as he observed the treaty.[1] The theory of Moghul sovereignty still stood, but a large breach had been made in it. The breach was further enlarged when the English proceeded to overthrow the ruling nawab and set up another. In the treaty with Mir Ja'far, although the sovereignty over the country, in whosesoever hands it lay, was not formally impaired, the English were nevertheless established as an *imperium in imperio* with the right of doing themselves justice.[2] The revolution of 1760 was designed to strengthen the nawab and led, as we have seen, to a conflict between the person invested with the sole rights of administration in the province, and the corporation controlling the only efficient military force therein. Again the nawab was overthrown and Mir Ja'far restored, not as had formerly been the case, with the aid and concurrence of his friends and supporters, but by the mere act of the Calcutta Council. In 1765 this *de facto* power assumed the right of nominating the nawab's principal minister, and in the same year, under Clive's Treaty of Allahabad, it was invested with the right of revenue administration. The formal sovereignty still lay where it had; but alongside of the emperor and nawab there had sprung up a body which not only possessed the sole military force in Bengal, but also had conquered the province in 1763, had assumed the power of nominating the nawab's chief officer, and was now invested with the right of collecting the revenues. It was an indefinite situation which could not readily be brought within the scope of any western formulae.

The situation, perplexing as it was, was prolonged by the hesitation of the English authorities to assume formal sovereignty over the territories which in fact they controlled. Neither the crown nor the Company was prepared, though for very different reasons, to lay claim to territorial sovereignty in India. The Company feared that any such claims would provoke or hasten interference by the ministry;[3] the crown was unwilling to assail the legal rights of the Company.[4]

[1] Hill, *Bengal in 1756–7*, II, 215 *sqq.*

[2] P. 171 *supra.*

[3] Verelst, *op. cit.* p. 81.

[4] E.g. Chatham to Shelburne, 24 May, 1773 (*Chatham Correspondence*, IV, 264).

Indeed, the establishment of such a position was the precise motive with which Clive seems in 1765 to have desired the diwanni of Bengal rather than any territorial cession, which could have been obtained just as readily. It placed the Company in a strong tactical position alike as regards foreign powers and as regards the government at home.

This had not always been Clive's aim. After Plassey he had sought to induce Pitt to take over the government of the Company's possessions, in despair of ever seeing that body establish good government.[1] But Pitt had then been reluctant to intervene in so complicated a position. How complicated it was may be seen from an opinion delivered by the law-officers on 24 December, 1757, on the Company's memorial praying for the grant of all booty and conquests made in India.

"In respect to such places", they say, "as have been or shall be acquired by treaty or grant from the Mogul or any of the Indian princes or governments, your Majesty's letters patent are not necessary, the property of the soil vesting in the Company by the Indian grants, subject only to your Majesty's rights of sovereignty over the settlements as English settlements, and over the inhabitants, as English subjects who carry with them your Majesty's laws wherever they form colonies.... In respect to such places as have lately been acquired or shall hereafter be acquired by conquest, the property as well as the dominion vests in your Majesty by virtue of your known prerogative, and consequently the Company can only derive a right to them by your Majesty's grant...."[2]

But although the Company could not acquire territory by conquest, it could nevertheless "cede conquests made upon Indians", since by its charters it had power to make war and peace with them. In 1765 the legal view undoubtedly was that British sovereignty was established in Calcutta, in the 24-Parganas, and in the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong ceded by Mir Kasim, but not in the diwanni districts, a result which accorded well with the Company's policy of that time. The question as to where and at what point Indian inhabitants of places subject to English sovereignty became English subjects does not seem to have been considered, as is clear enough from the uncertain and ambiguous language of the Regulating Act. It was declared at Calcutta in 1773 that Sepoy officers were "not...subjects of Britain, but aliens and natives of Hindustan".[3]

From the point of view of the ministry the question was clearly two-fold: internal as regarded the Company, external as regarded the French and other foreign nations. It will be most convenient to sketch the development of policy under these two heads, and finally to describe the relations between the Company's government in India and the Moghul emperor—the *de facto* and the *de jure* wielders of Indian dominion.

[1] Malcolm, *Life of Clive*, II, 119 *sqq.*; Williams, *Life of Chatham*, II, 28–9.

[2] Public Record Office, C.O. 77–19; cf. an undated and unsigned minute, *ap.* Chatham MSS, I, 99.

[3] Forrest, *Selections from the State Papers of the Foreign Department*, I, 89.

The first direct exercise of sovereign power in India by the crown since the cession of Bombay to the Company resulted from an international document, the Treaty of Paris of 1763, in which both the French and the English governments recognised Muhammad 'Ali as nawab of the Carnatic and Salabat Jang as subahdar of the Deccan. No one seems to have considered how far these stipulations were consistent with the structure of the Moghul Empire. Indeed they were at the time intended only to secure the peace between the two European nations in India by preventing them from continuing to support rival princes in those regions. At a later time, however, the clauses were put to a new use. The disputes between the crown and the Company which came to a head in 1766–7 made the ministry anxious to find some means by which it could learn how matters were actually going in India. There was reason to distrust the execution which the Company's servants had given to the treaty in the East; and the upshot of the matter was that when the Company sent out its supervisors to reform its Indian administration, the ministry sent out in command of the squadron an officer vested with plenipotentiary powers from the king to the princes of India. About the commission of this officer there was much underhand work that ill became the dignity of the ministry; the commission, for instance, was not communicated to the Company; and so when the commodore arrived in India he found that the Company's governments knew nothing about the powers that had been granted to him. The natural result was the outbreak of violent disputes between the representative of the king's majesty and the councils which exercised the powers of the Company. These divided and undefined powers were bound to weaken and impede, rather than to strengthen the conduct of affairs, and the time had not yet come when the ministry was prepared to take a decisive part in determining Indian policy. However, it is curious to note that among the other duties of the plenipotentiary was included a mission to the Moghul emperor, who had sent presents to George III by the hands of Clive, and these, by some oversight, had never been acknowledged. Commodore Lindsay was entrusted with a letter of thanks from the king, whose titles were for the occasion strangely modified, obviously with a view to impressing the court of Delhi with a due sense of the king's importance. "George III", the letter is headed, "King...Defender of the Christian faith...and Sovereign of the Seas, etc."[1] A generation later the same style was employed in a letter addressed to the emperor of China.

The next step after this ill-concerted effort to interfere in the Company's Indian administration was the Regulating Act of 1773. That act takes for granted the existence of British sovereignty in Calcutta and its immediate neighbourhood, but not apparently

[1] Weymouth to Lindsay, 14 September, 1769, and George III to the Moghul, of the same date (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 18020, ff. 46 verso and 50 verso).

beyond. At best its language is hesitating and uncertain. A distinction appears between British subjects and the native-born inhabitants. The India Act of 1784 leaves the question still untouched, although it legislates for the full exercise of all sovereign powers in territory that in 1773 was clearly not yet a part of the dominions of the crown. The act of 1793 merely declared that all territorial acquisitions and their revenues were to remain in the possession of the East India Company for the next twenty years, thus leaving the question of sovereignty still open. Not until 1813 do we find the claim to sovereignty formally asserted. In the act renewing the Company's privileges in that year the territorial acquisitions were continued under its control "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the crown of the United Kingdom, etc. in and over the same". But at what moment that sovereignty came into being still remained a riddle.

Much the same attitude is displayed by the treaties concluded in this period. At first the question of sovereignty is not raised except in regard to the factories possessed by the European nations, and which it was taken for granted formed part of their respective territories. Thus Article 11 of the Treaty of Paris declares,

> Dans les Indes Orientales la Grande Bretagne restituera à la France...les différents comptoirs que cette couronne possédait...Et sa majesté Très Chrétienne renonce à toute pretention aux acquisitions qu'elle avait faite sur la côte de Coromandel et d'Orixa depuis le dit commencement de l'année 1749....Elle s'engage de plus à ne point ériger des fortifications et à ne point entretenir des troupes dans aucune partie des états du soubah de Bengale....

It is clearly implied that the English enjoyed a special position in Bengal by the limitations which the French engaged to observe; but neither then nor till long after was the least attempt made to define the position by the use of any of the political terms employed in Europe. The article in the Treaty of Versailles of 1783 even more obviously evades the matter. After providing for the restoration of the French factories in Bengal, it continues:

> Et sa Majesté Britannique s'engage à prendre les mesures qui seront en son pouvoir pour assurer aux sujets de la France dans cette partie de l'Inde, comme sur la côte de Coromandel, et de Malabar, un commerce sûr, libre et indépendant....

In 1786–7, when troubles with the French in Bengal produced renewed discussions in Europe, leading to the convention of 1787, the most inconsistent language was used, showing that the English still had not been able to make up their minds as to their position in India. Thus the Committee of Secrecy writes to the Governor-General in Council, 19 July, 1786, stating that the French could hardly expect the benevolent intervention of the Company so long as they assumed a position of independence and did not "acquiesce in the general controuling power existing in the English Company

as Dewan of the provinces".[1] But in Paris, on 6 February, 1787, Eden, who was negotiating the convention, took up a very different position in an *explication confidentielle* which he delivered to Montmorin. His proposals, he said, were intended,

> sans rien faire qui soit censé déroger à la souveraintè possessoire et exclusive dont l'Angleterre jouit dans l'Inde, de donner à la France toutes les facilités praticables, dans la vue de former un traité de commerce....C'est un fait incontestable que l'Angleterre possède tous les droits substantiels de la souveraintè dans les provinces de Bengale, Bahar, et Orixa....C'est en supposant cette qualité effective de la souveraintè que les deux cours ont formés l'article 11 de traité de Paris et l'article 13 de celui de Versailles....[2]

The French, however, did not accept this doctrine, which can hardly be read into the treaties mentioned without vigorous interpolation. The position is clearly summed up in an unpublished letter of Cornwallis to the Committee of Secrecy, dated 16 November, 1786. "From this complicated system", he says, "founded on grants conferred and powers assumed, of sovereignty exercised though not avowed, many difficulties arise in all negotiations with foreign nations."[3]

The Treaty of Amiens only dealt with India under a general article, but the Treaty of Paris of 1814, and the convention with the Netherlands of the same year, both place the position of the English Government in India beyond question internationally. Both refer specifically to the British sovereignty in India, which was then for the first time acknowledged by the French and the Dutch. In this connection, and as displaying the contrast which this treaty displays with previous diplomatic language, a sentence from Article 12 of the Treaty of Paris may be quoted:

> Sa Majesté Britannique s'engage à faire jouir les sujets de sa Majesté Très Chrétienne relativement au commerce et à la sûreté de leurs personnes et propriétés dans les limites de la souveraintè britannique sur le continent des Indes, des mêmes facilités, privilèges et protection, qui sont à présent ou seront accordés aux nations les plus favorisées.

Thus the claim put forward by the legislation of 1813 was in the following year formally announced to the diplomatic world of Europe and recognised by the two powers principally interested in the East.

We must now turn to see how in India itself the position of the East India Company gradually developed. The obvious point of departure is the Treaty of Allahabad, by which Clive secured for the Company a grant of the diwanni, agreeing in return to pay to the emperor twenty-six lakhs of rupees a year besides giving him possession of Allahabad and the revenues of the neighbouring country. The emperor at the time when he made the grant was a fugitive from his capital, without money, without troops, dependent on the English for his daily bread. His grant gave them nothing which they could

[1] India Office, *French in India*, vol. XIII. [2] *Idem.*
[3] *Idem.*

not very well have taken for themselves had they been so minded, and Clive's reason for his generosity, as has been pointed out above, referred not to the position of affairs in India but to the Company's relations with the crown and the French. The grant was, Hastings said, "a presumptuous gift of what was not his to give",[1] and

The sword which gave us the dominion of Bengal must be the instrument of its preservation; and if...it shall ever cease to be ours, the next proprietor will derive his right and possession from the same natural charter.[2]

Holding these views Hastings was inevitably opposed to Clive's settlement so far as it concerned the action of the governments in India. Indeed, he had hardly taken over the government in Bengal in 1772 before an opportunity arose for him to give effect to his ideas. The emperor, Shah 'Alam, having quitted English protection at Allahabad for Maratha protection at Delhi, Hastings decided to stop payment of the Bengal tribute. "I think I may promise", he wrote, "that no more payments will be made while he is in the hands of the Mahrattas, nor, if I can prevent it, *ever more*."[3] The refusal was diplomatically placed to the account of the Bengal famine of 1769–70. There followed an unceasing stream of letters from Delhi, in which the emperor or one of his ministers called upon the English to withdraw from their position, or at the least to lend the emperor troops who might be paid out of the arrears. Hastings at last wrote, "I must plainly declare that until the safety and welfare of these provinces will admit of it, I cannot consent that a single rupee be sent out of them which it is in my power to retain".[4] The payment of tribute was the one really crucial element in the relations between the emperor and the rulers of the provinces. A governor might strike coin and have the Friday prayers read in the emperor's name; he might pay handsomely to obtain the imperial confirmation of his succession, and offer large sums for the continuance of his predecessor's titles; but these things meant little except when they were accompanied by the regular remittance of the annual tribute, which alone signified a real, living allegiance to the imperial power. Hastings's refusal of tribute was in effect a declaration of the practical independence of Bengal.

It was accompanied by another act which in its way was equally significant. The districts of Kora and Allahabad were ceded to the nawab of Oudh. Clive's arrangement by which they had been given to the emperor might conceivably have been represented as obedience to the monarch's commands. Not so the decision which dispossessed the imperial revenue-officers and transferred the districts back to the nawab of Oudh in return for fifty lakhs paid into the Company's

[1] Minute, *ap.* Bengal Select Committee, 4 October, 1773.
[2] Minute, *loc. cit.* 12 October, 1772.
[3] Hastings to Purling, 22 March, 1772 (Monckton Jones, *op. cit.* p. 147).
[4] Hastings to Shah 'Alam, 13 September, 1773 (Forrest, *op. cit.* I, 58).

treasury. As if in order to make the position clearer still, Hastings declined the title which the emperor offered him.[1] In another way, too, Hastings aimed at introducing English sovereignty, though circumstances did not allow him to carry it into execution. He advocated the replacement of alliances between Indian princes and the Company by alliances between them and the crown. The first occasion on which he placed these ideas on paper seems to have been in a letter to North of 26 February, 1775;[2] but from a later letter to Elliot of 12 January, 1777,[3] it appears that the subject must have been discussed between him and Shuja-ud-daula when he visited Benares in 1773. He states that the nawab was desirous of alliance with George III and even offered to coin money in the name of the English monarch. Hastings was still in favour of this project in 1777, and thought it might be applied not only to Oudh but also to Berar. Had this policy been carried into effect, it would have led to a formal assertion of English paramountcy in India. But the directors, had it even been proposed to them, would have objected to it as lessening their importance, while the ministry of the time had no clear-cut conception of its own purposes. The plan thus came to nothing, and survives only as a project, foiled, like so many of Hastings's plans, by the opposition or the inertia of others.

While Hastings was thus bent on repudiating the emperor's authority over Bengal, he was equally active in reducing even the ostensible part played by that phantom the nawab in its internal management—implanting, as he said, the authority of the Company and the sovereignty of Great Britain in the constitution.

> "The truth is", he wrote to the Secret Committee on 1 September, 1772, "that the affairs of the Company stand at present on a footing which can neither last as it is nor be maintained on the rigid principles of private justice. You must establish your own power, or you must hold it dependent on a superior, which I deem to be impossible."[4]

In these ideas he was encouraged by the Company's decision "to stand forth as diwan". One of the guiding principles which inspired the reforms of the period 1772–4 was to make Calcutta the visible capital of the province. Thither was moved the chief revenue-office, and thither went the appeals from the courts which he established. "In a word", he claimed in 1773, "the sovereign authority of the Company is firmly rooted in every branch of the state."[5]

But in this he had out-run the intentions of his masters, the directors, and their masters, the parliament and crown. Lawyers like Thurlow might with brutal directness declare that in India existed no powers

[1] Hastings to Shah 'Alam, 1 August, 1773 (*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, IV, 77).
[2] Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 508.
[3] *Idem*, II, 136.
[4] *Idem*, I, 254.
[5] *Idem*, p. 332.

or rights but force, and that it was "a country with no public moral or faith".[1] But no one in England was yet ready to accept the idea of filling with British sovereignty the void created by the dissolution of the Moghul power. The vagueness of the Regulating Act corresponded in its own way with the vagueness of the directors' orders. They might resolve directly to administer the Bengal revenues on reports that their Indian deputy was playing them false; but though they enjoyed the powers they were not prepared to assume the position of the masters of Bengal. When they received complaints, for instance, that the French were refusing to obey the orders issued in the nawab's name, they replied:

> We direct that you afford the Country Government all necessary assistance in the execution of such equitable laws as are or may be framed for the protection of the natives....If the French persist in their contempt of the Nabob, it is our order that you decline as much as possible entering into a discussion of such of their complaints as shall be cognizable by the Nazim of the province, for so long as the English pay attention to His Excellency, it cannot be expected that other Europeans should be allowed to disregard him....[2]

So when Clavering and his followers arrived in India, and found that Hastings had adopted a different policy, and above all when they found the Supreme Court taking the same line, calling the nawab "a man of straw", and demanding that the majority should make oath that he was a sovereign independent prince, conducting his own affairs independently of their government and capable of making war and peace with Calcutta, though they were unable to make the required affidavits they were strongly inclined to adopt, support, and enforce the Company's views, reviving the phantom which Clive had summoned up. Not impossibly the latter had urged this course on Francis in some of those meetings which took place at Walcot shortly before the majority sailed from England and which were full of evil omen for the relations between the governor-general and his new colleagues. Hence their endeavour to maintain the fiction of the dual government and to hide the authority of the East India Company. Accordingly they insisted on re-establishing Muhammad Riza Khan as deputy nazim and supported their decision by taunting Hastings with neglect of the Company's intentions.[3]

> "The Governor roundly insists", we read, "on the futility of attempting to maintain a country government....An old servant of the Company might at least have treated their deliberate and invariable opinion with greater respect. With regard to us, if our ideas on this subject had not entirely concurred with theirs, and if we had not been convinced that in their circumstances it was the only rational system they could pursue, we should still have thought it our duty...to have adopted their doctrines."

[1] Thurlow's Opinion on Clive's Jagir Case.
[2] Company to Bengal, 3 March, 1775, paras. 59 *sqq*.
[3] Bengal Secret Consultations, 29 February, 1776.

Beside these thin and hollow declarations should be placed Hastings's vigorous and (in this case) accurate language.

All the arts of policy cannot conceal the power by which these provinces are ruled, nor can all the arts of sophistry avail to transfer the responsibility of them to the Nabob, when it is as visible as the light of the sun that they originate from our own government, that the Nabob is a mere pageant without so much as the shadow of authority, and even his most consequential agents receive their appointment from the recommendation of the Company and the express nomination of their servants.[1]

Absolute as the opposition appears, it is nevertheless deceptive. The majority were ready to use any stick to beat Hastings with, even if it was not one of their own growing; and although under the stress of controversy they found themselves committed to the views set down above, they had not always considered the dual system of government that best adapted to the situation of Bengal. In a letter written early in 1775 Francis had pointed out that under the system which in the next year the majority advocated so heartily, the people of Bengal had either two sovereigns or none, and that the only course to follow was to declare the sovereignty of the king of Great Britain over the whole of the provinces; and at this time his criticisms of Hastings's conduct seem confined to the fact that in abolishing the Moghul sovereignty he had not formally declared the British.[2] Francis had recorded similar sentiments in a minute of 8 March, 1775. After this it is odd to find him, in a private, unpublished letter to Lord North, declaring that the English should set about giving or restoring an active constitution to the Moghul Empire. "The authority of the Emperor should be in a considerable degree restored and means given him to support it."[3] The revival of the empire would have been wholly inconsistent with English authority in Bengal.

It is worth noting that in this respect the policies of the English and the French had been, and continued to be, diametrically opposed. Dupleix and Bussy had consistently acted within the theory of the empire. They had based their claims in Southern India on the authority of Salabat Jang, as legitimate subahdar of the Deccan. Even in the Seven Years' War, when matters were going ill for the French, Bussy advocated summoning the subahdar's brother, Basalat Jang, into the Carnatic, on the ground that the authority of his name and connection with the subahdar would enable the French to collect revenues where without him they could not raise a rupee. All their intrigues of a later date included schemes to secure the influence of the imperial name, as if that could give them a man more in the field or a rupee more in the treasury. Down to the time of Wellesley they continued to dream of reviving the empire in order

[1] Hastings's Minute, *ap.* Bengal Secret Consultations, 7 December, 1775.
[2] Francis to North, February, 1775 (Parkes and Merivale, II, 27).
[3] Same to same, 21 November, 1775 (Public Record Office, T 49–8).

thereby to establish their own supremacy; and so obsessed were they with this idea that some of them even attributed it to their English rivals.[1]

But Jean Law, the coolest head among them, saw better and more clearly into the heart of things. In a *mémoire* composed in 1777 he pointed out with incisive force that English security depended on the existence of many independent princes, certain to be divided among themselves, and so incapable of a united attack on the foreigner; but, if the government of Calcutta set to work to increase its power under cover of re-establishing the Moghul Empire, it would be following the only policy which would give every prince of India an urgent motive for attacking it.[2] The ideas with which Francis dallied had occurred to many Englishmen before him—to Clive, who had resolutely put them aside; to Vansittart, who had been willing to put them into action but luckily had been prevented by circumstances. Here the Company was in complete agreement with its servants' actual policy. An attempt to restore the emperor at Delhi, the Company had written, "might bring on the total ruin of our affairs; and we add that, should you be persuaded into so rash and dangerous a measure, we shall deem you responsible for all the consequences".[3]

Hastings, however, was never adverse to modifying his policy, if it seemed desirable, with all that freedom from the shackles of a formal consistency which is the peculiar privilege of the despot. Not that he ever weakened on the point of English sovereignty in Bengal, but in 1782 he thought it desirable to re-enter into relations with Delhi, and with that object had appointed Major James Browne to be his agent at that place. Browne was first to visit the nawab of Oudh and ascertain his views, since Hastings desired "to second and assist his views [rather] than to be the principal or leader in any plan that may be undertaken". Aware that the emperor might take advantage of the agent's appearance to raise once more the old question of the tribute and Allahabad, Hastings instructed him to avoid if possible the discussion of such unpleasant topics, "since it is not in my power to grant either one or the other". The purpose of the mission was rather to secure information than anything else. "Hitherto we have known nothing of the political state of the court but from foreign and suspected channels. Your first care must be to collect the materials for a more complete and authentic knowledge," not only of Shah 'Alam's court but also of "the independent chiefs and states whose territories border on his".[4] This was then no revival of the schemes of Vansittart, merely an extension of political relations to

[1] Cf. Modave's Memorandum of 1774, *ap.* Barbé, *Madec*, p. 65.
[2] Law, *État politique de l'Inde en* 1777, pp. 76–7.
[3] Company to Bengal, 16 March, 1768.
[4] Hastings to Browne, 20 August, 1782, *ap.* Bengal Secret Consultations, 10 September, 1783. A collection of papers bearing on the British relations with Delhi forms Home Miscellaneous volume no. 336 at the India Office.

a prince of exalted dignity and pretensions but of definitely circumscribed territorial power, and whose sovereignty, as Hastings observed on a later occasion, "is universally acknowledged though the substance of it no longer exists".

Browne's mission led to no action of any kind; but on the occasion of Hastings's final visit to Benares in 1784, he was brought into contact with a fugitive prince, Mirza Jiwan Bakht, who had fled from Delhi and was anxious for English or any other intervention to procure his return. At this time Hastings was regarding with a speculative eye the rise of the Sikh power in Northern India, whence he predicted the emergence of new dangers to the Company's possessions "if this people is permitted to grow into maturity without interruption". He seems to have contemplated the possibility of affording assistance to the prince with a view to checking the advances of the Sikhs; but preferred that Mahadaji Rao Sindhia should be committed to this enterprise; indeed very shortly after this, on the occasion of the murder of Afrasiab Khan, Sindhia did assume control of affairs at Delhi; and this was the position of affairs when Hastings quitted India early in 1785.

The degree in which the decay of the Moghul Empire was apparent to and recognised by the people of India, and the aspect under which the rising power of the East India Company appeared to them, must have varied widely according to the class and the interests of the observer. Princes such as the nawab of Oudh or the Nizam of Hyderabad still made haste on their accession to obtain a formal confirmation in their offices and the grant of titles; and for these they were willing to pay in hard cash. They still struck coin in the emperor's name; in his name were still read the prayers in the mosques; and the seals which they used to authenticate their public documents still declared them the humble servants of the emperor. But, in strong contrast to the observance of these forms, none thought of obeying his orders, of remitting to him the surplus revenues of the provinces, of mustering troops for his support. Shah 'Alam himself with his immediate courtiers doubtless regarded them all as rebels whom he would duly chastise had he the power; but in view of his complete impotence he could only acquiesce. To the common people these affairs were too remote to concern them in any way. They had suffered in silence the establishment of Muslim rule; they had watched with unconcern one Muslim dynasty replace another; and now they watched unmoved the last of these falling into decay and dishonour, while they paid their taxes to whatever power appeared with armed force to demand them, whether it were Muslim, Maratha, or European.

Among the princes of India two policies emerged as alternatives to that policy of drift to which most of them were inclined. One was to declare their independence of the empire, as Tipu did when he

proclaimed himself *padshah* in his own right;[1] the other was to espouse the imperial cause and extend a personal dominion under the shadow of the imperial name, as Mahadaji Rao Sindhia sought to do. Of these the first was generally reprobated by Muslims, to whom even the later Moghul emperors, as in an earlier century even the later Abbasid Khalifs, symbolised religious as well as political sentiments, though no longer capable of transforming them into effective action; while the second of the two could only commend itself to able and ambitious individuals, like Sindhia, who perhaps dreamed of ultimately transforming the empire from Muslim to Hindu.

When matters were in this state of flux, Cornwallis arrived in India and a new period begins in the development of the East India Company's position. Cornwallis and the later governors-general could not be expected to and in fact did not display that sympathy with Indian ideas which made the Company's servants not unwilling to perpetuate traditional forms, even though they might obscure the essential facts of the situation. To Cornwallis the customary diplomatic language was a "pompous, unmeaning jargon".[2] The tone of the Calcutta government rises.

"I expect", writes Cornwallis, "that all the princes of the country except those of the royal family shall habituate themselves to consider the English residents at their respective courts as the representatives of a government at least equal in power and dignity to their own."[3]

When Shah 'Alam fell into the hands of the cruel Rohilla Ghulam Kadir Khan, Cornwallis, though horrified at the torture inflicted on him, could see no political reason for interference. "If we should now free him," he said, "unless we could give him an army or a permanent fund for the payment of it, he would immediately again become the slave and perhaps the prisoner of some other tyrant."[4] Casual interference would thus be useless; and practical statesmen could not be expected to employ their resources in restoring a vanished empire.

"I have received several melancholy [letters] from the King", Cornwallis writes to Shore, "calling on me in the most pressing terms for assistance and support. This morning I wrote him a letter, perfectly civil and respectful, but without all that jargon of allegiance and obedience, in which I stated most explicitly the impossibility of our interference."[5]

This was not Cornwallis's only assertion of the Company's independence. In 1790 the Bombay Government proposed that advantage should be taken of the death of the nawab of Surat to obtain a farman from Shah 'Alam for the country in the Company's name. Cornwallis rejected the proposal. For one thing the nawab had left a son whose claims should not be overlooked; and for another, "I am...unwilling

[1] Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, ed. 1867, II, 110.
[2] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, I, 418.
[3] *Idem*, p. 558. [4] *Idem*, p. 352. [5] *Idem*, p. 295.

to lay much stress on a sannud from the King, as a formal acknowledgment of its validity might be turned to the disadvantage of the Company upon some other occasion".[1] Accordingly the nawab's son was recognised as his successor by the Company, and there the matter was left. The same procedure was adopted in 1793 when Nasir-ul-mulk was recognised as nawab of Bengal. Sindhia in the name of Shah 'Alam protested; but his protests were disregarded. Similarly too when Sindhia indirectly sought to revive the demand for Bengal tribute in 1792. Sindhia was at once informed that any such claim would be warmly resented, on which he hastened to assure Cornwallis that he regarded the British as supreme within their own territories.

The government of Shore displays no change in the Company's position; and, indeed, if circumstances had demanded of him any important decision, he would hardly have borne the Company's banner so high. He was much more careless of the political deductions that might be drawn from a compliance with forms, and actually submitted to be invested with a *khil'at* or dress of honour by the princes whom he visited at Benares in 1797.[2] But when in the following year he was succeeded by Mornington as governor-general, a change of tone rapidly became apparent. In the course of the war with Sindhia, Lake defeated the enemy before Delhi in 1803, and the capital and the person of the emperor fell into English hands. This was an object which, on account of French intrigues, Mornington, now become Lord Wellesley, had much at heart. A French paper, written by one of Decaen's officers, had fallen into his hands, stating that Shah 'Alam

> ought to be the undisputed sovereign of the Mogul empire....The English Company by its ignominious treatment of the Great Mogul, has forfeited its rights as dewan and treasurer of the empire...; thus the Emperor of Delhi has a real and indisputable right to transmit to whomsoever he may please to select, the sovereignty of his dominions, as well as the arrears due to him from the English.[3]

Wellesley concluded that the English interests demanded the removal of Shah 'Alam from the reach of such dangerous suggestions. The emperor might confer on the French an independent sovereignty in the French possessions and factories, and that, in a time of peace in Europe, might produce most embarrassing consequences. Accordingly when Sindhia's troops fled from Delhi, the person of the emperor was reckoned among the most precious spoils of victory. In Maratha hands the imperial name and prestige had not counted for much, as was demonstrated clearly enough by the events of this same war, for, though Sindhia was as deputy *wakil-i-mutlak* master of all the resources of the empire, and on the outbreak of war had caused the emperor to declare that he had erected his conquering standards and entered his

[1] *Cornwallis Correspondence*, II, 22.
[2] Teignmouth, *Life of Shore*, I, 404.
[3] *Wellesley Despatches*, IV, 652 *sqq.*

tents in order to settle the points at issue, it is certain that Sindhia neither strengthened himself nor weakened the Company by his use of the imperial name. But it might have been very different if a French army had taken the field, or if French diplomatists in Europe could have fortified their pretensions with imperial grants.

The situation created by Wellesley's occupation of Delhi can hardly be expressed by the technical language of the West, which carries with it too sharply defined ideas to be appropriate to such vague relations as were established. The facts were these: Shah 'Alam blandly acquiesced in the defeat of his lieutenant. He received Lake in his palace, conferred on him a *khil'at* and a title; and shortly after it was decided to continue the jagirs assigned by the Marathas for his maintenance, but they were to be administered by the Company's Resident at Delhi who was also in charge of the administration of the city; these functions were to be discharged under orders from Calcutta in the emperor's name, and the only area in which the imperial orders were really effective was the palace and its precincts. No written engagements of any sort were given; no grants of any kind were requested; everything that was done was done by the authority of the Company's government at Calcutta; but it was intimated that the latter did not intend "to interdict or oppose any of those outward forms of sovereignty to which His Majesty has been accustomed. His Excellency is desirous of leaving His Majesty in the unmolested exercise of all his usual privileges and prerogatives", and the Resident was directed to use all the forms of respect "considered to be due to the emperors of Hindustan".[1] Wellesley's view of the matter was that the emperor had passed under the protection of the British Government. The palace view possibly was that the Company had returned to its obedience; but in the eyes of India the fortune of war had transferred Shah 'Alam from the custody of Sindhia into that of the Company.

Down to this time the British assertion of sovereignty within the Company's possessions had been spasmodic and incomplete. But from the arrival of Lord Moira in 1813 it was definite and full. The date corresponds with the statutory assertion of the king's sovereignty and only precedes by a year the diplomatic acknowledgment of the claim by France and Holland. Moira was persuaded of "the expedience (and indeed necessity) of extinguishing the fiction of the Mogul government".[2] His seal, therefore, no longer bore the phrase proclaiming the governor-general the servant of the emperor. The *nazars*—gifts offered by an inferior to his lord—were no longer presented in the name of the governor-general.[3] Akbar II, who had succeeded his father Shah 'Alam in 1806, desired an interview with Moira, but the latter declined unless the other waived all ceremonial

[1] *Idem*, pp. 153, 237, 542 and 553.
[2] Hastings's *Private Journal*, I, 78.
[3] *Idem*, p. 323.

implying supremacy over the Company's dominions. "Nothing", Moira wrote in his journal, "has kept up the floating notion of a duty owed to the imperial family but our gratuitous and persevering exhibition of their pretensions." He encouraged the nawab of Oudh to assume the title of king, and declared the expediency of granting titles of honour. And while he thus refused to acknowledge any supremacy but that of his own master, he established the Company's power on a new and broader basis by his decisive overthrow of the Marathas and the network of protective alliances which he cast over Northern India.

Probably these developments had their share in deciding Akbar II to receive his successor, Amherst, in 1827, without that ceremonial to which Hastings had objected. The two entered the Diwan-i-khas at Delhi from opposite sides at the same moment; they met in front of the throne, exchanged embraces, and then took their seats, the emperor on his throne, the governor-general on a state-chair placed on the right; no *nazar* was offered; and on Amherst's departure, the emperor presented him with a string of pearls and emeralds.[1] Amherst also modified the style of letters addressed to the emperor, using forms which recognised the other's superiority but excluded allegiance or vassalage on the part of the British Government.[2] In 1835 the coinage, which ever since 1778 had purported to have been issued in the nineteenth regnal year of Shah 'Alam, was replaced by the Company's rupee bearing the English monarch's image and superscription.

With this change the absolute disappearance of the old style and titular dignity came in sight. Ellenborough, an enthusiast for the direct government of India by the crown,[3] cherished a scheme for inducing the Delhi family to quit the palace that had been built by Shah Jahan, and to resign the title which was, by voluntary request of the chiefs, to be offered to the queen,[4] despite the oddity—had his ideas been carried into effect—of her figuring as *Padshah Ghazi*, the imperial champion of Islam, which would have made a queer pendant to the *Fidei defensor*. Dalhousie shared Ellenborough's dislike of such survivals of the past world of India. Under his reformatory rule the titles of nawab of the Carnatic and raja of Tanjore were allowed to lapse along with the pension which had been granted to the Peshwa on his surrender in 1818. He proposed that with the death of the existing emperor, Bahadur Shah II, the imperial dignity too should be allowed to lapse. In this matter the Court of Directors was strongly opposed to him, and though the president of the Board, Sir John Hobhouse, obliged it to sign a dispatch formally sanctioning such action, he also wrote to the governor-general, informing him that there was strong feeling against his plan, and hinting that it would

[1] *Selections from the Panjab Records*, I, 337.
[2] *Idem*, p. 343 *sqq*.
[3] Colebrooke, *Elphinstone*, II, 266.
[4] Durand, *Life of Sir H. Durand*, I, 84.

be well to reconsider matters, while the chairman of the Court, General Sir A. Galloway, strongly urged the impolicy of any measures that had not the assent of the heir to the title. In these circumstances Dalhousie decided not to carry out the original plan, but to negotiate. Prince Fakr-ud-din was therefore approached with proposals offering recognition as emperor on his father's death, provided he would consent to meet the governor-general at all times on equal terms, and to remove the imperial family from the palace in Delhi to the Kutb, some miles to the southward of the modern city. To these terms the prince assented, so that it seemed that the principal purpose which had inspired all these manœuvres, securing possession of the palace not only as a symbol of sovereignty but also as the ideal site for the principal military depot in Upper India, would be accomplished within a few years.[1] This, it may be noted, explains how it came to pass that the vigorous Dalhousie took no action regarding the famous magazine at Delhi beyond removing the powder magazine to a point outside the city walls.

But on the death of Fakr-ud-din in 1856 the question was raised once more. Bahadur Shah urged that another son, Jiwan Bakht, should be recognised as heir, but Canning, who had by then replaced Dalhousie, was more obstinately determined than had been his predecessor on the abolition of the dignity. In this decision he seems to have been supported by all the Company's servants in a position to be consulted—the Resident at Delhi, the lieutenant-governor of the North-West Provinces, and the members of the governor-general's council; the court of directors either changed its mind or was overruled; and nine months before the outbreak of the Mutiny it was decided that the imperial rank should no longer be recognised after the death of Bahadur Shah.[2]

But at last circumstances precipitated the crisis. After the fall of Delhi the old emperor was tried for complicity in the Mutiny, and ended his days in exile in Rangoon, while the direct government of the Company's possessions by the British crown was at last established. That the course of events, the gradual stripping of the imperial house of all the emblems of royalty, and the final resolve to terminate its honours, created a furious resentment within the walls of the palace, and was represented as a blow at their faith by the more fanatical Muslims in India, may be accepted as certain. But to regard it as the main, or one of the main, causes of the outbreak involves the absurdity of attempting to explain a complex movement by viewing it from one only of its many aspects. The hostility of the Moghul court had been a constant factor from the day, eighty odd years earlier, when Warren Hastings had refused to continue the tribute due from Bengal as a Moghul province; it had

[1] Lee-Warner, *Dalhousie*, II, 135 *sqq.* *Selections from the Panjab Records*, I, 405 *sqq.*
[2] *Idem*, p. 456 *sqq.*

inspired Akbar II when he saw the Company's government assuming the marks of eastern sovereignty; and it was in itself no more formidable in 1857 than it had been any time in the previous eighty years.

If this shadow-king had had influence enough to make the Company's sepoy forces mutiny, he would have used it many years before.

Finally, it should be noted that such survivals of vanished power were by no means uncharacteristic of eastern history. The khalif of Baghdad was visited by embassies bearing gifts and seeking titles long after the provinces of the Abbasid Empire had become independent, and ceased to send their tribute to the imperial treasury. A nearer parallel may be found in India itself. When the Peshwas founded their power at Poona, they did not overthrow the Maratha monarchy. The descendants of Sivaji continued to reign at Satara while for a century their ministers ruled from Poona, and each Peshwa solemnly sought investiture from the king, although the king could only do as he was directed. At Mysore Hydar and Tipu preserved the old Hindu kingly family, and showed its representative periodically to the people; and at Nagpur the Bhonsles preserved a Gondh prince, to whom they left the title of raja and in whose name they issued their orders. The relations between the East India Company and the Moghul, the one exercising and the other claiming the attributes of sovereignty, the one possessed of material power and the other of mystic superiority, the one obeyed and the other revered, were by no means extraordinary. The peculiar factor in this case was not the separation of right and power, but the fact that the East India Company was not a purely Indian body, that it represented the sovereign of Great Britain and brought with it a European impatience of pretensions that had ceased to have a basis in fact.

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CHAPTER II

THE DUTCH IN INDIA

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

The archives of the Dutch East India Company are now preserved at the Rijksarchief at the Hague. Among the papers sent over annually from Batavia were copies of the correspondence carried on by the Governor-General and Council with the various establishments in India. Further documents concerning these establishments preserved at Batavia were also transferred to the Hague in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The Rijksarchief further possesses certain collections of private papers formed by servants of the Company. A work of great importance for the administrative and commercial history of the Company was composed at the request of the Seventeen by Pieter van Dam between 1689 and 1701; it fills eight large manuscript volumes, preserved in the Rijksarchief; its publication has been undertaken by the Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatie Commissie.

At the India Office are seventy volumes of "Hague Transcripts" with thirty-six volumes of translations (see *List of General Records*); and a collection of volumes concerning relations with the Dutch down to 1824 (see Sir William Foster, *Guide to the India Office Records*, pp. 96–7). Numerous Dutch papers occur among the Mackenzie MSS (see C. O. Blagden, *Cat. of the Mackenzie Collections*, Part I).

At the Madras Record Office is preserved a large collection of records relating principally to Cochin, though it includes a number of transcripts of memoirs, obtained from Batavia, relating to Negapatam. See the *Catalogue of Madras Records*, and the *Press List of Ancient Dutch Records from* 1657 *to* 1825 (Madras, n.d.).

At the Colombo Record Office are still preserved a great body of documents relating to the Dutch administration of that island, including some 3000 volumes of "General Records" and 700 volumes of the proceedings of the Council. See R. G. Anthonisz, *Report on the Dutch Records in the Government Archives at Colombo* (Colombo, 1907).

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CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH FACTORIES IN INDIA

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

Les Archives anciennes du Ministère des Colonies (conservées, en ce qui concerne l'Inde, au Ministère même des Colonies et non pas aux Archives Nationales) contiennent la plupart des documents importants relatifs à l'histoire des débuts de l'Inde française dans les volumes de la *Correspondance générale* relatifs à l'Inde française pour les années 1666–1740 (C^2 62 à 80) et de son *Supplément* (C^2, 2e série, t. 1 à 5, 1666–1740). On trouvera également des pièces se rattachant à l'histoire de l'Inde soit dans les volumes de la *Correspondance générale* relatifs à l'Extrême-Orient et au Siam (C^1 22–25), soit dans le premier carton de la même *Correspondance générale* pour Madagascar (C^5 1, 1642–1674). A signaler encore dans la collection Moreau de Saint-Méry les copies de pièces contenues dans le registre F^3 238.

Il n'existe pas de répertoire de la Correspondance générale pour l'Inde, non plus que pour la Collection Moreau de Saint-Méry; mais la *Bibliographie de Madagascar* d'Alfred et de Guillaume Grandidier (Paris, Comité de Madagascar, 1906, 2 vols.) donne la liste des pièces contenues dans le carton 1 de la série 5 (t. XI, pp. 676–678), et Alfred Tantet, *Inventaire sommaire de la Correspondance générale de la Cochinchine*, 1686–1863 (Paris; Challamel, 1905, in-8) les documents se rattachant aux rapports de l'Inde et de l'Indochine au cours de la période dont traite le présent chapitre. Voir aussi Weber, *La Compagnie des Indes*, pp. xxvii–xxxii. Aux Archives Nationales se trouve le manuscrit des Mémoires de François Martin, un document considérable et dont on ne saurait exagérer l'importance pour l'histoire des tout premiers débuts de l'établissement des Français dans l'Inde. Ce manuscrit, qu'ont utilisé plusieurs historiens et que différents érudits ont projeté d'éditer, attend toujours sa publication intégrale. Il est intitulé "Mémoires sur l'établissement des Colonies françaises aux Indes Orientales, dressés par Messire François Martin, Gouverneur de la Ville et Fort-Louis de Pondichéry. Ces mémoires contiennent l'histoire de trente ans, depuis 1664 jusqu'en 1696" (in folio de 631 feuillets). La *Collection des Ouvrages anciens relatifs à Madagascar*, publiée par Alfred et Guillaume Grandidier et Henri Froidevaux (t. IX, pp. 429–633) contient le seul fragment un peu étendu des Mémoires de Martin qui ait jusqu'à présent vu le jour.

Comme on vient de le voir, ces mémoires ne vont pas plus loin que l'année 1696; ils ne dépassent même pas, en réalité, et quoi qu'en dise le titre, le mois de février 1694. Des lettres de François Martin conservées dans le carton K 1374 (Négociations, missions étrangères) et datées des années 1699–1702, permettent de les prolonger jusqu'au début du XVIIIe siècle, surtout si on les rapproche des fragments de son journal quotidien envoyés par lui à la Compagnie pour les périodes du 21 janvier 1703 (Arch. anc. Mre. Colonies, C^2 66, fol. 15–49 et 154–171).

Aux Archives Nationales sont déposées les Archives anciennes du Ministère de la Marine, dont les séries B^2 (*Dépêches et Ordres du Roi*) et B^4 (*Campagnes*) contiennent, l'une dans ses volumes 11–312 (1670–1740), l'autre dans ses volumes 3 à 44 (1666–1740) nombre de documents utiles (cf. *l'État sommaire des Archives de la Marine antérieures à la Révolution*; Paris, L. Baudoin, 1898, in-8). Il existe au Cabinet des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale dans les *Mélanges Colbert* (vol. 119 et suivants), dans le *fonds Ariel* (MSS. Fa., nouv. acquis., nos. 8.925–8.930) et dans la *Collection Margry* (nos. 9.348–9.351) différents documents de réelle valeur sur l'histoire de l'Inde française au cours de la période. A remarquer parmi eux une copie des mémoires de François Martin (*Collection Margry*, nouv. acq. fr., 9.348–9.351).

Nous signalons encore l'existence de différentes pièces intéressantes dans plusieurs volumes des mémoires et documents du *fonds Asie* des Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (tomes 2 à 6).

Dans l'Inde même, il existe à Pondichéry un dépôt d'archives dont, pour la Société de l'Histoire de l'Inde française, l'inventaire a été dressé par M. Alfred Martineau (*Inventaire des anciennes archives de l'Inde française*, Pondichéry, 1914, in-8 de 38 pages), et des manuscrits desquels M. Edmond Gaudart a commencé de publier le catalogue (*Catalogue des Manuscrits des anciennes Archives de l'Inde Française*, t. I, Pondichéry, 1690–1789. Paris-Pondichéry, 1922, in-8 de xxii–810–xvi pages).

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CHAPTER IV

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600–1740

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

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British Museum. A number of miscellaneous MSS. Cf. S. A. Khan, *Sources for the history of British India in the XVIIth century* (Oxford, 1926).

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Court Minutes, etc., of the East India Company, 1635–79. By Miss E. B. Sainsbury, with introductions and notes by W. Foster. 8 vols. Oxford, 1907–29. (In progress.)
The English factories in India, 1618–69. By W. Foster. 13 vols. Oxford, 1906–27. Down to 1654 this series calendars the documents to be found in the India Office, Public Record Office, Indian Record Offices, and British Museum; from that date it is in narrative form, based on similar materials. A supplementary volume covering the period 1600–40 has been published (London, 1928).
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The first Letter Book of the East India Company. Ed. by Sir George Birdwood and W. Foster. London, 1893. A printed version of the Miscellaneous Court Book, 1600–19.
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CHAPTERS V, VI, and VIII

THE STRUGGLE WITH THE FRENCH

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

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Among French records for the period of Dupleix, the following are the most important:

Archives du Ministère des Colonies. C^2 8^2 à E^2 90, année 1747 à 1756, lettres et actes divers.

Bibliothèque Nationale. Nouvelles acquisitions; 9192 à 9170: Lettres de Dupleix aux officiers de l'armée du Carnatic et du Deccan; lettres de Bussy et de divers officiers à Dupleix; correspondance de Dupleix avec divers; lettres de Moracin; comptes de Dupleix.

9356: Correspondance de Dupleix avec la Compagnie et avec Bussy.

9358: Journal de l'armée conduite par Bussy dans le Deccan (1751–1755).

9360 et 9361: Correspondance de Bussy et de Duval de Leyrit.

Archives de Seine-et-Oise. E 3746 à 3756 *bis*: Lettres de Dupleix à l'armée du Sud (3746); à l'armée de Trichinapoly (3747); à Bussy (3748); à Law et à Brenier (3750); aux officiers de Coblon, Chingleput et Valdaour (3751); au gouverneur de Madras (3752); aux syndics et directeurs de la Compagnie (3753); à l'armée de Golconde (3754); aux commandants de Karikal et Masulipatam (3755 et 3756); livre de compte pour 1754 (3756 *bis*).

For the period of Lally:

The d'Argenson papers at the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal; documents relating to the trial of Lally in the Archives Nationales; the Collection Ariel in the Bibliothèque Nationale; the archives of the Ministère de la Marine.

The Pondicherry records contain little or nothing relating to this vexed period. The important papers were probably taken to Europe in connection with the suits of Dupleix and the trial of Lally, and must have suffered further dispersion by the capture and destruction of Pondicherry.

The Madras records (preserved at the Madras Record Office and the India Office for the most part in duplicate): especially the Madras Public Consultations for the whole period. Fort St David, 1747–52 (while it was the Presidency headquarters); the proceedings of the Madras Select Committee (usually known as the Military Consultations). At the India Office is also a collection "The French in India", see Foster, *Guide*, p. 96. Consult also Dodwell, *Handbook to the Madras Records*.

Important papers relating to the conduct of the squadron and of the king's forces in India will be found in the Public Record Office, especially Admiralty papers, I, 160–161, and War Office papers.

The Orme Collection (at the India Office) is particularly important. It was formed by Orme for the purpose of his history and has been admirably catalogued by the late Mr S. C. Hill. There is also a large collection of Clive MSS (in the possession of Lord Powis) which was calendared by Mr Rushbrook Williams, though his calendar still awaits publication.

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CHAPTERS VII and IX

THE CONQUEST OF BENGAL

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

The principal authority for the period consists of the Proceedings of the Bengal Council and Select Committee, preserved in duplicate at the Imperial Record Office, Calcutta, and at the India Office Library. See Foster, *Guide*, pp. 40-42.

Important matter is also contained in the Clive MSS and the Orme MSS, for which cf. p. 621 *supra*.

A number of papers relating to the period will also be found in the earlier portion of the Hastings MSS at the British Museum, for which cf. p. 625 *infra*.

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CHAPTERS X–XIII and XVI–XVII

WARREN HASTINGS AND BENGAL, 1772–85

A. ORIGINAL SOURCES

MANUSCRIPT

In the India Office is a great mass of records dealing with the Hastings period. Foster's *Guide* (especially pp. 42–7) should be consulted. In the Home Miscellaneous Series, vols. 212–221 deal with Hastings' administration, and vols. 228–234 with the Impeachment. The following volumes in this series also deal with the period: 115, 118, 119, 123, 139, 140, 162, 172–4, 227, 372, 555, 683. Among other records for the period 1772–1785 are the Court Minutes (i.e. of the Court of Directors), 15 vols.; the General Court Minutes (i.e. of the Court of Proprietors), 4 vols.; Letters Received from Bengal, 13 vols.; Despatches to Bengal, 8 vols.; Bengal Public Consultations, 77 vols.; Bengal Secret and Military Consultations, 76 vols.; Bengal Revenue Consultations, 93 vols.; Bengal Foreign Consultations, 6 vols.; Calcutta Committee of Revenue Proceedings, 61 vols.

Duplicates of almost all the consultation volumes, similarly authenticated, are to be found in the Imperial Record Office, Calcutta.

At the Public Record Office are preserved the original correspondence of the Secretary of State (C.O. 77–24, 25, and 82, 83), but a great mass of further correspondence of the Secretary of State occurs in the Home Miscellaneous Series at the India Office (145–189). A great quantity of Lord North's East India Correspondence will be found in the Treasury Papers (*T* 49–1 to 9). Besides these there also occur in the Additional MSS three volumes of Robinson's correspondence with George III (37833–5); a volume of Clavering-Francis letters (34287); and the Impey papers (16259–74). The Hastings MSS form Additional MSS 28973–29236.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE FIRST CONFLICT OF THE COMPANY WITH THE MARATHAS, 1761–82

A. ORIGINAL SOURCES

MANUSCRIPT

The English records consist principally of the Bombay Public and Secret, and Political Consultations (see Foster, *Guide*, pp. 84–5, and A. F. Kindersley, *Handbook of the Bombay Government Records*, pp. 20–21 and 41–42). But the student should also consult the Bengal records of the period and the Hastings MSS (see p. 625 *supra*).

The surviving Maratha papers consist of the Poona *Daftar*, of which no index or catalogue has yet been prepared; and the family papers of the principal chiefs, which still await examination.

Much regarding the first Maratha War occurs in the *Officios dos Governadores*, in the *Archivo Ultramarino* at Lisbon; and the correspondence of the Goa Government with its English and Maratha neighbours has been incorporated in the series *Livros dos Reis visinhos* in the Goa archives.

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B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

BAINES, J. A. History of Gujarat—Maratha period (1760–1819). (Ap. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. I, part I, Bombay, 1896.)
Bombay Gazetteer, Materials.
DOUGLAS, JAMES. Bombay and Western India. 2 vols. 1893.
EDWARDES, S. M. The rise of Bombay.
—— Gazetteer of Bombay city and island. Vol. II. Bombay, 1909.
DUFF, JAMES GRANT. History of the Mahrattas. 3 vols. 1826.
KHARE, V. V. Adhikar Yoga.
KINCAID, C. A. and PARASNIS, D. B. History of the Maratha people. 3 vols. 1918–25.
WARING, E. S. A history of the Mahrattas. 1810.

CHAPTER XV

THE CARNATIC, 1761–84

A. ORIGINAL SOURCES

MANUSCRIPT

The principal source is the series of records of the governor and council of Madras, preserved for the most part in duplicate at the India Office and at the Madras Record Office. These consist mainly of two series of consultations, Public and Military. (See. Foster, *Guide*, pp. 75–76, and Dodwell, *Report on the Madras Records*, pp. 20 *sqq.*)

The Madras Record Office contains a special group of volumes (Military Sundries, nos. 60–62) containing the reports, etc., of the commissioners who concluded the Treaty of Mangalore.

Papers relating to the conduct of the naval commander at Madras will be found divided between the Public Record Office and the India Office. The chief items at the former are C.O. 77.82 and T 49.1, 2, and 25; and at the latter Home Miscellaneous 99–114.

Among the Additional MSS at the British Museum is a large part of the Macartney papers, especially his private correspondence (22454–62). The Bodleian Library contains a number of MSS supplementing this last item (Bodley MSS, English History C 66–114). Macartney's correspondence with the Chairs forms Home Miscellaneous 246–7 at the India Office.

A considerable quantity of the Persian papers of the Nawab of the Carnatic is at the Madras Record Office.

PRINTED DOCUMENTS

FORREST, Sir G. W. See p. 625 *supra*.
GHULAM MUHAMMAD. Lives of Haidar 'Ali and Tipu Sultan. 1855.
HUSAIN 'ALI KHAN KIRMANI. History of Hyder Naik. Translated by Miles. 1842.
LOVE, Col. H. D. Vestiges of old Madras. 3 vols. and index. 1913.
—— The Palk MSS. (Royal Hist. MSS Com.) 1922.
Reports (I–VI) of the committee of secrecy on the causes of the war in the Carnatic. 1781–2.

TRACTS AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS

Answer to the charges exhibited against Sir Thomas Rumbold...by himself. [1781.]
BENFIELD, PAUL. Report of the Committee of Correspondence. 1780.
—— Heads of objections. 1780.
—— The case of Mr. Paul Benfield. 1781.
—— Opinion of W. Grant...relative to Mr. Benfield's claims. 1781.
—— Trial for an action for £37,000. 1782.
—— Letter to the creditors of Boyd, Benfield and Co. 1800.
—— Case of Paul Benfield Esq. 1803.
BOYD, HUGH. Miscellaneous works. Ed. by Lawrence Campbell. 2 vols. 1800.
BRISTOW, JAMES. Ten years' captivity with Hyder and Tippoo. 1793.
BURKE, EDMUND. Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, with an appendix containing several documents. 1788.
CAMPBELL, DONALD. Journey overland to India. 4to. 1796.
CAMPBELL, Col. JOHN. Account of the gallant defence made at Mangalore. 1786.
CURTIS, CHARLES. Account of the diseases of India as they appeared in the English fleet at Madras, 1782–83. Edinburgh, 1807.
Defence of Lord Pigot. 1776.
Defences of George Stratton, Esq., and the majority of Council at Madras in answer to the accusations brought against them for the supposed murder of Lord Pigot. 1778.
Enquiry into the policy of making conquests for the Mahometans in India by British arms. London, 1779.
Essay towards illustrating the late conduct of...Sir Hector Munro. 1782.
FULLARTON, WILLIAM. A view of the English interests in India; and an account of the military operations in the southern parts of the peninsula, during the campaigns of 1782, 1783, and 1784. 1787.
King of Tanjore's memorial to the Court of Directors. 1776.
LE COUTEUR, Capt. JOHN (100th Foot). Letters from India containing an account of the military transactions on the coast of Malabar. 1790.
[MAISTRE DE LA TOUR.] Histoire d'Ayder-ali Khan. 1783.
Mangalore, Treaty of. Dallas-Huddlestone controversy. See *Asiatic Journal*, vols. V–VII.
Memoir of the public character and services of William Collins Jackson, late senior merchant on the Madras establishment. 1812.
Memoirs of the war in Asia. 1st ed. 2 vols. 1788; 2nd ed. 1 vol. 1789.
Mr. Floyer's case in the late disputes at Madras. 4to. 1778.
Narrative of the late revolution of the government of Madras. 1776 and 1778.
OAKES, HENRY. Narrative of the treatment of the English prisoners at Bednur. 1785.
Observations on the proceedings in Council at Madras. 4to. [1778.]
Original letters from Warren Hastings, Esq., Sir Eyre Coote, K.B., and Richard Barwell, Esq., to Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart., and Lord Macartney, K.B. 1787.
Original papers...and proceedings before the coroner's inquest upon the death of Lord Pigot. 1778.
Original papers relative to Tanjore. 4to. 1777.
Remarks on the most important military operations of the English forces on the western side of the peninsula of Hindoostan in 1783 and 1784...by a British officer. 1788.

Restoration of the King of Tanjore considered. [1776.]
ROBSON, F. The life of Hyder Ali. 1786.
ROUS, G. The restoration of the King of Tanjore considered. 3 parts. 1777.
SCURRY, JAMES. Ten years' captivity by Hyder and Tippoo. 1824.
[STANHOPE, PHILIP DORMER.] Genuine memoirs of Asiaticus. 1785.
State of the facts relating to Tanjore. [1776.]
STUART, ANDREW. Letter to the directors of the East India Company from —— respecting the conduct of Brigadier-General James Stuart at Madras. 4to. 1778.
—— Letters to the Rt. Hon. Lord Mansfield. Dublin, 1775.
[STUART, Major-General JAMES.] Correspondence during the indisposition of the commander-in-chief. 4to. n.d.
[SULIVAN, R. J.] Analysis of the political history of India. 4to. 1779.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

BARROW, J. Some account of the public life and a selection from the unpublished writings of the Earl of Macnartney. 2 vols. 1807.
BIDDULPH, Col. JOHN. The XIX and their times. 1899.
BILGRAMI, S. H. and WILMOT, G. Historical and descriptive sketch of the Nizam's dominions. 2 vols. 1883–4.
BOWRING, LEWIN B. Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. Oxford, 1899.
DODWELL, H. H. "Warren Hastings and the assignment of the Carnatic." (*E.H.R.* LX, 375 *sqq.*)
GÉNIN, E. Talents militaires d'Aider-aly, sa lutte contre les Anglais, 1780–82.
HILL, S. C. Yusuf Khan. 1914.
LACOUR-GAYET, G. La marine militaire sous le règne de Louis XVI. 1905.
LINDSAY, Lord. Lives of the Lindsays. 3 vols. 1849. (Vol. III contains narratives of R., James, and John Lindsay.)
MAHAN, A. T. The influence of sea-power upon history, 1660–1788. 1889.
OAKELEY, HERBERT. Some account of Sir Charles Oakeley. 1829.
PAGE, J. Schwartz of Tanjore. 1921.
PEARSON, HUGH. Life...of Christian Frederick Swartz. 2 vols. 1834.
RICHMOND, Vice-Admiral Sir H. W. "The Hughes-Suffren Campaigns." (*Mariner's Mirror*, XIII, 219 *sqq.* 1927.)
ROBINS, HELEN H. Our first ambassador to China. 1908.
ROUX, J. S. Le Bailli de Suffren dans l'Inde. 1862.
RUMBOLD, E. A. Vindication of Sir Thomas Rumbold. 1868.
STAUNTON, Sir G. L. Memoirs of the life and family of the late ——. Havant, 1823.
WILKS, MARK. Historical Sketches of the South of India. 3 vols. 1810–17.
WILSON, Col. W. J. History of the Madras army. 5 vols. Madras.
WRIGHT, ARNOLD, and SCLATER, W. L. Sterne's Eliza. 1922.
WYLLY, Col. H. C. Life of Coote. 1922.

CHAPTER XVIII

LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENTS, 1786–1818

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

The principal surviving record series of the Board of Control at the India Office are summarised in Foster, *Guide*, pp. 33–6.

Castlereagh's correspondence when President of the Board forms vols. 502 *sqq.* of the Home Miscellaneous Series. The Dundas papers, which would have been invaluable for this subject, have been dispersed; but some letters occur in the Home Miscellaneous Series 731 *a*.

An interesting reference to the relations between the Board and the Company will be found in Additional MS 33108 at the British Museum, where the Wellesley and Liverpool papers may also be consulted.

Printed Documents

Debates at the India House on the Company's new charter. 1793.
Parliamentary Papers. Papers relating to the renewal of the Company's charter in 1813 occur in vols. VI and VII, session 1812, and VIII–X, session 1812–13. The evidence given before the Select Committee in 1831–2 also relates to the earlier period (vols. VIII–XII, session 1831–2). Correspondence relating to the constitution of the Indian Governments (session 1833, vol. XXV, 115, 185).
Ross, Charles. Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis. 3 vols. 1859.
Wellesley, Marquess. Despatches. 5 vols. 1836.

Tracts and other Contemporary Publications

Anderson, George. ...Variations...in the affairs of the East India Company since...1784. 1792.
[Bruce, J.] Historical view of plans for the government of India. 1793.
Considerations of an attempt of the East India Company to become manufacturers in Great Britain. 1796.
Considerations on the danger...of laying open the trade with India and China. 1813.
Elphinstone, Mountstuart. Opinions of...upon some of the leading questions connected with the government of British India examined and compared with those of the late Sir T. Munro and Sir J. Malcolm. 1831.
Grant, Robert. The Expediency maintained of continuing the system by which the trade and government of India are now regulated. 1813.
Hasty sketch of a debate at the East India House on the subject of the private trade. 1801.
Lauderdale, Earl of. An inquiry into the practical merits of the system of the government of India. Edinburgh, 1809.
Malcolm, Sir John. The government of India. 1833.
Memorandum of the relative importance of the West and East Indies to Great Britain. 1823.
Rickards, R. India or facts submitted to illustrate the character and condition of the native inhabitants. n.d.
Russell, F. A short history of the East India Company. 1793.
[Scott-Waring, Major T.] Observations on the present state of the East India Company. 1807.
Tucker, H. St G. Review of the financial situation of the East India Company. 1822.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

Auber, Peter. Analysis of the constitution of the East India Company. 1826.
Foster, Sir W. "The India Board." (*Trans. of the Royal Hist. Soc.* 1916.)
Kaye, J. W. Life and correspondence of Henry St George Tucker. 1854.
Macpherson, David. Annals of commerce. 4 vols. 1805.
—— European commerce with India. 1812.
Morris, Henry. Life of Charles Grant. 1904.
Seton, Sir Malcolm. The India Office. 1926.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784–1815

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

The chief English records are the Bengal Political, Foreign, Military and Secret Consultations for the period (Foster, *Guide*, pp. 50 *sqq.*). But besides these a good deal of matter ready collected occurs in the series *The French in India* (*idem*, p. 96) and in the later part of the Factory Records: Persia and the Persian Gulf (*idem*, p. 99).

At the Public Record Office the series F.O. 60 contains the papers relating to the early Persian missions.

At Paris the archives of the Ministries of the Colonies and of Marine are especially important.

Printed Documents

Aitchison. Treaties. See p. 623 *supra*.
Fortescue MSS. (Hist. MSS Com.) 1894– .
Gardane, Comte Alfred de. Mission du Général Gardane en Perse sous le premier empire. 1865.
Gaudart, E. Catalogue des manuscrits des anciennes archives de l'Inde française. 2 vols. Pondichéry, 1922–4.
Law, Jean. État politique de l'Inde en 1777. Pondichéry, 1913.
Napoléon I. Correspondance. (Especially vol. xv.)

Tracts, Travels, and other Contemporary Writings

Baldwin, George. Political recollections relative to Egypt. 1801.
Brittanicus. Letter to Samuel Whitbread.... 1810.
Capper, J. Observations on the passage to India through Egypt, by Baghdad, etc. 1785.
Cossigny, Charpentier. Voyage au Bengale. 1789.
Forster, George. Journey from Bengal to England through the northern parts of India.... 2 vols. 1808.
Francklin, Col. W. Observations made on a tour from Bengal to Persia, 1786–87. 1790.
Grandpré, L. de. Voyage dans l'Inde et au Bengale, 1789–90. 2 vols. 1801.
Hanway, Jonas. Historical account of the British trade over the Caspian Sea. 2 vols. 4to. 1754.
[Hopkins, D.] The dangers to British India from the French and missionary establishments. 1808.
Morellet, Abbé André. Mémoire sur la situation actuelle de la Compagnie des Indes. 1769.
Plaisted, Bartholomew. A journey from Calcutta in Bengal by sea to Busserah: from thence across the great desert to Aleppo.... 1757.
Sonnerat. Voyage to the East Indies, 1774–81. Translated. Calcutta, 1788.
Taylor, Major J. Travels from England to India, with instructions for travellers and an account of the expenses of travelling. Maps. 2 vols. 1799.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

Barbé, Émile. Le nabab René Madec. 1894.
Boigne, Comte de. Mémoire sur la carrière militaire et politique de M. le Général Comte de Boigne. Chambéry, 1830.

BRETTE. La colonie de l'Isle de France en 1790. n.d.
BRYDGES, Sir HARFORD JONES. Account of the transactions of H.M.'s mission to the Court of Persia in the years 1807–11. 2 vols. 1834.
CHARLES-ROUX, FRANÇOIS. Autour d'une route: L'Angleterre, l'isthme de Suez, et l'Égypte au 18e siècle. 1922.
—— Les origines de l'expédition d'Égypte. 1910.
—— L'Angleterre et l'expédition française en Égypte. Cairo, 2 vols. 1925.
—— "Un projet français de commerce avec l'Inde par Suez sous le règne de Louis XVI." (*Rev. de l'hist. des cols. fr.* 1925, pp. 411 and 551.)
—— Les échelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIIIe siècle. [1927.]
CHEVALIER, E. Histoire de la marine française sous le consulat et l'empire. 1886.
DAUBIGNY, E. T. Choiseul et la France outremer. 1892.
DOURDON, Chevalier DE. "Voyage dans l'Inde par les deserts (1787)." (*Rev. Hist. de l'Inde Française*, i, 171.)
DRIAULT, ÉDOUARD. La politique orientale de Napoléon: 1806–1809. Sebastiani et Gardane. 1904.
GALLOIS, NAPOLÉON. Les corsaires français sous la république et l'empire. Le Mans. 2 vols. 1847.
HOSKINS, H. L. British routes to India. New York, 1928.
KAYE, J. W. The life of Sir John Malcolm. 2 vols. 1856.
LA GRAVIÈRE, JURIEN DE. Guerres maritimes sous la république et l'empire. 2 vols. 1860.
LARCHEY, L. Correspondance intime de l'armée d'Égypte interceptée par la croisière anglaise. Introduction et notes par L. Larchey. 12mo. 1866.
MAILLARD, L. Notes sur l'isle de la Réunion. 1862.
MASSON, PAUL. Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe siècle. 1896.
MINTO, Lady. Lord Minto in India. 1880.
NOË, Comte DE. Mémoires relatifs à l'expédition partie de Bengale pour aller combattre en Égypte l'armée d'Orient. 1826.
PEARCE, ROBERT ROUILLERE. Memoirs and correspondence of...Richard Marquess Wellesley. 3 vols. 1846.
PINGAUD, L. Choiseul-Gouffier, la France en Orient au XVIIIe siècle. 1887.
PRENTOUT, H. L'île de France sous Decaen. 1901.
ROSE, J. HOLLAND. Life of Pitt. 1911.
—— Life of Napoleon. 1901.
SURCOUF, ROBERT. Un corsaire malouin, Robert Surcouf. n.d.
SYKES, Sir P. M. History of Persia. 2 vols. 1922.
TORRENS, W. M. The Marquess Wellesley. 1850.

CHAPTER XX

TIPU SULTAN, 1785–1802

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

Documents relating to Tipu's administration seem almost entirely to have disappeared (but see *infra s.v. Printed Documents*). Our main authorities consist therefore in the Proceedings of the Bengal and Madras Councils for the period (Foster, *Guide*, p. 50, and Dodwell, *Report on the Madras Records*, pp. xii–xiii and 33).

Essential private collections are the Cornwallis MSS at the Public Record Office and the Wellesley MSS at the British Museum.

PRINTED DOCUMENTS

AITCHISON. Treaties. See p. 623 *supra*.
GURWOOD, Lt.-Col. J. Dispatches of the...Duke of Wellington. 13 vols. 1834–9.
KIRKPATRICK, Col. W. Select letters of Tippoo Sultan. London, 1811.
Mysore State Papers. Mysore, 1922.

ROSS, CHARLES. Correspondence of Charles 1st Marquis Cornwallis. 3 vols. 1859.
Société de l'histoire de l'Inde Française. Catalogue des manuscrits des anciennes archives. Vol. I. Pondichéry, 1690–1789. 1922. Vol. II. Pondichéry, 1789–1815. 1924.
STEWART, CHARLES. Tippoo's oriental library, and memoirs of Hyder and Tippoo. 1809.
WELLESLEY, Marquess. Despatches, minutes and correspondence. Ed. by Montgomery Martin. 5 vols. 1836.
—— The Wellesley Papers. 2 vols. 1914.

CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

ALLAN, Capt. A. Views in the Mysore country. (20 large aquatint views.) Oblong fol. 1794.
—— Account of the Campaign in Mysore, 1799. Ed. by Nares Chandra Sinha. Calcutta, [1913].
BEATSON, ALEXANDER. View of the war with Tippoo Sultan. 4to. 1800.
CAMPBELL, Sir ARCHIBALD. Letters from the late Sir A. C. to the Rajah of Travancore, 5th, 17th and 30th April, and 12th August, 1788. 1792.
—— Letter to Major Bannerman, 12th August, 1788. 1792.
DIROM, Major. Narrative of the campaign in India which terminated the war with Tippoo Sultan in 1792. 1794.
ELERS, GEORGE. Memoirs. Ed. by Ld. Monson and G. L. Gower. 1903.
Historical and political view of the Deccan. 1791.
HOLLINGBERRY, W. History of Nizam Alee Khaun. Calcutta. 1805.
MACKENZIE, Lt. RODERICK. Sketch of the war with Tippoo Sultan (1789–1792). 2 vols. 4to. Calcutta, 1794.
MICHAUD, JOSEPH FRANÇOIS. Histoire des progrès et de la chute de l'empire de Mysore, sous les règnes d'Hyder-Aly et Tippoo-Saib. 2 vols. 1801.
MOLEVILLE, BERTRAND DE. Mémoires (for M. Leger, Tipu's envoy in 1791).
MOOR, EDWARD. Narrative of the operations of Captain Little's detachment. 4to. 1794.
[MUNRO, INNES.] Narrative of the military operations...against the combined forces of the French, Dutch and Hyder Ally (1780–84). 4to. 1789.
Narrative of the operations of the British army in India April–July 1791. 4to. 1792.
Narrative sketches of the conquest of Mysore effected by the British troops and their allies. 1800.
RENNELL, Major JAMES. Marches of the British armies...during the campaigns of 1790 and 1791. 1792.
SALMOND, JAMES. Review of the origin, progress and result of the decisive war with Tippoo. 1800.
TIPU SULTAN. Negotiations with the French. 1799.
WELSH, Col. JAMES. Military reminiscences. 2nd ed. 2 vols. 1830.
WOOD, MARK. A review of the origin, progress and result of the late decisive war in Mysore, in a letter from an officer in India. London, 1800.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

BIDDULPH, Col. JOHN. The XIX and their times. 1899.
[HOOK, THEODORE.] Life of Sir David Baird. 2 vols. 1832.
LUSHINGTON, S. R. Life and service of General Lord Harris in America, the West Indies, and India. 1840.
TANTET, V. L'Ambassade de Tippou Saheb à Paris en 1788. 1899.
TEIGNMOUTH, Lord. Memoirs of the life and correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth. 2 vols. 1843.
WILKIN, Capt. W. H. Life of Sir David Baird. 1912.
WILKS, MARK. Historical sketches of the south of India. 3 vols. 1810–17.
WILSON, Col. W. J. History of the Madras army. 5 vols. Madras.

CHAPTER XXI

THE CARNATIC, 1785–1801

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

The principal source of information is the series of Madras Military and Secret Consultations for the period, but especially for the years 1795 and 1801, at the India Office and the Madras Record Office. In the Home Miscellaneous Series at the India Office vols. 271–84 are especially concerned with Tanjore and 285–328 with the Nawab of Arcot.

The Cornwallis MSS at the Public Record Office and the Wellesley MSS at the British Museum should also be consulted.

The Persian records of the Nawabs of Arcot are preserved at the Madras Record Office.

Printed Documents

Aitchison. Treaties. See p. 623 *supra*.
Parliamentary Papers. 1801–2, vol. v; 1802–3, vol. ix; 1806, vol. ii; 1806–7, vol. viii.
Ross. Cornwallis Correspondence. See p. 634 *supra*.
Wellesley Despatches. See p. 634 *supra*.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

Pearce. Life of Wellesley. See p. 633 *supra*.
Saunders, Bailey. Life and letters of James Macpherson. 1894.
Teignmouth. Life of Shore. See p. 634 *supra*.
Wilks. Historical sketches of Southern India. See p. 634 *supra*.
Wraxall, Nathaniel. Memoirs. 4 vols. 1836.

OUDH, 1785–1801

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

The principal source of information is the Political and Secret Proceedings of the Bengal Council for the period (at the India Office and the Imperial Record Office, Calcutta).

In the Home Miscellaneous Series at the India Office vols. 577–83 are specially concerned with Oudh. Vols. 447–8 of the same series contains Shore's correspondence with the resident at Lucknow.

Printed Documents

Abu Talib. History of Asafu'Daulah. Translated by W. Hoey. Allahabad, 1885.
Aitchison. Treaties. See p. 623 *supra*.
Parliamentary Papers. 1806, vols. xv–xvii.
Ross. Cornwallis Correspondence. See p. 634 *supra*.
Wellesley Despatches. See p. 634 *supra*.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

See also the list under this head for "The Final Struggle with the Marathas", p. 637 *infra*.

CHAPTER XXII

THE FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS, 1784–1818

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

The principal materials comprise the Proceedings of the Bengal and Bombay Councils for the period at the India Office, the Imperial Record Office, Calcutta, and the Secretariat, Bombay. See Foster, *Guide*; Kindersley, *Handbook of the Bombay Government records*, and *Handbook to the records of the Government of India*.

The Home Miscellaneous Series at the India Office contains, among other items of importance, letters from Duncan to Wellesley (vols. 470–8), correspondence relating to the Marathas (vols. 616–27), and Nepal (vols. 643–56).

See also the Cornwallis MSS at the Public Record Office and the Wellesley MSS at the British Museum.

For the Maratha records see p. 627 *supra*.

PRINTED DOCUMENTS

AITCHISON. Treaties. See p. 623 *supra*.
FORREST, Sir G. W. Selections from the minutes...of Mountstuart Elphinstone. 1884.
—— Selections from the letters, despatches, and other papers preserved in the Bombay Secretariat. Maratha Series, Bombay. 1885.
GUPTE, B. A. Historical records of Baroda. Calcutta.
GURWOOD, Lt.-Col. J. The dispatches of...the Duke of Wellington. 13 vols. 1834–9.
HASTINGS, Marquess of. Private diary. 2 vols. 1858.
JENKINS, RICHARD. Report on the territories of Nagpore. Calcutta, 1827.
KHARE, V. V. Aitihasik Lekha Sangraha. 12 vols. Poona. (Marathi.)
Papers relating to the Nepaul War (printed by the East India Company). [See also Parliamentary Papers, 1817, vol. XI.]
PARASNIS, D. B. Itihas Sangraha. 7 vols. Bombay. (Marathi.)
PARASNIS, D. B. and MAWJEE, P. V. Treaties, agreements and sanads. Bombay. (Marathi.)
Parliamentary Papers. 1803–4, vol. XII; 1805, vol. X; 1806, vol. XVI; 1818, vol. XI; 1819, vol. XVIII.
ROSS, C. Correspondence of...Marquis Cornwallis. 3 vols. 1859.
SETON-KARR, W. S. Selections from the Calcutta Gazettes 1784–1823. 5 vols. 1864–9.
WELLESLEY, Marquess. Despatches. Ed. by Montgomery Martin. 5 vols. 1836.
——. The Wellesley Papers. 2 vols. 1914.

CONTEMPORARY PUBLICATIONS

Asiatic Annual Register. 1800–11.
Asiatic Journal. 28 vols. 1816–29.
Selections from the Asiatic Journal. 2 vols. Madras, 1875.
BLACKER, V. Memoir of the operations of the British army in India during the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818, and 1819. 2 vols. 4to. 1821.

Brief remarks on the Mahratta War and on the rise and progress of the French establishments in Hindoostan under Generals du Boigne and Perron. 1804.
BROUGHTON, THOMAS DUER. Letters written in a Mahratta camp during the year 1809. 1892.
BUSAWUN LAL. Memoirs of Ameer Khan. Tr. H. T. Prinsep. Calcutta, 1832.
CAMPBELL, L. D. Letter...on the articles of charge against Marquis Wellesley which have been laid before the House of Commons. 8vo. 1808.
DIROM, Major. Campaign in India in 1792. 1793.
DUFF, J. GRANT. History of the Mahrattas. 1826.
East India Military Calendar. Vol. III. 1826.
FORBES, J. Oriental memoirs. 2nd ed. 1834.
FRANCKLIN, W. History of the reign of Shah Aulum. 4to. 1798.
—— Military Memoirs of Mr George Thomas. 1805.
HEBER, REGINALD. Narrative of a journey through the upper provinces of India. 2nd ed. 3 vols. 1828.
MALCOLM, Sir JOHN. The political history of India from 1784 to 1823. 1826.
—— Memoir of Central India. 2 vols. 3rd ed. 1832.
Notes relative to the late transactions in the Mahratta empire. Calcutta, 1803.
Origin of the Pindarries preceded by historical notices on the rise of the different Mahratta states by an officer in the service of the Hon. East India Company. Calcutta, 1819.
PRINSEP, HENRY T. History of the political and military transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813–1823. 2 vols. 1825.
—— Memoirs of...Ameer Khan. *See* Busawun Lal.
SCOTT-WARING, T. History of the Mahrattas. 1810.
SMITH, L. F. Sketch of the rise, progress and termination of the regular corps formed...by Europeans in the service of native princes of India. Calcutta, 1805.
THORN, Major WILLIAM. Memoir of the War in India. 1818.
VALENTIA, Viscount. Voyages and travels to India. 3 vols. 1809.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

BLAKISTON, Lieut. JOHN. Twelve years' military service in three quarters of the Globe. 2 vols. 1829.
Bombay Presidency Gazetteers. Bombay, 1877–94.
COLEBROOKE, Sir H. T. Life of Elphinstone. 2 vols. 1884.
COMPTON, HERBERT. European military adventurers of Hindustan, 1784–1803. 1892.
FORTESCUE, Sir JOHN W. History of the British Army. Vol. XI. 1923.
FRASER, JAMES. Military memoir of Colonel James Skinner. 1851.
GLEIG, G. R. Life of Sir Thomas Munro. 3 vols. 1830.
HOPE, J. The house of Scindea. 1863.
HUTTON, W. H. The Marquess Wellesley. 1897.
KAYE, Sir JOHN. Lives of Indian officers. 2 vols. 1889.
KAYE, J. W. Life of Sir John Malcolm. 2 vols. 1856.
—— Life and correspondence of Charles Lord Metcalfe. 2 vols. Rev. ed. 1858.
—— Selections from the papers of Lord Metcalfe. 1855.
KEENE, H. G. Hindustan under free lances. 1770–1820. 1907.
KELKAR, N. C. Maratha ani Ingraj. (Marathi.)
KHARE, V. V. Nana Phadnavis. (Marathi.)
LUARD, Lt.-Col. C. E. Central India State Gazetteer. Calcutta and Lucknow, 1907–8.
Mahratta and Pindari War. Compiled for the General Staff, India. Simla, 1910.
NATU. Mahadaji Sindhia. (Marathi.)
PARASNIS, D. B. Satara.

PARASNIS, D. B. Sangli State.
PEARCE, ROBERT ROUILLERE. Memoirs and correspondence of...Richard Marquess Wellesley. 3 vols. 1846.
PEARSE, Col. HUGH. The Hearseys, 1768–1893. 8vo. 1905.
—— Life and military services of Viscount Lake. 1907.
[PESTER, JOHN.] War and sport in India, 1802–6. n.d.
[PRICE, Major.] Memoirs of the early life and service of a field officer on the retired list of the Indian army. 1839.
TEIGNMOUTH, Lord. Memoirs of the life and correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth. 2 vols. 1843.
[WALLACE, R. G.] Fifteen years in India or sketches of a soldier's life...from the journal of an officer in H.M.S. 1822.

CHAPTER XXIII

MARATHA ADMINISTRATION

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

For the Maratha records see p. 627 *supra*.

PRINTED DOCUMENTS

ELPHINSTONE, M. Report on the territories lately conquered from the Paishwa. Calcutta, 1822.
JENKINS, R. Report on the territories of the Raja of Nagpur. Calcutta, 1827.
MAWJEE, P. V. and PARASNIS, D. B. Sanadpatra Nivadapatra.
Revenue and Judicial Papers. Published by the East India Company. Vols. III and IV. 1826.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

ATRE. Ganv Gada. (Marathi.)
Iniquities of the Inam Commission in the Presidency of Bombay compiled from the published selections from Government Records and other sources exposed for the information of Enamdars. 1859.
RANADE, M. G. Introduction to the Peshwas' Diaries.
SEN, S. N. Administrative System of the Marathas. 2nd ed. Calcutta, 1925.
SYKES, Lt.-Col. Statistics of the four Collectorates of Dukhan under the British Government. 1838.
—— "On the Land Tenures of the Dekkan." (*J.R.A.S.* 1835, pp. 205–33.)
—— "Land Tenures of Dukhun." (*J.R.A.S.* 1836, pp. 350–76.)
TONE, W. H. Illustrations of some institutions of the Mahratta people. Calcutta, 1818.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795–1815

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

At the India Office is a group of 57 volumes covering the period of the Company's administration (see Foster, *Guide*, pp. 92–3).

The Public Record Office has an extensive series of records C.O. 54–9, beginning with 1794.

At the Record Office, Colombo, exists a great quantity of administrative papers.

At the Record Office, Madras, are volumes relating to the embassies of Pybus and Andrews (see Dodwell, *Report*, pp. 22 and 34).

The Wellesley MSS (especially Add. MSS, 13864–7) at the British Museum.

Printed Documents

Boyd, Hugh. Miscellaneous Works. Vol. II. 1800.
Cleghorn Papers. Ed. by the Rev. W. Neil. 1927.
Pybus, John. Mission to the King of Kandy in 1762. 1862.
The Uva Rebellion 1817–18. (Reprinted from the Ceylon Government Gazette.) Colombo, 1889.

Contemporary Publications

Cordiner, James. A description of Ceylon, containing an account of the country, inhabitants, and natural productions; with narratives of a tour round the island in 1800, the campaign in Candy in 1803, and a journey to Ramisseram in 1804. 2 vols. 1807.
Davy, John. An account of the interior of Ceylon, and of its inhabitants; with travels in that island. 1821.
D'Oyly, Sir John. "A sketch of the constitution of the Kandyan kingdom." (*Trans. Royal Asiatic Soc.* vol. III, 1832.)
Narrative of events that have recently occurred in the island of Ceylon. 1815.
Percival, Captain Robert. An account of the island of Ceylon, containing its history, geography, natural history, with the manners and customs of its various inhabitants; to which is added, the Journal of an embassy to the Court of Candy. London, 1805.
Philalethes. A history of Ceylon...to the year 1815. 4to. 1817.
Turnour, George. An epitome of the history of Ceylon. 1836.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

Bennett, John Whitchurch. Ceylon, and its capabilities. 1843.
Campbell, Lieut.-Col. James. Excursions, adventures, and field-sports in Ceylon; its commercial and military importance, and numerous advantages to the British emigrant. 2 vols. 1843.
Ceylon: a general description of the island: historical, physical, statistical, by an officer, late of the Ceylon Rifles. 2 vols.
Knighton, W. History of Ceylon. 1845.
Marshall, Henry. Ceylon: a general sketch. 1846.
Pridham, Charles. An historical, political and statistical account of Ceylon and its dependencies. 2 vols. 1849.
Tennent, Sir James Emerson. Ceylon. 3rd ed. 2 vols. 1859.

CHAPTER XXV

THE REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF BENGAL, 1765–86

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

The principal series are: Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit; Proceeding of the Committee of Revenue, 1772–1774; Proceedings of the Committee of Revenue, 1774–1781 (Governor-General's Proceedings); Public Proceedings, 1772–1779 (Home Department); Proceedings of the Committee of Revenue, 1781–1786; Report of Messrs Anderson, Croftes and Bogle, dated March 1781 (Govern-

ment of Bengal Records, Revenue Department), and Reports of Mr John David Patterson on the Office of Kanungo dated 23 April 1781, and 18 May 1787, respectively (Government of Bengal Records, Revenue Department). The text used is that of the Imperial, and the Government of Bengal, records. See the *Hand-book to the records of the Government of India*, and the *Catalogue of the English records of the Government of Bengal*. For the series at the India Office see Foster, *Guide*, pp. 50–3.

Printed Documents

Bengal Dt. Records. Chittagong. Vol. I. 1760–1773. 1923.
—— Midnapur. 3 vols. 1911–25.
—— Rangpur. Vol. I. 1770–1779. Vol. II. 1779–1782 Received. Vol. III. 1783–1785 Received. Vol. IV. 1779–1785 Sent.
—— Sylhet. 4 vols.
Bengal Government Records. Press List, Series I. Vol. II. Committee of Circuit, 1772–1773. Vol. IV. Revenue Proceedings, 1775. Vol. V. Revenue Proceedings, 1776. Supplement, 1771–1775.
—— Press List, Series II. Vol. I. Intermediate Rev. Authorities, 1765–1773. Vol. II. Intermediate Rev. Authorities, 1769–1774.
—— Press List, Series III. Vol. I. Controlling Correspondence of Commerce, 1771–1773. Vol. II. Board of Trade, 1774–1776.
—— I. Resident's Letter Bks, 1769–70. II. Controlling Council, 1770. III–VIII. Controlling Council, 1771. VII A. Controlling Council, 1771. IX. Controlling Council, 1772. X, XI, XII. Controlling Council, 1772–1774.
—— Copy-Book of the Supervisor of Rajshahi at Nator. Letters issued 30 Dec. 1769–15 Sept. 1772. 1925.
Colebrooke, Sir J. E. Digest of the laws and regulations. 1807.
Francis, P. Original minutes of the Governor-General and Council of Fort William on the settlement and collection of the revenues of Bengal. 1782.
Halhed, Nathaniel Brassey. A code of Gentoo laws. 1781.
Harrington. Analysis of the Bengal Regulations. 3 vols. 1805.
Long, J. Selections from the unpublished records of Government, 1748–67. Calcutta, 1869.
Proceedings of the Governor and Council of Fort William respecting the administration of justice amongst the natives in Bengal. 4to. 1774.
Smyth, D. C. Original Bengalese Zumindaree Accounts. Calcutta, 1823.

Contemporary Publications

Amir Haidar Bilgrami. Dissertation concerning the revenues. Persian text, and trans. by F. Gladwin. 1796.
Bolts, William. Considerations on Indian affairs. 3 vols. 1772–5.
Plan for the Government of the Provinces of Bengal, addressed to the Directors of the E.I.C. 1772.
Scrafton, L. Observations on Mr. Vansittart's Narrative. n.d.
Vansittart, H. Narrative of the transactions in Bengal. 3 vols. London, 1766.
Verelst, H. View of the rise...of the English Government in Bengal. 1772.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

Ascoli, F. D. Early revenue history of Bengal and the fifth report. 1917.
Baden-Powell, B. H. Land-systems of British India. 3 vols. 1892.
Cotton, Henry. Memorandum on the revenue history of Chittagong. 1880.
Firminger, Rev. W. K. Introduction to his edition of the fifth report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons. 3 vols. Calcutta, 1917.
Gleig, G. R. Memoirs of Warren Hastings. 3 vols. 1841.

RAMSBOTHAM, R. B. Studies in the Land Revenue History of Bengal 1769–1787. 1926.
RAY, S. C. Land revenue administration in India.
THOMPSON, W. H. Final settlement of Tippera and Noakhali. Calcutta, 1922.
WILSON, H. H. Glossary of judicial and revenue terms. 1855.
Zemindary Settlement of Bengal. 2 vols. Calcutta, 1879.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE BENGAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, 1786–1818

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

India Office Records. Despatches to Bengal, vols. 15–94. (Index: vols. 3–10.) Letters received from Bengal, vols. 25–91. Home Miscellaneous Series, especially volumes 359, 372, 380–4. Bengal, Revenue Consultations, *passim.* Bengal, Judicial Consultations, *passim.*
Public Record Office. Cornwallis Correspondence, bundles 8–59. Chatham Papers, bundles 125, 362.

PRINTED DOCUMENTS

Bengal, Fort St George and Bombay Regulations 1813 to 1824.
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COLEBROOKE, Sir J. E. Digest of the Regulations...of...Bengal. 3 vols. Calcutta, 1807.
Fifth Report...1812. Parl. Papers 1812. VII, 1. (Ed. by W. K. Firminger. 3 vols. Calcutta, 1917.)
HARRINGTON, J. H. Analysis of the Bengal Regulations. 3 vols. 1805.
Minutes of evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company. Vol. III, Revenue. Parl. Papers 1831–2. XI, 1. Vol. IV, Judicial. Parl. Papers 1831–2. XII, 1.
Papers relating to the administration of justice in Bengal. Parl. Papers 1819. XIII, 479.
Regulations for Bengal, Behar and Orissa, 1793–1794. 1795.
Ross, C. Correspondence of...Marquess Cornwallis. 3 vols. London, 1859.
Second Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company. 1810. Parl. Papers 1810. V, 13.
Selection of Papers from the records at the East India House. 4 vols. London, 1820–6.
Wellesley Despatches. 5 vols. 1836.

CONTEMPORARY PUBLICATIONS

[GALLOWAY, Sir ARCHIBALD.] Observations on the law and constitution of India, on the nature of landed tenures, and on the system of revenue and finance, as established by the Moohummadan law and Moghul government, with an enquiry into the revenue and judicial administration and regulations of police at present existing in Bengal. 1825.
[GREVILLE, J.] British India analyzed. 3 vols. 1795.
History of the Adawlat System in Bengal. 1820.
ROUSE-BOUGHTON, C. W. Dissertation concerning the landed property of Bengal. 1791.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

ASCOLI, F. D. Early revenue history of Bengal and the fifth report. 1917.
ASPINALL, A. The administrative and judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis in Bengal. (An unpublished thesis.)
BADEN-POWELL, B. H. Land systems of British India. 3 vols. 1892.
BRADLEY-BIRT, F. B. Sylhet Thackeray. 1911.
HUNTER, Sir WILLIAM WILSON. Bengal MS Records...letters in the Board of Revenue, Calcutta, 1782–1807. 4 vols. 1894.
—— Annals of rural Bengal. 1897.
KAYE, Sir J. W. Administration of the East India Company. 1853.
MINTO, Lady. Lord Minto in India. 1880.
MORRIS, HENRY. Life of Charles Grant. 1904.
PRINSEP, H. T. Political and military transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings. 2 vols. 1825.
RAY, S. C. Land revenue administration in India.
TEIGNMOUTH, Lord. Memoirs of Lord Teignmouth. 2 vols. 1843.
—— Memoirs of the life, writings and correspondence of Sir William Jones. 2 vols. 1835.
TWINING, THOMAS. Travels in India a hundred years ago. 1893.
WALPOLE, Sir S. History of England. Vol. VI. 1898.
WILSON, H. H. Glossary of judicial and revenue terms. 1855.
Zemindary Settlement of Bengal. 2 vols. Calcutta, 1879.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE TO 1818

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

The main sources of information are the Revenue Consultations of the Madras Council from 1774; the records of the Board of Assigned Revenue 1781–85; and the records of the Board of Revenue from 1786. See Foster, *Guide*, pp. 76–7, and the *Madras Catalogue of records in the Revenue Department*. Copies of the judicial and revenue minutes of Sir Thomas Munro are at the British Museum (Add. MSS, 22077–9). For the records of the Nawab of the Carnatic see p. 635 *supra*.

PRINTED DOCUMENTS

ARBUTHNOT, Sir A. J. Sir Thomas Munro: selections from his minutes. 2nd ed. Madras, 1886.
Baramahal Records. 7 vols. Fo. Madras, 1907–20.
Fifth Report...1812. Parl. Papers, 1812, vol. VII. (Ed. by W. K. Firminger. 3 vols. Calcutta, 1917.)
General Reports of the Madras Board of Revenue. (Printed for official use but not published.)
HUDDLESTONE. Papers on mirassi tenures.
IRWIN, EYLES. A collection of letters chiefly between the Madras Government and Eyles Irwin, 1781–85. Madras, 1888.
Minutes of evidence taken before the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company. Parl. Papers, 1831–2, XI–XII (especially the evidence of A. D. Campbell and Hodgson).
Mysorean Revenue Regulations. 1792.

Papers relating to the village panchayat and other judicial systems of administration. Fo. Madras, 1916.
Poligar Peshkash. Parl. Papers, 1808, XIII.
RAMASAWMY NAIDOO, B. Memoir on the internal revenue system of the Madras Presidency. (Selection from the records of the South Arcot district.) Cuddalore, 1870.
Regulations of the Presidency of Fort St George.
Reports of the Committee of Circuit (printed for official use but not published).
Second Report from the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company. 1810. Parl. Papers, 1810, v.
Selection of papers from the records at the India House. 4 vols. 1820-6.

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BUCHANAN, F. Journey through Mysore and southern India. 3 vols. 1807.
DU BOIS, Abbé. Hindu manners and customs. 1816. (Reprinted 1897, etc.)
FULLARTON, Col. View of the British interests in southern India. 1787.
HEYNE, BENJAMIN. Tracts, historical and statistical, on India; with journals of several tours through various parts of the peninsula. 1814.
SULIVAN, JOHN. Observations respecting the Circar of Masulipatam. Sm. 4to. 1780.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

BADEN-POWELL, B. H. Land systems of British India. 3 vols. 1892.
BRADSHAW, JOHN. Sir Thomas Munro. Oxford, 1906.
BRIGGS, Gen. JOHN. Land-tax in India. 1830.
District Gazetteers of the Madras Presidency. 25 vols. Madras.
GLEIG, G. R. Life and correspondence of Sir Thomas Munro. 3 vols. 1830.
PEARSON, HUGH. Memoirs of the life and correspondence of Christian Frederick Swartz. 2 vols. 1834.
RAY, S. C. Land revenue administration in India.
SRINIVASA RAGHAVA AIYANGAR. Forty years' progress of the Presidency of Madras. Madras, 1892.
SUNDARARAJA AIYANGAR, S. Land tenures in the Madras Presidency. Madras, 1916.
WILKS, MARK. Historical sketches of the south of India. 3 vols. 1810-17.
WILSON, H. H. Glossary of judicial and revenue terms. 1855.

CHAPTER XXVIII

AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

The chief authorities are the Political Proceedings of the Government of India, at the India Office and the Imperial Record Office, and the Foreign Office series *Russia* and *Persia*, at the Public Record Office. Of these the Government of India papers are not, while the Foreign Office papers are, generally, accessible to the student. Besides these there are three private collections of great importance:

(1) The Ellenborough Papers at the Record Office. This vast mass of documents has now been arranged as follows: Files 1-36 miscellaneous loose letters and papers; files 37-69, letters to Lord Ellenborough from April, 1841, to July, 1844, from various men of note such as the Prince Consort, the Duke of Wellington, Sir

Robert Peel, and the various higher officials in India, *e.g.* Sir C. Napier, Major-General Pollock, Major-General Nott, the Commander-in-Chief, and Major Sleeman; files 70–73, miscellaneous papers, civil, European, military, political; files 74–106, letters from Lord Ellenborough to various important Indian officials and to the Secret Committee and Court of Directors; files 107–110, miscellaneous letters, civil, European, military and political. Some of these letters have been printed, others have not.

(2) The Broughton Papers at the British Museum. This collection of the correspondence and papers of John Cam Hobhouse, first Baron Broughton, fills 29 volumes, and was bequeathed to the British Museum at his death in 1869 with the condition that it was to be sealed up till the year 1900. It forms Add. MSS 36455–83. The important volumes are 36467–72, his general correspondence relating to the time when he was at the Board of Control; 36473–4, April, 1835–May, 1841, correspondence with Lord Heytesbury and then mainly with Lord Auckland. There are enclosures relating to Central Asia, Afghanistan.

(3) The Auckland Papers at the British Museum. This collection of thirty volumes of letters, books, and minute books forms Add. MSS 37689–718. Of these numbers 37689–707 consist of confidential letters to various eminent men; they run from 13 March, 1836 to 16 February, 1842. At folio 174 in 37707 is a letter (a little out of its right date) from Lord Auckland to Lord Ellenborough giving an account of recent events in Afghanistan. 37708 contains copies of a few letters from Lord Auckland to Sir Charles Metcalfe and others running from 24 September, 1836, to 3 April, 1837. 37709–13. Five volumes of minutes and memoranda by Lord Auckland, from 11 April, 1836, to 30 December, 1840.

Printed Documents

Afghan War. Parl. Papers, 1839, XL, 29, 139, 159, 207, 217, 241, 269, 317; L, 89; 1840, XXXVII, 137; 1842, XLV, 125; 1843, XXXVII, 1, 3, 13, 17; 1859 (Session 2), XXV, 7 (Burnes's correspondence).
COLCHESTER, Lord. Indian administration of Lord Ellenborough. 1874.
LAW, Sir ALGERNON. India under Lord Ellenborough. 1926.

Contemporary Publications

ABBOT, Capt. J. Journey from Heraut to Khiva, Moscow and St. Petersburg. 2 vols. 1843. 3rd ed. 1884.
ATKINSON, JAMES. Expedition into Afghanistan 1839–40. 1842.
—— Sketches in Afghanistan. Fol. 1842.
BARR, Lieut. WILLIAM. Journal of a march from Delhi to...Cabul with the mission of Sir C. M. Wade. 1844.
Bengal Civilian. Lord Auckland and Lord Ellenborough. 1845.
Bengal Officer. Recollections of the first campaign west of the Indus. 1845.
BRYDGES, Sir HARFORD JONES. Account of H.M.'s mission to the Court of Persia in the years 1807–11. 1834.
BUIST, GEORGE. Outline of the operations of the British troops in Scinde and Afghanistan 1838–41. Bombay, 1843.
BURNES, ALEXANDER. Travels into Bokhara, etc. 3 vols. 1834.
—— Cabool: being a personal narrative. 1842.
CONOLLY, ARTHUR. Journey to the north of India overland from England. 2 vols. 1834.
CUMMING, Lieutenant JAMES SLATOR. (H.M.'s 9th.) Six years' diary. 1847.
Defence of Jellalabad...Drawn on stone by W. L. Walton. Fol. 1846.
DENNIE, WILLIAM H. Personal narrative of the campaigns in Affghanistan. Dublin, 1843.
ELPHINSTONE, MOUNTSTUART. Account of the kingdom of Caboul. 4to. 1815.
Étude diplomatique sur la guerre de Crimée. 1878.
EVANS, Lt.-Col. DE LACY. The designs of Russia. 1828.
—— On the practicability of an invasion of British India. 1829.

EYRE, Sir VINCENT. Military operations at Cabul, in January 1842. 1843. Ed. by G. B. M(alleson). 1879, under title "The Kabul Insurrection".
—— A retrospect of the Affghan War. 1869.
FANE, Col. H. E. Five years in India. 2 vols. 1842.
FERRIER, J. P. Caravan journeys...in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan, and Beloochistan. Translated by Captain W. Jesse. 1856.
FORSTER, GEORGE. Journey from Bengal to England through the northern part of India, Kashmire, Afghanistan, and Persia. 2 vols. 1798.
GLEIG, G. R. Operations of Sale's brigade. 1846.
GREENWOOD, J. Narrative of the late victorious campaign in Afghanistan under General Pollock. 1844.
GRIFFITH, W. Journals of travels. 1847.
GROVER, Captain. The Bokhara victims. 1845.
HALL, J. H. W. Scenes in a soldier's life (1839–43). 1848.
HARLAN, J. A memoir of India and Avghanistaun, with observations on the present exciting and critical state and future prospects of those countries. Philadelphia, 1842.
HAVELOCK, Capt. HENRY. Narrative of the war in Affghanistan in 1838–39. 2 vols. 1840.
[HOLDSWORTH, T. W. E.] The campaign of the Indus. 1840.
HOLME, F. Anglo-Indian policy during and since the Afghan War. Edinburgh, 1845.
HOUGH, Major W. Narrative of the march and operations of the Army of the Indus...1838–9. 1841.
India, Great Britain and Russia. 1838.
KENNEDY, R. H. Narrative of the campaign of the army of the Indus. 2 vols. 1840.
LAWRENCE, Sir GEORGE. Forty-three years in India. 1874.
Letters on recent events in India. 1842.
LOGIN, Dr J. S. Facts relating to Herat.
MACGREGOR, C. Report on the causes of the Caubul outbreak.
MALCOLM, Sir JOHN. Sketches of Persia. 1845.
MASSON, CHARLES. Narrative of a journey to Kalat. 1843.
—— Narrative of various journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan and the Punjab. 3 vols. 1842.
MEYENDORFF, Baron G. DE. Voyage d'Orembourg à Boukhara, 1820. 1826.
Military service and adventure in the far East. 1847.
MOHAN LAL. Travels in the Panjab, Afghanistan, etc. 1846.
—— Life of Dost Mahomed. 2 vols. 1846.
MOSLEY, J. Russia in the right. 1853.
Narrative of the recent war in Affghanistan. By an officer in the H.E.I.C.'s service. 1842.
NASH, C. History of the war in Afghanistan. 1843.
NEILL, J. M. B. Recollections of four years' service in the East. 1845.
OUTRAM, Capt. JAMES. Rough notes of the campaign in Sinde and Afghanistan 1838–39. 1840.
PRICE, WILLIAM. Journal of the British embassy to Persia. 2 vols. Sm. oblong Fol. 1825.
Report of the East India Committee of the Colonial Society on the causes and consequences of the Affghan War. 1842.
Royal Engineer Papers. Vols. IV and VI.
SALE, Lady. Journal of the disasters in Afghanistan. 1843.
SHAHAMAT 'ALI. Picturesque sketches in India, with notices of the adjacent countries of Sindh, Multan, and the West of India. n.d.
STACY, L. R. Narrative...whilst in the Brahoe campaign. Serampore, 1844.
—— Narrative of services...in the years 1840, 1841, and 1842. 1848.
STOCQUELER, J. H. Memorials of Affghanistan. 1842.
URQUHART, DAVID. Exposition of transactions in Central Asia through which the independence of states and the affections of people, barriers to the British possessions in India, have been sacrificed to Russia by...Palmerston.... 1840.

VIGNE, G. T. A personal Narrative of a visit to Ghuzni, Kabul, and Afghanistan, and of a residence at the Court of Dost Mohamad. 1840.
WOLFF, Rev. JOSEPH. Narrative of a mission to Bokhara. 2 vols. 1845.

Note. Much information is contained in contemporary periodicals, *e.g.* the *Quarterly Review* (especially vols. 64, 78), the *Edinburgh Review*, *Blackwood's Magazine*, the *Revue des deux Mondes* (1840–3), the *Asiatic Journal*, the *Calcutta Review*, and the *Calcutta Monthly Journal*.

B. SECONDARY WORKS

For general works see the list at p. 624 *supra*.

BELLEW, H. W. Afghanistan and the Afghans. 1879.
—— The races of Afghanistan. 1880.
BROADFOOT, Major W. Career of Major George Broadfoot in Afghanistan and the Panjab. 1888.
BROUGHTON, Lord. Recollections of a long life. 6 vols. 1909–11.
BURNES, JAMES. Notes on his name and family (including a memoir of Sir Alexander Burnes). Edinburgh, 1851.
COLVIN, Sir AUCKLAND. John Russell Colvin. 1895.
CURZON, Lord. Russia in Central Asia in 1889. 1889.
DAVIS, H. W. C. The Great Game in Asia—1800–1844. [1927.]
DURAND, Sir H. MARION. The first Afghan War and its causes. 2 vols. 1879.
DURAND, H. M. Life of Major-Gen. Sir Henry Marion Durand. 2 vols. 1883.
EDWARDES, Sir H. B. and MERIVALE, HERMAN. Life of Sir Henry Lawrence. 2 vols. 1872.
FERRIER, J. P. History of the Afghans. Trans. by Captain W. Jesse. 1858.
FORREST, G. W. Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain. 1909.
GARDNER, ALEXANDER. Memoirs. Ed. by Col. Hugh Pearse. 1898.
GOLDSMID, Sir F. J. James Outram 1802–63. 2 vols. 1881.
GRIFFIN, Sir LEPEL. Ranjit Singh. 1911.
HELLWALD, F. VON. The Russians in Central Asia. Tr. by Wirgman. 1874.
HUME, J. Selections from the writings...of the late H. W. Torrens. 2 vols. Calcutta, 1853.
JOHNSON, Capt. "Diary." (*Blackwood's Magazine*, March, 1906.)
KAYE, JOHN WILLIAM. Memorials of Indian government. 1853.
—— Life and correspondence of Henry St. George Tucker. 1854.
—— Life and correspondence of Sir John Malcolm. 2 vols. 1856.
—— Lives of Indian officers. 2 vols. 1889.
—— History of the war in Afghanistan. 3 vols. 1878.
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CHAPTER XXIX

THE CONQUEST OF SIND

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS.

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CHAPTER XXIX

THE CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

MANUSCRIPT

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CHAPTER XXX

BURMA, 1782–1852

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

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CHAPTER XXXI

THE INDIAN STATES, 1818–57

A. ORIGINAL MATERIALS

Manuscript

The principal source of information—the proceedings of the Government of India—is not generally accessible. In some degree this is made good by the large number of Parliamentary Papers, see *Printed Documents, infra*; and a good deal of matter occurs in the Home Miscellaneous series, see Hill's *India Office Records, Home Miscellaneous Series, passim.*

The chief private collections in which information may be sought are those described at p. 643 *supra.*

1509	Albuquerque governor of India.
1510	Goa occupied.
1511	Malacca taken by Albuquerque.
1513	Albuquerque's attempt on Aden.
1515	Albuquerque establishes Portuguese suzerainty over Ormuz.
	Death of Albuquerque.
1516	Soares' attempt on Aden.
1518	Expedition to Ceylon.
1520	Diogo Lopes' expedition to the Red Sea.
1521	De Brito besieged in Colombo.
1524	Vasco da Gama dies at Cochin.
1529	Nuno da Cunha governor of India.
1530	Goa becomes the Portuguese headquarters.
1534	Bassein ceded to the Portuguese.
	The Portuguese permitted to build a fort at Diu.
1537	Bahadur Shah's quarrel with the Portuguese and death.
	See of Goa established.
1538	The Turkish squadron attacks Diu.
	Garcia de Noronha viceroy.
1540	Portuguese treaty with the Zamorin.
1541	Portuguese expedition to Suakin.
	Francis Xavier arrives in India.
1545	João de Castro viceroy.
1546	Second siege of Diu.
1548	Death of João de Castro.
1550	Affonso de Noronha viceroy.
1552	Francis Xavier dies.
1554	Pedro de Mascarenhas viceroy.
1555	Portuguese war in Ceylon.
1557	Goa made a metropolitan see.
1559	Daman occupied by the Portuguese.
1560	Goa made an archbishopric.
1562	Siege of Daman.
1564	Portuguese war in Malabar.
1569	Luiz d'Atayde reduces Honawar.
	Camoens returns from Goa to Lisbon.
1570	Defence of Chaul.
1571	Dom Antonio de Noronha viceroy.
1578	King Sebastian killed in Morocco.
1579	Linschoten reaches Goa.
1586	Portuguese war with Raja Sinha.
1590	Capture of the *Madre de Dios*.
1595	Houtman's voyage.
1600	Charter to the London East India Company.
1602	Formation of the United Dutch East India Company.
	Spilbergen in Ceylon.
1603	Mildenhall at Agra.
1605	Death of Akbar and accession of Jahangir.
1606	Dutch blockade of Goa.
1609	Hawkins at Agra.
	Dutch factory at Pulicat.
1611	Middleton at Surat.
1612	Best at Surat.
	Danish East India Company founded.
1615	Roe at the Moghul Court.
1616	The Danes at Tranquebar.
1619	Anglo-Dutch treaty.
1622	The Portuguese expelled from Ormuz.
1623	The massacre of Amboyna.

1625	Dutch factory at Chinsura.
1629	Death of Jahangir and accession of Shah Jahan.
1634	Farman permitting English trade in Bengal.
1635	Courteen's Association formed.
1638	Dutch attack Portuguese in Ceylon.
1639	Fort St George founded.
1644	Temporary peace between the Dutch and Portuguese in the East.
1651	English factory at Hugli founded.
1654	Treaty of Westminster.
1657–8	Moghul war of succession; Aurangzib emperor.
1660	Portuguese completely driven from Ceylon.
1661	Charles II's charter to the East India Company.
	Cession of Bombay to the English.
1663	Publication of peace between the Dutch and Portuguese.
1664	Sivaji plunders Surat.
	Colbert founds the Compagnie des Indes.
1665	Humphrey Cooke obtains possession of Bombay.
1667	Treaty of Breda.
1670	Sivaji again plunders Surat.
1671	La Haye's expedition.
1673	The French besieged in St Thomé.
1674	François Martin founds Pondichery.
1680	Dedication of St Mary's Church in Fort St George.
1683	Keigwin's mutiny at Bombay.
1686	English war with the Moghuls.
1688	Heath's expedition to Bengal.
1690	Calcutta founded.
1693	Death of Job Charnock.
	The Dutch capture Pondichery.
1698	Formation of the English East India Company.
1702	Amalgamation of the English and London East India Companies.
1707	Death of Aurangzib; accession of Bahadur Shah.
1712	Accession of Jahandar Shah.
1713	Accession of Farrukhsiyar.
1715	Surman's embassy to Farrukhsiyar.
1719	Murder of Farrukhsiyar.
	Accession of Muhammad Shah.
	Law's Company formed.
1720	Baji Rao I Peshwa.
1722	Ostend East India Company set up.
1726	Lenoir governor of Pondichery.
	Charter establishing courts of law at the English presidencies.
1731	Dupleix *directeur* of Chandernagore.
	The Swedish East India Company founded.
1735	Dumas governor of Pondichery.
1737	The Marathas occupy Salsette.
1739	Nadir Shah's invasion of India.
1740	The Marathas raid the Carnatic; Nawab Dost 'Ali killed.
1741	Chanda Sahib captured by the Marathas.
1742	Dupleix governor of Pondichery.
	Murder of Safdar 'Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic.
1743	Nizam-ul-mulk's expedition to the Carnatic.
1744	War of the Austrian Succession.
	Anwar-ud-din Nawab of the Carnatic.
1746	La Bourdonnais takes Madras.
1748	Boscawen besieges Pondichery.
	Death of Nizam-ul-mulk.
	Ahmad Khan Durani invades the Panjab.
	Accession of Ahmad Shah.

1749 Chanda Sahib with French aid defeats and kills Anwar-ud-din at Ambur.
Madras restored to the English.
1750 Defeat and death of Nasir Jang.
1751 Bussy establishes Salabat Jang as subahdar of the Deccan.
Clive's seizure and defence of Arcot.
1752 Chanda Sahib killed by the Tanjoreans and Law surrenders to the English.
1753 Cession of the Northern Sarkars to Bussy.
1754 Conference of Sadras.
Recall of Dupleix.
Accession of 'Alamgir II.
Truce between the French and the English.
1755 Clive returns to India.
1756 Capture of Gheria.
Bussy's defence of the Chahar Mahal.
Siraj-ud-daula captures Calcutta.
The Seven Years' War.
1757 Clive recovers Calcutta and takes Chandernagore.
The battle of Plassey.
Mir Ja'far Nawab of Bengal.
1758 Lally's expedition.
Capture of Fort St David.
Bussy recalled from the Deccan.
Lally besieges Madras.
1759 Forde captures Masulipatam.
'Ali Gauhar invades Bihar.
The Dutch expedition against the English in Bengal.
'Alamgir II murdered by Ghazi-ud-din.
1760 Battle of Wandiwash.
Clive returns to England.
'Ali Gauhar again in Bihar, and proclaims himself Shah 'Alam II.
The Marathas capture Delhi.
Mir Kasim made Nawab of Bengal.
1761 Battle of Panipat.
Capitulation of Pondichery.
Hyder 'Ali usurps Mysore.
Nizam 'Ali imprisons his brother Salabat Jang.
1763 War with Mir Kasim; re-establishment of Mir Ja'far.
Treaty of Paris.
1765 Clive returns to India and obtains a grant of the diwanni of Bengal.
1766 The Bengal officers' mutiny.
Nizam 'Ali grants the Northern Sarkars to the English.
1767–9 The first Mysore War.
1769 Appointment of Scrafton, Forde, and Vansittart as supervisors.
1770 Lindsay at Madras.
1771 Shah 'Alam leaves Allahabad for Delhi.
1772 Warren Hastings governor of Fort William.
Trial of Muhammad Reza Khan.
Madhava Rao Peshwa dies.
1773 The Regulating Act passed.
Taimur Shah succeeds to Ahmad Shah Durani.
Narayana Rao murdered.
1774 The Rohilla War.
Bogle's mission to Tibet.
The Regulating Act comes into force.
1775 The treaty of Surat.
The trial of Nandakumar.
1776 The treaty of Purandhar.
Lord Pigot arrested by a majority of the Madras Council.

1776	Death of Colonel Monson.
1777	General Clavering dies.
1778	Sir Thomas Rumbold governor of Madras.
	Renewed war with the Marathas.
	Capture of Pondichery.
1779	Convention of Wadgaon.
	Capture of Mahé.
	Goddard's expedition.
1780	Popham's capture of Gwalior.
	Duel between Hastings and Francis.
	Second Mysore War.
1781	Battle of Porto Novo.
	Lord Macartney governor of Madras.
	Chait Singh deposed.
	Treaty of Chunar with Asaf-ud-daula.
1782	The French fleet under Suffren arrives on the Coromandel Coast.
	The Treaty of Salbai.
	Death of Hyder 'Ali.
1783	Arrival of Bussy's expedition at Cuddalore.
	Death of Sir Eyre Coote.
	News of peace with the French.
	Fox's India Bills.
1784	Treaty of Mangalore.
	Pitt's India Act.
1785	Warren Hastings resigns.
1786	Lord Cornwallis governor-general.
1788	Hastings' trial begins.
	Ghulam Kadir seizes and blinds Shah 'Alam.
1789	Tipu attacks Travancore.
1790	Third Mysore War.
1793	The Company's Charter renewed.
	The Permanent Settlement of Bengal.
	Capture of Pondichery.
	Sir John Shore governor-general.
1794	Mahadaji Sindhia dies.
1795	The battle of Kharda.
	Expedition against the Dutch in Ceylon.
	Death of Muhammad 'Ali Walajah.
1796	Baji Rao II Peshwa.
1797	Zaman Shah at Lahore.
	Death of Asaf-ud-daula.
1798	Wazir 'Ali deposed and succeeded by Sa'adat 'Ali.
	Tipu's mission to Mauritius.
	Lord Mornington governor-general.
	Subsidiary treaty with Nizam 'Ali.
1799	Fourth Mysore War.
	Marshman at Serampore.
	Malcolm's mission to Persia.
1800	Death of Nana Phadnavis.
	The College of Fort William established.
1801	Baird's expedition to the Red Sea.
	The assumption of the Carnatic.
	Treaty with Sa'adat 'Ali.
1802	Symes's mission to Ava.
	Treaty of Bassein.
1803	War with Sindhia.
	Treaties of Deogaon and Surji Arjungaon.
1804	War with Holkar.
1805	Siege of Bhartpur.

1805	Lord Cornwallis supersedes Lord Wellesley and dies.
1807	Lord Minto governor-general.
1808	Missions to Persia, Lahore, Peshawur and Sind.
1810	Bourbon and Mauritius captured by the English.
1811	Java occupied by the English.
1813	The Company's charter renewed, but its monopoly of the trade to India abolished.
	Lord Moira (Hastings) governor-general.
1814	The Nepal War.
1817	The last Maratha War.
1818	Baji Rao II deposed.
1823	Lord Amherst governor-general.
1824	The first Burmese War.
	Dutch settlements in India transferred to the English.
1825	The voyage of the *Enterprise*.
	The second siege of Bhartpur.
1827	Daulat Rao Sindhia dies.
1828	Lord William Bentinck governor-general.
1829	Measures against thagi.
	Prohibition of sati.
1830	Mysore rebellion.
1832	Treaty for the free navigation of the Indus.
1833	The Company's charter renewed but its trade abolished.
1834	The annexation of Coorg.
	Macaulay appointed Law member of council.
	Province of Agra formed.
1836	Lord Auckland governor-general.
1837	Burnes's mission to Kabul.
	Siege of Herat.
1838	The Tripartite Treaty.
1839	Shah Shuja enthroned at Kandahar.
	Death of Ranjit Singh.
1840	Dost Muhammad surrenders.
1841	The revolt at Kabul; murders of Burnes and later of Macnaghten.
1842	Massacre of the Kabul brigade.
	Lord Ellenborough governor-general.
	Withdrawal from Afghanistan.
1843	Conquest of Sind.
	Battle of Maharajpur.
1844	Lord Ellenborough recalled; Sir Henry Hardinge governor-general.
1845	Danish settlements transferred to the English.
	First Sikh War.
1846	Battle of Sobraon and peace with the Sikhs.
1848	Lord Dalhousie governor-general.
	Annexation of Satara.
	Second Sikh War.
1849	Battle of Gujrat and annexation of the Panjab.
1852	Second Burmese War.
1853	Railway opened from Bombay to Thana.
	Cession of Berar.
	Annexation of Nagpur.
	The Company's charter renewed.
1854	The Ganges Canal opened.
1855	Treaty with Dost Muhammad.
1856	Annexation of Oudh.
	Lord Canning governor-general.
	War with Persia.
1857	The Sepoy Mutiny.
1858	Assumption of government of India by the crown.

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